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_________________________________________________________________________________

 ; .- Random Words -. +                                                         |

 *: [-] Introduction ............................................ The Clone    :*
 *: (-) Inspirational Music ..................................... The Clone    :* 
 *: (-) Contact Information ..................................... The Clone    :*
 *: (-) Link of the Quarter ..................................... The Clone    :*
 *: (-) K-1ine Magazine Mirrors ................................. The Clone    :*
 *: (-) Nettwerked Meetings ..................................... Nettwerked   :*
 *: (-) Nettwerked BBS .......................................... Nettwerked   :*
 *: (-) Nettwerked Stickers for Sale ............................ Nettwerked   :*
 *: (+) An e-mail from Steve Wozniak ............................ The Clone    :*
 *: [!] Honourable Mention; H1D30U5 for 780-958-XXXX ............ The Clone    :*
_________________________________________________________________________________

 ; .- Documents -. +                                                            |

*: (x) 'The Comprehensive Guide to AWAS' ........................ The Clone    :*
*: (x) 'Millennium Hardware Modification' ....................... H1D30U5      :*
*: (x) 'Alberta CLLI's and other stuff' ......................... Tr00per      :*
*: (x) 'Telus Physical Key Systems; an internal memo' ........... A.P.H.       :*
*: (x) 'Disabling Deep Freeze' .................................. Aftermath    :*
*: (x) 'No Sleep Magazine Interviews The Clone' ................. Jackel       :*
*: (x) 'Internet Psychology' .................................... Aestetix     :*
*: (x) 'Why AI is Possible' ..................................... Aestetix     :*
*: (x) 'Number Systems' ......................................... Ice          :*
*: (x) 'Cheap And Effective WireTapping' ........................ Jackel       :*
*: (x) 'Crafting Symlinks for Fun and Profit' ................... Shaun2k2     :*
*: (x) 'Phun with the Audiovox 8900 and Telus Mobility' ......... TeK-g        :*
*: (x) 'MORE CODES FOR AUDIOVOX 8900' ........................... TeK-g        :*
*: (x) 'The Codec War: Operation Zipem' ......................... Jedkiwi      :*
_________________________________________________________________________________

; .- K-1ine News -. +                                                           |

*: (x) Nettwerked Lays off 4500 from Red Deer factory ........... Wizbone      :*
*: (x) New York City E911 Crashes (no fault of my own!) ......... Nyxojaele    :*
_________________________________________________________________________________

 ; .- Conclusion -. +                                                           |

 *: [-] Credits ................................................. The Clone    :*
 *: [-] Shouts .................................................. The Clone    :*
_________________________________________________________________________________



 [ Introduction ]


Welcome to the Spring season issue of K-1ine #43! Boy do you ever have a bunch of
great articles lined up for you kids this time 'round. Everything from artificial
intelligence to phreaking Telus (as per usual), to interviews, to CDMA phreaking.

Again, thank you to Cyb0rg/asm for his wicked ASCII art, and thanks to everyone
who contributed their time and full fledged effort to help make this one of the
best releases in the (nearly) 5 years of K-1ine history. It's beautiful to see
this kind of dedication to something that was created as a simple hobby when I
was but a wee lad in the 20th century in good ol' nineteen hundred and ninety nine.

Lets get this rolling. Here we go with the latest installment of K-1ine goodness...

... *splooge* ...




--->



This issue of K-1ine was inspired by the song:

'Black Steel' by Tricky



--



Contact Information;
 
|*> Comments/Questions/Submissions: theclone@hackcanada.com

|*> Check out my site: (Nettwerked) http://www.nettwerked.net

|*> Check out the Web-forum: http://nettwerked.mg2.org/phpBB2/


--


--=[ LINK OF THE QUARTER ]=--

 Every quarter I post one really great "link of the quarter" on each issue
 of K-1ine magazine. The link can be anything in the technology industry,
 music scene, rave scene, punk scene, or even a good article you read on
 a news site. I'll be taking submissions via e-mail or IRC right away; so
 get your links in and maybe you'll see it in the next issue of K-1ine!

  For the Spring, the link of the quarter is:

  http://www.bahga.com/gallery/bell_canada

  Bell Canada images within the Central Office. Need I say more? :-)

  [submitted by: The Clone]



 -->



 	  K-1ine Magazine Mirrors:


 http://www.mirrors.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/k1ine/

  (Now mirrored in two places, one in Belgium and another in Sydney)

 "Wiretapped.net is an archive of open source software, informational
 textfiles and radio/conference broadcasts covering the areas of network
 and information security, network operations, host integrity, cryptography
 and privacy, among others. We believe we are now the largest archive of
 this type of software & information, hosting in excess of 20 gigabytes of
 information mirrored from around the world."

 --
 
 http://www.hackcanada.com/canadian/zines/index.html#K-1ine

 Hack Canada - Canadian H/P - E-Zines

 --

 http://www.bawks.net/geek/k-1ine/

 Bawks.net - Wizbone's web-site.

 --

 http://archive.undergroundnews.com/index.php?&direction=0&order=&directory=Zines/K-1ine

 Undergroundnews.com - Gizmo's web-site


--->



    [ Nettwerked Meetings ]


 As promised in the last issue of K-1ine, Nettwerked Meetings are now a reality,
 and so far have been highly successful in turnout and measurement of the fun
 factor. So far we've had meetings in January, February, and March.


 For all three meetings we have had an amazing turn out. January brought us about
 20 people, February brought us 24, and March brought us an ass kicking 25 people!


 We have contests, prizes, and great conversation. Best of all, the food at Boston
 Pizza is simply awesome! If you live in the Edmonton Alberta area, or are planning
 on visiting the Edmonton area on the last Friday of the month, be sure and stop
 by a Nettwerked Meeting. You'll be happy you did.

 For more information visit: http://www.nettwerked.net/meetings/


 --->




 
  	 	     [ Nettwerked BBS ]

  	 	On Tuesday, February 17th, 2004

	         The Nettwerked BBS was born...


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              """""                             "$$$"   Gilo95'


	         << N E T T W E R K E D . N E T >>


		   telnet://nettwerked.bawks.net

			  STATUS: ONLINE

  Please direct all login / BBS problems to: theclone@hackcanada.com.



  --->




              [  Nettwerked Stickers for Sale  ]

 Nettwerked Stickers here. 3 for $5.00 (CDN). Credit Card, Money Order,
 and Cheque Accepted. Nexus XI & Paypal Processing available. Buy your-
 self into our bad ass rebel world, silly wankers!

 SIZE: 1 X 3. High quality, Glossy Stickers. Nettwerked web-site address:
 "WWW.NETTWERKED.NET", with Nettwerked's official witty slogan below:
 "Fuck the system? Nah, you might catch something." Indeed.

 GET THEM NOW: http://www.nettwerked.net/store/stickers/



  --->



  [ An e-mail from Steve Wozniak ]
 

I hope this makes your guys' day. I know it made mine. I e-mailed Steve Wozniak
congratulating him on Apple Macintosh's 20th anniversary, and thanking him for
the contributions he made to the phreak scene and he replied and offered me an
interesting caller ID spoofer (requires payment) that a friend of his runs!

I figured an e-mail from Steve Wozniak, the inventor of the first computer
for regular people and the designer of the first electronics blue box. Here's
to you Mr.Wozniak... you changed the world of phreaking and hacking forever!



At 4:23 AM -0700 1/24/04, Steve Wozniak wrote:

Thanks. 

Cool that there are still active phone phreaks. 

One of my friends set up a [billing] caller ID spoofer - 1-800-658-6716. He also has
access to a lot of line test/disable capabilities. That's all I know of modern phone
phreaking though. 

--

Regards, 

Steve (is tv wake zone?) 


At 2:28 AM -0700 1/24/04, The Clone wrote: 

"On January 24th Apple will introduce Macintosh. And you'll see why 1984 won't be like
'1984'". That was 20 years ago today. Congratulations, Steve. You made it happen. You
are my personal hero. Thank you for everything you have done. From the personal computer
for regular people to the blue box which you helped develop. As an active phone phreak
and computer nut, I wanted to just show my appreciation.


  -->


	       [Honourable Mention; H1D30U5 for 780-958-XXXX]


  H1D30U5 was too lazy to give me his 780-958-XXXX hand scan, simply because he found
  absolutely nothing. Zero. Ziltch. Why? The answer is easy; Telus blocks any non-CO
  calls to that prefix from any non-test system, such as a residential phone line.

  Bummer.

  Still, great job on the hand scan. At least now we know it's not possible to find
  anything unless you're calling from within a central office.  *evil thoughts*...

  - The Clone




  -->



<theclone> goodman2 you're hetero aren't you
<goodman2> Thank you very much for calling me that!
<theclone> Admit it! you are
<theclone> Are you or are you not?
<goodman2> i dont wanna argue like a kid
<theclone> Are you a heterosexual?
<theclone> Please yes or no
<theclone> If you tell me I'll stop bugging
<goodman2> NO,if that's what you're asking
<theclone> HAHAAHAHAHAAH
<theclone> So what, you're gay then?
<goodman2> :(

 -->

  


	 	    	  [>   The Comprehensive Guide to AWAS   <]



			"No amount of effort and intellect is being
			withheld in the drive to augment your overall
			       experience as a valued customer."

		 	     - Darren Entwistle, Telus Corporation.

				 We  beg  to  differ,  spanky. 



   * Author: The Clone
   * Written: Sunday March 28, 2004

   * Web-site: http://www.nettwerked.net
   * Contact:  theclone@hackcanada.com

   * Credits: Tr00per. Thanks for your enormous contribution of information.
	      Nyxojaele for the additional documentation you found.

   * Shouts: Hack Canada, Nettwerked, K-1ine 'zine, GHU.CA, 2600 magazine.
	     Also to H1d30u5 and Kankraka for inspiring me to get off my ass
	     and actually get this guide finished for public release. heh.


   Disclaimer > This information was aquired through legal means. Please do
	        not use the information contained in this file for illegal
	        purposes. You are completely responsible for what you do.

     Notes > The Comprehensive Guide to AWAS is one of the most fascinating
	     western telecommunications systems that I have had the sincere
	     pleasure of studying and learning about. This entire document will
             give you insight into the Automated Work Administration System, a
             system used by two of the largest telecom carriers in North America;
             Telus and Verizon. This document however, will focus mainly on Telus'
             implementation of AWAS rather than the original AWAS system that was
             first created and used by GTE (now Verizon) in the early to mid 1990's.
  ->

	
      ----------------------
      The Table of Contents:
      ----------------------

   * An Introduction to AWAS

   * eNetwork Wireless Gateway

   * AWAS Identification ID's

   * AWAS Driver Codes

   * AWAS Clearing Codes

   * SAP Region Codes

   * Terminal Equipment Codes

   * Attendance / Absence Codes

   * Premiums / Hourly Differentials

   * SAP Internal Orders and AWAS

   * Network Functional Locations

   * AWAS Related Telephone #'s

   * Online AWAS Resources

   * Conclusion to Document

  <->



  [> An Introduction to AWAS <]


  AWAS which stands for 'Automated Work Administration System' is an efficient, low maintenance,
  customer billing, employee performance monitoring, trouble ticket tracking and creation system
  utilized by every field-technician within Telus Communications. AWAS includes subsiduary companies,
  independent entities within the company (Telus Mobility), as well as outside 3rd party contractors.

  AWAS was adopted by Telus in the late 1990's and fully implemented on August 18 1999 through
  an industry shaking a merger with BC TEL after it experienced some major billing problems with
  its existing 6099 customer billing processing system. The 6099 customer billing processing system
  was used by service technicians both on the landline and wireless side of the Telus corporate
  spectrum. 6099's customer billing process handled all billable activities, including remote admin-
  istration of business, government, and residential telephone / data lines, service tickets, etc.

  Several problems soon began with the use of AWAS's dial up by Telus field-technicians. With dial-up
  AWAS, service technicians found the system to be slow, inconvenient and unreliable, and generally
  not up to the standard that they required to do their important jobs with the utmost efficiency.

  At the completion of each job, field technicians would dial into the dispatch system and listen to
  details on next job and bulletin announcements. A problem encountered was the inconvenience of
  finding a POTS phone line and then the added inconvenience of having to get through to dispatch.
  A lot of their time was spent on locating a landline and accessing the Telus dispatch system.

  To add to the problem, "dial up AWAS" did not even give Telus field-technicians access to the
  company's remote intranet, meaning they wouldn't have the added convenience of getting company
  memos in real-time, or be able to learn about the CEO's latest hooker n coke party for executive
  staff until the news and gossip was considered "old". Think about how something like this could
  affect the self-esteem and morale of an employee! Telus just didn't seem to care one little bit.

  It got so bad that dial-up AWAS brought in a lot of unfortunate built-in delays such as the re-
  assignment of technicians' schedules to handle changing customers, workload requirements, and
  updates on possible network problems that could affect the field-technician's job for the day.

  And another thing that lacked with Telus' dial-up version of AWAS; its security. According to
  a case study on Telus' AWAS by IBM (see: 'Online AWAS Resources' section for the url), any
  technician at Telus had the ability to tap on to work orders of co-workers and modify them
  because old AWAS lacked strict authentication. You basically logged onto the network using
  the same Username and Password as everyone else. Talk about a pain in the big proverbial ass!

  Something needed to be done, and quick!

  Soon the power that be, IBM, stepped up to help out poor Telus. With IBM's half-a century strangle
  hold on business/government/consumers, convinced Telus that they could help resolve the problems
  associated with the Automated Work Administration System. But how? The answer was; better data
  management, faster and more reliable backend servers, and the most innovative approach; wireless.

  Through the efforts of IBM and business partner GE Capital IT Solutions, 'eNetwork Wireless Gateway',
  'eNetwork Wireless Software' became the world's first wireless deployment of GTE's AWAS application.

  eNetwork Wireless hasn't replaced the dial-up side to AWAS (see phone number list at the end of this
  document) completely, however it has been adopted as the best way to use Telus' field tech system.
  
  Read below for some specifics on eNetwork Wireless Gateway.


  ->



  [> IBM's eNetwork Wireless Gateway <]


  Definition:

  "The IBM eNetwork Wireless family of middleware products extends the reach of the network by providing
   mobile users secure access to existing IP-based applications over wireless and dial-up networks, with-
   out complex reprogramming. This software can reduce the cost, complexity and time required to deploy
   mobile computing solutions. These products continue to deliver on the IBM eNetwork Software promise of
   providing customers with access anytime, anywhere to their mission critical information, whether host
   or Web based."


   Hardware: IBM Thinkpad 380 laptops, later upgraded to the 'Itronix' ruggedized laptop featuring a
	     Sierra Wireless GPS module (MP200/210 CDPD GPS). The AWAS server backbone: IBM RS/6000.
 

   Software: 'IBM eNetwork Wireless Gateway' middleware for AIX (Operating System), controlling the IBM
	      eNetwork Web Express used by Telus employees for road to office wireless communication.
	      The SB 220 software by Sierra Wireless offers multi-mode access - wireline, Circuit-Switched
	      Cellular (CSC) and Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD). CZT Gateway for dial up AWAS access.


   Application: Wireless Access for Telus Field Technicians.


   Depending on the jobs required, the Sierra SB 200 modem allows the Telus technician to select any of the
   three options (wireline, Circuit-Switch Cellular and Cellular Digital Packet Data) for wireless data tran-
   smissions to the Telus Intranet / Dispatch Centre. The main advantage is the convenience of contacting the
   dispatch system to download information on new jobs and file completed assignments - all wirelessly without
   the need of a landline. A typical situation now occurs when a Telus employee completes the order and time-
   sheet on the laptop with the built-in Sierra modem, sends wirelessly through the selected cellular network, 
   downloads the job completion information to the host system, which then sends the next job back to their
   wireless laptop.

   Ultimately, this convenience has given the staff more time to spend with their customers. Telus also accesses
   the database for information services, like inventory, customer records and purchase order status. The field
   technicians now have the added ability of giving customers pricing information on telephone rates, monthly
   billings and schedules for service.

   --


   Configuring Itronix Laptop for AWAS Access:


 1. Add Sierra 220 wireline modem. Go to start, control panel, modems, add, install new modem,
    other, select 'don't detect', find Sierra Wireless under manufacturer, find Sierra wireless
    sb220wireline, next select com1, next. Windows will install modem. Finish.


 2. Drag icons from shortcut bar and rename with 1,2, and 3 after name.


 3. Set address for temp server for training. Open Daswin 2, open gateway 3, login as admin,
    password [8 digit #. Stupidly obvious. Take a guess]. select OK, cancel out of employee data,
    go to admin, change host name from *.edtel.ab.ca (or host of your city) over to the *.agt.ab.ca
    address and then 'Exit Gateway'.


 4. Open client 1 and log in via cdpd modem with passwords.


 5. To add default number 423-**** (Scan for it, you lazy bloke) under Gateway. Open Daswin 2, open
    Gateway 3, login as admin, password [8 digit #. Stupidly obvious. Take a guess], select OK, enter
    student's clearing number (see 'AWAS Clearing Codes' section) enter company AGT, enter dac as cal,
    press add, close. Sign off as ADMIN and then connect to Gateway as yourself. It will bring up a box
    with student ID, select, it will ask for new password three times, enter test12, then it comes to
    connect to gateway screen - place cursor in telephone number box and enter [LOCAL EDMONTON #], tab
    to description, enter DEFAULT NUMBER. Click add. DO NOT CONNECT AT THIS POINT!

  6. Change windows desktop theme to Window Default.

  7. Check that CPDP IP address is 172.29.*.*.

  8. Check dial-up number is [TOLL FREE # NOT LISTED IN THIS FILE]

  9. Secure ID number [TOLL FREE # NOT LISTED IN THIS FILE]

 10. Set address for active server for training. Open Daswin 2, open Gateway 3, login as yourself,
     select OK, cancel out of employee data, go to admin, change host name from *.ent.agt.ab.ca
     to *.edtel.ab.ca as last thing you do before ending course.

 11. To set up on Outlook go to control panel, mail and fax, show profiles, add, select manually configure,
     select next, type in your username as in abriggs1, select next, select services, select add, select
     exchange server, input exchange2 in exchange server box, input your actual name in mailbox. Select
     check name - if it underlines, you are successful. It may ask you for a username as in abriggs1, a
     domain which is telus, and a password which will be your current outlook password. It will also
     update the server to correct exchange server. You must be online via CDPD or wireline modem
     preferably wireline to perform this.


  -->

  Gaining access to AWAS through the field laptops, and connecting to the AWAS network using
  the CZT Gateway to connect to the dial up AWAS and/or the AWAS (IBM Corp) e-wireless gateway:



 1. Logging into AWAS.


  [General Login Instructions]


 To add new ID to account:


 1. Get to the AWAS sign on screen (on field laptop).

 2. Sign on with AWAS Clearing Number of ADMIN.

 3. Password is [8 digit #. Stupidly obvious. Take a guess].

 (If you go to the Employee Date screen that indicates clearing number go to point 11)

 4. On the "Your Password Has Expired" Message Box press space bar or click OK.

 5. The user ID field is Blue. Press the letter A on the keyboard. Admin goes into "User ID"

 6. Enter Current password of [8 digit #. Stupidly obvious. Take a guess]

 7. Enter new password of [8 digit #. Stupidly obvious. Take a guess. Same password as step 6]

 8. Click update. Message says "Please Re-enter the password for validation" (type same password).

 9. Click on Update.

 10. Press spacebar to close "Password updated successfully" box.

 11. With the cursor blinking in clearing number, enter the last 5 numbers of your employee number.

 12. Press Tab.

 13. With the cursor on Company enter AGT.

 14. Press Tab.

 15. With the cursor blining on DAC enter CAL.

 16. Click on the Add button. Your ID will change color.

 17. Click on Cancel button.

 18. In the upper left hand corner of the screen, click on a picture of a hand.

 19. On the AWAS sign on screen, enter your new ID.

 20. The system will prompt you for a new password. You can use your old one if you want. (heh!)


 --


 AWAS Sign On and Administration:


 OBJECTIVES:

 At the end of this section, you will be able to successfully:


 * Access the CZT Gateway Application using CDPD.

 * Identify options on the CZT Gateway Menu Bar.

 * Use the Job Selection Window.

 * Change Administration settings.


 GETTING the L/PC ready for use:


 Before you can communicate to AWAS through L/PC, the AWAS Laptop Configuration window must be
 setup. AWAS downloads information for all access types. (NOTE: The information on this window
 is extremely important. Supervisors are the only employees making changes to this window. If
 you want to login as a supervisor, please refer to the Telus employee list and choose one of
 the managers accounts. Make sure to take note of the employer ID #, and name.)

 --

 Sign On:

 Your coach is responsible for setting up your user ID before you sign on to AWAS. Your ID
 populates the CLEARING NUMBER field in the L/PC EMP (employee) record. This allows the L/PC
 to retrieve important employee data from the AWAS application when you dial in for the first
 time. Your user ID must be unique within the AWAS L/PC.

 The process of signing on to AWAS consists of two basic steps. The first is to connect to CDPD
 using ARTour, and the second is to log in to Gateway.


 * Remember four incorrect attemps to sign on causes the CZT Gateway application to lock you out.
   If this occurs, you must contact your coach for assistance. This is case sensitive as well.
   Verify that Caps Locks or NukLk are not enabled.

 Four common reasons for connecting to Gateway are:

 * To select work to being your day.

 * Your laptop has a job that is complete and you need to upload it and have a new job downloaded
   to you.

 * A job has remarks that must be sent to the host to provide a current status before completing
   the job. (Remarks Only)

 * You need to readjust your time. (FTR Only)



				ARTour - Gateway Sign on
				------------------------

 Locate the ARTour or Client icon on your desktop and "double click" the icon. You may find this
 icon in the system tray just right of the "Start" button. The icon in the system tray only requ-
 ires a "single click" of the mouse.

 Clicking on the ARTour or Client icon opens the eNetwork Wireless - Connect window. This window
 connects us to the ARTour server, which gives us secure, password-protected access to the AWAS
 server. The drop down connection window gives you two connection choices:

 * Telus - CDPD for digital cellular connection

 * Telus - Dialup for modem connection

 
 Once you have chosen your connection type, "single click" your mouse in the Password field and key
 in the required password. Due to security requirements, this password must be changed every 45 days.
 Do Not click on the save Password check box because of security concerns if the laptop is lost or
 stolen. The latest release of Gateway does not show the save password option.

 Once the password is entered, point and click on the "Connect" button. The "Connecting - Telus -
 Dialup" or "Connecting - Telus - CDPD" window opens giving you a visual picture of the connection
 process. During this process ARTour validates your password and unique laptop "IP" address. The
 same password will work for ARTour authentication whether for Dialup or CDPD.

 If validation is successful, the eNetwork Wireless - Connect window reduces to a small window with
 a Disconnect button and a digital clock showing your connect time.

 If validation is not successful you may have entered a wrong password or the ARTour server may not
 recognize you as a valid user. This is usually relayed to you through an "ERROR" pop-up window.
 This could be caused by Cap locks or Num locks being on. Log in ID's are case sensitive.

 Assuming you have received a successful ARTour connection, the next step is to locate and "double
 click" on the DASWin icon on your desktop. If you have a DASWin icon in the system tray to the right
 of the "Start" button, you can "Single Click" on it to attain the same results.

 DASWin is a required program, which acts as an "interpreter" between ARTour and CZT Gateway. Once the
 DASWin Main window opens you can locate the CZT Gateway icon.

 "Double clicking" on the CZT Gateway icon on your desktop opens CZT Gateway, which gives you access to
 the AWAS server. If you have a CZT Gateway icon in the system tray to the right of the "Start" button,
 you can "single click" on it to attain the same results.

 The CZT Gateway application opens with the "Welcome to the CZT Gateway Network" window in the center of
 the screen. You must enter your User ID and Password then click on "OK". The first time you access CZT
 Gateway you must enter an alphanumeric password of 6 - 8 characters. You will then be asked to re-enter
 and confirm this password on this initial entry into CZT Gateway. You may also use this window to change
 your CZT Gateway password, which should be changed every 45 days, as is the ARTour password.

 Once you are validated by CZT Gateway, the "Connect to Gateway" window appears. You must change the Comm-
 unication Type to NETWORK by selecting it from the drop-down list. Once NETWORK has been selected you must
 Tab to the Network User ID field and enter an "X". Pressing Tab again takes you to the Network Password
 field where you enter another "X". Pointing and clicking on the Connect button connects you to the AWAS
 server which gives you the Job Selection window or a new job depending on your settings in the AWAS Empl-
 oyee Tables.

 * Note: The Time field shows how much time remains to select a job.

 Another important field is the Ovr indicator field. If the job is overridden to you, an asterisk [*]
 appears in the Ovr field.

 There are two methods used to select a Job:

 * Point and click on a Job box

 * Press the Up & Down arrow keys so the cursor highlights a job, then press the Enter key.

 After selecting a job, the empty job box to the left of each job contains a number. The jobs are downloaded
 in the order they are selected. You can deselect a job if you change your mind before you download a job
 using one of the following methods:

 * Point and click on a Job Box

 * Press the Up & Down arrow key so the cursor highlights a job, then press the Enter key.


 Job Selection Summary

 The Job Selection Summary window provides additional information that you may need to select a job. Before
 selecting your job, review the Job Select Summary window for additional information.

 The Job Select Summary window displays detailed information regarding the following:

 * Job Request Information

 * Job - allows you to select each job from the Job Select window, thus eliminating the need to go back and
   forth between the Job Select and Job Select Summary windows.

 * Customer Information

 * Key Indicators

 * Facility Information

 * Time Left


 To return to the Job Selection window you can point and click on the OK button.

 * Note: The Quit button discontinues the connection proces. If you click on the Quit button and jobs reside
   on the laptop, the Review Jobs window appears. If you click the Quit button and no jobs reside on the
   laptop, the sign on window appears.


 You can choose to have a job downloaded to your laptop in one of three ways:

 * You can select and view a job within 3 minutes then point and click on the Download button.

 * You can point and click on the Download button without selecting a job to automatically download the
   optimal job [job 1].

 * If you do not select a job within 3 minutes AWAS automatically downloads the optimal job to the laptop.


  When you download a job, the Review Jobs window and Memo window appears.


  Using the ADMIN Menu
  --------------------

  The ADMIN Menu is an option on the Gateway Menu Bar. You use the ADMIN Menu to modify the
  system parameters within your L/PC. The ADMIN Menu allows you to perform all the following:

  * Change Job Class Code (Employee Data)

  * Laptop Communication Config

  * Change Password

  * Unlock a Password



  Change Job Class Code (Employee Data)
  -------------------------------------

  The Employee Data window allows the user to add, delete or update users on an individual laptop.
  This information is validated with the host AWAS system to insure only authorized users will AWAS.


  Laptop Communication Config
  ---------------------------

  The Laptop Communication Configuration window allows the user to change communication parameters,
  as new or updated communication devices are required.


  Change Password
  ---------------

  The Change Password window allows you to change your existing password which should be done at least
  every 180 days or every 6 months. Click on the Current Password: field and key in your current password,
  then press Tab to move to the New password: field.

  Key your new password in the New Password: field, then press the Update button.

  You will be asked to Re-enter the password for validation, then press the Update button.


  Unlock a Password
  -----------------

  If you key a password incorrectly four times in a row, CZT Gateway will "Lock" you out of the application
  and notify you that your User ID is locked.

  To unlock the technican's password, the coach must sign-on to the CZT Gateway application using the techn-
  ician's laptop and the administrative ID [8 digit #. Stupidly obvious. Take a guess]. Next, the coach pres-
  ses the Cancel button on the Employee Data window so he/she can select the Change Password option from the
  ADMIN menu.

  When the Change Password window opens, the coach selects the technician's user ID from the User ID list box
  then Tabs to New Password field and enters a new password. Once the new password has been entered, the coach
  points and clicks on the Update button, re-enters the password, then clicks on Update again. A message box
  confirms that the password is updated. The coach can now exist the application and have the Technician sign
  on using the new password supplied by the coach.


  --->



  [> AWAS Identification ID's <]



  AWAS JOB IDENTIFICATION JOB ID'S:


 A - OOS/Customer Trouble

 B - NOS/Customer Trouble

 C - Change Service Order

 F - From Service Order

 G - OOS/Company Trouble

 H - NOS/Company Trouble

 I - In Service Order

 J - Optional Job Report

 K - OOS/ISC Circuit Trouble

 L - NOS/ISC Circuit Trouble

 M - Mandatory Job Report

 N - Exceptions

 O - Out Service Order

 P - Plant Service Order

 Q - Special Assignment

 R - OOS/Customer Circuit Trouble

 S - NOS/Customer Circuit Trouble

 T - To Service Order

 U - OOS/Company circuit Trouble

 V - NOS/Company Circuit Trouble

 W - Prewire Service Order

 X - OOS/Other Telco Circuit Trouble

 Y - NOS/Other Telco Circuit Trouble


 Acronym Definition:

 (OOS - Out of Service, ISC - Impedence Short Circuit)

 (NOS - Not in Service)


 ->



 [> AWAS Driver Codes <]


 -----------------
 AWAS Driver Codes
 -----------------

 Driver		Used For	Description

  11             TCI            Used for all work done for TCI. This is used for all TELUS Communications
			        as of 01/01/99.

  13             MOB            Used for all work done for TELUS Mobility. This code became effective
				01/01/99.

  16       TAC Enhancement      Used for all work done for TELUS Advanced Communications.

  20          Multimedia        Used for all work done for TELUS Multimedia.

  36       TAC Main Stream      Used for all work done for TELUS Advanced Communications.



 -------------------		     --------------
 AWAS Product Worked		     AWAS BID CODES
 -------------------  		     --------------

 Product	Used For  	     BID       Used For

  1000          Res. Single Line      -          ---

				      R        Repair Work
  2000          Bus. Single Line

				      P        Preventive Maintenance
  3000          Bus. Multi Line

  				      M        Modification & Improvement

  4000          VLOB Centrex

                                      S        Service

  5000          Coin Telephones

                                      K        Maintenance Contract

  6000          DLOB (Including
                Centrex Data)

                                      O        Operational

  7000          VLOB Special
                 Services
                                      C        Capital

  8000          Cable Locates
                                      L        Cable Locates

  9000          Take Outs

                                      A        Absence/Administration

  9900          Absence / Admin




  ->



                -------------------------
	        A W A S   Clearing  Codes
		-------------------------




  [ Type ]                    		            [ Sub Codes ]                     [ Cause   and   Sub ]


                     ----  [      SET        ] ----

                     ----  [ LEASED SETS-All ] ----

   Plant/Equipment - DIRT/POOR HOUSEKEEPING             n/a                               1           01

   Plant/Equipment - AGE/DETERIORATION                  n/a                               1           02

   Plant/Equipment - OUT OF ADJUSTMENT                  n/a                               1           03

   Plant/Equipment - OVERLOADED EQUIPMENT               n/a                               1           04

   Plant/Equipment - BLOWN FUSE/BREAKER                 n/a                               1           05

   Plant/Equipment - CORROSION/ELECTROLYSIS             n/a                               1           06

   Plant/Equipment - CRACKED/DAMAGED/DEFECTIVE          n/a                               1           07

   Customer - PHYSICAL DAMAGE                           n/a                               4           01

   Customer - ILLEGAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTION              n/a                               4           02

   Customer - INTEREXCHANGE CARRIER                     n/a                               4           03


                   ---- [ NETWORK SERVICE WIRE ] ----

   DROP/ERV WIRE (INCL BONDING)                         01                               n/a          n/a

   PROT/NID/CCB (INCL GROUND)                           02                               n/a          n/a

   Weather - LIGHTNING                                  n/a                               2           01

   Weather - FLOOD                                      n/a                               2           02

   Weather - WIND                                       n/a                               2           03

   Weather - ICE, SLEET AND SNOW                        n/a                               2           04

   Weather - MOISTURE/RAIN/CONDENSATION                 n/a                               2           05

   Weather - TEMPERATURE                                n/a                               2           06

   Weather - EARTHQUAKE                                 n/a                               2           07
   
   Employee - FIELD TECHNICIAN                          n/a                               3           01

   Employee - OSP CONSTRUCTION                          n/a                               3           02

   Employee - ASSIGNMENT PERSON                         n/a                               3           14

   Employee - OSP CABLE REPAIR/MAINTENANCE              n/a                               3           06

   Employee - TELUS CONTRACTOR                          n/a                               3           16

   Employee - CO CONVERSION RELATED-RECORDS             n/a                               3           17

   Employee - CO CONVERSION RELATED-SW SVC              n/a                               3           18

   Employee - CO CONVERSION RELATED-OSP                 n/a                               3           19

   Foreign Workman - GAS                                n/a                               5           01

   Foreign Workman - ELECTRIC                           n/a                               5           02

   Foreign Workman - CATV                               n/a                               5           03

   Foreign Workman - SEWER                              n/a                               5           04

   Foreign Workman - WATER                              n/a                               5           05

   Foreign Workman - BUILDING CONSTRUCTION              n/a                               5           06

   Foreign Workman - DEPT OF HIGHWAYS (ROAD CONST)      n/a                               5           07

   Foreign Workman - TREE TRIMMING-MOWING               n/a                               5           08

   Foreign Workman - GOVERNMENT AGENCIES                n/a                               5           09
		     (POLICE, FIRE, ETC)

   Foreign Workman - CONTRACTORS (NON TELUS PERSONNEL)  n/a                               5           10

   Foreign Workman - FOREIGN WORK PERSON                n/a                               5           11

   Foreign Workman - IXC/CLEC (CAUSING TROUBLE ON       n/a                               5           12
			       THE TELUS NETWORK)

   Miscellaneous - FIRE                                 n/a                               6           01

   Miscellaneous - INSECTS/BIRDS/ANIMALS                n/a                               6           02

   Miscellaneous - VEHICLE ACCIDENTS                    n/a                               6           03

   Miscellaneous - POWER BURN/INFLUENCE                 n/a                               6           04

   Miscellaneous - COMMERCIAL/POWER FAILURE             n/a                               6           05

   Miscellaneous - TREES                                n/a                               6           06

   Vandalism - MALICIOUS DAMAGE                         n/a                               7           05


                       ----  [  COIN  ] ----

   HANDSET                                              01                                n/a         n/a

   COIN ACCEPTER/SCANNER/VALIDATOR                      02                                n/a         n/a

   COIN RELAY/ESCROW                                    03                                n/a         n/a

   CIRCUIT CARD - ALL TYPES                             04                                n/a         n/a

   DISPLAY SCREEN                                       05                                n/a         n/a

   DIALPAD/KEYPAD                                       06                                n/a         n/a

   CARD READER                                          07                                n/a         n/a

   HOOKSWITCH                                           08                                n/a         n/a

   COIN RETURN                                          09                                n/a         n/a

   REPLACE UPPER HOUSING                                10                                n/a         n/a

   REPLACE SET                                          11                                n/a         n/a

   PROGRAM SET                                          12                                n/a         n/a

   PROGRAM HOST                                         13                                n/a         n/a

   COIN BOX FULL/COIN BOX COLLECTION                    14                                n/a         n/a

   INSTRUCT, CARD/SIGNS/BINDER/BOOKS                    15                                n/a         n/a

   SHELF/BOOTH/POWER                                    16                                n/a         n/a

   LIGHTING (NON SERVICE AFFECTING)                     17                                n/a         n/a

   TDD (TELEPHONE DEVICE FOR THE DEAF)                  18                                n/a         n/a

   PAYPHONE-OTHER                                       19                                n/a         n/a


              ----  [  OUTSIDE PLANT  ] ----

   CHANGE PAIR                                          01

   CABLE SHEATH                                         02

   SPLICE CLOSURE                                       03

   TRANSMISSION (BOND, GRD, PROT)                       04

   EQPT (COIL, BOL, BOC, RPTR, XFMR, ETC.)              05

   CONNECTOR                                            06

   CLEAR CAP                                            07

   TERMINAL (INCLUDING JUMPERS)                         08

   CABLE CUT/DIGUP                                      09

   CUT SHEET/WORK ORDER                                 10

   PUG UNECONOMICAL TO REPAIR                           11

   LATS/ALIT - REFERRED TO PMO                          12


             ----  [  ENHANCED  ] ----

   ADSL - Modem Replaced                                52

   ADSL - Power Supply Repalced                         53

   ADSL - Software (Modem Software)                     54

   ADSL - Software (Installation Kit)                   55

   ADSL - Software (PC)                                 56

   ADSL - Hardware (PC)                                 57

   ADSL - NIC Replaced                                  58

   ADSL - NIC Reinstalled                               59

   ADSL - Tweak/Provisioning                            60

   ADSL - CO - Hardware Card                            61

   ADSL - CO - Hardware Port                            62

   TOPS SOFTWARE                                        63

   TOPS HARDWARE                                        64

   TOPS/POSITION SOFTWARE                               65

   TOPS/PLATFORM SOFTWARE                               66

   TOPS/PLATFORM SOFTWARE                               67

   TOPS/PLATFORM HARDWARE                               68


  ----  [  PABX (Private Automatic Branch Exchange ] ----

   MULTILINE ELECTRONIC LEASED                          01



         ----  [  AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT  ] ----

   ENTERPHONE (LEASE ONLY)                              01

   AUXILITARY SIGNALING EQUIPMENT                       02

 

         ----  [  RECORDS  ] ----

   ASSIGNMENT/FACILITIES                                01

   DISCONNECT/RECONNECT ERROR                           02

   CARRIER CHANNEL/DESIGN ASSIGNMENT                    03

   IXC ASSIGNMENT                                       04

   CUSTOM CALLING FEATURE                               05

   RECENT UPDATE - SWITCH CHANGES                       06

   TES COMPUTER NETWORK FAILURES                        07

   RECENT UPDATE - LSMS CHANGES (LNP)                   08



     ----  [  SUBSCRIBER CARRIER SYSTEMS  ] ----

   FILTER - ALL                                         01

   POWER UNITS - ALL TYPES                              02

   ANALOG CHANNEL UNIT - FIELD                          03

   ANALOG CHANNEL UNIT - C.O.                           04

   ANALOG REPEATER - ALL                                05

   DIGITAL CHANNEL - FIELD                              06

   DIGITAL CHANNEL - C.O.                               07

   DIGITAL REPEATER - ALL                               08

   CONCENTRATOR CARDS - ALL TYPES                       09

   CONCENTRATOR LINES - ALL TYPES                       10


   	----  [ CENTRAL OFFICE ]  ----

   SWITCHING HARDWARE - LINE                            01

   SWITCHING HARDWARE - PERIPHERAL                      02

   SWITCHING HARDWARE - FRONT END                       03

   SWITCHING SOFTWARE - PERIPHERAL                      04

   SWITCHING SOFTWARE - FRONT END                       05

   SWITCHING SOFTWARE - PATCHES                         06

   SWITCHING POWER                                      07

   TRANSPORT HARDWARE                                   11

   TRANSPORT SOFTWARE                                   12

   TRANSPORT CROSSCONNECT FRAME                         13

   TRANSPORT POWER                                      14

   CUSTOMER COAM/CPE                                    21

   SITE DC POWER AND SIGNAL                             22

   MOBILE RADIO                                         23

   SITE MASTER CLOCK                                    24

   LOOP ENHANCEMENT EQUIPMENT                           25

   ENGINEERING WORK IN PROGRESS                         26

   AUTOMATIC MESSAGE ACCTG                              27

   I/O EQUIPMENT                                        28

   FRAME-JUMPER/TERMINATION                             61

   FRAME-PROTECTION                                     62


   (EXCLUDE CODES)


        	----  [ TEST OK ]  ----

   PRIM TEST CLR - NO ANSWER / VERIFICATION OK W/SUBS   01



          	----  [ FOUND OK ]  ----

   FOUND OK                                             01


                ----  [ CUSTOMER ] ----


   RECEIVER OFF HOOK                                    01

   INCORRECT DIALING                                    02

   CUSTOM CALLING PROGRAMMING                           03

   NUISANCE CALLS                                       04

   EQUIPMENT MISUSE                                     05

   DISCONNECT POWER                                     06

   SERVICE ORDER IN PROGRESS                            07

   IMPROPER CUSTOMER INSTALLATION                       08

   CUSTOMER TRAINING/EDUCATION/ENQUIRY                  09

   PPU USAGE                                            10

   PERSONAL VOICE MAIL USAGE                            11

   CUSTOMER REFUSES CHARGES                             12

   CUSTOMER REFUSES ACCESS                              13

   CUSTOMER CANCELLED                                   14


                  ----  [ EXCLUDE ] ----


   NO ACCESS - CUSTOMER (FIELDED)                       01

   NO ACCESS - TELCO (NON-FIELDED)                      02

   2ND PARTY REPORT                                     03

   DISCONNECTED NUMBER                                  04

   WRONG RPTS OR CREATE SCREEN USED                     05



                 ----  [ REFERRED OUT ] ----


   OTHER TELCOS                                         01

   INTEREXCHANGE CARRIERS                               02

   VENDORS                                              03

   ALARM COMPANIES                                      04

   COMPETITIVE LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIER (CLEC)            05

   OTHER TELUS DEPARTMENTS                              06

   TELUS MOBILITY                                       07

   REFERRED TO SECURITY / POLICE                        08

   INTERNATIONAL CARRIERS                               09



                  ----  [ CPE / COAM ] ----


   CPE/COAM NOT REPAIRED BY TELUS                       01

   CPE/COAM REPAIRED BY TELUS                           02

   ISW DIAGNOSTIC CHARGE ONLY                           03

   ISW DIAGNOSTIC & REPAIR CHARGE                       04

   ENTERPHONE REPAIRED - MAINTENANCE CONTROLR APPLIES   05

   CPE/COAM REP'D-MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER APPLIES        06



          ----  [ NSA NATIONAL BROADCAST ] ----


   Audio/Video - Cameras                                01

   Audio/Video - Audio Local Loop                       02

   Audio/Video - Analog Switch                          03

   Audio/Video - Analog Patch                           04

   Audio/Video - Program Equipment                      05

   Audio/Video - Carrier Equipment                      06

   Audio/Video - Audio Sub Carrier                      07

   Audio/Video - Customer Action                        08

   Video Conf - COAM Equipment Config                   09

   Video Conf - COAM Equipment Failure                  10

   Video Conf - Customer Wiring                         11

   Video Conf - TELUS Network                           12

   Video Conf - Telco Wiring (Non TELUS)                13

   Video Conf - Telco Network (Non TELUS)               14



   --->   


  		------------------------------------------
		S A P  Region Codes for Terminal Equipment
		------------------------------------------


 [ Function Location ]   [ FL Description ]

  SAP Region (rrrr)
  CLGR  	         CLGR - Calgary and Fringe Area
  EDTN 			 EDTN - Edmonton and Fringe Area
  NTHR			 NTHR - Northern Alberta Region
  STHR			 STHR - Southern Alberta Region


  ->



  	-----------------------------------------
	Terminal Equipment Codes for AWAS and SAP
	-----------------------------------------

 Definitions:

 AWAS = Automated Workforce Administration System

 SAP  = Nortel Networks' Norstar Applications

 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

							       AWAS      AWAS          AWAS	   A W A S
							      Driver   Supplies	     Function       B I D
								         wwww          Code
   Level 3        Level 3	Level 4		   Level 4
 Description	  Asset	       Description         Prod/Tech    CO    Region  Code   AWAS Code   Type of Work

 Business Sys.    BUS						       ---    ---      2000          ----

 Business Sys.    BUS          AUXILLARY           AUX          c      rrrr   AUX      2001          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - Others        ENHC         c      rrrr   ENHC     2002          sRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - Call          ENHCALL      c      rrrr   CALL     2003          SRK
			       Sequences  

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - CDR           ENHCDR       c      rrrr   CDR      2004          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - Companion/    ENHCOMP      c      rrrr   COMP     2005          SRK
			       Lucent Wireless

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - CTI PBX       ENHCTIP      c      rrrr   CTIP     2006          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - Lucent        ENHLUVM      c      rrrr   LUVM     2007          SRK
			       Voice Mail

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - M1		   ENHM1VM      c      rrrr   M1VM     2008          SRK
			       Voice Mail

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - M1 IVR        ENHM1VR      c      rrrr   M1VR     2009          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - NORSTAR       ENHNSAP      c      rrrr   NSAP     2010          SRK
			       applications

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - Norstar VM    ENHNSVM      c      rrrr   NSVM     2011          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - Octel Mail    ENHOCVM      c      rrrr   OCVM     2012          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Enh - VISIT         ENHVISP      c      rrrr   VISP     2013          SRK
			       Products

 Business Sys.    BUS          KEY - All Others    KEY          c      rrrr   OKEY     2014          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          KEY - Norstar       KEYNRTR      c      rrrr   NRTR     2015          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          KEY - Partner       KEYPTNR      c      rrrr   PTNR     2016          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          PBX - Discontinued  PBX          c      rrrr   OPBX     2017          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          PBX - Lucent        PBXLUCE      c      rrrr   LUCE     2018          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          PBX - M1 option     PBXMMOD      c      rrrr   MMOD     2019          SRK
			             21 - 81

 Business Sys.    BUS          PBX - MI Option II  PBXOP11      c      rrrr   OP11     2020          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          PBX - SL1 sets      PBXSL1S      c      rrrr   SL1S     2021          SRK

 Business Sys.    BUS          Desk Top Products   DESKTOP      c      rrrr   DSKT     2022          SRK

 --

 Existing Drop Facilities:

 Customer         CDF          CDF BUSINESS        CDFBUS/COIN  c      rrrr   CDFB     2101          CSRMK

 Customer         CDF          CDF DATA            CDFDATA      c      rrrr   CDFD     2102          CSRMK

 Customer         CDF          CDF RESIDENCE       CDFRES       c      rrrr   CDFR     2103          CSRMK

 --

 New Drop Facilities:

 Customer         CDF          CDF BUSINESS        CDFBUS/COIN  c      rrrr   CDFB     2104          CSRMK

 Customer         CDF          CDF DATA            CDFDATA      c      rrrr   CDFD     2105          CSRMK

 Customer         CDF          CDF RESIDENCE       CDFRES       c      rrrr   CDFR     2106          CSRMK

 --

 Customer Site    DTM                                           c      ---    ---      2200          ---
 Data Termination

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: Ascend      MASCEND      c      rrrr   MASC     2201          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: Other       MDIAL        c      rrrr   MDMD     2202          SRPMK
 products                      Dial Up

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: GDC         MGDC         c      rrrr   MGDC     2203          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: Motorola    MMOTR        c      rrrr   MOTR     2204          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: Nortel      MNRTL        c      rrrr   MNR      2205          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: Paradyne    MPDYN        c      rrrr   PDYN     2206          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: Other       MPRIV        c      rrrr   MDMP     2207          SRPMK
 products		               Private

 Data networking  DTM          Modems: U.S.R.      MUSR         c      rrrr   MUSR     2208          SRPMK
 products		        (US Robitics)

 --

 Inside Wiring    INW                                                  ---    ---      2300          ---

 Inside Wiring    INW          INSIDE WIRE BUS     INWBUS       c      rrrr   INWB     2301          SRK

 Inside Wiring    INW          INSIDE WIRE DATA    INWDATA      c      rrrr   INWD     2302          SRK

 Inside Wiring    INW          INSIDE WIRE RES     INWRES       c      rrrr   INWR     2303          SRK

 --

 Internet         NET                                                  ---    ---      2400          ---

 Internet         NET          NIC and Software    PLANET       c      rrrr   NICP     2401          SRK

 --

 Payphones        PAY                                           c      rrrr            2500          OSRMK

 Enclosures       PAY          Pay: Enclosures     ENCIN        c      rrrr   ENCI     2501          OSRMK
 Indoor			            Indoor

 Enclosues        PAY          Pay: Enclosures     ENCOUT       c      rrrr   ENCO     2502          OSRMK
 Outdoor			    Outdoor

 Centurion        PAY          Pay: Centurion      CENTUR       c      rrrr   CENR     2503          OSRMK

 Protel           PAY          Pay: Protel         PROTEL       c      rrrr   PROT     2504          OSRMK

 Charge a Call    PAY          Pay: Charge a Call  CHGCALL      c      rrrr   CHGC     2505          OSRMK

 Millennium       PAY          Pay: Millennium     MILLEN       c      rrrr   MILN     2506          OSRMK

 --

 Customer Site    PSW                                           c      ---    ---      2600          ---
 Packet Switching

 Data networking  PSW          HUBS: 3COM          HUB3COM      c      rrrr   3COM     2601          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  PSW          HUBS: Ascend        HUBASND      c      rrrr   HASC     2602          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  PSW          HUBS: Bay Networks  HUBBAY       c      rrrr   BAY      2603          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  PSW          HUBS: Cisco Systems HUBCSCO      c      rrrr   CSCO     2604          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  PSW          HUBS: Newbridge     HUBNEWB      c      rrrr   NEWB     2605          SRPMK
 products

 Data networking  PSW          HUBS: Other         HUBS         c      rrrr   HUBS     2606          SRPMK
 products

 --

 Telephone sets   SET	       					c      ---    ---      2900          ---

 Telephone sets   SET          Cordless            CRDL         c      rrrr   CRDL     2901          SRK

 Telephone sets   SET          Discontinued or     DSET         c      rrrr   DSET     2902          SRK
			       Old Technology

 Telephone sets   SET          hotel/motel         HOTL         c      rrrr   HOTL     2903          SRK

 Telephone sets   SET          Harmony             HRMY         c      rrrr   HRMY     2904          SRK

 Telephone sets   SET          Meridian 9216       M216         c      rrrr   M216     2905          SRK

 Telephone sets   SET          M8000               M8K          c      rrrr   M8K      2906          SRK

 Telephone sets   SET          M9000 series        M9K          c      rrrr   M9K      2907          SRK

 Telephone sets   SET          MBS                 MBS          c      rrrr   MBS      2908          SRK

 Telephone sets   SET          Others(single line, OSET         c      rrrr   OSET     2909          SRK
                               Centrex consoles,
			       unity, etc.)

 Telephone sets   SET          Others(Residential) ORES         c      rrrr   ORES     2910          SRK

 Telephone        SET          Signature           SIGN         c      rrrr   SIGN     2911          SRK

 Telephone        SET          Solo                SOLO         c      rrrr   SOLO     2912          SRK

 Telephone        SET          Vista 100           V100         c      rrrr   V100     2913          SRK

 Telephone        SET          Vista 200           V200         c      rrrr   V200     2914          SRK

 Telephone        SET          Vista 2000          V2K          c      rrrr   V2K      2915          SRK

 Telephone        SET          Vista 350 Base      V350B        c      rrrr   V35B     2916          SRK

 Telephone        SET          Vista 350 Module    V350M        c      rrrr   V35M     2917          SRK

 --

 Vid-conf'ing     VID                                           c      ---    ---      2700          ---

 Vid-conf'ing     VID          Tanberg Video       TAND         c      rrrr   TAND     2701          SRK
			       conferencing

 Wireless term    WTD                                           c      rrrr   WTD      2800          SRPMK
 device

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW                                           c      wwww   ---      1000          ---

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          Other CSW           OTHCSW       c      wwww   OCSW     1001          SRPMK

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          DMS100              DMS100       c      wwww   S100     1002          SRPMK

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          STP                 DMS100S      c      wwww   STP      1003          SRPMK

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          DMS200              DMS200       c      wwww   S200     1004          SRPMK

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          TOPS                DMS200T      c      wwww   TOPS     1005          SRPMK

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          DMS250              DMS250       c      wwww   S250     1006          SRPMK

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          GTD 5               GTD 5        c      wwww   GTD5     1007          SRPMK

 Circuit Swtchg   CSW          5 ESS               5ESS         c      wwww   5ESS     1008          SRPMK

 --

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR                                           c      wwww   ---      1100          ---

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR          S6A, S6B,           ANALOG       c      wwww   ANLG     1101          SRPMK
			       Lenkurt 84A

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR          UMC 1000            UMC          c      wwww   ---      1102          SRPMK

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR          Lynch 300S          300S         c      wwww   300S     1103          SRPMK

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR          Time Span           TMSP         c      wwww   TMSP     1104          SRPMK

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR          Nortel DMS-1 Urban  DMSU         c      wwww   DMSU     1105          SRPMK

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR          Nortel DMS-1 Rural  DMSR         c      wwww   DMSR     1106          SRPMK

 Subscrbr Carrier CXR          Nortel Access Node  ACN          c      wwww   ACN      1107          SRPMK

 Subscrb  Carrier CXR          Pair Gain           PRGN         c      wwww   PRGN     1108          SRPMK

 Subscrb  Carrier CXR          Tadiran Multi Gain  TADN         c      wwww   TADN     1109          SRPMK

 Subscrb  Carrier CXR          Fiber Loop Carrier  FITL         c      wwww   FITL     1110          SRPMK

 Subscrb  Carrier CXR          Other Subs Carrier  OCXR         c      wwww   OCXR     1111          SRPMK

 --

 Digital Access   DAC                                           c      wwww   ---      1200          ---
 Cross Connects

 DACS             DAC          Alcatel 1633        AL33         c      wwww   AL33     1201          SRPMK

 DACS             DAC          Alcatel 1630        AL30         c      wwww   AL30     1202          SRPMK

 DACS             DAC          Tadiran T:Dax       TD31         c      wwww   TD31     1203          SRPMK

 DACS             DACS         Tellabs Titan 5500  TL31         c      wwww   TL31     1204          SRPMK

 DACS             DACS         Lucent 1:0          LU10         c      wwww   LU10     1205          SRPMK

 DACS             DACS         Other DACS          ODAC         c      wwww   ODAC     1206          SRPMK

 --

 Network Data     DTM                                           c      wwww   ---      1300           ---
 Termination

 ADSL MODEM       DTM           Netspeed           ADSLMDM      c      wwww   ADSL     1301          SRPMK

 Data Termination DTM           General            NETDTM       c      wwww   DTM      1302          SRPMK

 --
 
 Fibre optic      FOT                                           c      wwww   ---      1400          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Asynchronous       ASYT         c      wwww   ASYT     1401          SRPMK
 Terminals			Transport

 Fibre optic      FOT           Asynchronous       ASYM         c      wwww   ASYM     1402          SRPMK
 Terminals                      Multiplex

 Fibre optic      FOT           Nortel OC 3        NO3          c      wwww   N03      1403          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Nortel OC 12       N12          c      wwww   N12      1404          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Nortel OC 48       N48          c      wwww   N48      1405          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Fujitsu OC 1       F01          c      wwww   F01      1406          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Fujitsu OC 3       F03          c      wwww   F03      1407          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Fujitsu OC 12      F12          c      wwww   F12      1408          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Lucent OC 3        L03          c      wwww   L03      1409          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Lucent OC 48       L48          c      wwww   L48      1410          SRPMK
 Terminals

 Fibre optic      FOT           Other FOTS         OFOT         c      wwww   OFOT     1411          SRPMK
 Terminals

 --

 Multiplex        MUX                                           c      wwww   ---      1500          ---

 Multiplex        MUX           Network Analog     NETA         c      wwww   MXNA     1501          SRPMK

 Multiplex        MUX           Network Digital    NETD         c      wwww   MXND     1502          SRPMK
                                Subscriber

 Multiplex        MUX           Subscriber Analog  SUBA         c      wwww   MXSA     1503          SRPMK

 Multiplex        MUX           Subscriber Digital SUBD         c      wwww   MXSD     1504          SRPMK

 Multiplex        MUX           Channel Banks      CHNL         c      wwww   MXCB     1505          SRPMK
			        
 Multiplex        MUX           DS-1 Cross-        DS1X         c      wwww   DS1X     1506          SRPMK
				connect

 Multiplex        MUX           DS-3 Cross-        DS3X         c      wwww   DS3X     1507          SRPMK
				connect

 Multiplex        MUX           STS-1 Cross-       STSX         c      wwww   STSX     1508          SRPMK
				connect

 Multiplex        MUX           Optical Cross-     OPTX         c      wwww   OPTX     1509          SRPMK
				connect

 Multiplex        MUX           Synchronization    SYCH         c      wwww   MXSY     1510          SRPMK

 Multiplex        MUX           ADSL Multiplexer   ADSLMUX      c      wwww   ADSM     1511          SRPMK

 --

 PCM              PCM                                           c      wwww   ---      1600          ---

 PCM              PCM           Transport          TRNP         c      wwww   PCMT     1601          SRPMK

 PCM              PCM           Access             ACS          c      wwww   PCMA     1602          SRPMK

 --

 Power            PWR                                           c      wwww   ---      1700          SRPMK

 Power            PWR           Battery            BATT         c      wwww   BATT     1701          SRPMK

 Power            PWR           Plant              PLNT         c      wwww   PLNT     1702          SRPMK

 Power            PWR           Auxiliary          UPS          c      wwww   UPS      1703          SRPMK

 Power            PWR           Other              OPWR         c      wwww   OPWR     1704          SRPMK

 --

 Radio            RAD                                           c      wwww   ---      1800          ---

 Radio            RAD           Mobile Radio       MOB          c      wwww   MOB      1801          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Subscriber Radio   SUB          c      wwww   SUB      1802          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           General Radio      ORAD         c      wwww   ORAD     1803          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Nortel RD3         NORRD3       c      wwww   RD3      1804          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Nortel RD6         NORRD6       c      wwww   RD6      1805          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Farinon DM-2A      DM-2A        c      wwww   DM2A     1806          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Farinon DVM-6      DVM-6        c      wwww   DVM6     1807          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Quadralink T1      QUADLNK      c      wwww   QUAD     1808          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Alcatel 4000       4000         c      wwww   4000     1809          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Alcatel 6000       6000         c      wwww   6000     1810          SRPMK

 Radio            RAD           Outside Wave Guide WAVEGYD      c      wwww   WAVE     1811          SRPMK

 --

 Supplementary    SCS                                           c      wwww   ---      1900          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg

 Supplementary    SCS           800 Service        800S         c      wwww   800S     1901          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg

 Supplementary    SCS           900 Brite          900B         c      wwww   900S     1902          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg

 Supplementary    SCS           IBM Voice          IVMM         c      wwww   IVMM     1903          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg                 Msg Machine

 Supplementary    SCS           Boston Voice       BVMM         c      wwww   BVMM     1904          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg                 Msg Machine

 Supplementary    SCS           Octel Voice        OVMM         c      wwww   OVMM     1905          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg                 Messaging

 Supplementary    SCS           AIN                AIN          c      wwww   AIN      1906          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg

 Supplementary    SCS           VNET SVCS          VNET         c      wwww   VNET     1907          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg

 Supplementary    SCS           E911               E911         c      wwww   E911     1908          SRPMK
 Circuit Swtchg

 --

 Aerial Copper    AC                                            c      wwww   AC       3000          LSRPM
 cable & wire

 Aerial Fibre     AFC                                           c      wwww   AFC      3001          LSRPM
 optic cable

 Aerial Coaxial   AXC                                           c      wwww   AXC      3002          LSRPM
 cable

 Buried Copper    BC                                            c      wwww   BC       3003          LSRPM
 cable

 Buried Fibre     BFC                                           c      wwww   BFC      3004          LSRPM
 optic cable

 Buried Coaxial   BXC                                           c      wwww   BXC      3005          LSRPM
 cable

 Cable closures   CT                                            c      wwww   CT       3006          LSRPM
 & terminals

 In-Conduit       IC                                            c      wwww   IC       3007          LSRPM
 Copper cable

 In-Conduit Fibre IFC                                           c      wwww   IFC      3008          LSRPM
 optic cable
 
 In-Conduit Coax- IXC                                           c      wwww   IXC      3009          LSRPM
 ial cable

 Conduit          CON                                           c      wwww   CON      3010          LSRPM

 Poles            POL                                           c      wwww   POL      3011          SRPMK

 Framework &      FRM                                           c      wwww   FRM      3012          SRPMK
 Support

 Application      APS                                           c      wwww   APS      3013          SRPMK
 Software

 Broadcast Equip- BRD                                           c      wwww   BRD      3014          SRPMK
 ment

 Network Manage-  NWM                                           c      wwww   NWM      3015          SRPMK
 ment

 Traffic Operator TOW                                           c      wwww   TOW      3016          SRPMK
 Workstations

 Towers           TWR                                           c      wwww   TWR      3017          SRPMK

 Packet Switching PSW              See Terminal Equipment       c      wwww   PSW      2600          SRPMK

 

 --


  	-------------------------------
	AWAS Attendance / Absence Codes
	-------------------------------

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________


  SAP Description	      SAP	       Old AWAS                Old UDS Code 	     New AWAS
			      Codes	     Function Code               	           Function Code


 Approved Furlough            AF             9918, 9919, 9920, 9921    AWO, D/O, LOU, LWO      9918

 Apprenticeship Training      AT             9925                      ATL                     9925

 Formal Training              FT             9926, 9927                IST                     9926

 Bereavement Leave            BL             9913                      BRV                     9913

 Pallbearer Leave             PL             9914                                              9914

 Compensation Absence         CA             9909                      WCF, WCO, WCR           9909

 Compensation Doctor         CADM                                      WCS                     9910
 Appointment

 Doctor Medical               DM             9906                      MDL                     9906

 Serious Distress             DS             9907                                              9907

 Funeral Leave                FL             9915                                              9915

 Holiday in Lieu              HL             9937                      SHL                     9937

 Holiday Unpaid               HU                                                               9938

 Working Scheduled            HW             9939                      SHW                     9939
 Stat Holiday

 Northern Vacation            NW             9904                                              9904

 Sick Absence                SICK            9908                   LSP, S7, S8, S9,           9908
								    SI, SIE, SWO

 Union Leave                  UL             9916                      LNG, LWS                9916

 Vacation                     VA             9902, 9901                VAC                     9902

 Vacation Bank Taken          VB             9903                                              9903

 Vacation Leave Without Pay   VF                                       VWO                     9901

 VACATION OVERTIME PAYOUT     VP             9912                                              9912

 Jury Duty                    JD                                                               9920

 Military Leave               ML                                                               9905

 Paid Absence                 XP             9929                      LWP                     9929

 Regular Time                 RG          9917, 9930, 9931,       REG, ST, STE                 9917
					  9932, 9933, 9934,
					  9935, 9936, 9937,
					  9938

 Banked Time Off              BTO            9911                      BU                      9911

 FWAP Straight Time Banked    FTO                                                              9912

 Worked up leave Weekend      DNP         9940, 9924                                           9940

 Personal Family Day Off      KS                                       PLD                     9930

 Limited Sick Pay (Part Time  LSP                                      LKA                     9938
 Employee)

 Suspension Without Pay       SO             9921                      SSO                     9921

 PREGNANCY FURLOUGH           PF             9922                                              9922

 ADMIN SUPPORT                YA             9035                                              9035

 INTERNAL SUPPORT             YI             9036                                              9036

 OUTSIDE SUPPORT              YO             9037                                              9037

 ACTING SUPERVISOR            AS             9038                                              9038


 --


 	-----------------------------------
	SAP Premiums / Hourly Differentials
	-----------------------------------

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________


  SAP Description	      SAP	       Old AWAS                Old UDS Code 	     New AWAS
			      Codes	       OTH EHC               	             	     OTH EHC


 Standby Pay                  SB                                                               SB

 FWAP Straight Time Banked    STOT                                                             ST

 Overtime                     OT              DT, TH, SV,              BOT, BOTR, DB,          OT
					      VH, VO, TV,	       DBR, DT, DT94,
					      VS, ST, VT	        DTR, OT, TT

 Overtime Non Continuous      OTB                                                              OB

 Premium Call Out             PC                                                               PC

 Tower Climb                  TC                                                               TC

 Tower Time                   TT                                                               TT

 Charge Hand                  CH              CH                                               CH

 Training                     TR              TR                                               TR

 Class Instructor            7002             CI                                               CI

 Plant to Management         7004             PM                                               PM

 Equipment Servicing         7005             ES                                               ES

 Heavy Equipment Operator    7006             HE                                               HE

 Mechanic Field Worker       7007             ME                                               ME

 Truck Driver                7008             TD                                               TD

 Partial Assignment of       P6                                          PAM6                  P6
 Management Duties

 Partial Assignment of       PM                                          PAM                   PM
 Management Duties

 Partial Assignment of       PR                                          PAMR                  PR
 Management Duties

 Responsibility Pay          R1                                          RP1                   R1

 Responsibility Pay          R2                                          RP2                   R2

 Responsibility Pay          R3                                          RP3                   R3

 Responsibility Pay          R4                                          RP4                   R4


 --

 	----------------------------
	SAP Internal Orders and AWAS
	----------------------------

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________


  Description	      SAP Internal 	 AWAS         AWAS Product     AWAS Function   AWAS   Product/Account
		      Order Number	 Driver          Worked            Code        BID     code Entered


  MULTIMEDIA SUPPORT  5001886             20              1000             4000        S,R     5001886
  (RESIDENTIAL)

  PUBLIC PAYPHONE     5009309            TCI             5000             4000         M       5009309
  Change to ($0.35)


 --

 	----------------------------
	Network Functional Locations
	----------------------------

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________


  Functional
  Location             				       FL Description                         AWAS C.O. Codes

    Wire
   Centre
   (WWWW)


    ACVY					       Acadia Valley Area                          0603

    ACME                                               Acme Area                                   0146

    ARDR                                               Airdrie Area                           	   0118

    ATBH                                               Alberta Beach Area                          0372

    ADFL                                               Alder Flats Area                            0339

    ALIX                                               Alix Area                                   0172

    ALNC                                               Alliance Area                               0315

    ALRO                                               Altario Area                                0170

    ANDR                                               Andrew Area                                 0512

    ANZC                                               Anzac Area                                  0428

    ADSN                                               Ardrossan Area                              0366

    AWWD                                               Arrowwood Area                              0138

    ASMT                                               Ashmont Area                                0543

    ASMP                                               Assumption Area                             0495

    ATBC                                               Athabasca Area                              0433

    BNFF                                               Banff Area                                  0127

    BRNS                                               Barons Area                                 0277

    BRHD                                               Barrhead Area                               0381

    BSHW                                               Bashaw Area                                 0305

    BSSN                                               Bassano Area                                0625

    BWLF                                               Bawlf Area                                  0306

    BRCN                                               Bear Canyon Area                            0485

    BUMT                                               Beaumont Area                               0365

    BRLG                                               Beaverlodge Area                            0452

    BSKR                                               Beiseker Area                               0147

    BLLV                                               Bellevue Area                               0260

    BNTL                                               Bentley Area                                0179

    BWYN                                               Berwyn Area                                 0483

    BGVY                                               Big Valley Area                             0168

    BDLS                                               Bindloss Area                               0606

    BLFD                                               Blackfalds Area                             0174

    BLKE                                               Blackie Area                                0137

    BLRM                                               Blairmore Area                              0258

    BLRG                                               Blue Ridge Area                             0385

    BACD                                               Bon Accord Area                             0350

    BNNZ                                               Bonanza Area                                0451

    BNVL                                               Bonnyville Area                             0550

    BWIS                                               Bow Island Area                             0607

    BWDN                                               Bowden Area                                 0189

    BOYL                                               Boyle Area                                  0435

    BGCK                                               Bragg Creek Area                            0114

    BRTN                                               Breton Area                                 0331

    BRCK                                               Brocket Area                                0255

    BRKS                                               Brooks Area                                 0622

    BNVA                                               Brownvale Area                              0487

    BRHE                                               Bruderheim Area                             0360

    BRDT                                               Burdett Area                                0609

    BYMR                                               Byemoor Area                                0167

    CDMN                                               Cadomin Area                                0401

    CLLK                                               Calling Lake Area                           0431

    CLMR                                               Calmar Area                                 0320

    CMRS                                               Camrose Area                                0301

    CNMR                                               Canmore Area                                0128

    CRBN                                               Carbon Area                                 0196

    CMGY                                               Carmangay Area                              0278

    CRLN                                               Caroline Area                               0191

    CRST                                               Carstairs Area                              0143

    CAST                                               Castor Area                                 0164

    CYLY                                               Cayley Area                                 0136

    CREL                                               Cereal Area                                 0602

    CSFR                                               Cessford Area                               0627

    CHMP                                               Champion Area                               0141

    CHVN                                               Chauvin Area                                0534

    CWLK                                               Chipewyan Lake Area                         0430

    CHMN                                               Chipman Area                                0363

    CRMT                                               Clairmont Area                   	   0455

    CRHO                                               Claresholm Area                  	   0256

    ARWY                                               CLGR - Airways Area in Calgary              0061

    BNVT                                               CLGR - Bonavista Area in Calgary            0014

    BWNS                                               CLGR - Bowness Area in Calgary              0009

    CPHL                                               CLGR - Capital Hill Area in Calgary         0004

    CHTS                                               CLGR - Cres Heights Area in Calgary         0046

    CRCD                                               CLGR - Crowchild Area in Calgary            0033

    ELPK                                               CLGR - Elbow Park Area in Calgary           0007

    FSLN                                               CLGR - Forest Lawn Area in Calgary          0010

    HLHT                                               CLGR - Hillhurst Area in Calgary            0031

    HNHL                                               CLGR - Huntington Hills in Calgary          0013

    KLRN                                               CLGR - Killarney Area in Calgary            0002

    KGLD                                               CLGR - Kingsland Area in Calgary            0012

    MAIN                                               CLGR - Main Area in Calgary                 0001

    MCKZ                                               CLGR - Mckenzie Area in Calgary             0051

    MTRY                                               CLGR - Mount Royal Area in Calgary          0006

    OKRG                                               CLGR - Oakridge Area in Calgary             0015

    OGDN                                               CLGR - Ogden Area in Calgary                0038

    SNSY                                               CLGR - Shawnessy Area in Calgary            0049

    TMPL                                               CLGR - Temple Area in Calgary               0022

    CLIV                                               Clive Area                                  0173

    CLYD                                               Clyde                                       0375

    CODL                                               Coaldale Area                               0274

    CCHR                                               Cochrane Area                               0113

    CDLK                                               Cold Lake Area                              0549

    CLMN                                               Coleman Area                                0259

    CNKL                                               Conklin Area                                0427

    CNST                                               Consort Area                                0166

    CRNT                                               Coronation Area                             0165

    CTHL                                               Country Hill Area Calgary                   0054

    COTS                                               Coutts Area                                 0269

    CWLY                                               Cowley Area                                 0261

    CGMY                                               Craigmyle Area                              0629

    CMNA                                               Cremona Area                                0144

    CSFD                                               Crossfield Area                             0119

    CSTN                                               CSTN - Cardston Area                        0254

    CZAR                                               Czar Area                                   0533

    DYLD                                               Daysland Area                               0307

    DBLT                                               Debolt Area                                 0462

    DLBR                                               Delburne Area                               0187

    DELI                                               Delia Area                                  0631

    DRWT                                               Derwent Area                                0524

    DEVN                                               Devon Area                                  0319

    DSBY                                               Didsbury Area                               0145

    DXVL                                               Dixonville Area                             0492

    DNLD                                               Donalda Area                                0161

    DNLY                                               Donnelly Area                               0471

    DRVY                                               Drayton Valley Area                         0334

    DMHL                                               Drumheller Area                             0197

    DCHS                                               Duchess Area                                0623

    EGHM                                               Eaglesham Area                              0454

    ECLE                                               East Coulee Area                            0198

    ECVL                                               Eckville Area                               0181

    EGTN                                               Edgerton Area                               0528

    EDSO                                               Edson Area                                  0395

    BVLY                                               EDTN - Beverly Area Edmonton                0752

    BNDN                                               EDTN - Bonnie Doon Area Edmonton            0711

    CTDW                                               EDTN - Castle Downs Edmonton                0742

    CLBR                                               EDTN - Clover Bar Area Edmonton             0743

    ESGT                                               EDTN - East Gate Area Edmonton              0712

    EDIA                                               EDTN - Edmonton International Airport       0346

    EMAN                                               EDTN - EDTN Main Area Edmonton              0701

    ELSL                                               EDTN - Ellerslie Area Edmonton              0732

    EVGR                                               EDTN - Evergreen Area Edmnoton              0744

    JSPL                                               EDTN - Jasper Place Area Edmonton           0721

    KASK                                               EDTN - Kaskitayo Area Edmonton              0733

    LNDM                                               EDTN - Lendrum Area Edmonton                0731

    LWIS                                               EDTN - Lewis Farms Area Edmonton            0722

    LDDY                                               EDTN - Londonderry Area Edmonton            0741

    MDWS                                               EDTN - Meadows Area Edmonton                0713

    MLWD                                               EDTN - Mill Woods Area Edmonton             0714

    NRST                                               EDTN - North East Area Edmonton             0745

    NRWD                                               EDTN - Norwood Area Edmonton                0751

    OLVR                                               EDTN - Oliver Area Edmonton                 0763

    PLSD                                               EDTN - Pilot Sound Area Edmonton            0746

    ROPR                                               EDTN - Roper Area Edmonton                  0715

    SEIP                                               EDTN - South East Industrial Area Edmonton  0716

    STON                                               EDTN - Stone Area Edmonton                  0764

    STRC                                               EDTN - Strathcona Area Edmonton             0734

    TWGR                                               EDTN - Terwillegar Area Edmonton            0735

    TWBK                                               EDTN - Twin Brooks Area Edmonton            0736

    WJPL                                               EDTN - West Jasper Place Edmonton           0724

    WEML                                               EDTN - West Edmonton Mall Edmonton          0723

    WSMT                                               EDTN - Westmount Area Edmonton              0761

    WRBN                                               EDTN - Winterburn Area Edmonton             0765

    CNNL                                               EDTN - Cannell Area Edmonton                0762

    ELPN                                               Elk Point Area                              0542

    EKWR                                               Elkwater Area                               0615

    ELNR                                               Elnora Area                                 0201

    EMPR                                               Empress Area                                0605

    ENCH                                               Enchant Area                                0268

    ETZK                                               Etzikom Area                                0620

    EVBG                                               Evansburg Area                              0335

    EXSW                                               Exshaw Area                                 0129

    FRVW                                               Fairview Area                               0490

    FLHR                                               Falher Area                                 0470

    FAST                                               Faust Area                                  0472

    FRNT                                               Ferintosh Area                              0303

    FLTB                                               Flatbush Area                               0376

    FRMS                                               Foremost Area                               0618

    FSBG                                               Forestburg Area                             0313

    FTAS                                               Fort Assiniboine Area                       0380

    FTCP                                               Fort Chipewyan Area                         0426

    FTMK                                               Fort Mackay Area                            0429

    FTML                                               Fort Macleod Area                           0251

    FTSK                                               Fort Saskatchewan Area                      0351

    FTVM                                               Form Vermilion Area                         0497

    FXCK                                               Fox Creek Area                              0386

    FXLK                                               Fox Lake Area                               0501

    FTMM                                               Ft McMurray Area                            0425

    GDSB                                               Gadsby Area                                 0163

    GLHD                                               Galahad Area                                0314

    GIBN                                               Gibbons Area                                0353

    GFLK                                               Gift Lake Area                              0468

    GXVL                                               Girouxville Area                            0464

    GLCH                                               Gleichen Area                               0126

    GLND                                               Glendon Area                                0537

    GLWD                                               Glenwood Area                               0252

    GDCT                                               Grand Centre/Cold Lake Area                 0547

    GDCH                                               Grand Cache Area                            0404

    GDPR                                               Grand Prairie Area                          0450

    GRNM                                               Granum Area                                 0257

    GRLD                                               Grassland Area                              0436

    GYLK                                               Grassy Lake Area                            0266

    GMSW                                               Grimshaw Area                               0482

    GRAD                                               Grouard Area                                0467

    HRHL                                               Hairy Hill Area                             0520

    HLKR                                               Halkirk Area                                0162

    HANN                                               Hanna Area                                  0628

    HRTY                                               Hardisty Area                               0317

    HYLK                                               Hay Lakes Area                              0299

    HAYS                                               Hays Area                                   0267

    HSBG                                               Heinsburg Area                              0544

    HSLR                                               Heisler Area                                0309

    HILV                                               High Level Area                             0496

    HIPR                                               High Prairie Area                           0465

    HIRV                                               High River Area                             0132

    HILD                                               Hilda Area                                  0613

    HNCK                                               Hines Creek Area                            0484

    HITN                                               Hinton Area                                 0399

    HBMA                                               Hobbema Area                                0326

    HLDN                                               Holden Area                                 0518

    HGDN                                               Hughenden Area                              0532

    HUSR                                               Hussar Area                                 0205

    HYTH                                               Hythe Area                                  0453

    INFL                                               Innisfail Area                              0188

    INFR                                               Innisfree Area                              0514

    IRMA                                               Irma Area                                   0527

    IRSP                                               Iron Springs Area                           0276

    IRCN                                               Irricana Area                               0120

    IRVN                                               Irvine Area                                 0612

    ISLY                                               Islay Area                                  0525

    JRVE                                               Jarvie Area                                 0377

    JSPR                                               Jasper Area                                 0403

    JSRE                                               Jasper East Area                            0402

    JENR                                               Jenner Area                                 0610

    JDPR                                               John D'Or Prairie Area                      0502

    JSRD                                               Joussard Area                               0469

    KNKS                                               Kananaskis Area                             0148

    KPHL                                               Keephills Area                              0337

    KGRV                                               Keg River Area                              0500

    KILM                                               Killam Area                                 0311

    KNSO                                               Kinuso Area                                 0475

    KTCY                                               Kitscoty Area                               0555

    LCRT                                               La Crete Area                               0498

    LBCH                                               Lac La Biche Area                           0437

    LCMB                                               Lacombe Area                                0176

    LKLS                                               Lake Louise Area                            0130

    LAMT                                               Lamont Area                                 0361

    LNGD                                               Langdon Area                                0122

    LAVY                                               Lavoy Area                                  0515

    LEDC                                               Leduc Area                                  0318

    LEGL                                               Legal Area                                  0374

    LSVL                                               Leslieville Area                            0182

    LTBR                                               Lethbridge Area                             0250

    LTBF                                               Little Buffalo Area                         0493

    LLYD                                               Lloydminister Area                          0553

    LDGP                                               Lodgepole Area                              0338

    LMND                                               Lomond Area                                 0140

    LGVW                                               Longview Area                               0133

    LGHD                                               Lougheed Area                               0316

    MGRT                                               Magrath Area                                0283

    MMOB                                               Ma-Me-O Beach Area                          0328

    MNNG                                               Manning Area                                0491

    NMVL                                               Mannville Area                              0529

    MYBR                                               Manyberries Area                            0619

    MRBO                                               Marlboro Area                               0398

    MRWN                                               Marwayne Area                               0554

    MYTP                                               Mayerthorpe Area                            0384

    MLNN                                               Mclennan Area                               0473

    MNRV                                               Meander River Area                          0503

    MDHT                                               Medicine Hat Area                           0621

    MKRV                                               Milk River Area                             0273

    MILT                                               Millet Area                                 0327

    MILO                                               Milo Area                                   0139

    MNBN                                               Minburn Area                                0523

    MIRR                                               Mirror Area                                 0171

    MRVL                                               Morinville Area                             0368

    MRLY                                               Morley Area                                 0131

    MORN                                               Morrin Area                                 0200

    MLHT                                               Mulhurst Bay Area                           0329

    MNDR                                               Mundare Area                                0519

    MRNM                                               Myrnam Area                                 0522

    NAMO                                               Namao Area                                  0352

    NMPA                                               Nampa Area                                  0481

    NATN                                               Nanton Area                                 0134

    NDTN                                               New Dayton Area                             0282

    NNRY                                               New Norway Area                             0302

    NSPA                                               New Sarepta Area                            0304

    NBRK                                               Newbrook Area                               0432

    NSKU                                               Nisku Area                                  0323

    NTJT                                               Niton Junction Area                         0397

    NBFD                                               Nobleford Area                              0279

    NRDG                                               Nordegg Area                                0184

    OKTK                                               Okotoks Area                                0115

    OLDS                                               Olds Area                                   0192

    ONWY                                               Onoway Area                                 0373

    OYEN                                               Oyen Area                                   0601

    PRVY                                               Paradise Valley Area                        0556

    PCRV                                               Peace River Area                            0488

    PLLK                                               Peerless Lake Area                          0479

    PERS                                               Peers Area                                  0396

    PNHL                                               Penhold Area                                0186

    PCBT                                               Picture Butte Area                          0275

    PNCK                                               Pincher Creek Area                          0262

    PLDN                                               Plamondon Area                              0439

    PNKA                                               Ponoka Area                                 0177

    PRDS                                               Priddis Area                                0116

    PRVT                                               Provost Area                                0526

    RDWY                                               Radway Area                                 0355

    RNLK                                               Rainbow Lake Area                           0499

    RLTN                                               Ralston Area                                0611

    RYMN                                               Raymond Area                                0280

    RDDR                                               Red Deer Area                               0194

    RDER                                               Red Earth Area                              0480

    RDWR                                               Redwater Area                               0354

    RMBY                                               Rimbey Area                                 0178

    ROBB                                               Robb Area                                   0400

    ROCH                                               Rochester Area                              0434

    RMTH                                               Rocky Mountain House Area                   0183

    RKFD                                               Rockyford Area                              0123

    RLHL                                               Rolling Hills Area                          0626

    RSLD                                               Rosalind Area                               0308

    RSBD                                               Rosebud Area                                0199

    RMSY                                               Rumsey Area                                 0195

    RYCF                                               Rycroft Area                                0458

    RYLY                                               Ryley Area                                  0517

    SNGD                                               Sangudo Area                                0383

    SKCS                                               Saskatchewan River Crossing Area            0175

    SCHL                                               Schuler Area                                0614

    SBBH                                               Seba Beach Area                             0333

    SDWK                                               Sedgewick Area                              0312

    SVPR                                               Seven Persons Area                          0608

    SXSM                                               Sexsmith Area                               0456

    SWPK                                               Sherwood Park Area                          0364

    SBLD                                               Sibbald Area                                0604

    SLVY                                               Silver Valley Area                          0463

    SELK                                               Slave Lake Area                             0477

    SMTH                                               Smith Area                                  0476

    SMLK                                               Smoky Lake Area                             0358

    SPRV                                               Spirit River Area                           0461

    SPGV                                               Spruce Grove Area                           0369

    SPVW                                               Spruce View Area                            0190

    STAL                                               St Albert Area                              0367

    STMC                                               St Michael Area                             0362

    STPL                                               St Paul Area                                0535

    STOF                                               Stand Off Area                              0253

    STDD                                               Standard Area                               0125

    STVY                                               Stavely Area                                0135

    STLR                                               Stettler Area                               0160

    STNG                                               Stirling Area                               0281

    SYPL                                               Stony Plain Area                            0370

    STMR                                               Strathmore Area                             0121

    STRM                                               Strome Area                                 0310

    SCOC                                               Sunchild O'Chiese Area                      0185

    SNDR                                               Sundre Area                                 0193

    SNHL                                               Swan Hills Area                             0379

    SYLK                                               Sylvan Lake Area                            0180

    TABR                                               Taber Area                                  0264

    TRHL                                               Thorhild Area                               0359

    THRS                                               Thorsby Area                                0322

    THHL                                               Three Hill Area                             0204

    TLLY                                               Tilley Area                                 0624

    TOFD                                               Tofield Area                                0516

    TMHK                                               Tomahawk Area                               0336

    TRTN                                               Torrington Area                             0203

    TRCH                                               Trochu Area                                 0202

    TRVY                                               Turner Valley Area                          0117

    TWHL                                               Two Hills Area                              0511

    VYVW                                               Valleyview Area                             0466

    VXHL                                               Vauxhall Area                               0265

    VGVL                                               Vegreville Area                             0510

    VRML                                               Vermilion Area                              0531

    VTRN                                               Veteran Area                                0169

    VKNG                                               Viking Area                                 0521

    VILN                                               Vilna Area                                  0538

    VLCN                                               Vulcan Area                                 0142

    WBMN                                               Wabamun Area                                0371

    WBSC                                               Wabasca Area                                0478

    WNWR                                               Wainwright Area                             0530

    WLSH                                               Walsh Area                                  0617

    WNRV                                               Wandering River Area                        0438

    WNHM                                               Wanham Area                                 0457

    WRBG                                               Warburg Area                                0321

    WRNR                                               Warner Area                                 0270

    WSPT                                               Warspite Area                               0357

    WKTN                                               Waskatenau Area                             0356

    WRTP                                               Waterton Park Area                          0263

    WMBY                                               Wembley Area                                0459

    WLOC                                               Westlock Area                               0378

    WTKW                                               Wetaskiwin Area                             0325

    WTCO                                               Whitecourt Area                             0382

    WHLW                                               Whitelaw Area                               0486

    WDWR                                               Widewater Area                              0474

    WLWD                                               Wildwood Area                               0332

    WLDN                                               Willingdon Area                             0513

    WNFD                                               Winfield Area                               0330

    WOKG                                               Woking Area                                 0460

    WRSY                                               Worsley Area                                0489

    WRHM                                               Wrentham Area                               0272

    YNTW                                               Youngstown Area                             0630

    ZAMA                                               Zama Area                                   0494


   ---



    AWAS Related Telephone #'s / IP's:


   'DISPATCH / ANALYSIS CENTERS'

    LOWER MAINLAND:

    Bus DAC - CPE (604) 453-2212
    BUS DAC - NET (604) 453-2213
    
    I/R DAC - (604) 453-2330 or 1-800-665-2927
    Network DAC - (604) 453-2900 or 1-877-828-8812

    TNO CSD Support Line - 1-800-665-2927

    --

    KELOWNA:
 
    Bus DAC - (250) 470-5455 or 1-800-665-4249
    
    I/R DAC - (250) 470-5455 or 1-800-665-2927

    --

    VICTORIA:

    Bus DAC - (250) 388-8021

    I/R DAC - (250) 388-8877 or 1-800-665-2927

    -->

    LAPTOP SUPPORT NUMBERS:

    'TELUS OPERATIONS LAPTOP SUPPORT'
 
    7035 Greenwood Street
    Burnaby, B.C.  V5A 1X7
    (604) 432-5559 or 1-888-999-2927
    Fax (604) 415-9067

    --

    SPOC (PASSWORD TROUBLES) - 1-800-606-7762

    --

    FIELD SUPPORT NUMBERS:

    'CUSTOMER SERVICE REPS'

    Residential - 1-888-483-4777
    Business    - 1-888-388-3302

    --

    ASSIGNMENT AND PROGRAMMING:

    Assignment - 310-3344  -6  -1
 
    Local # Portability - 310-3344  -6  -2

    Activations (CDA)     310-3344  -6  -3

    --
    
    TEST DESK:
    
    1-800-665-1774
    (250) 861-2280
    (604) 430-7333

    --

    (PLANT) TEST NUMBERS:

    Line Opener - 958-4111
    ANI (ANAC)  - 958-6111
 
    ADSL Provisioning - (604) 878-3101 or 1-877-519-9292


     --

     LAPTOP (MODEM) DIAL-UP NUMBERS:

     AWAS local: 205-5923
     AWAS long dis: 1-888-665-2100
     Secure ID local: 205-5263
     Secure ID long dis. 1-888-886-7877

    -->




    'Online AWAS Resources'
     ---------------------

     The following are some links for additional information on AWAS:

     http://www-1.ibm.com/industries/wireless/doc/content/bin/telusappbrief.pdf

     http://www.crtc.gc.ca/ENG/publications/reports/8660/TCBC/Aug98a2.doc

     http://www.hackcanada.com/canadian/phreaking/gc_dima.txt

     http://www.e-voliucija.lt/2001presentations/evoliucijaIBM.pdf

     --




    [ 'Conclusion to Document' ]


    There you have it, folks; The Comprehensive Guide to AWAS. I hope it was worth it.

    The Automated Work Administration System, a network of love, hate, and chaos.

    Can you sit around and let this system control your lives, or are you going to stand
    up and fight against the new world order? Fear not, for we are here to protect you.

    This guide represents part of my effort to widen the audience of the latest and great
    est groundbreaking technologies from the incumbent telecommunication powers that be. 

    Phreaking has had an enormous influence on my life and my view of the universe. My
    only regret is that the limits of the current technologies we're involved with today
    fail to capture the full fidelity of the bigger picture. The bigger picture is that
    you are a slave! A slave to POTS copper, a slave to the proprietary. Wake up, sleepy!

    AWAS' wireless side... to die?

    In other news, the CDPD side of AWAS is said to be in the works of "deconstruction".

    Is AWAS too expensive, too complex, too resource intensive to keep alive? Is AWAS
    going to be replaced with an advanced Teradyne engineered 4TEL (VRS) system? A telus
    technician from Edmonton who spoke with my associate H1D30U5 said this may happen, or
    are these foolish rumours in a failed attempt to TRICK local phreaks into leaving the
    "system" alone? Only time will tell because, of course... the future is friendly(tm)!




   --->

  <senorita> buy me an ice cweam?

   --->





    Millennium Hardware Modification for the purpose of Redboxing


 By: H1D30U5

 03/29/04



Shouts to Hackcanada, Nettwerked, The Clone, Wizbone, Kankraka,
Cyb0rg/Asm, Question, Tr00per, H410G3N, and of course Nortel (for
giving us a laugh or 2)

Thanks to Joe Clark for taking the time to send me some information.
And thanks to Jackel for writing the first document regarding this idea.




Equipment required to pull this 'sploit

1. Propane torch + Lighter

2. Wire cutters

3. Electrical Tape

4. Super Glue

5. Balls of Solid Rock.



For Reference, the tones for NACTS are as follows

Quarter 2200hz 33ms on 33ms off 5 times repeated

Dime    2200hz 66ms on 66ms off 2 times repeated

Nickel  2200hz 66ms on 66ms off once



3900hz can also be substituted because Telus' switching equipment will also
accept this as a valid frequency.  If it's easier to produce, go for it.  Also
see the redboxing file on Hackcanada.com written by Cyb0rg/Asm for more details
on how to build your redbox.




***Millennium Info/History***



MILLEN MTR 2.0--Millennium Payphone (A0748017) 


The Millennium Payphone was once called the "Un-Phreakable Phone" simply because 
it has many fraud deterrants such as the false dial tone, the remote DTMF dialling,
and the microphone muting.  It was manufactured by Quortech and licenced for use and
distribution to Nortel. The birth of the Millennium happened in 1993, according to
Doug Matatall, director of Millennium marketing at Northern Telecom.  Ordinary people
on the street and marketing designers wanted to produce the "Perfect" pay-telephone.
Consumers asked that the buttons on the dialing pad not be hidden under the handset
as they are on the older Centurion model, so the  Millennium's handset was placed next
to the buttons. People with tremors, cerebral palsy, and other motor impairments had
difficulty inserting coins and dialing numbers, so the Millennium's buttons are farther
apart and the coin slot is surrounded by a tapered bezel to guide a coin in. It has an
alpha-numeric display, and an internal computer that will set off alarms in case of
vandalism / abuse, a full coin box, or when the coin slot is jammed (so don't say it's
jammed to a live op, THEY KNOW.)



Matatall states that there are just over 167 000 payphones in Canada, and over 60,000 of
them are Millenniums. There are over 150,000 Millenniums in North America alone.  They are
also found in Singapore, Australia, and Thailand. This phone has been engineered, and re-
engineered to weather anything.  The LCD was even engineered with a special substance that
has a freezing point of -60 Celcius so that the display will not freeze even in the harshest
of Canadian winters.  


The Millennium doesn't merely display information, it also talks to you in a synthesized voice.
Though this redundancy should make the phone accessible to people with vision or hearing impair-
ments, what you hear doesn't always match what is displayed. Place a long-distance call via a
credit card, for example, and the display will read "Card verification in progress" while the
synthesized voice simply says "Please wait." These features draw electrical power, using a
TA10750 Transformer and only draw up to 8.6 watts a month, at a cost which Matatall estimates
at 30 cents.


(The Centurion draws no separate electrical power.) Converting all 167,000 payphones in Canada
to Millenia will incur a power bill of over $50,000 a month; presumably telephone utilities
will try to recoup this overhead through higher rates.  



***Millennium Stats***



Height : 533mm (21")
Width : 194mm (7 13/16")
Depth : 155mm (6 3/16")
Weight : 19.05kg (42lbs) *EMPTY*


It has an enhanced G type handset with armored cabling, and an Electret Microphone with
a dynamic receiver.  It's operating temperature range is from -40'C to +60'C, and it's 
Non operating but still physically undamaged temperature range is from 10'C in either 
direction from it's operating range.  It uses supplemental power (110v DC) and can
function without the use of it's LCD to call emergency numbers, and operator assisted
calls in case of a power outage.  It uses a Vaccuum Fluorescent Display (but for all
intents and purposes we'll just call it LCD in this article.)  And it's "LCD" is able to
function using English, French, Spanish, and Japanese letters and symbols.  The display
can also be independantly configured to display any message that the owner wants.  If it
were used as a COCOT, then the owner could program an advertisment into the LCD.



***THE SPLOIT***


The only method of redboxing from a Millennium before Jackel's findings was to cut the power,
which is not only in-efficient, but it also automatically signals the telco.  Then they'll come
and repair it, etc. There is another method... we earlier discussed the "microphone muting".

There is a way around this feature, for they were not smart enough to have the local switching
station initiate the muting, because there are many makes and types of switches, and the older
ones would not have to resources to initiate this feature.  Quortech, in their infinite wisdom,
then decided to use electrical grounding on a computer controlled switch to mute the microphone.

They did this by sending an electrical current from the phone's power supply to the mouthpiece.
This current is equal to the voltage required to power the microphone, therefore completing the
circuit without passing through the microphone.  That means that when the phone is kicked over
into NACTS, (when the coin are to be inserted) that the microphone is bypassed.  Now that we
know WHY it happens, we can make it fail.  The only mildly dangerous part of this exploit, is
that you have to take a little bit of time to do it.  This means that concerned citizen/police
officer could see you doing it.


I recommend night-time for this, and that you try to pick a Millennium that is semi-secluded.
Not the one that's beside the door of your local 7-11... The "Bloated Gas-Bag" could see you.
To stop the phone from bypassing the microphone, we have to open the handset.  There are a few
methods of doing this, either by breaking it, or otherwise.  I prefer to bring a propane torch
along with me and heat the microphone cap on the handset.  This will melt the glue, and at the
same time, expand the cap making it easier to remove.  Okay, so we got the cap off. Pull the
microphone out and take a look at how the microphone is wired.

Study it, and learn something.

You'll see 3 wires there;  Hot, Neutral, and a strange, out of place looking wire with a clear
coating on it.  That's the one we're looking for.  It's the wire that completes the microphone
bypass.  All you have to do is cut that wire, and then the phone will send current down the line
as per usual, but nothing will happen.  The important part though, is to tape the loose ends of
the wires with electrical tape.  If you go to all of this trouble to modify a payphone, then it'd
better damn well work.  If you do not tape the wires, and the hot loose end touches something metal,
it will either fry the wiring, (it is 110v DC, same voltage as your household plugs) or mute the
mouthpiece as normal... therefore undoing all your hard work! 


What a kick in the pants eh?


So tape those wire ends up, and then glue the cap back on the mouthpiece.  Done, now you can try
to redbox it.  I find that op's will fail to notice redboxing from millenniums because it's the
"unphreakable fone." When you call from a Millennium, the op knows that you're calling from a
Millennium.  It will display it on their console, so you have a better success rate.  I have had
about 95% success when using this technique.  The best reason for modifying a Millennium instead
of just using a Centurion, or Fortress, is that you can learn something while doing it, and the
success rate will dramatically increase.  

Also, you won't have telco personnel coming around to fix the phone like you'd have if you use the
power out exploit.  There you have it, The "Unphreakable Phone" has been phreaked.  On a side note,
I'd suggest that you mark the payphone after you've modified it, to let other phreakers know that
it has been rigged.  A Nettwerked sticker would be perfect, and that's the way that I marked the
one I took apart to research this article.


Have Phun, and come back safe.




--->

<wizbone> -bush-2.05b$ rm -r /usr/local/bin/laden
<son4r> Are you guys having fun? :D
<wizbone> not anymore :(
<theclone> you ruined it
<wizbone> thanks alot
<theclone> rm -rf /usr/local/bush/cia/drugs/cocaine/white.txt
<theclone> ^- cover up
<wizbone> haha
<wizbone> you're a coverup
<theclone> thanks

--->



 ------------------------------
 Alberta CLLI's and other stuff
 ------------------------------

 By: tr00per


 Shouts: Question, The Clone, steelethan, kankraka, port9,
         hades, Jackel, Treephrog, tek and everyone else from
        #hackcanada


 If you've read k-1ine 41, you probably already know about CLLI's.  The CLLI 
 format is the same all over Canada.  Ive typed out this chart to show how 
 the CLLI format works.  For more detail read 'The Complete (TELUS) British 
 Columbia CLLI Compilation' from k-1ine 41.


 Here's a little review:



             COMMON LANGUAGE LOCATION IDENTIFICATION FORMAT CHART


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ITEM                             |              CHARACTER TYPE               
       |
                                 
|-------------------------------------------------|
            CHARACTER POSITION   |   1    2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9   
10   11 |
---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
PLACE NAME                       |   A    A    A   A|        |        |      
       |
PROVINCE OR STATE                |                  | A   A  |        |      
       |
---------------------------------|                  |        |        |      
       |
BUILDING                         |                  |        | A    A |      
       |
---------------------------------|                  |        | N    N |      
       |
ENTITY                           |                  |        |        |      
       |
              -SWITCHING ENTITIES|                  |        |        | X   
X    X |
              -NON-SWITCHING     |                  |        |        | A   
x    X |
---------------------------------|                  |        
|---------------------|
NON-BUILDING                     |                  |        |               
       |
              -cUSTOMER          |                  |        | N    A   N   
N    N |
              -OTHER             |                  |        | A    N   N   
N    N |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  A= ALPHA CHARACTER    N= NUMERIC CHARACTER  X= ALPHA OR NUMERIC CHARACTER



This Chart might seem counfusing at first, but it's really quite simple. 
Here's an example of your standard CLLI : FTSKAB01CG1

                   F T S K A B        0 1                      C G 1
                   ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^        ^ ^                      ^ ^ ^
                   | | | | | |        | |                      | | |
             The First 6 Characters  These two numbers
             will most likely        will usually represent    The last 3 
characters
             always be letters.      the building site,        identify the 
equipment/                                                although there are 
        service used by the
                                     exeptions. It can have    place.
                                     numerical or Alpha
                                     characters




Now... to the good stuff.  Here's a list of digital switches,
and their CLLI's for the major cities of Alberta:

SWITCH (DMS100)                CLLI
------------               -----------

Airdrie	                    ARDRAB02DSO
Banff	                    BNFFAB01CG2
Bonnyville	            BNVLAB03CG1
Calgary Main	            CLGRAB01CG2
	                    CLGRAB01CG3
	                    CLGRAB21DS1
Camrose	                    CMRSAB06DSO
Drumheller	            DMHLAB01CGO
Ft McMurray            	    FTMMAB03DSO
Ft Saskatchewan	            FTSKAB01CG1
Grande Prairie	            GDPRAB01DSO
High Level	            HILVAB01CGO
Hinton	                    HNTNAB02DSO
Lethbridge	            LTBRAB01CG1
	                    LTBRAB01DSO
Lloydminister	            LLYDAB01CG1
Medicine Hat	            MDHTAB02CG1
Peace River	            PCRVAB01CGO
Red Deer	            RDDRAB01CG1
	                    RDDRAB01CG2
Sherwood Park	            SWPKAB01DSO
Slave Lake	            SELKAB01CG2
St Albert	            STALAB01DSO
Stettler	            STRLAB01CGO
Vegreville	            VGVLAB01DSO
Wainwright	            WNWRAB01CGO
Wetaskiwin	            WTKWAB02CGO


These are seperate areas within Calgary:

AREA'S in Calgary            CLLI
--------------		-----------------
Airways	                  CLGRAB61CGO
Bonavista	          CLGRAB14DSO
Bowness	                  CLGRAB09DSO
Crescent Heights	  CLGRAB46DSO
Crowchild	          CLGRAB33DSO
Elbow Park	          CLGRAB07DSO
Forest Lawn	          CLGRAB10DSO
Hillhurst	          CLGRAB31DSO
Huntington Hills	  CLGRAB13DSO
Killarney	          CLGRAB02DSO
Kingsland	          CLGRAB12DSO
Main CG2	          CLGRAB01CG2
Main CG3	          CLGRAB01CG3
Main DSO	          CLGRAB21DSO
Main DS1	          CLGRAB21DS1
Mount Royal	          CLGRAB06DSO
Oakridge 	          CLGRAB15DSO
Ogden	                  CLGRAB38DSO
Shawnessy	          CLGRAB49DSO
Temple	                  CLGRAB22DSO

I hope to have a complete list soon.

Since this file is pretty damn short, I've compiled a list of telus/telco 
acronyms and their definitions that I thought might be useful to make it longer.
If you dumpster dive or other shit, you have probably come accross e-mails, or
papers or even manuals that make no sense because they are full of weirdo acronyms
(silly telus where do they come up with this shit) and terms, hope this helps :)


                  -------

..............................................................................
ANA     - Automatic Number Announcement
ANI	- Automatic Number Identifier
BERT	- Bit Error Rale Test
BOP	- Bit Oriented Protocol
BRI	- Basic Rate Interface (2B+D) ISDN 128 Kbps (2 x 64 Kbps plus 1x16 Kbps 
channels)
CIC	- Carrier Identification Code
CIR	- Committed Information Rate
CLCI	- Common Language Circuit Identifier (the circuit number)
CLLI	- Common Language Location Identifier
CPE	- Customer Premises Equipment, Customer Provided Equipment
DCC	- Digital Access Cross-Connect
DCE	- Data Communication Equipment
DDS	- Digital Data Service
DLCI	- Data Link Connection Identifier
DS-0	- Digital Signaling - Level 0 - ( 64.0 Kbps)
DS-1	- Digital Signaling - Level 1 - (1.544 Mbps)
DS-3	- Digital Signaling - Level 3 - (44.7 Mbps)
DSU/CSU - Data Service Unit / Channel Service Unit
DTE	- Data Terminal Equipment
DVACS	- Digital / Voice Access and Control System
FOX	- Message Pattern
FT1	- Fractional T1 (The Customer uses only a portion of the available 
bandwidth - ie: 128 KBPS)
HBM	- High Speed Bert Mode
ILS	- Individual Line Service
ISDN	- Integrated Service Digital Network
ITU	- International Telecommunications Union
LAN/WAN - Local Area Network / Wide Area Network
LCRV	- Low Capacity Remoting Vehicle
LMI	- Local Management Interface
MAO	- Maintenance Administration Office
MAP	- Maintenance Administration Position
NETCAP  - Network Capabilities Database
NID	- Network Interface Device
NIDP	- Network Interface Device Point
PIC	- Preferred Inter-Exchange Carrier
PR I	- Primary Rate Interface (23B+D)
PAD	- Packet Assembler Device
PAO	- Plant Administration Office
POC	- Program Operating Center
POS	- Point Of Sale
POTS	- Plain Old (ordinary) Telephone Service
PRO	- Plant Provisioning Office
PSTN	- Public Switched Telephone Network
PVC	- Permanent Virtual Circuit
RILS	- Rural Individual Line Service
S4T4	- Schedule 4, Type 4 Transmission Tests
SND	- Switch Network Data
SPID	- Service Point Identification Number (ISDN circuit number)
SSOSS	- Special Services Operational Support System (a provisioning and 
testing database and tool)
STS	- Synchronous Transport System
SV#	- Switched Virtual Circuit
TDM	- Time Division Multiplexing
TIMS	- Transmission Impairment Measurement Set
TLA	- Three Letter Acronym (The Surgeon General recommends these be avoided)
TLp	- Test Level Point or STLP (Standard Test Level Point)
TOC	- Television Operating Center
USO	- Universal Service Order
USSO	- Universal Special Services Order

-tr00per

--end--



-->


Gizmo [IntricateP@dialup-67.75.231.95.Dial1.Seattle.Level3.net] has joined #hackcanada
<theclone> GIZMO CACA!!
<nach0> i love gremlins
<theclone> me too
<nach0> You're a sheep. Baaaah.. baaaaaah..
<theclone> haha


-->




		Telus Physical Key Systems; an internal memo


By: Anonymous Phone Hero

03/04

This is an e-mail I aquired from a much respected member of our community. This regards Telus' new
use of override keys on Telus CO's and other buildings used by lineman and switchman. Hopefully this
is useful for everyone in one way or another. Again, this is not to be used for malicious purposes,
but rather to educate you on Telus' Physical Security. 



From: Dennis Senio 
Sent: Friday, June 20, 2003 8:02am 
To: Barry Iverson; Brian Andrews; Brian Mckelvey; Brian Richardson; Dave O'donahue; Eric Hannem;
Gary MacKinnon; Jim Ellis; Lynn Mattoon; Mark Hebert; Mike COllins; Reigh Hughes; Rick Domes;
Shawn Cardinal; Vern Tremblay; Verne Forsberg 

Subject: FW: AB New keys 


Just a heads up that new gate and building locks are going to be installed in AB and BC that
will reduce the number of different keys required for access. The recommended keys for us are
the Edm.ABA2.1 and the North ABA4.1. I am trying to order them now so we may actually have
them once the rollout starts. 

---- Original Message ---- 

From: Ginger Surgeon 
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2003 8:21 AM 
To: Garry Zannet; Louise Beattie 
Cc: Paul Lord; Roger Burak; Scott Wellicome; Louis Lafortune; Doug Urichuk; Rick Castonguay;
Don Hamaliuk; David Beaudette 
Subject: AB New keys 

Please distribute this as necessary. There has been much discussion and e-mails regarding locks
in Alberta, below are the details of what is happening. 

Alberta Lock Upgrades / Re-keying 

GENERAL SCOPE 

There is a project in progress to upgrade all the external locks in TELUS buildings. This project
is already underway in BC, and will be starting this year in Alberta. The new locks are 'Abloy'.
They will replace 'Medeco' locks on the external doors. 

KEY STRATEGY 

In an effort to reduce the current amount of keys in use, the province has been divided into 4 sections: 

CALGARY - all buildings in / around Calgary (must have CLLI codes starting CLGR) 
EDMONTON - all buildings in / around Edmonton (must have CLLI codes starting EDTN) 
SOUTH - all other buildings in Southern part of the province (must have area code 403) 
NORTH - all other buildings in Northern part of the province (must have area code 780) 

The new keys required for these areas are as follows: 

CALGARY - gates only ABA1.G - buildings & gates ABA1.1 - card access override CAC1.40 
EDMONTON - gates only ABA2.G - buildings & gates ABA2.1 - card access override CAC2.40 
SOUTH - gates only ABA3.G - buildings & gates ABA3.1 - card access override CAC3.1 
NORTH - gates only ABA4.G - buildings & gates ABA4.1 - card access override CAC4.1 

ROLL OUT PLANS 

1. Sites being converted to card access wil be changed to 'Abloy' when the card access system is installed. 

2. Materials for the remaining lock changes are on order. 

3. Once most of the materials are on site, a communication will be sent out advising all AB employees of
the lock changes and to request new keys. 

4. Once the majority of the key requests have been filled, the rest of the lock changes will begin. 

DO I NEED TO ORDER KEYS NOW? 

There is an urgency to order card access override keys, if your sites are being changed to card readers.
All other requests should wait until the communication is sent out to all AB employees. That will ensure
that there are sufficient keys in stock to process the requests. 

HOW DO I ORDER KEYS? 

To simplify the process, a "bulk" key request form has been developed. A copy is attached. Once the form
is complete, it should be mailed to "teluslock.key@telus.com" with a cc to the authorizing manager. 

Additional questions or concerns should be directed to me at the contact information below. 

Regards, 

Ginger Spurgeon 
Physical Security Specialist 
10 TPS 10020 100 Street 
Edmonton AB T5J 0N5 

tel. (780) 493-3699 
fax. (780) 493-3998




-->

<cyb0rg_asm> i heard there's a new drug that gives men multiple orgasms.. they're still debating
whether or not to release it publicly
<eidolon|DnD> cyb0rg_asm: sweet
<theclone> crazy
<cyb0rg_asm> yeah, instead of pearl necklaces we could be giving the ladies pearl turtlenecks!


-->



Disabling Deep Freeze

The author of this text takes no responsibility for your actions.


In this text, I will discribe how to disable deep freeze 2000xp 4.10. The 
methods discribed in here are relevent to this version of deep freeze and 
possibly others as well.

Deep Freeze is a computer program that works like an etcha sketch. You bring 
out the etcha sketch, you start doodling it, and when your done, all you 
need to do is give it a shake and it all goes away.

Deep Freeze loads up your operating system, and your operating system is all 
on top of deep freeze. You go to porn sites, get infected with worms, 
accidentaly delete command.com and on restart everything comes back to the 
way it was.

Registry settings will go back to the way they were, and all programs will 
go back to the way they were.

Once deep freeze has loaded up on a computer, you cant simply disable it and 
be able to write to the hard disks. No sir. If deep freeze is loaded, 
nothing will be changed after a reboot.

Deep freeze is good like that. It's great for schools where students like to 
play with system files and in offices where people like to view e-mail 
attachments and accidentaly get infected with worms.

So, being the person that I am, I found that the way my computer was frozen 
wasn't exacltly the way I wanted it to be frozen. I wanted some things on it 
different when it boots up. For example, the refresh rate of the monitor was 
set too low. I wanted it at 85hrz, but every time I booted it would be at 
60hrz and I had to change it EVERY TIME I BOOTED UP! It got to suck. First I 
found that if you held down shift and double clicked the deep freeze icon 
you get the deep freeze login screen. Theoreticly you could brute force it, 
but who knows how long that might take.

So I started researching on how to disable deep freeze. It is so very easy, 
and here's how you do it in three easy steps.

1) Create a DOS boot disk  and boot from it.

2) get into c:\progra~1\hypert~1\deepfr~1

3) Copy DFSERVEX.EXE to another folder (I like C:\progra~1\ but put it 
wherever you want, just aslong as it's not in this folder)

Now deep freeze is disabled! To re-enable deep freeze, just copy that file 
back into the folder and your computer will be totaly frozen again.


Why this works.

This works because DFSERVEX.EXE is a file that deep freeze needs to freeze a 
machine. Without this file, deep freeze can't freeze anything.

I have been told that on older versions of deep freeze that the actual file 
is called PERSIO.SYS, a driver or something in the same folder, but I can't 
comment on this myself.

How can sysadmins prevent this? Making the hypertechnologys folder hidden 
wouldnt hurt, but the real big one is to have a password to get into the 
bios setup and disalow booting from anything but the hard disk.


Recommended Reading:

http://www.elitehackers.com/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=1;t=004522
http://www.deepfreezeusa.com/index.htm

Have fun :)



-Aftermath

03/04



--->


<nach0> How's the wife?  Is she at home enjoying capitalism?


--->




No Sleep Magazine Interviews The Clone

By: Jackel

03/04
 
Inspired By The Epic Interview I Have Decided To Do One About The Man
Behind Canada's Longest Running Online Zine; K-1ine. Thats Right, The Clone!

The Canadian scene is often over looked, the media tends to focus more on the
American Hacking/Phreaking side of things (although it often paints us as evil
doers and nerds with no life). Hopefully in this article the people who are not
familiar with the Canadian H/P scene will notice we have the same problems as
everyone else.

I have noticed most of the attention in the Nosleep community going toward H3C
so inspired by the Epic interview, I have decided to concentrate on Hack Canada
and Nettwerked.



NoSleep: How Long Has it Been Since You Started Up Nettwerked?

The Clone: I started Nettwerked on May 22nd 1999. So about 4 years and 8 months.
Nettwerked was originally a site I started on Hypermart.net as a place to publish
my writings, specifically articles surrounding phone phreaking.

NoSleep: What Is Your Relation To Hack Canada?

TheClone: My relation to Hack Canada? Good question. I first learned about Hack Canada
from my friend Wizbone back in December of 1998. We were both into phreaking quite a bit,
and we had even started a not-so-serious group we liked to call "Telus Watchers". Telus
Watchers was also hosted on a crappy freehost known as Hypermart, and like Nettwerked
contained phreak files, and the like. Eventually Wizbone e-mailed the webmaster of Hack
Canada, Cyb0rg/asm, congratulating him on the great site, mentioning our group, and
getting to know him and the rest of the members a bit better. After a few months of
building up the friendship with Hack Canada, I was asked to join the ranks. And the
rest my friends is history.


NoSleep: What was your first H/P experience?

The Clone: My first phreaking experience was when I was 11 years old. I did a dialing
of numbers... hand-scanning or "skanning" as some of us call it. Found a lot of inter-
esting systems, tinkered a lot, broke into some things that I probably shouldn't of
broken into it. Found a lot of interesting systems. Learned a lot about Nortel PBX's
as a kid, and that "need-to-learn-about-everything-telecom" has truly stuck with me
to this day... allowing me to meet great people and learn a hell of a lot more than I
could have ever imagined.


NoSleep: In Your Eyes, What Makes The Hack Canada/Nettwerked Scene So Special?

The Clone: We contribute... a lot. We contribute more articles and projects than an other
so-called hacker / phreak groups do today. We've always respected what L0pht / LOD did,
and in a way, we're keeping that h/p candle burning with our own stuff. One thing that
makes Hack Canada and Nettwerked so special is that we allow anyone to get involved and
write for K-1ine, and our sites. We have that open door policy that a lot of people tend
to respect about us.


NoSleep: What Major Projects is Nettwerked/HC taking on?

The Clone: Hack Canada is involved in a couple of projects that I was forced to sign non-
disclosure agreements over, so at this time I cannot say what those are. However I am
happy to announce that Nettwerked is involved in an outstanding project it calls the
"Anti-Tempest Computer Project." The Anti-Tempest project is a collaborated effort by
associates of the Nettwerked.net collective to create a fully functional / operational,
"secure" anti-emanation computer using Canadian Government-certified / CSE (Communications
Security Establishment) and Ontario Hydro-approved tempest equipment. Originally this
machine (with a 386SX processor, and custom-made and well labelled parts) was picked up
from Government Surplus Sales in Edmonton Alberta in the mid-1990's by Cyb0rg/asm. After
years of dragging this extremely heavy and fairly large computer around, he got sick of
it and gave it to The Clone as a present for his 20th birthday in hopes he might have more
use for it. Well, it's been a couple of years and after sitting on this project for too long,
The Clone is finally getting the proverbial ball rolling with the help of the official
building team (H1D30u5, Kankraka, Wizbone) and making this Anti-Tempest computer into more
than a glorified paper-weight.


NoSleep: How Does Nettwerked/HC cope with the people who are just there to Bring the scene down?

The Clone: We ignore them and they usually just go away. Or if that fails, we pay off a certain
italian organization, and they are happy to make "those people" disappear for a minimal fee.
Joking of course... or am I? :-)


NoSleep: I Know Hc/Nettwerked has had some problems with
         people "selling out" what's your take on that?

The Clone: It has? You mean making a living? If attempting to make a living while being a member
of Hack Canada, and running Nettwerked, then I guess I'm a sell out. A corporate machine and
without a soul. Zing. Selling is out when the un-corporate ideals you once held so dear are
thrown out the window in place of a comfortable suit-job, where you suck the executive's cock
for job security. Ask the "people" who joined @Stake. They'd be happy to endulge you.


NoSleep: How Much Porn Is Too Much?

The Clone: You're asking the wrong guy. I worked at a porn company as a writer, beta tester and
online support for nearly 2 1/2 years. I've seen more porn in that timespan than most average
Joe's see in a lifetime. To answer your question; too much porn is when you start neglecting
your friends, family, and work for it.


NoSleep: K-1ine has been Canada's longest running H/P zine, how many readers do you have and
after 42 issues are you concerned that is it becomming a little "stale"?

The Clone: I don't know how many readers K-1ine has since it's archived across the Internet on
sites like textfiles.com, wiretapped.net, and Hackcanada.com. I'd say I've had thousands of
people read the 'zine. But if you're wondering how many people are on my mailing list, I have
about 300+. Stale? Of course not. One thing that will never happen with K-1ine (at least I hope),
is that the contributing writers will stop coming up with phresh new articles. But since technology
is contantly changing and the creative juices of hackers are always flowing, my answer is no. So
here's a suggestion to everyone; don't want K-1ine to become stale? Then sit down and start writing.
Thanks.


Nosleep: Would You Care to give us a brief history lession about HC/Nettwerked?

The Clone: I think I summed it up quickly in answer #2.


Nosleep: Got Any Shouts or props you would like to send out to anyone?

The Clone: Yeah, I'd like to give props to Hack Canada, Nettwerked, and NoSleep Magazine. No names
in particular, as I'm sure I'll forget someone and I'll have them whining obsessively, biting my
ankles, wondering why I didn't mention their name in this interview. heh.



-->


<Pokeon> well back to my THG vids
<theclone> what's that, underage anime pron for juniors?

-->




Internet Psychology 
Now he was getting somewhere. 


By: aestetix

Joe scanned the screen for certain serial numbers he'd recognize, dates of copyright, version
numbers. Anything to help him to identify where it was he'd just got himself into. He was
looking at a daemon scroller, but not a typical Apache or Redhat configuration like he was
used to. This one was cryptic, not hidden like the one in WarGames but jargled to where it
seemed like there was something important that someone not important wasn't supposed to read.

Naturally, Joe wanted in. 

In a day where 99.999% of the world was used to seeing cute flash advertisements in a standard
web page format using the latest W3C XML technologies, he'd managed to find this bizarre server.
Nobody used telnet anymore if they had something important to share; SSH had taken over the net.

Where the hell did he even find this server? It definately wasn't in a routine slashdot comment,
or a tracert of some spam email. Maybe he'd picked it up sniffing AIM packets or something.
Actually, it was more likely he'd found it in IRC somewhere. But it didn't work right away, like
a normal server. Then he ran a trace of the server, found it was in Russia... probably only
accepts Russian computers, something this secure. Step one, look up class numbers for Russian
ISPs... step two, change IP address. Very rarely would a server running ip authority checks look
at your MAC address too, so he was clear. 

Change the IP address, log into the server and BLIP! it connected, only to display that junk.
Hmmm, gotta figure it out. He copied the jargon into Google, to no avail. Ok, maybe ROT-13,
just for kicks. Nothing. Pop over to neworder, run a search.... three results, two crap, this
one looks like it might work. Strange name for a server, but what is this? It's almost like a
buffer overflow, but those are carefully fixed now. Couple RFC references, browse through,
here's some interesting syntax... looks like a wierd cross between HTTP and SSH. So maybe
the server doesn't actually use telnet, but it performs a node translation.... bizarre. 

This is the dead time, like writer's block, when you thought you'd gotten somewhere but realized
you've only scraped some sand off this massive steel door. None of the pieces really fit anywhere,
it's like one of those LucasArts games where you wander around repeating the same thing 50 times
because you have no idea what to use. Ninety percent of the time, when you get here it's over.
Either there's some insane Netscape plugin you need to listen to the sound that's really not all
that important, or you realize you haven't even looked up the cake recipe for your mom yet. 

But a few relentless devotees won't let it go. They're the hardcore. Some call them idiotic,
others call them elite. These are the people who show up at school or work looking like a
train hit them, mad at the sun and the annoying test they didn't study for. They live off
caffeine like a badger needs garbage, and while they seem completely socially inept occas-
ionally they become the life of the party. They don't really need a party though, if they
have a good book, a computer, or someone to prove wrong. 

Joe logs into IRC, server irc.0062.net, pops into his normal channel. "Hey, everyone, look
at this!" he says. He mentions the basic nature, private messages the specifics to the three
or four users he's known for over a year. Let's see if they can help. Half the channel is
debating ideas Joe's already considered, the other half goes into a stupid flamewar. The
trusted users, like v3nus and y7ta, are the only ones he really makes progress with. Each
of them log into the server, same conclusion. 

Is it corporate? No, too secure. Could it be a university testing a new protocol? Possibly.
Maybe it's government. That sounds way too much like a movie though. Joe imagines the secret
service busting down the door any minute, even though he knows it's completely legal to dial
into a system, provided he doesn't access anything. Or at least that's what the logs say.
It feels strange in one sense, but silly in another. He knows it's most likely some kid who
configured his daemon to output jargon so he could show off to his kid friends ("Look, I know
how to change the config files!"). 

At this point, maybe the only thing left stimulating him is the insane techno music streaming
from a 24/7 server, though he has no idea who's playing or how long it's been. Something to
sink into, a trancey beat, yet with enough bass to propell him into the hunt. With the music
everything he does seems a little bit cooler, even if he has nobody else to show off his skills
to. He doesn't need to, anyways, because anyone who needs to know already does.

Suddenly y7ta messages him, sends him a really obscure web address. But it's dot cx, which he
recognizes immediately as Christmas Island. Figures, it's probably some asshole's sick idea
of a joke, But y7ta wouldn't do that to him. He loads up the site. Odd, it's a short story
about a new internet protocol, something that combines HTTP and SSH to form a new language,
one that allows a terminal window to display graphics. That's really fucked up.

He picks up the RFC of the protocol, looks it up. Absorbs it. All this new syntax. Amazing.
He knows what he wants, a directory list. So he figures it out. Logs back into that server,
gets the empty prompt, pastes his request. There's a dot stp file, which works with this new
protocol. Fucking sweet! He's rocking, he's rolling, screw that dead type, he's gonna get it.
The beats play in the background, but he doesn't need that anymore. He's almost beat the
challenge! Back to the RFC, needs to load up that file. Puts in the proper request syntax,
waits five seconds.... and his terminal screen fills up with the ass of goatse.


--->


<port9> I want to meet cyborg..
<port9> I'd be like, "Hello cyborg." And he'd be like, "Uh, hi.. who are you^" and I'd be like,
"I'm port!" and he'd be like, "Port who^" and I'd be like, "port nine!" and he'd be like, "Umm,
right" and I'd be like "Yeah!" and he'd be like, "So, when's your mom coming to pick you up" and
I'd be like "7!" and it'd be cool...

--->



Why AI is Possible

By: aestetix

"A strange game. The only winning move is not to play. How about a nice game of chess?" One
of the greatest challenges in modern technology is creating a program we can recognize as a
sentient being. Although the topic has been explored in dozens of movies and hundreds of
stories and novels, we still seem to be stumped. A common stipend is that the "consciousness"
which humans seem to have cannot be recreated in logic-- there are many impeding factors like
emotion. This has been a real roadblock, especially in the last two decades: MIT AI Lab founder
Marvin Minsky has been on record numerous times attacking research, accusing students of wasting
their time with ideas they don't understand. Despite this roadblock, there are still evolving
theories as to how one can create consciousness.

A common criticism is that humans have an uncanny ability to "think", which is impossible to
duplicate in a machine because we simply don't understand it. While theories are proposed left
and right, they all fall into the same trap of assuming that with logic complex enough, consci-
ousness will eventually create itself. This is almost equivalent to a child thinking that he has
created a computer system because he has compiled assorted hardware and installed an operating
system; even though he has no real conception of how the system works together, the logic all
fell into place, made the appropriate connections, and his computer works. In fact, many people
unknowingly view computers as conscious beings because they -do- work. However, they immediately
disavow any notion of this because, for example, the computer doesn't know how to find a floppy
that's next to the drive but not in it. Of course, this falls more into the fault of the human
who doesn't know the proper language and etiquette necessary to converse with the system.

Let's approach this from another angle: a common laborer doesn't need to know the physics of
how a bookshelf works to assemble one, provided he has the instructions. In fact, most of the
time he doesn't even need instructions, because he is given input (boards, screws, etc) and
with basic logic (match screw 1 to hole 1) he can assemble the board. The question is, can
this thought process be represented entirely with logic? It's the same problem a child
encounters when she is given a board with holes of shapes in it, blocks of shapes, and
told to match them up. She puts the triangle to the square, and because it doesn't go in,
she moves it to the triangle with success. The key is that she eventually -remembers- this,
so that perhaps in another dozen attempts, she won't make the error. It seems easy enough to
imagine creating logic that will mimick this: imagine a robotic arm that's programmed to insert
the triangle in the triangle block, repeating the exact trial-and-error process. If a program
is capable of learning on this level, then theoretically it can learn on -any- level. This
concept extends to the movie WarGames, in which the computer account "Joshua", after repeated
attempts at playing a game, is able to learn how to "win."

Perhaps we view "consciousness" as being extremely complex because we just don't understand it yet.
A good mathematician knows that the simplest answer is always the best one, and likewise, it seems
that consciousness should be easy to describe, once understood. An example of this, albeit dealing
with animal instincts rather than human thought, is Craig Reynold's "boids" experiment. Essentially,
he went out to a park every day for months, making hundreds of observations, trying to understand
how the flocking patterns of birds is achieved. Eventually he managed to narrow it down to three
simple rules, which, when he wrote into a computer program, imitated the flocking far better than
he had predicted.

Here's an interesting scenario: is it possible to create a program that can analyse source code
and tell you what language it's written in? At first, this seems really rudimentary, and something
even the most primitive compiler/parser in capable of. But take it to the next step. What if you
deliberately insert semantic errors in your code (ie "printg()")? Even the most idiotic human can
probably glance at this and see the error, but can the computer? Moreover, what if you're using
one of the newer language systems like PHP, where you can mix two or three languages into the
same page? Your "analyser" will be registering all kinds of HTML source, then it gets hit by
Javascript, then PHP! Or what if you've written a program that outputs itself in a different
language? (ie "printf("PRINT \'HELLO\'"). Finally, what is the program is trying to analyse itself?

Your chances of creating this program seem kind of hopeless at this point: however, there is one
thing to keep in mind. While there are still an infinitude of possible challenges that can come up
in practice, there is still a single axis on which the biological eye rotates. Your scenarios may
change, but you do not. The key difference is that you can remember the thought pattern you used
to tackle these problems: you can learn. The human mind has a sort of "database" of memory it can
analyse to attempt to recall certain skill sets, and we are coming closer to finding out how this
database is built. Of course, once we've created the database, we still need to construct tools
that can read it. But reconsider the previous challenge: say you come across a language and want
to figure out what it is. You take in different pieces of your object, and your brain looks through
your memory to find a matching thought or skill. If we can get a program to run "the last time I
saw an instruction like this, I used the fuction to output text to the monitor" instead of "IF
INSTRUCTION THEN PRINT", we've tackled one of the biggest obstacles in AI.

There's a lot of work with AI related pattern recognition going on these days: voice recognition,
ad blocking software, etc. But a key problem is that sometimes the algorithms recognize a pattern,
but not the pattern we want it to find. For example, a picture of a person's face might be blocked
from a web browser because the placement of peach pixels in the photo matches a pattern for porno-
graphy. From a fundamentalist AI viewpoint, these ideas still suffer from following instructions,
rather than thinking on their own. However, a more liberal voice may point out that almost all
human decision can ultimately be mapped out in logic, implying that a program could eventually
be written, similar to Joshua, which would, after processing multiple images, learn to distinguish. 

Ultimately, there are two large barriers keeping AI from advancing: our limited understand of our
own consciousness, and the presumption that AI cannot exist. Of course, 150 years ago we knew that
humans could never fly, and 25 years ago Bill Gates knew that a computer would never need more than
640K of memory. AI has progressed from primitive forms like an electronic chess game to extremely
advanced ideas like Will Wright's "SimCity" and "The Sims". There are so many advances it's silly
to even try to list them all, but each one of them reflects a move closer, in some cases a pivotal
discovery, to creating AI.


--->


<port9> GIBS ME SHIT WOMAN! *sniff* I miss the old to2600...
<kankraka> right there, i like that
<port9> Such a great group in its day..
<theclone> what is it now...
<theclone> :x
<kankraka> a gay bar


--->



0x01
				<====================>
				<== Number Systems ==>
				<==    By: Ice     ==>
				<====================>

0x02

This article is just a simple introduction into number systems including the Decimal Number system,
The Binary System, The Octal and Hexadecimal number system. The article will look into some simple
conversions and basics of these Number systems.

0x03

The Decimal Number System
------------------------->

The most popular number system is ofcourse the decimal system (Base 10). This system includes ten
different symbols, they are (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). This system has been used for thousands
of years, but it's not well suited for modern computers. Therefor, we have three other systems that
are used by computers, they are Binary, Octal, and Hexadecimal.

Each Number has a Face Value and a Place Value, Lets look at this by using the number 666.

	Face Value		Place Value
	----------              -----------
	   6			100 = 10 ^ 2
	   6			 10 = 10 ^ 1
	   6			  1 = 10 ^ 0

Lets look at a example that has a decimal in the number like 1884.36

	Face Value		Place Value
	----------		-----------
	   1			1000 = 10 ^ 3
	   8			 100 = 10 ^ 2
	   8			  10 = 10 ^ 1
           4			   1 = 10 ^ 0
	   3			  .1 = 10 ^ -1
	   6   			 .01 = 10 ^ -2



As you can see, this is pretty simple, not very complicated at all. You can also write this in an
expanded form.

	666 = (6*10^2) + (6*10^1) + (6*10^0)
	    = (6*100) + (6*10) + (6*1)

	
	1884.36 = (1*10^3) + (8*10^2) + (8*10^1) + (4*10^0) + (3+10^-1) + (6*10^-2)
		= (1*1000) + (8 *100) + (8*10) + (4*1) + (3*.1) + (6*.01)

This is pretty much the same thing as the Face and Place value method.

As you can see, the Decimal Number system is very easy to understand and use. Lets look at Binary
System know.

0x04

The Binary Number System
------------------------>

The Binary Number System (Base 2) has two symbols, they are 1 and 0. This system is appropriate
for electronic computers becuase its either a 1 (on) or a 0 (off). This system is very easy to
understand just like the Decimal Number System is.

Like Before, each number has a Face Value and Place Value. Lets look at two examples like we did
in the Decimal Number System.


	Face Value		Place Value
	----------		-----------
	    1   		 8 = 2 ^ 3
            1	                 4 = 2 ^ 2
            1			 2 = 2 ^ 1
            0                    1 = 2 ^ 0

Lets look at a example that has a decimal in the number.

	Face Value		Place Value
	----------              -----------
	    1			 8 = 2 ^ 3
	    0			 4 = 2 ^ 2
	    1			 2 = 2 ^ 1
	    0			 1 = 2 ^ 0
	    0                   .5 = 2 ^ -1
            1                  .25 = 2 ^ -2
            0                 .125 = 2 ^ -3
	    1                .0625 = 2 ^ -4

As you can see, the binary number system isnt very difficult to learn either. Lets write these in
expanded form as we did in the Decimal System.

	1110 = (1*2^3) + (1*2^2) + (1*2^1) + (0*2^0)
	     = (1*8) + (1*4) + (1*2) + (1*0)

   1010.0101 = (1*2^3) + (0*2^2) + (1*2^1) + (0*2^0) + (0*2^-1) + (1*2^-2) + (0*2^-3) + (1*2^-4)
	     = (1*8) + (0*4) + (1*2) + (0*1) + (0*.5) + (1*.25) + (0*.125) + (1*.0625)

Not very hard to understand, and is just as simple as the Decimal System. Lets look at Octal System.

0x05

The Octal Number System
----------------------->

The Octal Number system (Base 8) is just as simple as Decimal and Binary Number System. The Octal
system contains eight symbols, they are (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Lets look at some examples using
the Face value and Place value as we did before. (I will just show one example, including the decimal
point).

	Face Value		Place Value
	----------		-----------
	    5			 64 = 8 ^ 2
	    0			  8 = 8 ^ 1			 
	    7			  1 = 8 ^ 0
	    3		       .125 = 8 ^ -1
	    4	            .015625 = 8 ^ -2

Lets write it in Expanded form just like we did with the other examples.

	507.34 = (5*8^2) + (0*8^1) + (7*8^0) + (3*8^-1) + (4*8^-2)
	       = (5*64) = (0*8) + (7*1) + (3*.125) + (4*.015625)

Just as the other systems, very simple.

0x06

The Hexadecimal System
---------------------->

The Last number system is the Hexadecimal System (Base 16). The Hexadecimal system contains 16 symbols,
they are:

0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A (10), B (11), C (12), D (13), E (14), F (15)

Dont let the Letters confuse you, its very simple once you remember them and get some practice with
the Hexadecimal System.

Lets look at some Examples:

	Face Value		Place Value
	----------		-----------
	    2			256 = 16 ^ 2
	    F (15)		 16 = 16 ^ 1
	    7			  1 = 16 ^ 0	
	    4		      .0625 = 16 ^ -1
	    A (10)	  .00390625 = 16 ^ -2

Lets see this example written in Expanded form:

   2F7.4A = (2*16^2) + (F*16^1) + (7*16^0) + (4*16^-1) + (A*16^-2)
	  = (2*256) + (15*16) + (7*1) + (4*.0625) + (10*.00390625)

Same as before, not very difficult.

0x07

Converting Any Base to the Decimal System
----------------------------------------->

There are many more ways then doing this, i am going to show you the expanded form way.
Lets look at some examples:

Binary Example
--------------> 

 1.011 = (1*2^0) + (0*2^-1) + (1*2^-2) + (1*2^-3)
       = (1*1) + (0*.5) + (1*.25) + (1*.125)
       =  1 + 0 + .25 + 1.25
       = 1.375

	So 1.011 (Base 2) is 1.375 (Base 10)

Because we are using the Base 2 system, we uses 2^x. 

Lets look at this Example in the Face and Place Value method.

	Face Value		Place Value
	----------		-----------
	    1   		 1 = 2 ^ 0                   
            0			.5 = 2 ^ -1
            1		       .25 = 2 ^ -2
            1                 .125 = 2 ^ -3

Octal Example
------------->

 616.7 = (6*8^2) + (1*8^1) + (6*8^0) + (7*8^-1)
       = (6*64) + (1*8) + (6*1) + (7*.125)
       = 384 + 8 + 6 + .875
       = 398.875

	So 616.7 (Base 8) is 398.875 (Base 10)

Because we are using Octal System in this example. We use 8^x. 

Lets look at this Example in the Face and Place Value method.


	Face Value		Place Value
	----------		-----------
	    6 			64 = 8 ^ 2                   
            1			 8 = 8 ^ 1
            6		         1 = 8 ^ 0
            7                 .125 = 8 ^ -1

Hexadecimal Example
------------------->

 D39 = (D*16^2) + (3*16^1) + (9*16^0)
     = (13*256) + (3*16) + (9*1)
     = 3328 + 48 + 9
     = 3385

	So D39 (Base 16) is 3385 (Base 10)

Because we are using Hexadecimal System in this example. We use 16^x.

Lets look at this Example in the Face and Place Value method.

	Face Value		Place Value
	----------		-----------
	    D (12)		256 = 16 ^ 2
	    3 (13)		 16 = 16 ^ 1
	    9			  1 = 16 ^ 0	
	
0x08

Converting from Decimal to Any base
----------------------------------->

Binary Example
-------------->

Know that you have a basic understanding of how the number system works.
You will be looking at diffrent types of conversions.

Lets start with a Binary Example. This example will convert 52 (Base 10) into Base 2.

	2^5 = 32 = 1
	2^4 = 16 = 1
	2^3 = 8  = 0		Our answer is 52 Base 10 is 110100 in Base 2.
	2^2 = 4  = 1
	2^1 = 2  = 0
	2^0 = 1  = 0

Lets have a closer look on how we did this converstion.

The first rule is that the place value number cant be bigger then the number we are trying
to convert. (So if we did 2^6 is 64. We can't use this because its greater then 52. So the
highest we can go is 2^5).

Know, 32 fits into 52 once. So we put a one besides it. We then go to 16, we add it to 32 = 48.
We go down to the 8 and try adding it to 48. We cant do this because it will be higher then 52.
So we place a zero. We go down to 4. We add 48+4 = 52. Bingo.. We got it, We place a 1 and place
a zero on the other numbers that we dont need.

So we got one 32 + one 16 + zero 8 + one 4 + zero 2 + zero 1 = 52

So our Answer is 110100 Base 2

Octal Example
------------->

Same rules apply as they did above, the only diffrences is that we are in the Octal number
system and use 8^x.

Lets look at a example. In this example will convert 112 (Base 10) into a Base 8 Number.

	8^2 = 64 = 1
	8^1 = 8  = 6		Our answer is 112 Base 10 is 160 in Base 8.
	8^0 = 1  = 0

Lets have a closer look on how we did his converstion.

Because the Octal Number System has 8 digits, we dont need to use 1's and 0's like in the
Binary example.

Know, 64 fits into 112 once. If we used two 64's, it would be 128, you cant do this because
its bigger then your number. Know we use six 8's.

One 8 (64 + 8) = 72 (To Low, We can go higher)
Two 8 (64 + 8 + 8) = 80 (To Low, We can go higher)
Three 8 (64 + 8 + 8 + 8 ) = 88 (To Low, We can go higher)
Four 8 (64 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8) = 96 (To Low, We can go higher)

Well you get the idea...

So six 8 = (64 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8) = 112 (Thats our Original Number)

And we dont need any 1's because we hit 112.

So the answer is 160 in Base 8. This isnt very difficult once you get the hang of it.

Hexadecimal Example
------------------->

Lets look at the Hexadecimal Number system using this method. We will convert 220 (Base 16)
to Base 10.

	16^1 = 16 = D (13)
	16^0 = 1  = C (12)

We cant go 16^2 because that is 256 and its higher then our number.

We can fit 16 thirteen times into 220. This will give use 208 (16*13).
Know we need 12 one's, this will give use 220 (208+12).

So the Answer is DC in Base 16. As you can see, Hexadecimal isnt very difficult to do.

0x09

Converting Decimal Fractions to Any Number System
-------------------------------------------------->

Binary Example
-------------->

Lets start with a Binary Example. Will convert 0.3 (Base 10) to a Base 2 number

	0.3*2 = 0.6
	0.6*2 = 1.2
	0.2*2 = 0.4
	0.4*2 = 0.8
	0.8*2 = 1.6

 =  -----
   .01001 (Base 2).

Lets get a closer look on how we did this. You first multiplied 0.3 by 2 (Base 2) and we
received 0.6. Know you take the last digit witch is .6 and multiply it by 2 and you get 1.2.
Then you take the .2 and multiply it by 2 and you get 0.4. You take .4 and multiply it by 2
and you get 0.8. You take .8 and then multiply it by 2 and we get 1.6.

You may ask, why are we stoping here, well, its simple. We cant take the .6 and multiply it
by 2 because we all ready did this. Meaning the numbers will be in a infinite loop. So know
we take the left site digits (0, 1, 0, 0, 1) and thats our answer. We put a line above the
numbers representing the infinite loop.

	                ----- 
So our answer would be .01001 in Base 2

Octal Example
------------->

Lets look at a Octal Example know. We will convert 0.1 (Base 10) to a Base 8 number

	0.1*8 = 0.8
	0.8*8 = 6.4
	0.4*8 = 3.2
	0.2*8 = 1.6
	0.6*8 = 4.8

  ------
= 0.06314 (Base 8)

The same rule applies, and the same method is used. Lets see how we did this in the Octal System.

So, we multiply by 8 because we are converting to the Octal System. Know we multiply 0.1 by 8 and
get 0.8. We take the last number .8 and multiply it by 8 and get 6.4. We take .4 and multiply it
by 8 and get 3.2. We take .2 and multiply it by 8 and get 1.6. We take the .6 and multiply it by
8 and get 4.8. We stop here because .8*8 will be repeated again. This means the same patter will
go on and on and on... you get the point

		       ------
So our answer would be 0.06314 in Base 8.

Hexadecimal System
------------------>

Lets try a Hexadecimal System example. We will convert .2 (Base 10) Into base 16.

	.2*16 = 3.2

    -  	
= 0.3 (Base 16)

Hehe, Looks like this one is pretty short and simple. I dont think i need to explain.
It's simple enough = )

I will explain it, just in case if anyone needs one.

We multiply .2 by 16 (Because we are converting to Hexadecimal) and we get 3.2. We cant use .2
because it will be infinite loop of so .3 is our answer.

0x0A

Conclusion
---------->

Well I hope you enjoyed reading this article as much as I enjoyed writing it (My First Article I
have written). There might me some spelling mistakes (Not the best Speller). I will be making
another part to follow this one. It will include some other conversions and Number System Arith-
metic such as Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication and Division.

I would like to give a shout out to

UndergroundNews ==> www.undergroundnews.com
Iced Reviews ==> http://ice.promodtecnologies.com (come review some stuff if you have time =] )
Everyone at HackCanada and Nettwerked

EOF




--->



<theclone> fruedian slit^h^h^h^hslip


--->




Cheap And Effective WireTapping


By Jackel

Disclaimer

**********************************************************************

The information contained in this document is for educational purposes

only and I take no responsibility for any actions you may take with use

of knowledge. So it's not my fault if you get put behind bars.

**********************************************************************



1.Intro

Anyone who can beige box can easily do this, and for those who don't know
how to beige box this article will teach you how to do this. Before we start
you need to know that wiretapping is a gross violation of privacy and is
highly illegal (the cops need permits to do wiretaps) this means possible
jail time if you are caught doing this and i am in now way to be held
responsible if you fuck up or are spotted doing this.

2. Time

Time is the most important factor when doing wire taps. Most likely you either
know the victim or its some one you have put a great deal of time and effort 
into researching and stalking. This means you know their daily schedule, when 
they get up, when they sleep and when they go to take a piss. If you have no
idea of their daily schedule then this is best preformed around 2-3am on a week
day when everyone is safely tucked away in their beds and have no clue what is
about to happen to them.

Now another easy way to get this done but a little more risky is to dig out 
that old Telus Tech uniform you swiped from the clothes line a few months
back and has been collection dust in your closet and put it on. This is where
your Social Engineering skills really shine, what? you have never even social
engineered a operator? Then turn around right now because you need these type
of skills if you are ever going to do any work in the field. Working in the
field is unpredictable, you have to be aware of your target area and what goes
on in a regular day in that area. I have spent hours on end just sitting in my
car watching the same area day after day just to get a good grasp of what goes
on and so I'm not supprised when I carry out my dirty deed. So Unless you want
to end up next to "Bubba" take my advice. Now after you get all dressed up, and
have all your accessories on... its time to head to the house. Keep in mind your
target is the telecom box outside the house it will usually be near the gas/water
meters, but I will get into that later.

After you finally work up the balls to go and lie your ass off to the poor house
wife or kid of the person you are targeting you will need to come up with a cover
story like "There are been some surges in the phone lines in the past couple days
and we need to intall a surge protector to safeguard your lines" remember 99% of 
people dont know how their phone line works or the components that it needs to work
or keep working so if you look like a telus tech and sound like you know what you're
talking about 99% of the time they will let you in and just ask simple questions like
"how did this happen" or "why did this happen" so be prepared to answer all of these,
as I stated before the field is unpredictable. Once you are able to gain entrance to
the residence of the victim and get access to the telecom box its all down hill from
there.


3. The Bug

These things are just beautiful, they aren't the 200 dollar bugs the RCMP uses and
there are downs to using them but realistically some of us can't afford those (and
you have to special order them in from Japan, also technically they will only sell
to Law Enforcement or other related purposes). You can find these "bugs" at your
local Radio Shack or the Radio Shack will order them in for you, they are simply
Wireless Microphones that work on a FM frequency (yes these will fit into a telcom
box and aren't those big stage mics you find people using at a concert). They usually
cost around 20-25 dollars. The instructions on how to set the FM frequency are on the
back of the box.


**TIP**

I usually set the bug on a high end FM frequency, as you don't want to hear a radio
station when trying to listen to your victim.

Upsides To This Bug:


1. Cheap

2. Expendable


Downsides:


1. If a tech opens the box its the first thing he sees

2. If the poor bastard you're tapping happens to be radio surfing and comes across the
   frequency you have the bug on and just happens to be talking on the phone he will hear
   himself (but what are the chances of that?)

3. The Exploit

   Okay after you have social engineered you're way to the telecom box (please don't say
   you don't know what a telecom box looks like), if you can't find it then your cover
   is blown and your life as a phreaker will be short lived indeed.

   Now once you have located the telcomm box you will need to open it, easy enough, there
   are usually 2 bolts, it would be wise to bring a wide range of screw drivers and ratchet
   heads with you because the bolts the dominate telecom company in your area uses may not
   be the same ones that they use in my area.

   After you have opened up the box you will see 4 medium sized metal bolts there are for
   lines 1 and 2 in the house I assume you know what line you want to tap. Now at this point
   unless the person is paranoid or has nothing better to do they should have left by now
   and if they have'nt my advice is to poke around a little bit, mumble something about
   crossed wires to your self then tell them that this may take a while and you're not sure
   if you have the tools required to finish the job. After that hopefully the target will
   leave now after that little annoyance is taken care of you will need to get the bug out,
   there will be a mic attached to a wire. Cut the wire right at the base of the mic.

   **IMPOTANT YOU WANT AS MUCH OF THE WIRE LEFT ATTACHED THE THE AM/FM TRANSMITTER AS POSSIBLE**

   ... because the more wire you have, the more you get to wrap around the line bolts. Now to
   expose the wire of the mic all you need to do is strip it, but what if you find yourself
   asking "But Jackel, all I do is whack off and I don't have the dexterity necessary to strip
   the wires and I always cut right through it!" Well then I can't help ya, sorry. Get a girl
   and leave phreaking behind :)

   It's time to do the actual wire tap now. Inside the rubber insulation you melted or stripped
   off there should be 2 wires, attach these with alligator clips or you can just wrap them
   around the 2 bolts (attach the wires to the bolts that are located horizontally beside each
   other, not vertically. While attaching the wires, for the well being of your hand for the love
   of god do not get your finger or hand to complete the connection between the two bolts. The
   shock won't kill ya but it fucking hurts like hell. I know, I've done it many times.

   After you're all done close the box up and make up some bullshit story about how it is all
   fixed and the victim shouldn't be having anymore problems. If they do just call (insert fake
   number here).


   **TIP**

   Line 1 is usually the house line while Line 2 is usually used for the comp if the target still
   uses a dial up modem. In that case you can just have more fun with them. Or the line could be
   used by the teenage son/daughter that never gets off the phone if they happen to have one of
   those.


5. Conclusion

   After it's all said and done, just walk back to your car, turn the radio on to the frequency you
   put the bug on and wait to get some dirt on your victim. But remember that the bug has a very
   short range so don't go more than a block away.


   Shouts: NoSleep Crew, All Of Nettwerked, Theclone, Kankraka, Port9, Hades, Tek, tr00per,
   Treephr0g, Papa Kybo ;), H1D30U5, and all the others I forgot. I'm very sorry my friends.


   <Kankraka> its like im retarded

   Forgive Me My Friend For I Have Sinned >:)



  --->


 <deadprez> straight up dawgs. mah name iz deadprez n shyyte. 
 <deadprez> im the biggest poseur thsi syde of da calgary trax
 <merker> oh yeah eh 
 <merker> which side of the tracks again ? 
 <deadprez> the wrong siiiiide
 <merker> ha ha ha  sure 
 <deadprez> I lied. I live in my parents basement and I act tough on IRC.
 I really have a small bent wiener and I look funny.


  --->


  
                     ####################################
		     Crafting Symlinks for Fun and Profit 
		     ####################################
                       
		      by shaun2k2 <shaunige@yahoo.co.uk>



--[ 0 - Introduction

Due to the recent hype of the more in-your-face class of program insecurities,
other, slightly more subtle vulnerabilities are often overlooked during the
auditing of source code.  One of these classes of vulnerabilities is the "sym
link bug", which can indeed be *just* as dangerous as buffer overflow bugs,
format string vulnerabilities and heap overflows.  Although often misconcepted
as "not critical", or "not that serious", it is my belief that symlink bugs can 
be very serious in nature, and deserve just as much attention as buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities have received - yet the array of papers regarding this
class of security holes is slim.

In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate and analyze the risks of sym
link bugs at large, providing interesting case-studies where necessary to 
demonstrate my points.  Information on preventing these sorts of attacks is 
also provided, with general safe-guards against preventing them.

A knowledge of UNIX-like Operating Systems is assumed, and whilst not necessary
it would be helpful to have a working knowledge of C, C++, Perl or BASH
scripting.



--[ 1 - Symlink bugs: An Overview

So, you might ask, what exactly is a symlink vulnerability?  In general, sym
link bugs are vulnerabilities which may allow an attacker to overwrite certain
or even arbitrary files with the permissions of the invoking user of the 
vulnerable application or script.  Typically, symlink bugs present themselves
due to lack of checks on a file, before writing to it.  So, to put it simply,
symlink bugs exist primarily due to sloppy file handling in an application or
script.  To make matters even worse, an application or script could be SUID
or SGID, thus eliminating the need for a legimate user to invoke the program - 
the attacker can instead run the application or script herself, because of the
privileges the vulnerable application has due to the SUID/SGID pre-set on it.
In quite a fair number of cases, a symlink vulnerability exists due to the
application writing to tmpfiles, which contain data they may need to use at
a later time.  Programmers, often enough, may forget to, or not feel the need
to perform checks when writing to tmpfiles - this is a common recipe for
trouble.

What sort of possibilities for an attacker can symlink bugs actually provide?
Well, this usually depends on the type of functionality the vulnerable program
was designed to provide.  As stated above, the typical symlink bug allows one
to overwrite or corrupt files not usually accessible to themselves.  At first,
this may not seem like a great window of possibility.  But, when reconsidered,
this could prove promising; what if an attacker could control what was written
to an arbitrary file, or could otherwise trick the vulnerable application or
script to write to a *critical* system file which could possibly leave the
host OS inoperable?  In certain circumstances, this possibility *does* present
itself, and in others, the attack has less impact.

So, how are symlink vulnerabilities exploited?  In most respects, the leverage
of symlink attack is actually quite generic across most vulnerable scripts or
programs.  As touched on above, such bugs usually occur due to poor or lack of
file checks before data is written, so a little bit of thinking provides us
with the answer: if a vulnerable application or script attempts to write to a
file (often tmpfiles, to store data to be used later) without sufficient checks
(i.e is the file a symlink?  does the file already exist?), an attacker can
quickly create a symlink with the *same* name as the file which the application
is intending to write to - if the file handling routines are written insecurely
enough, the program will obliviously write to the file - *causing the data to
be written to where the symlink is pointing*.  An attack like this can be
demonstrated as below:


---
root# vulnprog myfile

[...program does some processing...]

k1d$ ln -s /etc/nologin myfile

[...program writes to 'myfile', which points to /etc/nologin...]
---

In the above example attack scenario, the superuser ran a program with poorly
written file handling routines, providing the filename 'myfile' to vulnprog
for the relevant data to be written to.  However, k1d happened to be looking
over the shoulder of 'root' at the time, and created a link from myfile to
/etc/nologin.

Although the chances of finding a program written poorly is not at all great,
the above scenario is useful for example purposes, and at least illustrates
how vulnerable applications are sometimes attacked.  Though more critical
files could've been overwritten/appended with semi-useless data, the above
sample scenario does demonstrate the possibility of attack - if this had been
a real life attack, no users would've been able to login, due to the new found
existance of /etc/nologin.  Thus, one can see why it is important to reveal
symlink bugs, and begin to write more secure code.

Although I have only discussed file writing routines being vulnerable to sym
link vulnerabilities, other possibilities do arise, such as routines which are
written to set privileges.  An example scenario would be a SUID root binary
which at some point, changes the permissions of a file named 'test' or else
to 666.  However, the routine does not sufficiently check the state of the file
'test', resulting in a potentially vulnerability.  With this, an attacker could
create a link from 'test' to /etc/shadow.

A very common occurance of symlink vulnerabilities, perhaps the most common is
when applications create tmpfiles insecurely.  Not only are the tmpfiles 
created with predicable names, permissions are not correctly attributed, and
the program or script often does not even check if the file is a symlink.  
This sort of problem is quite a common occurance - this is evident by the 
vast number of 'symlink bugs' and 'tmpfile bugs' in the bugtraq archive.

In the example discussed above, the attacker could not control what was written
to the file, and the program did not have any special privileges (i.e SUID or
SGID), so exploitation of the vulnerability required a legimate user to run
the application.  However, in some cases, the data written *can* be controlled,
and, often enough, the application is SUID root.  It is obvious to anyone with
a minimal amount of security knowledge that this is not good - let us now 
explore an discuss a classic example of such a vulnerability.



--[ 2 - Case Study: Sendmail 8.8.4 Vulnerability

This vulnerability is a classic example, though versions of sendmail vulnerable
to this attack are now pretty obsolete.  The vulnerability presents itself when
the sendmail daemon cannot deliver an email, and thus stores it in the file
/var/tmp/dead.letter, incase the email was important to the sender.  The 
sendmail daemon stores the exact email in /var/tmp/dead.letter, exactly how
it was written, but what if /var/tmp/dead.letter pointed somewhere?  Wouldn't
the exact email get written to the file /var/tmp/dead.letter was linked to?
Bingo!  And since the attacker can write to an arbitrary file (a file of her
choice), and also chooses what will be written, this vulnerability is perfect
for example purposes.  Although /var/tmp/dead.letter must be created as a hard
link, rather than a symlink, this is still a link vulnerability, and is of the
same class of vulnerabilities, in my opinion.

Example exploit techniques were provided during the discussion of the bug, when
it was discovered:


---
k1d$ ln /etc/passwd /var/tmp/dead.letter
k1d$ nc -v localhost 25
HELO localhost
MAIL FROM: this@host.doesn't.exist
RCPT TO: this@host.doesn't.exist
DATA
r00t::0:0:0wned:/root:/bin/sh
.
QUIT
---

Sendmail would then attempt to deliver the mail to 'this@host.doesn't.exist',
but soon determines that such a recipient does not exist.  Due to the design
of sendmail, it drops the email message body into /var/tmp/dead.letter.  It is
due to poor file handling routines that sendmail does not complete sufficient
checks on 'dead.letter' in /var/tmp, for possible pitfalls: the possibility of
/var/tmp/dead.letter existing as a hard link ('man ln' for more info) to an
arbitrary file of interest to an attacker.  Instead, sendmail, assumably, just
sloppily writes the undelivered email to /var/tmp/dead.letter - this is the
manifestation of the vulnerability itself.  And since the attacker can exploit
this sinister vulnerability to write arbitrary data, privilege escalation is
possible - the ultimate goal of an attacker.

Assuming the exploit worked, a new account with the name 'r00t' should exist,
with a blank password field, and root privileges.  Migiting factors exist 
which may prevent this vulnerability from existing, such as the account
'postmaster' existing, or /var/tmp being on a different partition, but we shall
assume the exploit worked, for example purposes.

---
kid$ grep "r00t" /etc/passwd
r00t::0:0:0wned:/root:/bin/sh
kid$
---

The vulnerability was indeed exploited successfully, let us now look at why 
sendmail was vulnerable to such an attack in the first place.  Several more 
specific reasons might be given, such as where in the actual code the poorly
coded
file writing routine exists, and why it is insecure, but the two more general
reasons for the issue are outlined below:


- Sendmail is SUID root, thus giving it permission to do most anything.
- Sendmail did not check for the existance of /var/tmp/dead.letter being a
  hard link - this is due to poor, insecure programming.


Although this provides an excellent example of the possible impacts of sym/hard
link vulnerabilities, it still does not provide much of an example of how they
manifest in program code.  Below we will explore another case study in which
we will explore and exploit a sample 'vulnerable script', which is particuarly
sloppily written, and in it manifest an obvious symlink vulnerability.



--[ 3 - Exploitation: A Vulnerable Script

Below is a sample vulnerable script:

--- vulnscr.sh ---
#!/bin/sh

if  [ -z "$1" ]; then
        echo "Usage: vulnscr <file>"
	exit
fi

echo "vulnscr - vulnerable to a symlink bug."
echo "writing 'Hello World' to" $1
sleep 3
echo "Hello World" >> $1
sleep 1
echo "Setting perms."
chmod 666 $1
echo "Done!"
---- EOF ----

Just by studying the commands in the script, it should be quite obvious that
this script is vulnerable to a fairly bad symlink vulnerability.  'vulnscr.sh'
first checks for the existance of $1 (argument 1), and prints an error message
accordingly.  A simple information message is printed to the user's terminal,
the script sleeps for 3 seconds, and the string 'Hello World' is appended to
the file specified at the shell.  Then, the permissions of the file are set
to 666 (world-writable), and a simple 'Done' message is printed to stdout.

This is simple enough, but as you have most probably noticed, we see no code 
performing checks on the file given at the command line.  Rather, a simple 
'echo' command is implemented by our vulnerable script to do its file writing, 
and what's more, a 'sleep 3' command is ran by our script, heightening even 
more the possibility of exploitation.  On the second from last line of the
script, the permissions of the file is set to world-writable, and again, no
check is made for a symlink pointing elsewhere.

Below is the offending vulnerable code found in vulnscr.sh:

---vulnscr.sh fragment
sleep 3
echo "Hello World" >> $1

[...]

chmod 666 $1
---

By taking a quick glimpse at the above commands, it is soon apparent that no
file checks take place - just a blind 'echo' command appending our Hello World
string, and a quick 'chmod' invokation.  
Thus, vulnscr.sh is definately an avenue for exploitation, and
frankly, a recipe for trouble on a corporate or production machine, but in
reality, scripts with code as sloppy as this *do* get packaged with  major and
popular Linux distributions.

Now that we know why it is vulnerable to a classic symlink bug, how could the
script be exploited?  You can exploit this script by simply creating a symlink
to a file writable by the invoking user of vulnscr.sh.  Obviously, we would
need to know the name of the filename the targetted user specified on the
command line, but in a busy workplace environment, this might not be so hard,
simply by peering over the shoulder of the person.  Another possibility is 
that the script is to be run as a cronjob, so we know the filename which will
be specified.  Either way, let's assume we *know* for a fact that a user is
about to invoke 'vulnscr.sh', specifying the filename 'test' as the output
file.

A simple attack scenario is shown below, illustrating the potential impact
of exploitation of this symlink-vulnerable script:


---
k1d$ ln -s /etc/passwd test

[...]

root# vulnscr.sh test
vulnscr - vulnerable to a symlink bug.
writing 'Hello World' to test
Setting perms.
Done!

[...]

k1d$ grep -n "Hello World" /etc/passwd
32:Hello World
k1d$ ls -al /etc/passwd
-rw-rw-rw-  1 root root 1460 2004-03-15 16:00 /etc/passwd
---

So, as you can see, k1d's exploitation of 'vulnscr.sh' worked, and worked
extremely well, as illustrated by k1d's checks.  "Hello World" is now present
in the password file, and to make matters even worse, /etc/passwd is now even
world-writable, due to the 'chmod' command written in 'vulnscr.sh'.  Chmod
followed the symlink 'test', and since the invoking user of vulnscr.sh was
root, the chmod call inevitably succeeded.

So, at this point, k1d has effectively owned the system, and is free to do as
he pleases; add root accounts, access mounted devices, corrupt important files
and so on.  Although it is doubtful that an actual script of this type would
appear on a system for real, scripts vulnerable to almost an identical attack
do exist in the default install of popular Linux distributions - such as 
'extcompose', for example.  Extcompose is a small script, packaged with
the metamail package.  It is designed for allowing a user to make external 
reference to a
file not included in an email.  After auditing it for a few short minutes,
I realised it was vulnerable to a classic symlink attack, very much similar to
the one discussed above.  Though it is not SUID root, if an attacker knew what
filename a user was going to choose as the output file, she could create a
symlink to a file writable by that user - /etc/passwd would be a good choice
if the invoking user was root.  Due to this vulnerability, important files can
be truncated or corrupted, and in theory, privileges could be elevated.

Although you will most likely already have extcompose installed 
(/usr/bin/extcompose), here is extcompose's code:


--- /usr/bin/extcompose ---
#!/bin/csh -fb
# (The "-fb" might need to be changed to "-f" on some systems)
#

if ($#argv < 1) then
    echo "Usage:  extcompose output-file-name"
    exit 1
endif
set OUTFNAME="$1"

chooseaccesstype:
echo ""
echo "Where is the external data that you want this mail message to reference?"
echo "    1 -- In a local file"
echo "    2 -- In an AFS file"
echo "    3 -- In an anonymous FTP directory on the Internet"
echo "    4 -- In an Internet FTP directory that requires a valid login"
echo "    5 -- Under the control of a mail server that will send the data on 
request"
echo ""
echo -n "Please enter a number from 1 to 5: "
set ans=$<
if ("$ans" == 1)  then
    set accesstype=local-file
else if ("$ans" == 2) then
    set accesstype=afs
else if ("$ans" == 3) then
    set accesstype=anon-ftp
else if ("$ans" == 4) then
    set accesstype=ftp
else if ("$ans" == 5) then
    set accesstype=mail-server
else
    echo "That is NOT one of your choices."
    goto chooseaccesstype
endif
if ("$accesstype" == "ftp" || "$accesstype" == "anon-ftp") then
    echo -n "Enter the full Internet domain name of the FTP site: "
    set site=$<
    echo -n "Enter the name of the directory containing the file (RETURN for 
top-level): "
    set directory=$<
    echo -n "Enter the name of the file itself: "
    set name = $<
    echo -n "Enter the transfer mode (type 'image' for binary data, RETURN 
otherwise): "
    set mode = $<
    if ("$mode" == "") set mode=ascii
    echo "Content-type: message/external-body; access-type=$accesstype; 
name="\"$name\"\; > "$OUTFNAME"
    echo -n "    site="\"$site\" >> "$OUTFNAME"
    if ("$directory" != "") echo -n "; directory="\"$directory\">> "$OUTFNAME"
    if ("$mode" != "") echo -n "; mode="\"$mode\">> "$OUTFNAME"
    echo "">> "$OUTFNAME"
else if ("$accesstype" == "local-file" || "$accesstype" == "afs") then
fname:
    echo -n "Enter the full path name for the file: "
    set name = $<
    if (! -e "$name") then
        echo "The file $name does not seem to exist."
        goto fname
    endif
    echo "Content-type: message/external-body; access-type=$accesstype; 
name="\"$name\"> "$OUTFNAME"
else if ("$accesstype" == "mail-server") then
    echo -n "Enter the full email address for the mailserver: "
    set server=$<
    echo "Content-type: message/external-body; access-type=$accesstype; 
server="\"$server\"> "$OUTFNAME"
else
    echo accesstype "$accesstype" not yet implemented
    goto chooseaccesstype
endif

echo -n "Please enter the MIME content-type for the externally referenced data: 
"
set ctype = $<
getcenc:
echo "Is this data already encoded for email transport?"
echo "  1 -- No, it is not encoded"
echo "  2 -- Yes, it is encoded in base64"
echo "  3 -- Yes, it is encoded in quoted-printable"
echo "  4 -- Yes, it is encoded using uuencode"
set encode=$<
switch ("$encode")
    case 1:
        set cenc=""
        breaksw
    case 2:
        set cenc="base64"
        breaksw
    case 3:
        set cenc="quoted-printable"
        breaksw
    case 4:
        set cenc="x-uue"
        breaksw
    default:
        echo "That is not one of your choices."
        goto getcenc
endsw
echo "" >> "$OUTFNAME"
echo "Content-type: " "$ctype" >> "$OUTFNAME"
if ("$cenc" != "") echo "Content-transfer-encoding: " "$cenc" >> "$OUTFNAME"
echo "" >> "$OUTFNAME"
if ("$accesstype" == "mail-server") then
    echo "Please enter all the data to be sent to the mailserver in the message 
body, "
    echo "ending with ^D or your usual end-of-data character:"
    cat >> "$OUTFNAME"
endif
---EOF


I'd like to leave this as an exercise to the reader - figure out why the script 
is vulnerable, and how it can be exploited.



--[ 4 -  Additional Thoughts

Although in our examples, exploitation seems ridiculously easy, there are 
practical considerations to take into account, where theory and practicality are 
two different things entirely:

- Timing
- Guesswork
- Permission issues

These issues are factors which can effect the likely-hood of exploitation of
even gaping symlink vulnerabilities, like the example discussed above.


Timing
#######

Depending on where and why the bug manifests in the application's code, timing 
can be an issue.  For example, if an attacker physically spots a work collegue
invoking an application with symlink bugs, even if she can find out what
filename the application will deal with, will she be fast enough?  In an ideal
world, this wouldn't be a problem, but in reality, an attacker would've had to
have planed for an attack, to a certain extent, because by the time the attacker 
had created a symlink from the appropriate file name, the vulnerable program 
could've already terminated execution.

However, this is often not an issue; many applications include various
invokations of 'sleep(2)' and 'usleep()'.  As noted in the example we discussed 
previously, delay operations can often greatly increase the attacker's 
likely-hood of success - during the time a vulnerable application slept, the 
appropriate conditions could be prepared (i.e creation of a suitable symlink).



Guesswork
##########

Depending on the nature of the program, oftentimes a little guesswork is 
required by the attacker.  A good example of my point is when a file is
specified at the shell, upon which file operations are to be performed by a 
poorly written vulnerable program.  Unsurprisingly, many folks prefer filenames 
which are easy to remember, but not necessarily relevant to what material is 
stored in the file in question.  Many people may just choose a simple filename
like 'test'.

In other applications, this is not so much of an issue, due to the fact that 
filenames are hardcoded into the source code, or are hardcoded to a certain 
extent - this is often the case for tmpfiles used by many mainstream 
applications.  In this scenario, all an attacker need do is create a symlink 
bearing the name of the tmpfile which the vulnerable program will operate on 
(i.e write to, set permissions on it, etc...) to a desirable location (system 
files, password files, config files etc...).



Permission issues
##################

On an average system, with a small-to-medium user load, system administrators 
and users in general are not usually over cautious.  However, if an attacker 
does not have write access to either the directory in which files handled by the 
vulnerable application are created, or the actual file itself, this can become a 
significant problem for a would-be attacker, as they do not have sufficient
privileges to cannot craft a symlink.  Coinciding with points stated above, this 
is often not an issue if an exploitable application writes temporary files in 
/tmp, but
if a user may specify a file, an attack can be thwarted by specifying a path to 
which attackers do not have sufficient access.


Despite discussions of symlink bugs have been primarily focused towards regular
files, tmp directories are vulnerable in almost an identical way.  I'll leave it 
to the reader to delve into the references at the end of the paper.



--[ 5 - Prevention & Safe programming

The prevention of symlink bugs, as with all programming, is achieved via good 
programming standards.  In general, symlink vulnerabilities can be avoided in
part by employing some of the following techniques.

- Perform checks on files to be handled.
  a) Check for existance of file.
  b) Check for symlinks
  c) Check for hardlinks
  d) etc.
  
  This can be done by optionally generating a semi-random filename, and adding 
  the 'O_CREAT|O_EXCL' flags to any 'open()' calls made.
  
- Implement safe tmpfile creation.

- Give the files restrictive permissions


My aim is not to reinvent the wheel, so instead, references and areas of 
further reading are given, including measures worth taking to avoid the 
symlink class of vulnerabilities.



--[ 6 - References

I have attempted to provide papers and material for further reading, which I 
think may be useful to the reader.

<http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/12389>
<http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/357221>
<http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/209687>
<http://www.sfu.ca/~siegert/linux-security/msg00199.html>
<http://clip.dia.fi.upm.es/~alopez/bugs/bugtraq7/0080.html> - "not-so-dangerous
symlink bugs" - a better look.
<http://www.linux.com/howtos/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/avoid-race.shtml> -
Preventing Race Conditions.

Large archives such as Bugtraq have quite a big collection of symlink 
vulnerabilities, checking it out would be interesting.



--[ 7 - Conclusion

Thanks for reading.  If you have any constructive critisism or comments, I 
would appreciate your feedback <shaunige@yahoo.co.uk>.





--->



KankGAME/#hackcanada wishes he had a hot bf like clone to buy him fone minutes


--->




Phun with the Audiovox 8900 and Telus Mobility


by TeK-g

All codes are entered at main menu. At the conclusion of
the code, press the END key (hangup) Some have been reported
to work on the 8500 also.

THIS IS THE ONLY EXCEPTION:
PRESS: 2539**
menu says: Input A-Key
puts phone into service mode, requires a reboot

CODEZ:

##1111 - Fades out screen

##1122 - Test menu (test the phone's features)

##2222 - Blank Menu

##2769737 (##BROWSER)- Internet options (EDITABLE!!)

Of Note here is 3 links to 2 proxies each, each with an IP
and PORT On mine all are the same (216.198.139.113:80) using
a web browser we get:

You have reached the Openwave NSM 1.0 Proxy Server. This server
does not serve any web content. Use this server only for routing
proxy requests.

##242743 (##CHARGE) - Battery info displayed, nothing editable

##27732726 (DEBUG MODE)

SW and UI (User Interface versions) Debug screen gives you realtime
signal strength, in absolute terms. Some battery values and thermal
values listed aswell. LNA state (don't know what that is!)


TEST CALL: Allows one call in a variety of modes, no idea if you get
billed for this call

##27752345 - MISC. TEST (EDITABLE)

Change battery values and other values (Some make your phone freeze
and require reboot)

Change Channel (dunno what that is!)

Change other stuff that doesnt seem to work

##33284 (##DEBUG) Direct link to DEBUG SCREEN IN DEBUG MODE

##2250 RFNV CONTENTS (editable)

CDMA/PCS/FM/GPS options all editable USE AT OWN RISK possibly a way
to disable GPS tracking of the phone RF AND FACTORY test mode is also
available, don't seem to do much

##83587 (##TELUS) ASKS FOR PASSWORD

That is all I have found so far, if anyone can figure out which settings
to manipulate for free calls, disabling GPS tracking or enabling GPS
display, the telus menu codes or other updates please write to:

fawkyou420@hotmail.com


** PROPS TO HOWARDFORUMS COMMUNITY FOR MUCH OF THIS INFO!!!!!

-ez


---



MORE CODES FOR AUDIOVOX 8900

By: TeK-g

#5625* DISPLAYS PHONE's LOCK CODE

##4771 (##GPS1) SOME GPS OPTIONS PRESUMEABLY, PASSWORD PROTECTED

##7738 CHANGE P_REV (no idea what this does 3 different modes for it, all 
changeable)

##2222 Displays phone's Channel

##1133 reset (USE AT OWN RISK doesnt seem to reset much though, perhaps use 
if you fuck with these menus and can't get back, hehe!!!)

##1144 KEY TONE TIME


A-KEY is: a number given to a cell phone that is used in conjunction with a
users SSD info for authentication.


UPDATE ON GPS IN AUDIOVOX 8900/8500:

Back in the beginning, the good'ol gov decided that there should be a method
for locating a cell phone... actually, it was the NENA group, created to 
serve the goals of the 9-1-1 people. There were a lot of methods suggested
but it boiled-down to two systems. One was called the "Tower Solution" and
the other is known as the "Chip Solution". Most cell phones use the Chip
Solution. What's going on in your phone is this... (by the way, your phone
can not, does not, and never will, receive any signals from any satellites
in orbit) There is an IC in your phone that compares a timing signal received
from the local cell towers and derives a value from the data. That value is
included with the data portion of any cell call you make and in some special 
conditions, calls and data messages sent to your phone. When that information
is processed at the "head-in", your location (the location of the phone when
the data was generated) can be "detected" and then sent to the party who needs
it (usually your local 9-1-1 site). The information is known as "Phase 2 ALI
data". Unless you use "social engineering" on your local 9-1-1 Call Taker, you
will not get any use from your phone's "GPS" feature.

Personal comment: The use of the term GPS by the cell phone industry is pure 
hype. It should have never been allowed. There is no GPS system involved in 
the phone. The only relationship GPS has to all this location stuff is that 
the cell sites use the Time Mark data from the GPS to synchronize the cell 
system. The location of the cell site is known and does not move.


-->



The Codec War: Operation Zipem
by jedkiwi

Because I will be getting a Tungsten E ( joy^happiness ) soon, obviously 
I am gonna use the built-in music player. Even though I am getting a 
256mb SD card, I don't really want to waste all that. So naturally, I 
looked at alternates to MP3. I downloaded a copy of dbPower AMP, got a 
bunch of codecs, and wasted an hour doing all this.

Original
Linkin Park - Faint
2470kb
128kbit 44100Hz Stereo


ogg1
1870kb
80kbit 44100Hz Stereo
5/5: completely lossless quality.
Conversion time 0:32

ogg2
1070kb
48kbit 44100Hz Stereo
4.5/5: almost lossless, the untrained ear shouldn't be able to pick up 
the difference.
Conversion time 0:28

real audio1
898kb
ISDN (68kbit) 44100Hz Stereo
4/5: excellent quality for the size, just a few bits metallic sounding.
Conversion time unknown

real audio2
657kb
56kbit 32000Hz Stereo
4/5: excellent quality for the size, just a few bits metallic sounding 
and a few bits overstretched.
Conversion time 1:03

wma1
2800kb
VBR 90 44100Hz Stereo
2/5: pauses after beat, horrid quality, the size is way off.
Conversion time 0:11

wma2
1230kb
VBR 50 44100Hz Stereo
3/5: pauses after beat, horrid quality.
Conversion time 0:13

aac1
2470kb
128kbit 44100Hz Stereo
4.5/5: Just a few clips that I could detect, but not everybody should 
hear them.
Conversion time unknown

aac2
1540kb
80kbit 44100Hz Stereo
4.5/5: Just a few clips that I could detect, but not everybody should 
hear them.
Conversion time 0:35

In the end, I think that I will either be using either ogg2 or real 
audio1 if I compress my tunes. However, I will never

ever use wma9, as the quality they have shown me is horrible. M$ should 
stay out of the music business, those

who are 100% devoted to A/V and the open source camps will always prevail.



-->


<theclone> Ice - Life is like a box of well lubed dildos... it's painful at
first when it's inserted into your ass but then you eventually get used to it
and enjoy the ride.


-->




		 [ K-1ine News ]



 Nettwerked Lays off 4500 from Red Deer factory

Frank "Paradichlorobenzene" Wizbone, February 16, 2004


In a surprising move, President and CEO of Nettwerked Communinications 
Inc. (LMNOP/TSX) has announced it will be shutting down its Red Deer, 
Alberta manufacturing plant and outsourcing the jobs to factories run by 
independent labour contractors in Import/Export zones in China.

At a public press meeting this morning, Mr. Clone stated "This is a 
positive move for Nettwerked, our Brand must stay competitive. Others 
such as Nike and IBM have reaped the benefits of more cost-effective 
labour practices available in other countries. It's our turn for a piece 
of the globalization pie!"

After the announcement, the Nettwerked shares skyrocketed closing at a 
record $108.40, ten times that of arch-rival Nortel Networks Corp. (NT)



-->


			New York City E911 Crashes (no fault of my own!)

(Source: New York Times)

Verizon began taking steps yesterday to better protect New York City's 911 emergency line
after a data error by an employee brought down the system in Brooklyn, Queens and Staten
Island for about two hours on Friday night, city and Verizon officials said.

The emergency system broke down about 7:20 p.m. after a Verizon engineer who was making
service changes to a bank's telephone numbers in Brooklyn inadvertently included numbers
that are used to carry 911 calls, city and telephone company officials said. The numbers
were close in sequence, the officials said.

The 911 calls then ended up being rerouted to the bank's phone system, and callers heard
a busy signal. City and Verizon officials said that while the backup system in place for
911 was functioning properly, it failed to pick up the calls because it was designed to
catch a technical error, not a human error that would be interpreted as simply a change
of instruction.

Daniel Diaz Zapata, a Verizon spokesman, said the telephone company would now require a
second person to double-check any entry of data that could affect the 911 system, and
said the company planned a thorough review of its procedures that would be documented
in a report to the city within a few days.

"We determined that a human error resulted in the accidental rerouting of phone calls
during a procedure to upgrade service for a corporate client," Mr. Zapata said. "We have
immediately altered our processes to ensure this type of situation does not reoccur. We
have assured the city that we took immediate steps to make sure this doesn't happen again."

Citing privacy concerns, Mr. Zapata declined to identify the Verizon engineer, except to
say that he was a veteran of the company. Mr. Zapata said it was unlikely that disciplinary
action would be taken against him.

Police and fire officials said yesterday that they had no reports of injuries during the 911
failure. Fire officials said that about 60 firefighters responded to a major fire, at 3301
Foster Avenue in Brooklyn, which was called in at 8:49 p.m. by someone using a fire alarm
box on the street. There were no injuries in the fire.

Paul J. Browne, the Police Department's deputy commissioner for public information, said the
department immediately adopted emergency procedures, like requiring e officers on patrol to
turn on their flashing lights so people could find them easily and increasing staffing at
precinct station houses to answer phone calls. But he said there was no reported increase
in crime.

"This didn't present an opportunity for the criminally minded - like the blackout did -
because probably most people were unaware that it was out of service," he said.

However, several City Council members expressed anger that the 911 system could have been
so easily disabled, and called for creating a more effective backup procedure.

"It's an emergency wakeup call," said Councilman Peter F. Vallone Jr., the chairman of the
Public Safety Committee, who plans to hold a hearing about the incident. "We don't have an
adequate backup system for 911, which is more important than ever as we fight the war against
terrorism."

Gino P. Menchini, the commissioner of the Department of Information Technology and Telecomm-
unications, said city officials were working with Verizon to ensure that the emergency system's
numbers were clearly identified, and that its software and equipment were protected from similar
human errors.

But Mr. Menchini emphasized that the emergency system already had many built-in safeguards, such
as the ability to route 911 calls through either of two central offices and their 911 answering
centers. "The bottom line is, 911 works very well, and it's worked very well for a long time,"
Mr. Menchini said.

Several emergency services experts agreed yesterday with Mr. Menchini, saying that New York 911
system compared favorably with those in other large cities and that an error like the one made
by Verizon could not necessarily have been prevented because it was not a flaw in the 911 system
itself.

It's very unusual for that to happen, but it's understandable," said Robert C. Krause, executive
director of Emergency Services Consultants in Toledo, Ohio, who is familiar with the New York
system. "I don't know if anyone would anticipate this because it's a highly technical thing. I
think most public safety administrators would assume that their numbers are safeguarded."

Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg did not have any public events scheduled yesterday, and it was unclear
whether he was in the city at the time of the 911 failure. "We don't comment on the mayor's where-
abouts," said Jordan Barowitz, a spokesman for the mayor. His office referred questions on the
disruption to Mr. Menchini.


- submitted by: Nyxojaele

03/29/04



-->


	                       -- Credits

    Without the following contributions, this zine issue would be
  fairly delayed or not released. So thank you to the following people:

     Aestetix, Aftermath, Anonymous Phone Hero, Cyb0rg/ASM, H1D30U5,
   Ice, Jackel, Nyxojaele, Shaun2k2, TeK-g, The Clone, Tr00per, Wizbone


  -- Shouts:

     Cyb0rg/ASM, Wildman, H410g3n, The Question, Phlux, Magma, Hack Canada,
     The Grasshopper Unit, Flippersmack, soapie, H1D30U5, Nyxojaele, Ms.O,
     Tr00per, Flopik, dec0de, caesium, jimmiejaz, oz0n3, *Senorita Chandelier*,
     Kris, port9, kankraka, hades, Azriel J Knight, coercion, tek, #hackcanada,
     The Nettwerked Meeting Crew, and the entire (active) Canadian H/P scene.



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